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COMMENT: ******: a flurry of reports Dr Mohammad Taqi
The lack of attention to a population-centric counter-insurgency approach is not because of lack of capability but flows directly from the Pakistani security establishment's policy to preserve and promote its jihadist assets
Just when the Pakistani sleuths and their media cohorts were attempting to trash the London School of Economics (LSE) report on the formers nexus with the jihadists, the RAND Corporations National Security and Research Division published its monograph Counter-insurgency in Pakistan, last week.
The 209-page work, authored by Seth Jones and Christine Fair, concludes that Pakistans record against the militants remains a mixed bag, with the country lacking a comprehensive counter-insurgency doctrine and the militants continuing to be a significant threat to Pakistan, the region and the world at large.
The report makes four major recommendations. It states, First, Pakistan needs to establish a population-centric approach that aligns better with effective counter-insurgency efforts. Of particular importance are the Pakistani police, which need to serve as a key hold force over the long run. The authors correctly identify that FATAs constitutional status within Pakistan remains a stumbling block in the region, being a judicial black hole under the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).
The report adds, Second, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool for its foreign and domestic policy. A key objective of US policy must be to alter Pakistans strategic calculus and end its support to militant groups. The US should continue to make this position clear, as it began to do in 2010.
Third, the US needs to reduce it reliance on Pakistan where feasible. In some areas, the US will remain dependent on Pakistani cooperation, such as in targeting al Qaeda and other militants based in Pakistan that threaten the US homeland and its interests overseas.
Fourth, the US should re-examine carrots and sticks in a comprehensive strategy. The US should continue US Special Operations Forces training programmes and ensure that goods and services given to Pakistan are appropriate for counter-insurgency purposes. But it should withhold some aid until Pakistan makes discernible progress. Washington has had mixed success in persuading Pakistan to change course, partly because US strategy has focused too much on carrots and too little on sticks.
The RAND report is quite candid and even keel but has, in a way, put the carriage before the horse. The lack of attention to a population-centric counter-insurgency approach is not because of lack of capability but flows directly from the Pakistani security establishments policy to preserve and promote its jihadist assets.
The complete indifference of the Pakistani state apparatus to the wholesale killing of the traditional tribal elders (Maliks) in the tribal areas by the jihadists helped create a power vacuum that only the Taliban were allowed to fill. The systematic dismantling of the traditional tribal governance system has effectively thwarted the possibility of developing a population-based approach to clear, hold and build the region.
Similarly, in Swat Valley, the states support was either not given to the local resistance against the Taliban, as in the case of Afzal Khan Lala, or was withdrawn leading to the brutal slaughter of Pir Samiullah. Intriguingly, the security agencies had looked on as Fazlullahs thugs, reportedly, took over their establishments in Miandam and Mingora. The former commissioner of Malakand division, Syed Muhammad Javed, who allegedly was in cahoots with the Swat Taliban, has gotten off scot-free.
The LSE report was called outlandish by some, but knowing the track record of the Pakistani agencies in the region and the pliability of even the democratic governments to fall in line, there is not much surprise in it. Perhaps Mr Zardari did not meet the Taliban but was it not the same government and the security agencies that flatly denied the existence of the Quetta Shura and then a few months later nabbed half of the Shura members in Karachi?
What might have slipped from memory is a major instance of the civilian government endorsing the security establishments covert operations in Afghanistan. Just after the Soviet withdrawal, General Hamid Gul gave an in-camera briefing to parliament in February 1989 about his Jalalabad offensive. According to one of the most powerful ministers of the time, the civilian government decided to simply step out of their way.
It would be too simplistic to assume that the Pakistani security establishment is about to change its game plan any time soon. The US State Departments roadmap for institution building in Afghanistan and FATA, released earlier this year, was probably one of the most naïve and generic documents produced on the Pak-Afghan region thus far. Just when the credibility gap between the Pakistani security establishments words and actions comes to light, the West fills it in with its gullibility.
This author had noted in an essay, The Alsatia of FATA (April 1, 2009, AIRRA and Pakistan Link, California) that, The US and NATO planners need a paradigm shift in their approach to handling the mess in FATA. Without setting up metrics for specifically measuring the Pakistan Armys efforts in dismantling its jihadist assets, the US will be setting itself up for failure. Ambivalence towards the Alsatia of FATA could ultimately cost President Obama the war in Afghanistan.
The same remains true today and more so with the timeframe given by Mr Obama for a drawdown in Afghanistan. The RAND report does help to put things in perspective and in enumerating actionable issues. However, the Boston Globes observation noted in its June 18, 2010 editorial really cuts to the chase:
President Obama must recognise the necessity of persuading Pakistans military leaders, who control the ISI, to stop playing a double game with the US. This can be done. Washington has valuable carrots to offer and credible threats to make. To succeed, however, Obama must be willing to play hardball.
Mr Obama will have a window of opportunity immediately after the November 2010 elections to deploy a more robust strategy, but the time to plan for that is now.
Postscript: General McChrystal may have apologised for his recent remarks about Mr Obama but has highlighted the significant differences that exist among the US policy makers. Mr Obama and his clown-prince Joe Biden cannot ignore the advice by McChrystal, Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton. If they do not reverse their cavalier approach, soon they would be the ones apologising to the public.
The writer teaches and practices Medicine at the University of Florida and contributes to the think-tanks PoliTact Official Home - Alert, Prepare, Avoid and Aryana Institute. He can be reached at mazdaki@me.com
The lack of attention to a population-centric counter-insurgency approach is not because of lack of capability but flows directly from the Pakistani security establishment's policy to preserve and promote its jihadist assets
Just when the Pakistani sleuths and their media cohorts were attempting to trash the London School of Economics (LSE) report on the formers nexus with the jihadists, the RAND Corporations National Security and Research Division published its monograph Counter-insurgency in Pakistan, last week.
The 209-page work, authored by Seth Jones and Christine Fair, concludes that Pakistans record against the militants remains a mixed bag, with the country lacking a comprehensive counter-insurgency doctrine and the militants continuing to be a significant threat to Pakistan, the region and the world at large.
The report makes four major recommendations. It states, First, Pakistan needs to establish a population-centric approach that aligns better with effective counter-insurgency efforts. Of particular importance are the Pakistani police, which need to serve as a key hold force over the long run. The authors correctly identify that FATAs constitutional status within Pakistan remains a stumbling block in the region, being a judicial black hole under the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).
The report adds, Second, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool for its foreign and domestic policy. A key objective of US policy must be to alter Pakistans strategic calculus and end its support to militant groups. The US should continue to make this position clear, as it began to do in 2010.
Third, the US needs to reduce it reliance on Pakistan where feasible. In some areas, the US will remain dependent on Pakistani cooperation, such as in targeting al Qaeda and other militants based in Pakistan that threaten the US homeland and its interests overseas.
Fourth, the US should re-examine carrots and sticks in a comprehensive strategy. The US should continue US Special Operations Forces training programmes and ensure that goods and services given to Pakistan are appropriate for counter-insurgency purposes. But it should withhold some aid until Pakistan makes discernible progress. Washington has had mixed success in persuading Pakistan to change course, partly because US strategy has focused too much on carrots and too little on sticks.
The RAND report is quite candid and even keel but has, in a way, put the carriage before the horse. The lack of attention to a population-centric counter-insurgency approach is not because of lack of capability but flows directly from the Pakistani security establishments policy to preserve and promote its jihadist assets.
The complete indifference of the Pakistani state apparatus to the wholesale killing of the traditional tribal elders (Maliks) in the tribal areas by the jihadists helped create a power vacuum that only the Taliban were allowed to fill. The systematic dismantling of the traditional tribal governance system has effectively thwarted the possibility of developing a population-based approach to clear, hold and build the region.
Similarly, in Swat Valley, the states support was either not given to the local resistance against the Taliban, as in the case of Afzal Khan Lala, or was withdrawn leading to the brutal slaughter of Pir Samiullah. Intriguingly, the security agencies had looked on as Fazlullahs thugs, reportedly, took over their establishments in Miandam and Mingora. The former commissioner of Malakand division, Syed Muhammad Javed, who allegedly was in cahoots with the Swat Taliban, has gotten off scot-free.
The LSE report was called outlandish by some, but knowing the track record of the Pakistani agencies in the region and the pliability of even the democratic governments to fall in line, there is not much surprise in it. Perhaps Mr Zardari did not meet the Taliban but was it not the same government and the security agencies that flatly denied the existence of the Quetta Shura and then a few months later nabbed half of the Shura members in Karachi?
What might have slipped from memory is a major instance of the civilian government endorsing the security establishments covert operations in Afghanistan. Just after the Soviet withdrawal, General Hamid Gul gave an in-camera briefing to parliament in February 1989 about his Jalalabad offensive. According to one of the most powerful ministers of the time, the civilian government decided to simply step out of their way.
It would be too simplistic to assume that the Pakistani security establishment is about to change its game plan any time soon. The US State Departments roadmap for institution building in Afghanistan and FATA, released earlier this year, was probably one of the most naïve and generic documents produced on the Pak-Afghan region thus far. Just when the credibility gap between the Pakistani security establishments words and actions comes to light, the West fills it in with its gullibility.
This author had noted in an essay, The Alsatia of FATA (April 1, 2009, AIRRA and Pakistan Link, California) that, The US and NATO planners need a paradigm shift in their approach to handling the mess in FATA. Without setting up metrics for specifically measuring the Pakistan Armys efforts in dismantling its jihadist assets, the US will be setting itself up for failure. Ambivalence towards the Alsatia of FATA could ultimately cost President Obama the war in Afghanistan.
The same remains true today and more so with the timeframe given by Mr Obama for a drawdown in Afghanistan. The RAND report does help to put things in perspective and in enumerating actionable issues. However, the Boston Globes observation noted in its June 18, 2010 editorial really cuts to the chase:
President Obama must recognise the necessity of persuading Pakistans military leaders, who control the ISI, to stop playing a double game with the US. This can be done. Washington has valuable carrots to offer and credible threats to make. To succeed, however, Obama must be willing to play hardball.
Mr Obama will have a window of opportunity immediately after the November 2010 elections to deploy a more robust strategy, but the time to plan for that is now.
Postscript: General McChrystal may have apologised for his recent remarks about Mr Obama but has highlighted the significant differences that exist among the US policy makers. Mr Obama and his clown-prince Joe Biden cannot ignore the advice by McChrystal, Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton. If they do not reverse their cavalier approach, soon they would be the ones apologising to the public.
The writer teaches and practices Medicine at the University of Florida and contributes to the think-tanks PoliTact Official Home - Alert, Prepare, Avoid and Aryana Institute. He can be reached at mazdaki@me.com
