Air-To-Air Tactics & Combat Formations

[Kompromat]

Great find Antibody.

 

[Manticore]

thanks guys!

i think you would like--
the 'Combat Aircraft Designs' thread--its not wallpapers, rather i made myself or found the designs to compare e other fighters of same design/role/year of introduction etc--ive done e jf17, eurofighter,mirage, f16/17/18 evolution and much more-- ive started ww2 fighters evolution based per year --after that, i plan fighter helis!

 

[Manticore]

 

[Manticore]

If you study the incident between the Libyan MiG.-23 and the USN F-14A's in January 1989, it is a very good example of Soviet tactics versus NATO style tactics of the late Cold War period.
The F-14's approached the fight in a line-abreast formation. The Libyan used the Soviet "trail" formation, in which one aircraft follows another at a different altitude. The idea was that the Western radars would detect the first aircraft but, not the second aircraft trailing.
The F-14 pilots knew the MiG.-23's could not look down into "sea clutter" well. That is why as the F-14's approached the MiG's they continued to lose altitude. By the time the two groups were twenty-seven miles apart, the F-14's were at 5,000ft and descending, the lead MiG at 9,000ft and, the trailing MiG. at 13,000ft a few miles behind his leader. The F-14's had been locked-up five times but, once at 5,000ft or lower the F-14's were not locked-up by the MiG's again.
After the FSU developed the MiG.-29 and Su-27, the desired tactic was to use MiG.-21's or 23's to engage the US aircraft. Get the Western aircraft into a furball reducing their energy then, have the MiG.-29's and/or Su-27's enter the fight at a higher energy state and prevail. To lose a MiG.-21, MiG.-23 (or two/three) for the loss of an F-14 or F-15 while greatly reducing the losses of the MiG.-29's and Su-27's is a good exchange. This would prevent the West from getting an aerial war from gaining anything better than air parity.

When we got into Vipers, we could easily turn and run from a Sparrow that was fired at max range in a head-on scenario. The missile slows down after the motor quits, and the large smoke plume let us know the bandit had fired (RHAW gear let us know the bandit had us locked, but not that he had fired. new stuff prolly much better) .

The AIM-9L and Navy variants were really the best HO shot if the gomer didn't know you had him locked up. The sucker would guide immediately, and you knew you had a "solution" by using the audio and the HUD stuff. Then you went into a classic knife-fight, which the Viper had an immense advantage in those days.

Bottomline: The Russkies didn't have a "lock" on missile tactics. In fact, until the 80's, the PVO Strany used basic stern attacks with an immense amount of control by GCI. Even then, they continued to employ "close control" GCI a lot more than the NATO folks, IAF or the Pakistani troops.

posting some info here guys

 

[Manticore]

Fighter Tactics
New-generation aircraft such as the Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon and F-22 are in service now or under test. Most attention is naturally focused on airframe-related advances - stealth, supersonic maneuverability and so on - but it is smaller, often overlooked details that may bring about a revolution in air combat and bring about some of the most important changes since the advent of the missile-armed supersonic fighter in the 1960s.

Within 10 years, many in-service fighters will be armed with new and much more lethal air-to-air missiles (AAMs). They will be carrying more advanced radars and other technologies which make it much less difficult to declare a target as hostile well beyond visual range. They will also be operating with tactical datalinks which allow several aircraft to share tactical information in a manner which is simply impossible for most aircraft today. Individual and formation tactics will change - but the implications of new technology are such that nobody knows exactly how that will happen.

AAM technology defines the depth of the air battle. "Whoever has the longest reach controls the engagement," comments fighter analyst Ben Lambeth of the Rand Corporation. Lambeth recalls flying on a mock engagement in 1996, a four-versus-four out of Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. F-15s armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range AAM (AMRAAM) took on four F-15s simulating MiG-29s armed with R-27 Alamo MRAAMs and R-73 Archer SRAAMs. "I never had a tally on any of the bad guys. I rarely saw our wingman. We never put more than 3g on the airplane and we never got inverted. There were missiles and people dying everywhere."

This result reflects today's level of technology, in which the within visual range (WVR) and beyond visual range (BVR) envelopes are separate. A BAE Systems paper from 1996 - reflecting the UK thinking that led to the adoption of the BAE Systems Meteor AAM for the Typhoon - points out that a target beyond 40km range "can feel free to maneuver without fear of engagement". This is echoed by Robert Shaw, former US Navy fighter pilot and author of Fighter Combat Tactics. "There is virtually no missile that you can't outmaneuver at maximum range."

With today's weapons, the BAE paper notes, most MRAAM engagements will take place between 15km and 40km-range. Older short-range AAMs "lack not only total energy but also missile speed" and are most lethal at ranges under 8km, according to BAE. Between 8km and 15km, therefore, there is a 'commit' zone where the target can still avoid a merge into close combat if the odds are unfavorable.

The key to the next generation of MRAAMs, such as Meteor, is greater range and (more importantly) greater energy at range. The result is a much larger "no-escape zone". This zone surrounds a target and defines the maximum range at which the target cannot out-maneuver a missile shot. The missile's kill probability may be almost constant from its minimum range out to 80km. (One issue here, observes Shaw, is that it may be difficult to confirm that the missile has found its target, particularly in poor visibility: this may be one reason why Meteor has a two-way datalink.)

---------- Post added at 03:28 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:28 PM ----------

Boeing has joined the Meteor program with the intention of marketing the missile in the US. The situation is complicated by the fact that the F-22 needs it less than other fighters. Earlier this year, F-22 chief test pilot Paul Metz confirmed that the F-22's speed and altitude capability acts as a booster stage for the common-or-garden AMRAAM. At M1.5 and at greater altitude than the target (the F-22 has a very fast climb rate and a service ceiling well above 50,000ft), AMRAAM's range is 50% greater than is the case in a subsonic, same-altitude launch.

New SRAAMs are faster than the AIM-9 (due to larger motors or smaller wings) and have new infrared (IR) dome materials which do not blind the seeker when they are heated by air friction. With imaging infrared (IIR) seekers, they are just as effective against a non-afterburning target as against a full-reheat target. Under some circumstances, a modern SRAAM is a BVR missile, capable of being cued on to the target by aircraft sensors and locking on to it at an extreme range of 12-20km. "You can expect to be engaged from about 80km inbound and enter a [MRAAM] no-escape zone shortly thereafter," notes the BAE paper. The commit decision must be made sooner and, if the target pilot commits, the target will enter an SRAAM no-escape zone.

Once the fighters 'merge' - that is, their momentum takes them within SRAAM range of each other, so that the first fighter to attempt to escape will offer his opponent an open tail-on shot - improved SRAAMs and helmet-mounted display (HMD) technology multiply the opportunities for WVR shots. It is no longer necessary to point the aircraft towards the adversary; any target within the field of regard of the missile seeker can be engaged instantly.

According to one source, US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets from the Balkans theater recently engaged in mock combat with Israeli Air Force fighters. The Hornets were armed with AIM-9s, and the Israeli fighters carried Python 3 and Python 4 missiles and Elbit DASH helmet sights. IDR's source describes the results as "more than ugly", the Israelis prevailing in 220 out of 240 engagements.

There are lessons to be learned from this engagement and other tests which have shown similar results. One is that modern HMDs and SRAAMs are essential. A second lesson is that WVR combat is extremely dangerous and will become more so. "We'll see less dogfighting once we get the ability to engage targets 90 off the nose," says Shaw. "Somebody's going to get a shot, and if the missile is lethal you're going to get hit." Even the recent history of engagements suggests that the 'furball' of fighter combat, with multiple engagements spread across miles of sky, is on its way out. "We don't see a history of high-g maneuvering in recent engagements," says one industry analyst. "It's fun to practice but unwise to pursue."

A third lesson is that WVR is an equalizer. "An F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high-off-boresight missile and HMD is as capable in a 1-v-1 as an F-22," comments a former navy fighter pilot, now a civilian program manager. "In visual combat, everybody dies at the same rate," says RAND's Lambeth. Indeed, he says that a larger fighter like the F-22 may be at a disadvantage. In the early 1980s force-on-force exercises at the navy's Top Gun fighter school, F-14s were routinely seen and shot down by smaller F-5s flown by the navy's Aggressor units. An F-22 which slows down to enter a WVR combat also gives up the advantage of supersonic maneuverability.

---------- Post added at 03:29 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:28 PM ----------

•Close range confrontation

Nevertheless, the experts consulted by IDR agreed that the fighter still needs to have the ability to fight at close range - including having a gun. The current state of the debate on this highly controversial piece of equipment is that the F-22 has a gun - indeed, its M61A2 installation, complete with a neat power-actuated door over the muzzle, is one of the most complex ever seen - as does the US Air Force (USAF) version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The US Navy (USN) had apparentlyy decided at one point to forgo the gun on the JSF - which is primarily intended as a deep-strike aircraft - but Boeing program managers now say that there is an "ongoing debate" on the subject. The marines, concerned about vertical landing weight, have settled on a 'missionized' gun, installed in a package that replaces an internal bomb station. Both JSF competitors have selected a Boeing-developed version of the Mauser BK 27mm cannon, fitted with a linkless feed system by Western Design. The UK Royal Air Force has considered eliminating the gun from its second tranche of Typhoons, not so much to save weight as to eliminate training and support costs.

•Combat identification technology

A limitation of Boeing's JSF simulations is that they do not reproduce the typical instantaneous opportunities for a gun shot, Boeing managers concede. Comments Shaw: "We're reluctant to [eliminate the gun] until we have something to replace it. Any missile has a minimum range." One argument for the gun is that, without it, the adversary has the option of evading a missile shot by a dramatic charge into the minimum-range envelope of the missile. But the hard fact, according to Lambeth, is that "you can count the gun kills since the Bekaa Valley on one hand". Israeli F-16s have five gun kills, and Pakistani aircraft have two.

If the WVR fight is dangerous, though, the key is to avoid it by destroying as many hostiles as possible in BVR, preferably at extreme range. One basic and vital requirement, being addressed by new technology, is improved combat identification. "If you impose visual identification [VID] on an F-22, it deprives you of 90% of what the aircraft can do," says Lambeth.

Rules of engagement (ROEs) set the conditions under which an unseen target can be attacked. They vary from situation to situation, under political constraints, but a basic principle is that the target should be 'declared' by multiple independent channels. This, in part, explains why F-15s claimed the overwhelming majority of air- to-air kills in Desert Storm. The F-15 was equipped with modern identification friend-or-foe (IFF) equipment and had a non- cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode in its radar. The latter used jet engine modulation (JEM) processing to detect a characteristic beat in the radar return, associated with the target's spinning compressor blades, and is effective over a limited range of aspect angles. F/A-18s had similar NCTR but no equivalent IFF and F-14s had IFF but no NCTR, so they could not shoot without clearance from Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). (Similarly, recent export-model F-16s have a Northrop Grumman IFF which is superior to that fitted to most USAF aircraft.)

---------- Post added at 03:29 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:29 PM ----------

•Target recognition

Newer radar NCTR techniques are classified but are believed to involve very precise range measurements. If the target's orientation is known, the distribution of the signature over very small range bins can yield a range profile which is characteristic of a certain aircraft type. BAE Systems says that the Typhoon's Captor radar has an NCTR mode based on "target adaptive waveforms". The Typhoon's EuroFIRST PIRATE (Passive InfraRed Airborne Tracking Equipment) operates as both an IR search and track system and as a long-range imager, permitting an equivalent VID beyond unaided visual range.

Increasingly, too, modern fighters such as the F-22 feature passive electronic receiver systems which are much more accurate in bearing than the simpler radar warning receiver (RWR) systems on today's fighters. If a hostile fighter uses its radar, these new systems can correlate the signal with a passive radar return, confirming that it is hostile.

 

[Manticore]

Better radar performance also helps dominate the BVR battle. Dassault has noted that the Thales RBE2 electronically scanned radar on Rafale has a "track here while scan there" capability; for example, it can continue to track targets while searching another part of the sky. The Typhoon's mechanically scanned Captor radar always works in track-while-scan mode, because its performance is such that its search capability is ample when it is tracking known targets. 'Data adaptive scanning' technology allows the radar to refine its tracking of priority targets without wasted movements.

With better data from the radar, and a good chance to identify the threat BVR, the friendly fighters have both more time and more information to make decisions, sorting targets and committing forces - that is, assigning friendly aircraft and missiles to each target. This is what the US calls "information dominance"; the hostiles are still trying to sort out their targets, but there are already missiles in the air towards them.

Of the new generation of fighters, the F-22 and Typhoon will probably be in the best situation to avoid any return shots from the enemy. F-22 pilot Metz calls this 'cranking' - pulling a supersonic turn after firing a missile, forcing a hostile missile to maneuver with rapidly increasing line-of-sight rates. "Cranking after the shot always reduces the enemy's effective missile range, but a supercruise crank places the F-22 way outside an adversary's maximum range, even if it could detect the F-22," says Metz. Most fighters are relatively limited in their ability to maneuver at supersonic speed, but the F-22 (with a large wing area and immense thrust) and the highly unstable Typhoon are specifically designed to do so.

---------- Post added at 03:31 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:31 PM ----------

•The datalink advantage

But the single biggest tactical advantage, particularly in the BVR fight, is a simple information-technology device: a datalink. At one level, a datalink is a harder-to-jam substitute for voice radio; but at another, it makes a group of aircraft appear almost telepathic.

Beyond any serious doubt, the Swedish Air Force (AF) has more experience with the operational use of datalinks than any other service in the world. Because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, the Swedish AF recognized that it was vulnerable to communications jamming, and initially adopted ground-to-air links for the J35 Draken in 1963-65. The system was so secret that it was cunningly disguised in the cockpit and could never be mentioned on voice transmissions. The first 'fighter link', including aircraft-to- aircraft two-way transmission, was also deployed secretly, aboard the JA 37 Viggen in the early 1980s. The system deployed aboard the Gripen builds on this experience.

The Tactical Information Datalink System (TIDLS) can connect up to four aircraft in a full two-way link. It has a range of 500km and is highly resistant to jamming. Its basic modes include the ability to display the position, bearing and speed of all four aircraft in a formation on a tactical information system, including basic status information such as fuel and weapons state. The Swedish AF has already proven some of the advantages of the link, including the ability to spread the formation over a much wider area.

A basic use of the datalink is 'silent attack'. An adversary may be aware that he is being tracked by a fighter radar that is outside missile range. He may not be aware that another, closer fighter is receiving that tracking data and is preparing for a missile launch without using its own radar.

But the use of the link goes beyond this, towards what the Swedish AF calls 'samverkan', or close-cooperation. One example is the use of the Ericsson PS-05/A radar with TIDLS. An Ericsson paper compares its application, with identical sensors and precise knowledge of the location of both platforms, to human twins: "Communication is possible without explaining everything."

"Radar-samverkan," the Ericsson paper suggests, equips the formation with a super-radar of extraordinary capabilities. The PS-05/A can operate in passive mode, as a sensitive receiver with high directional accuracy (due to its large antenna). Two PS-05/As can exchange information by datalink and locate the target by triangulation. The target's signals will often identify it as well.

The datalink results in better tracking. Usually, three plots (echoes) are needed to track a target in track-while-scan. The datalink allows the radars to share plots, not just tracks; even if none of the aircraft in a formation gets enough plots on its own to track the target, they may do so collectively.

Each radar plot includes Doppler velocity, which provides the individual aircraft with range-rate data. However, this data on its own does not yield the velocity of the target. Using TIDLS, two fighters can take simultaneous range-rate readings and thereby determine the target's track instantly, reducing the need for radar transmission.

•Anti-jamming techniques

In ECM applications, one fighter can search while the wingman simultaneously focuses jamming on the same target, using the radar. This makes it very difficult for the target to intercept or jam the radar that is tracking him. Another anti-jamming technique is for all four radars to illuminate the same target simultaneously at different frequencies.

The 14 two-seaters in the third and final Gripen batch are different from the JAS 39B trainer. The JAS 39D will be a dedicated information warfare platform with a redesigned rear cockpit. The flight controls are removed and replaced by large-format displays. The JAS 39D will host different levels of backseaters, including a dedicated radar operator who can control all the radar sensors within a group. The overarching mission is to achieve information dominance; that is, to ensure that friendly assets have the best information possible while destroying or jamming the enemy's information resources.

Sweden's plans for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are based on the use of the datalink. With the link, a semi-autonomous UCAV can co-operate with a formation of manned fighters. Avoiding conflicts between the UCAV and other aircraft becomes a natural extension of normal datalink use; the UCAV can be used for tasks such as the suppression of enemy air defenses, and to identify targets at close range.

However, none of the experts consulted by IDR see a possibility that the UCAV will replace the fighter in the near future. There is no substitute for the situational awareness of the pilot, particularly in the complex three-dimensional air battle. On the other hand, it is also clear that the use of datalinks and long- range weapons will allow manned fighters to control much larger areas.

The process of tactical change - which is traditionally slow except in combat - should be accelerated by the use of full-mission, multiple-player simulators. "Traditionally, you fly the new aircraft like the old one until you figure it out," remarks a former F-15 pilot who now works on the Boeing JSF team. "It took us 10 years to employ the F-15 like an F-15, and not like an F-4." With simulation "we'll do the same in four to five years"

Fighter Tactics

 

[Manticore]

Modern Fighter Aircraft Technology and Tactics

online pdf book

 

[Manticore]

Soviet Air Power:
Tactics and Weapons
Used in Afghanistan

Lieutenant Colonel Denny R. Nelson

THE Soviet war in Afghanistan has provided a plethora of information about the Soviets and their use of military power. Additionally, the war has allowed the Soviets to learn many lessons and has offered them the opportunity to train, apply various tactics, and experiment with different weapons. Curiously, however, although the Soviets paralyzed the Afghan government initially with troops airlifted into the capital city of Kabul and since then have used helicopter, fighter-bomber, and bomber operations in the war, very little has been compiled heretofore in open U.S. sources regarding Soviet air power experiences and tactics. By studying Soviet use of air power in Afghanistan, we might gain a better understanding of Soviet air power doctrine and how the Soviets may employ air power in future conflicts.

•Airlift

Soviet military doctrine stresses the primacy of offensive operations aimed at stunning and preventing organized resistance by opponents. In Afghanistan, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets used the surprise landing of airborne units at strategic centers, particularly around the capital, in conjunction with the speedy movement of ground units along strategic routes toward vital centers to gain the initiative.1 The military invasion began on Christmas night, 1979, when the Soviets staged a massive, single-lift operation involving an estimated 280 transport aircraft packed with troops, munitions, and equipment. The aircraft were reported to be I1-76s (closely resembling the U.S. C-141), An-22s (a Soviet turboprop strategic transport), and An-12s (a C-130 equivalent). Subsequent airlifts completed the placement of three airborne divisions in Afghanistan.2

The size and swiftness of the airlift operation are significant. Each Soviet airborne division normally comprises nearly 8500 men, including artillery and combat support elements.3 The 280 transport aircraft represented approximately 38 percent of the total Soviet military transport air force (Voyenno-Tranportnaya Aviatsiya or VTA). If Aeroflot, the Soviet civilian airline, is included in the total transport capability figures, the 280 transport aircraft represented approximately 29 percent of the total Soviet transport fleet. This sizable transport fleet is a significant Soviet asset, contributing to the capability of the Soviets to mobilize and deploy quickly large numbers of troops. The Christmas night airlift was, of course, only the initial stage of the invasion; massive airlift of troops, equipment, and supplies has continued to flow into Afghanistan. To date, no Soviet transport aircraft appear to be permanently based in Afghanistan; transports are rotated in and out from air bases in the Soviet Union.4

Ironically, the Soviets may be copying U.S. transport tactics used in Vietnam. Soviet sources have suggested that An-12 Cub transports have been used as bombers by rolling bombs down and off the tail ramp while in flight.5 In Vietnam, the United States used 15,000-pound bombs dropped from C-130 transports to clear helicopter assault zones in the jungle.

Tactical airlift aircraft are used primarily, however, in their traditional role of supply. The Soviets have found that they often cannot use ground convoys to supply many outposts in the sparsely settled provinces along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan. Even such significant bases as Khost and Gardez––each held by a battalion or regiment of the Kabul regime––normally must be supplied by air, while smaller outposts in these provinces require parachute drops for resupply.6

 

[Manticore]

•Helicopters

Perhaps the most widely used element of Soviet air power in the Afghan war is the helicopter. Helicopters have been used extensively in varied types of military missions. Estimates of helicopter strength range from 500 to 650 machines, of which up to 250 may be the Mi-24 Hind gunships.7

The Hind is an extremely lethal weapon, with machine guns or cannon in the nose turret and up to 192 unguided missiles under its stub wings. It has room for eight to twelve ground troops and their equipment in the fuselage, and it is widely used by the Soviets for punitive and search-and-destroy missions.8 The Hind has also been used to provide close air support for ground troops, to strike Afghan villages (sometimes in conjunction with fixed-wing aircraft), and to conduct armed-reconnaissance missions to detect and attack guerrilla groups.9

Due to its heavy armor, the Hind is nearly impervious to guerrilla small arms unless the guerrillas can fire down at the helicopters using weapons positioned high on the sides of mountains.10 The Hind has only three known vulnerable points: the turbine intakes, the tail rotor assembly, and an oil tank inexplicably but conveniently located beneath the red star on the fuselage.11

The terrain in Afghanistan has had considerable influence on the use of the Hind. Many of the narrow roads in Afghanistan snake through valleys overlooked by steep, tall mountains. Such terrain provides perfect ambush situations. As a result, whenever a Soviet troop column or supply convoy moves into guerrilla territory, it is accompanied by Hinds whose pilots have developed a standard escort tactic. Some Hinds hover over the ground convoy, watching for guerrilla activity, while others land troops on high ground ahead of the advancing column. These troops secure any potential ambush positions and provide flank security until the column has passed; they are themselves protected against guerrilla attack by the Hinds that inserted them and subsequently hover overhead. Once the convoy passes their position, the troops are picked up and reinserted farther along the route. Convoy protection is also provided by other Hinds that range ahead of the column to detect and strike guerrillas that may have concentrated along the route.12

Other information on Hind tactics indicate that a closer relationship between air and ground arms has been a major aim of the Soviet force development (the helicopter is a part of the Soviet Air Force). Hinds are the primary Soviet close air support weapon in Afghanistan. They not only strike enemy forces in contact with Soviet troops but sometimes carry out attacks as much as twenty to thirty kilometers forward of the forward edge of battle area. This tactic is apparently an attempt to increase responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and integration with ground forces.13

The Soviets have had some problems with their helicopters. In 1980, losses to SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (a hand-held, heat-seeking missile) led to a change in tactics at the end of 1980 or early 1981. Since then, the Hinds have used nap-of-the-earth flight patterns, for which the machines were not designed nor their crews properly trained. There have been reports of Hind rotors striking the rear of their own helicopters during some of these nap-of-the-earth flights. The wear on airframes and systems caused by these lower-altitude flights has also greatly increased rates of operational attrition.14

These nap-of-the-earth tactics are a significant change from those employed in 1979-80. Hind crews then showed little fear of the opposition, attacking with machine guns, 57-mm rockets, or cluster and high-explosive 250-kg bombs normally during diving attacks from a 1000-meter altitude. After the firing pass, they would break away in a sharp evasive turn or terrain-hugging flight before repositioning for another firing pass. The Soviets used these tactics with several Hinds in a circular pattern, similar to the American "wagon wheel" used in Vietnam. Such tactics may still be used in some parts of Afghanistan, but by and large they have been changed.

Reportedly, new tactics that use scout helicopters for target acquisition have been adopted for both attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. These scouts are usually Hinds (or, in some cases, Mi-8 Hips) rather than smaller, lighter helicopters. Normally, they stay high, out of range of the target, giving crews a better field of view while directing attacks. This tactic may become standard in future Soviet conflicts.15

Current reports say the Hind now begins an attack run 7000 to 8000 meters from the target, running in at low altitude and then rising 20 to 100 meters in altitude to fire. Firing usually commences at maximum range, and mutual support is emphasized. One tactic that has endured the war has been to send one helicopter in at high altitude to draw enemy fire, while wingmen remain low, behind a ridge, ready to attack anyone who opens fire.16

The Soviets are also using helicopters in mass formations (a standard Soviet tactic). Reports have helicopters in packs of four and six, hovering, firing their rockets and machine guns, circling, hunting, and then swooping down and firing again.17

While the Hind is the primary attack helicopter being used in Afghanistan, the Soviets have also made extensive use of the big multi-purpose Mi-8 Hip in several different capacities. One of the major missions of the Hip is to serve as the main troop carriers.18 In this role, the Hip is enhanced by its ability to provide its own fire support/suppression with 57-mm rocket pods.19 The Hip has also been used for aerial minelaying, which the Soviets have found is a good way to reinforce a defensive perimeter quickly. Furthermore, the Hip has been used as a heavily armed attack helicopter to complement the Hind.20 As with the Hind, the Soviets have found problems with the Hip. These have come primarily in the areas of its exposed fuel system (a major hazard to crews in case of a crash), short rotor life, lack of engine quick-change capability, poor engine performance, and inadequate trim control. The engine and trim problems result from the low-density air conditions found in the high, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, which force the engine to work harder and make hovering difficult.21

The Mi-4 Hound has also been employed in the war, often in concert with the Hind. Many helicopter airstrikes start with two Mi-4 Hounds, which attack with unguided rockets and machine gun fire, followed by four Hinds, which continue the strike with rockets and cannon. While the Hinds attack, the Hounds circle, ejecting heat decoy flares at regular intervals, apparently in an effort to protect the helicopters from hand-held SA-7s. The Hounds also have been reported to hover near villages being shelled, perhaps acting as air controllers for ground-based artillery.22

One other type of helicopter that the Soviets are using in Afghanistan is the big Mi-6 Hook. It has been used extensively to provide heavy lift support for Soviet forces.23

Observers report that Soviet helicopter roles in the war have varied from dropping Soviet parachutists, antipersonnel mines, bombs, and leaflets to providing close air support for Soviet armor. Yet, while significant tactical changes have occurred, the broad picture of Soviet Frontal Aviation tactics in Afghanistan has remained largely unchanged. Trends and concepts observed prior to the war have been reinforced. The Hips still carry troops for airmobile assaults and provide suppression; the Hind remains the Soviets' primary source of airborne firepower.24

 

[Manticore]

•Fighter-Bombers

Helicopters may be the main element of Soviet air power in Afghanistan, but evidence indicates that the Soviets are testing their fighter-bombers and associated weapons and tactics in the Afghan war as well. Compared to reports on their helicopter use, very little on the type of fighter-bomber tactics that the Soviets are using has appeared in the open press. However, enough has been published to provide a glimpse of Soviet fighter-bomber philosophy.

Soviet fighter-bombers have been employed exclusively in the air-to-ground role, since the Afghan guerrillas offer no air-to-air threat. They have been used for carpet bombing, terror bombing, and scorched-earth bombing in efforts to destroy the guerrillas or drive them from the country. Combined with helicopter attacks, Soviet fighter-bombers have pounded settlements throughout the country. Half of the city of Herat (Afghanistan's third largest city, with a population of 150,000) was leveled in an extremely heavy, brutal, and prolonged attack.25

Most Soviet fighter-bomber crews are trained for close air support roles with ground troops in the European theater. In Afghanistan, they have also proved their value on sorties against targets deep inside guerrilla territory. Houses, crops, livestock, vineyards, and orchards in some areas have been systematically bombed and rocketed in what appears to be a scorched-earth campaign aimed at denying the guerrillas food and shelter. Terror bombings of villages, by both MiG aircraft and helicopters, have reportedly become commonplace in areas that are sympathetic to the guerrilla movement. To complete the destruction, ground troops often enter these areas after an air assault and shoot at anything alive, eventually turning everything of value into rubble.26

Early in the war, the primary fighter-bomber used by Soviet forces was the MiG-21 Fishbed. The Fishbed has one twin-barrel 23-mm gun with 200 rounds of ammunition in a belly pack, and it can carry four 57-mm rocket packs, two 500-kg bombs, and two 250-kg bombs, or four 240-mm air-to-surface rockets in a typical ground attack configuration.27 Tactically, the MiG-2s have generally operated in pairs, 28 but they attack individually, taking turns firing rockets at or bombing guerrilla positions. After releasing their ordnance, they each eject three sets of four heat decoy flares as they climb away. Again, the flares are an apparent attempt to negate any SA-7 threat. Reports also indicate that the MiG-21s often fire from a range of about 2000 meters, which makes their strikes somewhat inaccurate and ineffective. This tactic, combined with the failure of many bombs to explode on impact and the failure of some cluster bombs to deploy and scatter, has at times rendered the Soviet fighter-bombers ineffective.29

Still other reasons have been cited for the ineffectiveness of the MiG-21. All seem valid. First, the MiG-21 is best suited as an air-to-air platform. Second, the guerrillas are an elusive enemy, and any kind of early warning of an impending airstrike helps negate the effects of that strike. Third, the mountainous terrain, where most of the guerrilla resistance is located, tends to restrict the effectiveness of air-to-ground fire.30 The steep, deep, winding ravines and valleys make the use of high-speed aircraft somewhat sporty, and Soviet pilots have often pushed the Fishbeds to their flight limitations. Like the helicopters, the fighter-bombers in Afghanistan are affected adversely by the high altitudes associated with terrain that includes 10,000-20,000-foot mountain peaks. The fourth major difficulty experienced by the Soviet air forces seems to be a lack of an adequate quick-reaction tactical fighter-bomber strike capability. The use of forward air controllers (FACs), especially in the mode in which the United States used them in Vietnam, has been conspicuously absent (although, as noted previously, some helicopter FACs apparently have been used). The fifth drawback appears to be the lack of any significant night or all-weather fighter-bomber capability.31

To counter some of these drawbacks, the Soviets have introduced their new Su-25 Frogfoot fighter-bomber into the war. The Frogfoot, designed as a close-support aircraft, is similar in performance to the USAF A-10. At least one squadron operates from Bagram airfield in Afghanistan. The Frogfoot can carry up to 10,000 pounds of ordnance on ten stations, making it a formidable weapon.32 Tactically, the Frogfoot operates in loose pairs, going in separately and very low. Weapons accuracy has improved considerably, and the Frogfoot is used primarily to hit point targets in rough terrain. Delivery distances, from the weapons release point to the target impact point, have increased steadily, making the Frogfoot a much-feared weapon system.

The Soviets have also employed the Su-17 Fitter, the Su-24 Fencer, and MiG-23 Flogger in the war. These aircraft engage in intensive bombings of known guerrilla concentrations and installations. In the April-May 1984 timeframe, their combined sortie generation was estimated to be more than 100 per day. During this period, the Fitters and Fishbeds were relegated primarily to missions requiring general accuracy, while the Fencer, the Flogger, and especially the Frogfoot were used more for direct air support against point targets.33 Very little has been published about the tactics used or limitations incurred by these aircraft.

 

[Manticore]

•Bombers

Recently, the Soviet Union introduced the Tu-16 Badger into the aerial bombing campaign in Afghanistan. The Badger is a medium-range bomber that can carry bomb loads up to 19,800 pounds. Its service ceiling is listed as 40,350 feet above sea level.34

The Badgers, stationed inside the Soviet Union, were apparently first used in the bombing campaign directed against the city of Herat.35 Prior to 21 April 1984, the Soviets deployed numerous Badger bombers on their common border with Afghanistan. On 21 April, they began high-altitude carpet bombing against guerrilla villages and strongholds in the Panjshir Valley, which is located approximately seventy miles north of the capital city of Kabul. Reports indicate that thirty-six Badger36 bombers were being used, and that thirty to forty airstrikes a day were being flown.37

With the service ceiling listed for the Badgers, they probably can bomb at a maximum of only 20,000 feet above the highest peaks in the mountain ranges. But since most of the targets are in the valley floor, bomb releases can still remain high above the target impact points. The bombers are relatively safe because the guerrillas apparently have no weaponry that can accurately reach the bombers' altitude. The Badger attacks are followed by close-in attacks from fighter-bombers, helicopters, and artillery shelling. 38 The bombing raids, flown in support of Soviet ground forces advancing into the valley, signal an apparent willingness on the part of the Soviets to use any conventional air power available to support their ground operations.


•Weapons

Many other types of air-delivered weapons beyond those already mentioned have allegedly been employed by the Soviets in Afghanistan. The major headline grabber has been the alleged Soviet use of chemical warfare (CW). However, numerous conflicting reports surround this matter, with hearsay rather than hard evidence forming the basis for most conclusions.

A somewhat unique use of Soviet aircraft has been to lay down smoke screens. Smoke plays an important role in Soviet mountain fighting doctrine. By masking ground troop movements, it helps the Soviets achieve surprise. The Soviets also use air-delivered smoke to mark and direct artillery fire for their land forces.39

Other weapons employed by Soviet air forces include napalm40 and various types of antipersonnel mines. The standard small antipersonnel mine explodes when stepped on. This weapon does not seem to be designed to kill, but rather to injure. The injured person helps demobilize the guerrillas because they have to transport casualties. Thus slowed, the guerrillas become more vulnerable to helicopter attacks. Reportedly, many Soviet antipersonnel mines are camouflaged as toys, watches, ballpoint pens, or even books, which explode when picked up, blowing off fingers, hands, arms, etc. According to some accounts, these weapons have been aimed also at some of the civilian population in an effort to demoralize those who are pro-guerrilla.41 In an apparent effort to eliminate as many guerrillas as possible, the Soviets also have dropped enhanced-blast bombs and large blockbuster bombs. These weapons explode in midair, sending out lethal shock waves in a large-radius kill zone.42

 

[Manticore]

•Command, Control, and Communications

To complement the Soviet war effort, both in the air and on the ground, the Soviets have used a wide variety of command, control, and communications (C3) equipment and procedures. A look at the Soviet C3 system gives an insight into the complexities involved in the war and the Soviet ability to conduct such an undertaking.

The first two weeks of the invasion were an enviable demonstration of top level C3 and coordination. The C3 link went via satellite communications (Satcom) from the Army headquarters in Moscow to Termez, located in Soviet territory on the northern border of Afghanistan. Control of the complex and tightly scheduled initial airlift assault was impressive, with different aircraft types arriving from various routes. Radio command posts controlled the two motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) in their land invasion two days later, as well as the four MRDs that arrived within the next two weeks.

In mid-January 1980, the command post was relocated from Termez to Kabul, which has become the communications hub for the Soviet occupation force. Apparently, the antiaircraft, antitank, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and Frog missiles (a surface-to-surface missile) that normally accompany and comprise a Soviet C3 network of this type have since been removed, leaving the Soviet Signal Troop section as the major electronic element in the war effort. Within the Signal Troop is a wire company, which has three platoons: one for line construction and two for radio relay. In addition to the Signal Troop, each Soviet airborne division has one signal company of 22 officers and 221 enlisted men, 30 jeep-type vehicles, 23 GAZ-66 trucks, 11 motorcycles, and 9 SA-7 portable SAMs. Communications between the headquarters and MRDs are usually via UHF or VHF radios and/or land lines.43

According to Soviet literature, the signal companies have C3 survivability through concealment, dispersal, hardness, mobility, and redundancy. In addition to establishing various radio nets, the signal troops lay telephone and telegraph wire that provides communications via land lines. Thus, the Soviets use four systems to communicate:

* Line-of-sight––UHF,VHF, and microwave for twenty- to thirty-mile ranges.

* Troposcatter––set on vans or in fixed positions, with relays about 200 miles apart.

* Satcom––Malniya, Gorizont, and Kosmos series networks. The earlier Satcoms were in twelve-hour elliptical orbits; the newer ones are in synchronous twenty-four-hour orbits.

* Land lines––existing civilian lines or lines laid by Soviet forces. The Soviets favor secure underground land lines.44

Since the invasion, the Soviets have divided Afghanistan into seven military districts. The main army headquarters near Kabul may have Satcom and troposcatter links to some military districts or bases but not to all. Therefore, because of field command delays and the rigidity of the Soviet communications channels, it appears that each district commander has been given more than usual latitude to meet the combat needs of his area.45

Preplanned air support seems adequate in Afghanistan, but the Soviets seem to lack an adequate quick-reaction airstrike capability in support of field troops. To receive an airstrike, a junior-grade infantry officer must send a request, which is forwarded up to the division level in the Army and then over to the Air Force; there are delays at each command level and communications point. Associated with these delays is the fact that the Soviet army has neither aviation helicopters nor forward air controllers (although recently helicopter scouts have been used to some degree). Soviet air force helicopters and support aircraft are at the division level for Army interface. The compound communications structure tends to hamper support for truck convoys or airborne operations unless events proceed strictly in accordance with the advanced plan. An example of the communications problems that stem from this system can be seen in a July 1981 battle with guerrilla forces that occurred twelve miles from Kabul; here Soviet close-air-support jets mistakenly strafed Soviet and Afghan army troops.46

All in all, Afghanistan presents a benign electronic environment to the Soviets, with minimal need for electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), jamming, or smart weapons to home on emissions. The guerrilla forces rely primarily on runners or civilian walkie-talkies for communications.47

Meanwhile, the Soviets are using long-range surveillance-type radars, which they have installed in Afghanistan, to observe air activities in the neighboring countries of the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, Iran, and other Persian Gulf states. It is highly probable that Soviet electronic intelligence and ECM troops are collocated with these surveillance radars to monitor electronic emissions in Iran, the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, etc., since that is a somewhat standard Soviet tactic.48

The Soviet army communications environment in Afghanistan has changed from mobile and temporary tent-city layouts to sites with permanent buildings, fixed communications sites, and fixed antenna arrays. According to reports, Soviet engineers have established elaborate communications centers at a headquarters north of Kabul (at Bagram), as well as elsewhere in the country. Yet, while probably enhancing Soviet communications, these sites also provide lucrative targets for the guerrillas; and attacks on various communications sites have been reported.49

A variety of other electronic equipment also is being used. These systems include ground control approach, surveillance radar, and precision approach radar to control aircraft into and out of air bases, plus various radars that control the different types of Soviet SAMs positioned in Afghanistan. The avionics in Soviet fighters, helicopters, and reconnaissance aircraft are probably being tested in a combat environment. Laser ranges, low-light TV and infrared sensors, radars, computers, and communications are installed in both the MiG-23 Flogger and the Su-25 Frogfoot. Earlier-model Su-17 Fitter and MiG-21 Fishbed fighters have moderate electronics on board. Due to limited forward maintenance support, Soviet aircraft are ferried to depots inside the Soviet Union for overhaul or repairs. It is probable that communications equipment is not adequately supported in the field except for simple module swapping.50

Lessons have been expensive but valuable for the Soviets in the electronic and communications arenas. Two examples stand out. The Soviet army is now replacing 1950s-vintage tactical field transceivers with newer, standard backpack and vehicle models. In addition, redundancy in Soviet command posts and the effectiveness of specific communication methods are being tested by guerrilla raids on garrisons and cities throughout the country. Overall, the Soviet communications personnel appear to be fulfilling their tasks even under adverse and primitive conditions, primarily because the new-technology troposcatters and Satcoms have reached the field level and are augmenting the simplistic land lines historically preferred by Soviet army communicators.51

 

[Manticore]

•Combat Experience and Lessons Learned

The Soviets have learned and continue to learn many valuable lessons in their war in Afghanistan. Whether they win or lose their battle with the guerrillas is perhaps not as significant militarily as the lessons they learn, the experience they gain in warfighting, and the knowledge they obtain about the effectiveness of their weapons. Afghanistan, which is about the size of Texas and has terrain that varies from deserts to rugged mountains, affords the Soviets ample opportunities (and time) to experiment with their aircraft, tactics, weapons, and command and control equipment and procedures.

From the standpoint of world power politics, the Kremlin has demonstrated in Afghanistan its ability to project power outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union through a massive airlift operation. This demonstrated ability creates a worrisome problem for other nations, especially those bordering on or near Soviet territory.

Evidence from Afghanistan indicates that the Soviet military has become increasingly reliant on its helicopter force. Most likely, this dependency will remain a part of the Soviet military system after the Afghan issue is resolved. Current helicopter roles that could easily transfer to other theaters, depending on the terrain and capabilities of the enemy, are: (1) landing forces on peaks to envelop an enemy in support of ground advances, (2) providing aerial attacks to channel the enemy into killing zones where ground forces can inflict maximum casualties, (3) providing close air support for advancing ground forces, (4) moving troops and supplies, and (5) acting as scouts or forward air controllers.57

Fixed-wing fighter-bombers, at least the older models, have proved somewhat ineffective in the air-to-ground role in which they have been used. As time elapses, more information on the successes and failures of later models should become available for analysis. The same can be said concerning the high-altitude saturation bombings being conducted by the Tu-16 bombers.

Some significant changes already appear to be occurring within the Soviets' command, control, and communications system. Some latitude in decision making is apparently now given to lower levels of command, and communications equipment is being improved. These changes should improve the Soviets' worldwide fighting ability. However, surface evidence indicates that the Soviet decision-making process is still controlled at fairly high levels, is still heavily layered, and continues to lack responsiveness.

A major advantage that the Soviets are gaining is combat experience. Exercises are good training, but real combat is the only true test of commanders, unit personnel, and equipment. Soviet Signal Troops in Afghanistan have a 25-percent turnover every six months.58 It seems logical to assume that crewmembers in helicopters, fighter-bombers, bombers, etc., would also be rotated frequently to ensure that a large segment of the Soviet manpower force gains combat experience and a chance to hone individual combat skills. It follows that reports of various tactics and the effectiveness of different weapons would receive high-level scrutiny from Kremlin officials and that refinements would be made to enhance the effectiveness of Soviet air power. Gradually, the Soviets are learning the same hard lessons we learned in Vietnam. Fighting guerrilla forces with conventional forces is a long, arduous affair.

In concert with all the lessons learned and skills gained through combat in Afghanistan, it is evident that the Soviets have accomplished one thing––they have gained strategically important new airfields from which they can operate. Whether the Soviets transplant any of their specific tactics to future theaters of operations is still a matter of conjecture, but the basic warfighting principles that guide the Soviets remain intact––mass, shock, surprise, and willingness to apply any of the conventional weapons in their military arsenal.

SOVIET AIR POWER:

 

[Manticore]

Dogfight

•World War I

Dogfighting emerged in World War I. The Wright brothers invented the first “heavier than air” aircraft to achieve flight in 1903, and immediately, people began to think of how to apply the new technology to war. Aircraft were initially used as mobile observation vehicles and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat. Balloons had been used for this purpose since the Siege of Paris, by the Prussians, in 1871. The new airplanes proved their worth by spotting the hidden German advance on Paris in the second month of the war.

Enemy pilots at first simply exchanged waves, or shook their fists at each other. Due to weight restrictions, only small weapons could be carried on board. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by improvised means, including throwing bricks, grenades and sometimes rope, which they hoped would entangle the enemy plane's propeller. This progressed to pilots firing hand-held guns at enemy planes, such as pistols and carbines. In August 1914, Staff-Captain Pyotr Nesterov, from Russia, became the first pilot to ram his plane into an enemy spotter aircraft. In October 1914, the first airplane to be shot down by a hand gun from another plane happened over Rheims, France. On July 25, 1915, British RAF Major Lanoe Hawker attacked three separate aircraft during a single sortie, shooting down two with a single-shot, bolt-action rifle which was mounted next to his cockpit at an angle to avoid hitting the propeller, and was awarded the Victoria Cross. Once machine guns were mounted to the plane, either on a flexible mounting or higher on the wings of early biplanes, the era of air combat began.

The biggest problem was mounting a machine gun onto an aircraft so that it could be fired forward, through the propeller, and aimed by pointing the nose of the aircraft directly at the enemy. Roland Garros solved this problem by mounting steel deflector wedges to the propeller of a Morane Saulnier monoplane. He achieved three kills, but was shot down behind enemy lines, and captured before he could destroy his plane by burning it. The wreckage was brought to Anthony Fokker, a Dutch designer who built aircraft for the Germans. Fokker decided that the wedges were much too risky, and improved the design by connecting the trigger of an MG 07 Maxim machine gun to the timing of the engine. The Germans acquired an early air superiority due to the invention of the synchronization gear in 1915, transforming air combat with the Eindecker I, the first synchronized, forward firing fighter plane.

Battles in the air increased as the technological advantage swung from the British to the Germans, then back again. Pilots such as Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke began as lone hunters, shooting unarmed spotter planes and enemy aircraft out of the sky. During the first part of the war, there was no established tactical doctrine for air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts, conceived in 1916, are still applicable today, including use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.

British Brigadier General Hugh Trenchard ordered that all reconnaissance aircraft had to be supported by at least three fighters, creating the first use of tactical formations in the air. The Germans responded by forming Jastas, large squadrons of fighters solely dedicated to destroying enemy aircraft, under the supervision of Boelcke. Pilots who shot down five or more fighters became known as aces.
By the end of the war, the underpowered machines from just ten years prior had been transformed into fairly powerful, swift, and heavily armed fighter planes, and the basic tactics for dogfighting had been laid down.

 

[Manticore]

•Spanish Civil War

Airplane technology rapidly increased after World War I. By 1936, dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past, since aircraft were reaching top speeds of over 250 miles per hour. This was proved wrong during the Spanish civil war, as quoted by the U.S. Attaché in 1937, “The peacetime theory of the complete invulnerability of the modern type of bombardment airplane no longer holds. The increased speeds of both the bombardment and pursuit plane have worked in favor of the pursuit … The flying fortress died in Spain.”

Large scale bombing of the civilian population, thought to be demoralizing to the enemy, proved to have the opposite effect. Dr. E. B. Strauss surmised, “Observers state that one of the most remarkable effects of the bombing of open towns in Government Spain had been the welding together into a formidable fighting force of groups of political factions who were previously at each other’s throats…”, to which Hitler’s Luftwaffe, supporting the Spanish Nationalists, generally agreed.

During the war new tactics were developed, most notably by the Luftwaffe's Condor Legion lieutenant, Werner Molders. He advised abandoning the standard “V” formation used in combat, and grouping fighters in pairs, starting the practice of having a wingman at one's side. He advised that pairs of aircraft approaching a fight should increase the distance between them instead of holding tight formations, which became a precursor to the combat spread maneuver. He also started the practice of training pilots to fly at night, and with instruments only. Using the new tactics, and flying the newest ME-109 fighters, the Germans shot down 22 Spanish Republican fighters within a five day period, suffering no losses of their own.




•World War II
•Strategies for fighter development

During the 1930s two different streams of thought about air-to-air combat began to emerge, resulting in two different streams of monoplane fighter development. In Japan and Italy especially, there continued to be a strong belief that lightly armed, highly maneuverable single seat fighters would still play a primary role in air-to-air combat. Aircraft such as the Nakajima Ki-27 and Nakajima Ki-43 and the Mitsubishi A6M Zero in Japan, and the Fiat G.50 and Macchi C.200 in Italy epitomised a generation of monoplanes designed to this concept.

The other stream of thought, which emerged primarily in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States was the belief the high speeds of modern combat aircraft and the g-forces imposed by aerial combat meant that dogfighting in the classic WW I sense would be impossible. Fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Supermarine Spitfire, the Yakovlev Yak-1 and the Curtiss P-40 were all designed for high level speeds and a good rate of climb. Good maneuverability was not a primary objective.

Immediately following the Spanish civil war came World War II, during which dogfighting was most prevalent. It was widely believed that strategic bombing alone was synonymous with air power; a fallacy that would not be fully understood until Vietnam. After the failings in Spain, a greater emphasis was placed on the accuracy of air-to-ground attacks. The need to stop bombers from reaching their targets, or to protect them on their missions, was the primary purpose for most dogfights of the era.