Acts of Terrorism in Pakistan
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IceCold
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So since you are hopping on to the moral high horse of yours, what about the huge list of territorial disputes between the US and countries like Columbia, Canada, Cuba. Let US settle it with them and then give us the lecture about disputed territories under the international law.
In our case only Afghanistan( hardly what you call a country) is claiming while in your case check out the long list of disputes. Here's a link for the same:
List of territorial disputes - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
RabzonKhan
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Editorial: Fragility of governance in Pakistan
May 02, 2009
Regardless of the words used by US President Barack Obama Thursday, Pakistan needs to take a close look at the states capacity to govern the territory it claims as its own and on the basis of which it seeks to challenge the worlds intent to interfere. The army has gone into Malakand Division once again and there are reports of initial success against the Taliban there, but with much less credibility than when it first operated there nearly two years ago.
Earlier, the Pakistan Army went into South Waziristan under General Pervez Musharraf as president and was relatively unsuccessful. Today it is operating in Bajaur, Mohmand and Orakzai, while Kurram is virtually abandoned to the mercies of the Taliban. The populations in these areas have experienced the reality of Taliban power without interference from the Pakistani state and no longer trust that the state can effectively come to their help in any durable way. For instance, when the people of Bajaur want Nizam-e Adl they are tacitly asking the government to capitulate.
Post-Musharraf democracy has been characterised by division and rivalry, but even when he was ruling the country with more or less monolithic political power, the hold of the state on public affairs was loosening. Security was at low ebb, law and order in most of the country were so defective that the national economy was badly affected by it. As terrorist attacks increased, travel advisories by foreign states to their nationals had begun to damage the investment climate. Finally, the problem was not so much lack of foreign investment but domestic investments.
It is the unravelling of the state during the Musharraf years that has compelled the people to denounce Pakistans participation in the global war against terrorism. Had the state looked after its various executive branches and beefed up their competence and expertise, national opinion would have been different. Without going into the double-mindedness of the Musharraf regime on the question of the Taliban, one can understand that neglect of sectors linked to public safety was the main cause of the final collapse of public trust in the government in 2007.
Political wrangling after the 2008 elections has damaged the trust quotient more than we realise. The administration in Punjab has been disbanded and overhauled three times. In Sindh the triune of MQM-PPP-ANP has not found a political modus vivendi after the wisdom of working together in a coalition was imposed on them against their political instincts. Balochistan was the most problematic area of governance during the Musharraf years, but after 2008, democracy has served to highlight and sharpen the focus on the decay of the state in the province.
The politics of the 17th Amendment converted the NWFP into Musharrafs burnt offering to the Taliban. Now it is virtually under de facto Taliban rule. This month Bannu, a city of strategic importance for the army, has seen three of its girls schools blown up. In Kohat the local administration actually works in subordination to the terrorists and Hangu is virtually captive to what happens in the Orakzai agency. In Punjab, suicide-bombing has spread terror but, in place of actual Taliban control, it has sleeping cells waiting to rise and strike. Taliban proxies in the various powerful madrassas issue threats and are in a position to close down schools and colleges.
As a result of the retreat of the state, crime is on the upswing. Jails all over Pakistan are in a state of unrest as dangerous criminals serving long sentences anticipate the throwing open of the prison gates by the revolutionary Taliban. Dacoits in Lahore loot at gunpoint and have no hesitation to kill, but kiss the calendar saying Allah in the looted house to signal their allegiance to the coming power. The police, ill-trained and ill-paid, run away when violence occurs in order to save their lives. Because of uncertainty of physical security, the bureaucracy either refuses to take the initiative to get their work done or puts a price on it and takes graft.
Despite Pakistans own foreign hand misgivings, the international community wants to help in strengthening the state in Pakistan and develop its capacity to fight the kind of unprecedented threat represented by the Taliban. Therefore Pakistan should look inward and pay more attention to its fraying institutions and rebuild them with all the assistance it can get from its friends abroad.
May 02, 2009
Regardless of the words used by US President Barack Obama Thursday, Pakistan needs to take a close look at the states capacity to govern the territory it claims as its own and on the basis of which it seeks to challenge the worlds intent to interfere. The army has gone into Malakand Division once again and there are reports of initial success against the Taliban there, but with much less credibility than when it first operated there nearly two years ago.
Earlier, the Pakistan Army went into South Waziristan under General Pervez Musharraf as president and was relatively unsuccessful. Today it is operating in Bajaur, Mohmand and Orakzai, while Kurram is virtually abandoned to the mercies of the Taliban. The populations in these areas have experienced the reality of Taliban power without interference from the Pakistani state and no longer trust that the state can effectively come to their help in any durable way. For instance, when the people of Bajaur want Nizam-e Adl they are tacitly asking the government to capitulate.
Post-Musharraf democracy has been characterised by division and rivalry, but even when he was ruling the country with more or less monolithic political power, the hold of the state on public affairs was loosening. Security was at low ebb, law and order in most of the country were so defective that the national economy was badly affected by it. As terrorist attacks increased, travel advisories by foreign states to their nationals had begun to damage the investment climate. Finally, the problem was not so much lack of foreign investment but domestic investments.
It is the unravelling of the state during the Musharraf years that has compelled the people to denounce Pakistans participation in the global war against terrorism. Had the state looked after its various executive branches and beefed up their competence and expertise, national opinion would have been different. Without going into the double-mindedness of the Musharraf regime on the question of the Taliban, one can understand that neglect of sectors linked to public safety was the main cause of the final collapse of public trust in the government in 2007.
Political wrangling after the 2008 elections has damaged the trust quotient more than we realise. The administration in Punjab has been disbanded and overhauled three times. In Sindh the triune of MQM-PPP-ANP has not found a political modus vivendi after the wisdom of working together in a coalition was imposed on them against their political instincts. Balochistan was the most problematic area of governance during the Musharraf years, but after 2008, democracy has served to highlight and sharpen the focus on the decay of the state in the province.
The politics of the 17th Amendment converted the NWFP into Musharrafs burnt offering to the Taliban. Now it is virtually under de facto Taliban rule. This month Bannu, a city of strategic importance for the army, has seen three of its girls schools blown up. In Kohat the local administration actually works in subordination to the terrorists and Hangu is virtually captive to what happens in the Orakzai agency. In Punjab, suicide-bombing has spread terror but, in place of actual Taliban control, it has sleeping cells waiting to rise and strike. Taliban proxies in the various powerful madrassas issue threats and are in a position to close down schools and colleges.
As a result of the retreat of the state, crime is on the upswing. Jails all over Pakistan are in a state of unrest as dangerous criminals serving long sentences anticipate the throwing open of the prison gates by the revolutionary Taliban. Dacoits in Lahore loot at gunpoint and have no hesitation to kill, but kiss the calendar saying Allah in the looted house to signal their allegiance to the coming power. The police, ill-trained and ill-paid, run away when violence occurs in order to save their lives. Because of uncertainty of physical security, the bureaucracy either refuses to take the initiative to get their work done or puts a price on it and takes graft.
Despite Pakistans own foreign hand misgivings, the international community wants to help in strengthening the state in Pakistan and develop its capacity to fight the kind of unprecedented threat represented by the Taliban. Therefore Pakistan should look inward and pay more attention to its fraying institutions and rebuild them with all the assistance it can get from its friends abroad.
Taliban are a relatively benign organized resistance by the people of Swat and FATA against an unprovoked assault by the PA.
The real terrorist threat against the very fabric of Pakistani society is the MQM, an MI5 and India supported fascist outfit that has taken the principal commercial hub of Pakistan (Karachi) as hostage. This terrorist outfit is responsible for the murder of an estimated 15,000 people in Karachi since the late 80's. At least 1000 deaths can be directly traced to its British citizen chief Mr. Altaf Hussein.
MQM's modus oprendi is rather unique; it has successfully translated its terrorist firepower into a captive vote bank, ensuring that it is part of almost every government. Gen. Musharraf, being from the same ethnic community, patronized MQM to the hilt, essentially handing them over the Karachi metropolis..
MQM has managed to install Dr. Ishrat ul Ibad as the Governor of Sind; whereas he stayed in London on the payroll of Indian High Commission for good 8 years after he escaped Pakistan while being wanted in the Major Kaleem case.
Why bother about the poor Taliban at all? They got only a few barren remote mountainous areas, whereas MQM has the commercial hub of Pakistan under its control, with absolute freedom to massacre Pushtoons at will.
The US is a bit unfortunate in having the likes of MQM as its allies. Such “friends” are the biggest long term liability. The British and Indian governments too are sadly mistaken to bet on cards like these.
The real terrorist threat against the very fabric of Pakistani society is the MQM, an MI5 and India supported fascist outfit that has taken the principal commercial hub of Pakistan (Karachi) as hostage. This terrorist outfit is responsible for the murder of an estimated 15,000 people in Karachi since the late 80's. At least 1000 deaths can be directly traced to its British citizen chief Mr. Altaf Hussein.
MQM's modus oprendi is rather unique; it has successfully translated its terrorist firepower into a captive vote bank, ensuring that it is part of almost every government. Gen. Musharraf, being from the same ethnic community, patronized MQM to the hilt, essentially handing them over the Karachi metropolis..
MQM has managed to install Dr. Ishrat ul Ibad as the Governor of Sind; whereas he stayed in London on the payroll of Indian High Commission for good 8 years after he escaped Pakistan while being wanted in the Major Kaleem case.
Why bother about the poor Taliban at all? They got only a few barren remote mountainous areas, whereas MQM has the commercial hub of Pakistan under its control, with absolute freedom to massacre Pushtoons at will.
The US is a bit unfortunate in having the likes of MQM as its allies. Such “friends” are the biggest long term liability. The British and Indian governments too are sadly mistaken to bet on cards like these.
muse
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We had asked that the admin and mods post as their policy that statements which express support for those who have, those who are, waging war against the people and state of Pakistan will not be allowed to post expressions of their support of insurrectionists on this forum -- we were not successful and must now accept the consequences, I suppose.
niaz
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One of the best articles I have come across on the WOT in Pakistan.
Some candour, please
Legal eye
Saturday, May 02, 2009
Babar Sattar
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School
Those propagating a policy of pusillanimity and appeasement toward the Taliban make at least two flawed arguments. One, that Pakistan is fighting an alien war in FATA as a mercenary of the United States and the drone attacks and the hatred against US imperialistic agenda somehow justifies the Taliban insurgency against the state and people of Pakistan. Instead of fighting our own people to please the US, we must negotiate with them and stand together against imperialists. Two, where there is popular local support for a political agenda, the army cannot attack such agenda or those articulating and promoting it. Thus, it is fine for the state and the army to act as a neutral arbiter when it comes to a disagreement between the Taliban and the rest of the citizens of Swat or Buner for example, and act as a facilitator to promote reconciliation between the Taliban (as the dominant local group) and the state through peace deals.
Let us address our hatred for the US first. There are two sets of truths that fuel this hatred. One, that the US has pursued a shamelessly selfish foreign policy that is bereft of principles. And two, our successive political and military elites have not had the spine to enunciate a policy that squarely focuses on promoting and protecting Pakistans national interest where such approach might be at odds with the US foreign agenda. Together, these truths leave the people of Pakistan indignant, and the slavish disposition of incumbent rulers toward the US shames and angers us by exposing the gulf between our self-perception as a sovereign people and our reality of being led by a self-serving elite beholden to foreign masters.
It is understandable that there is some cheering and support for anyone who takes on a bully. We saw that during the first Gulf war when many in Pakistan (and in the Muslim world more generally) rooted for Saddam Hussain and Iraq, despite the fact that Saddams Iraq had never been a friend to Pakistan. Similarly the Hugo Chavez the-devil-was-just-here speech against George Bush in the UN a couple of years back attracted loud cheers from all around. But amidst this understandable opposition to US foreign policy, must we cut our nose to spite the face when it comes to the Taliban and their insurgency within Pakistan? That the Taliban have couched their domestic political agenda in anti-American terms and a majority of Pakistanis are angry with the US for its drone attacks and resentful over its foolishly apparent stick-and-carrot policy doesnt automatically align the interests of a majority of Pakistanis with those of the Taliban.
It is indeed marvellous that even people like Imran Khan (forget Jamat-e-Islami) are oblivious to the fact that in their opposition to the US agenda they have emerged as apologists for the Taliban. We must not act against the Taliban because the US wants us to. But we must neither underplay the genuine threat posed by creeping Talibanization to democracy, civil liberties and constitutionalism in Pakistan, nor embrace the Taliban in order to spite the US. There is no need to root our national agenda in anti-Americanism. So long as we are committed to upholding and implementing the Constitution across the four corners of Pakistan, opposition to both, drone attacks and the Taliban-leashed barbarism creates no paradox.
The second argument supporting inaction against the Taliban concludes that the state and the army must not fight its own people by making two subtle assumptions. One, the Taliban and those that they wish to impose their edicts over are in the middle of a political disagreement and the state and the army should not take sides. Two, the state should never use coercion or violence against its own people irrespective of their actions. Both these assumptions are misconceived. Let us remind ourselves that the Taliban are a product of Pakistans Afghan policy. The state created, supported and sustained madressas that propagated a brand of religious ideology that encouraged non-state actors to become agents of violence under the banner of jihad. The leaders of such madressas also had a penchant for a medieval society that shuns modernity and all things associated with the west.
The jihadi project didnt only create mercenaries driven by religious zeal, but also imbibed them with the ancillary objective of creating a backward society once the jihad against infidels succeeds. The state cared little about such collateral effect of a deliberate state policy to recruit jihadis to promote its geo-strategic interests. Unfortunately, the more esoteric calling of the militants of creating an obscurantist society has now merged with the primary objective of fighting the infidels, as they see the rest of Pakistan as one big agent of the infidels. It is then farcical for the state to act as if we are witnessing a difference of agreement between different political groups in Swat, Buner, Dir and FATA that needs to be sorted out by these groups themselves. The state destroyed the level playing field between citizen groups when it transformed one group into professional merchants of violence.
To sit back and watch citizens with opposing points of view stake it out and develop a consensus in the tribal belt simply amounts to allowing the Taliban to make minced meat out of those opposed to their agenda and diktat. The state led by the army created this Frankenstein and it now shoulders the responsibility of confronting and neutralizing it. It is also incorrect that the state never uses violence against citizens. The state monopolizes the means of violence and uses it on an everyday basis against those who do not abide by the compact between the citizen and the state. We call it the penal justice system. Militant groups slaughtering fellow citizens, annexing their property and robbing them of their fundamental rights and liberties might be culpable of a higher crime against the state itself, but they are also guilty of murder, homicide, robbery, extortion etc. as defined by our justice system.
As a matter of principle, we cannot appease and humour them in the name of peace and reconciliation just because enforcing the law is harder against this group of citizens in comparison to other criminals across Pakistan that are less organized and trained. Pakistan has been ambivalent about extending constitutional rights and obligations to the people of the tribal areas merely because we got comfortable with the colonial legacy and bought into the logic of not trying to fix what is not broken. Notwithstanding the past, now that the tribal belt is up in flames we have no option but to bring it within the realm of the Constitution. Would allowing Sufi Mohammad and the Taliban to run a system of governance that falls foul of our Constitutional structure and principles not amount to the state facilitating its own balkanization? If such separatism is acceptable in Swat, then why not in Balochistan and Sindh where people have been similarly disgruntled with the state?
There is urgent need to inject honesty and candour in our discourse on the Taliban. Lets admit that the Taliban are not barbaric because the US is bad. The Taliban are barbaric because they believe in a brutish approach to life and religion. If the US was to stop drone attacks in Pakistan or even quit Afghanistan, Muslim Khan is unlikely to go back to painting houses. The Taliban must be dealt with urgently and resolutely as an existential problem that is questioning and threatening the foundational principles on which our country is founded. Further, our politicos must give up double-speak. Let the PML-N say that it fears speaking against the Taliban because who knows they might prevail tomorrow and so this centre-right party wishes to keep its options open. Let the ANP plainly state that they had no option but to surrender their writ to the Taliban because of the dithering resolve of the army to fight armed militias in their province. And let the PPP acknowledge that in trying to second-guess what every other power broker wants from Pakistan, this mainstream liberal party has lost all ability to support a thought-process of its own.
The Pakistan Armys will and capability to confront the Taliban is under question because the masters of our security doctrine are confused about the future role and utility of the Taliban. The lack of capability of the army to fight a guerrilla war in the tribal areas is predominantly a consequence of lack of will to develop such a capability. Unless there is frank admission that the Afghan policy of the 1980 and 90s and the jihadi project conceived as a result was flawed and has had terrible consequences for Pakistan, the approach toward confronting Taliban will continue to be of the ineffectual fire-fighting variety that we have witnessed in Bajaur, Kohat, Swat, Dir and Buner over the last year or so. Once the army reformulates its defence doctrine wherein (i) Afghanistan is no longer a strategic hinterland but a friendly neighbour that should have a sustainable government representing the plural Afghan society, and (ii) jihadis have no further role in promoting Pakistani states geo-strategic interests, the need to keep options open with the Taliban will automatically subside. Only then will we begin to meaningfully address the root-causes of religious intolerance and violence in our society.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu
Some candour, please
Some candour, please
Legal eye
Saturday, May 02, 2009
Babar Sattar
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School
Those propagating a policy of pusillanimity and appeasement toward the Taliban make at least two flawed arguments. One, that Pakistan is fighting an alien war in FATA as a mercenary of the United States and the drone attacks and the hatred against US imperialistic agenda somehow justifies the Taliban insurgency against the state and people of Pakistan. Instead of fighting our own people to please the US, we must negotiate with them and stand together against imperialists. Two, where there is popular local support for a political agenda, the army cannot attack such agenda or those articulating and promoting it. Thus, it is fine for the state and the army to act as a neutral arbiter when it comes to a disagreement between the Taliban and the rest of the citizens of Swat or Buner for example, and act as a facilitator to promote reconciliation between the Taliban (as the dominant local group) and the state through peace deals.
Let us address our hatred for the US first. There are two sets of truths that fuel this hatred. One, that the US has pursued a shamelessly selfish foreign policy that is bereft of principles. And two, our successive political and military elites have not had the spine to enunciate a policy that squarely focuses on promoting and protecting Pakistans national interest where such approach might be at odds with the US foreign agenda. Together, these truths leave the people of Pakistan indignant, and the slavish disposition of incumbent rulers toward the US shames and angers us by exposing the gulf between our self-perception as a sovereign people and our reality of being led by a self-serving elite beholden to foreign masters.
It is understandable that there is some cheering and support for anyone who takes on a bully. We saw that during the first Gulf war when many in Pakistan (and in the Muslim world more generally) rooted for Saddam Hussain and Iraq, despite the fact that Saddams Iraq had never been a friend to Pakistan. Similarly the Hugo Chavez the-devil-was-just-here speech against George Bush in the UN a couple of years back attracted loud cheers from all around. But amidst this understandable opposition to US foreign policy, must we cut our nose to spite the face when it comes to the Taliban and their insurgency within Pakistan? That the Taliban have couched their domestic political agenda in anti-American terms and a majority of Pakistanis are angry with the US for its drone attacks and resentful over its foolishly apparent stick-and-carrot policy doesnt automatically align the interests of a majority of Pakistanis with those of the Taliban.
It is indeed marvellous that even people like Imran Khan (forget Jamat-e-Islami) are oblivious to the fact that in their opposition to the US agenda they have emerged as apologists for the Taliban. We must not act against the Taliban because the US wants us to. But we must neither underplay the genuine threat posed by creeping Talibanization to democracy, civil liberties and constitutionalism in Pakistan, nor embrace the Taliban in order to spite the US. There is no need to root our national agenda in anti-Americanism. So long as we are committed to upholding and implementing the Constitution across the four corners of Pakistan, opposition to both, drone attacks and the Taliban-leashed barbarism creates no paradox.
The second argument supporting inaction against the Taliban concludes that the state and the army must not fight its own people by making two subtle assumptions. One, the Taliban and those that they wish to impose their edicts over are in the middle of a political disagreement and the state and the army should not take sides. Two, the state should never use coercion or violence against its own people irrespective of their actions. Both these assumptions are misconceived. Let us remind ourselves that the Taliban are a product of Pakistans Afghan policy. The state created, supported and sustained madressas that propagated a brand of religious ideology that encouraged non-state actors to become agents of violence under the banner of jihad. The leaders of such madressas also had a penchant for a medieval society that shuns modernity and all things associated with the west.
The jihadi project didnt only create mercenaries driven by religious zeal, but also imbibed them with the ancillary objective of creating a backward society once the jihad against infidels succeeds. The state cared little about such collateral effect of a deliberate state policy to recruit jihadis to promote its geo-strategic interests. Unfortunately, the more esoteric calling of the militants of creating an obscurantist society has now merged with the primary objective of fighting the infidels, as they see the rest of Pakistan as one big agent of the infidels. It is then farcical for the state to act as if we are witnessing a difference of agreement between different political groups in Swat, Buner, Dir and FATA that needs to be sorted out by these groups themselves. The state destroyed the level playing field between citizen groups when it transformed one group into professional merchants of violence.
To sit back and watch citizens with opposing points of view stake it out and develop a consensus in the tribal belt simply amounts to allowing the Taliban to make minced meat out of those opposed to their agenda and diktat. The state led by the army created this Frankenstein and it now shoulders the responsibility of confronting and neutralizing it. It is also incorrect that the state never uses violence against citizens. The state monopolizes the means of violence and uses it on an everyday basis against those who do not abide by the compact between the citizen and the state. We call it the penal justice system. Militant groups slaughtering fellow citizens, annexing their property and robbing them of their fundamental rights and liberties might be culpable of a higher crime against the state itself, but they are also guilty of murder, homicide, robbery, extortion etc. as defined by our justice system.
As a matter of principle, we cannot appease and humour them in the name of peace and reconciliation just because enforcing the law is harder against this group of citizens in comparison to other criminals across Pakistan that are less organized and trained. Pakistan has been ambivalent about extending constitutional rights and obligations to the people of the tribal areas merely because we got comfortable with the colonial legacy and bought into the logic of not trying to fix what is not broken. Notwithstanding the past, now that the tribal belt is up in flames we have no option but to bring it within the realm of the Constitution. Would allowing Sufi Mohammad and the Taliban to run a system of governance that falls foul of our Constitutional structure and principles not amount to the state facilitating its own balkanization? If such separatism is acceptable in Swat, then why not in Balochistan and Sindh where people have been similarly disgruntled with the state?
There is urgent need to inject honesty and candour in our discourse on the Taliban. Lets admit that the Taliban are not barbaric because the US is bad. The Taliban are barbaric because they believe in a brutish approach to life and religion. If the US was to stop drone attacks in Pakistan or even quit Afghanistan, Muslim Khan is unlikely to go back to painting houses. The Taliban must be dealt with urgently and resolutely as an existential problem that is questioning and threatening the foundational principles on which our country is founded. Further, our politicos must give up double-speak. Let the PML-N say that it fears speaking against the Taliban because who knows they might prevail tomorrow and so this centre-right party wishes to keep its options open. Let the ANP plainly state that they had no option but to surrender their writ to the Taliban because of the dithering resolve of the army to fight armed militias in their province. And let the PPP acknowledge that in trying to second-guess what every other power broker wants from Pakistan, this mainstream liberal party has lost all ability to support a thought-process of its own.
The Pakistan Armys will and capability to confront the Taliban is under question because the masters of our security doctrine are confused about the future role and utility of the Taliban. The lack of capability of the army to fight a guerrilla war in the tribal areas is predominantly a consequence of lack of will to develop such a capability. Unless there is frank admission that the Afghan policy of the 1980 and 90s and the jihadi project conceived as a result was flawed and has had terrible consequences for Pakistan, the approach toward confronting Taliban will continue to be of the ineffectual fire-fighting variety that we have witnessed in Bajaur, Kohat, Swat, Dir and Buner over the last year or so. Once the army reformulates its defence doctrine wherein (i) Afghanistan is no longer a strategic hinterland but a friendly neighbour that should have a sustainable government representing the plural Afghan society, and (ii) jihadis have no further role in promoting Pakistani states geo-strategic interests, the need to keep options open with the Taliban will automatically subside. Only then will we begin to meaningfully address the root-causes of religious intolerance and violence in our society.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu
Some candour, please
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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It has been made clear in the past that support for criminal and terrorist groups like the TTP-S will earn a ban.
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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We have made our policy clear on the threads several times, and asked members to report such posts.
This individual in particular was directly addressed over this issue, and he chose to deliberately ignore it.
Please report the post next time for prompt action instead of commenting on the thread about it.
Gabbar
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Taliban behead two Pak officials in Swat
Mingora: Pakistani Taliban have beheaded two government officials in the northwestern Swat Valley in revenge for the killing of two insurgent commanders by security forces, a militant spokesman said on Sunday. Authorities struck a peace deal in February aimed at ending militant violence in the former tourist valley of Swat but the militants have refused to disarm and pushed out of the valley into neighbouring districts.
The Taliban aggression raised alarm in the US and in Islamabad, and a week ago the security forces launched an offensive to expel militants from two of neighbouring districts.
The two government officials were kidnapped and beheaded on Saturday evening in Khuwaza Kheil, a village 18 km north of the valley's main town of Mingora, said town police chief Danishwar Khan. Their bodies were dumped beside a road. "They beheaded the officers. We've sent an ambulance to pick up the bodies," Khan said. Militant spokesman Muslim Khan said the beheadings were revenge for the killing of two low-level Taliban commanders earlier on Saturday.
The US State Department said last week the number of people killed in terrorist attacks Pakistan last year rose by 70 % over the 2007 figure. The violence has raised fears for the prospects of the vital US ally in its efforts to stabilise neighbouring Afghanistan.
Mingora: Pakistani Taliban have beheaded two government officials in the northwestern Swat Valley in revenge for the killing of two insurgent commanders by security forces, a militant spokesman said on Sunday. Authorities struck a peace deal in February aimed at ending militant violence in the former tourist valley of Swat but the militants have refused to disarm and pushed out of the valley into neighbouring districts.
The Taliban aggression raised alarm in the US and in Islamabad, and a week ago the security forces launched an offensive to expel militants from two of neighbouring districts.
The two government officials were kidnapped and beheaded on Saturday evening in Khuwaza Kheil, a village 18 km north of the valley's main town of Mingora, said town police chief Danishwar Khan. Their bodies were dumped beside a road. "They beheaded the officers. We've sent an ambulance to pick up the bodies," Khan said. Militant spokesman Muslim Khan said the beheadings were revenge for the killing of two low-level Taliban commanders earlier on Saturday.
The US State Department said last week the number of people killed in terrorist attacks Pakistan last year rose by 70 % over the 2007 figure. The violence has raised fears for the prospects of the vital US ally in its efforts to stabilise neighbouring Afghanistan.
RabzonKhan
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As always, Rashid is right on mark. 
Pakistan is facing galloping Talibanisation
Ahmed Rashid
On Monday, April 4, veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid addressed a select crowd at Karachis Mohatta Palace Museum. Not surprisingly, the subject of his talk was Afghanistan and Pakistan: Quest for Peace or Recipe for War? He argued that Pakistan was facing a major existential crisis: I no longer say that theres a creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan, its a galloping Talibanisation. Here, Dawn.coms Huma Yusuf presents the salient points from Mr. Rashids presentation.
Where did the Taliban come from?
The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat, they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance. From 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban grew in numbers and influence and became radicalized because of their proximity to the Afghan Taliban. They planned and mobilized to establish a Taliban emirate or state in Fata and the expansion of that idea of statehood is what we see happening today.
Pakistani Taliban expanding
The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated with the Pakistan the several years of progressive diplomacy with India exacerbated the rise of different Taliban-affiliated factions. For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement.
Issues in Pakistani governance
Pakistan is also weaker because of a raging economic crisis, the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan, and a political crisis. The PPP government has wasted one year vying with the PML-N for power rather than tackling the Taliban threat. Meanwhile, ANP, which was supposed to serve as secular face of Frontier province, has collapsed (ANP officials are being targeted by Taliban in northern areas).
Before 2008, the Musharraf government allowed the Taliban to resettle in Pakistan from Afghanistan. Musharraf wanted to maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians. Also, the emphasis then was on getting rid of Al Qaeda, the Taliban were not seen as a major threat.
After 2004/2005, when military operations did begin in Fata, the government pursued a stop-and-start policy, which involved several peace deals that did not hold. In the meantime, the Pakistan government and army failed to protect the people of the Fata and the traditional tribal hierarchies that were pro-Pakistan. About 300 maliks of tribes were killed and by 2007, there were half a million refugees from Fata in Pakistan. Having lost the goodwill of the population in Fata, the government will find it hard to reenter the area and rebuild traditional tribal structures.
American failures
How did we get from 2001 to where we are today? The Bush government got distracted by Iraq, which provided a diversion of attention and resources from the situation in Afghanistan. Instead of having an on-the-ground plan for capacity building in Afghanistan, the US supported warlords instead of empowering the centre, regional powers were bolstered. Plus, little was done about the drug trade, which is now the main source of funding for the Taliban (it is estimated at 300 million dollars, but Rashid believes the real figures are triple that amount). Instead of defeating Taliban in Afghanistan, Americans routed them to Pakistan.
Obama policy
US President Barack Obama is now doing what Bush should have done in Afghanistan (troop surge, capacity building, securing the ground to ensure that presidential elections can take place this August). In Pakistan, however, American options are limited. There was a hope that after February 2008 elections, there would be a strong coalition government that could serve as a civilian partner for Obama to partner with. After all, army has proved unreliable ally (especially since it still thinks that India is the main enemy; army officials dislike Indian presence in Afghanistan; and army officials dont like Karzai and other Afghan leaders). However, there is no one for America to partner with. PM? President? Opposition leader? They have all proved too weak.
As a result, US is asking for aid to help Paksitan, but there is very little trust and faith in Pakistan amongst the Congress. The aid that will be given will be packed with conditionalities that Pakistan wont be able to accept. Congress is asking, who will we give this aid to?
India question
There is a tit-for-tat game between India and Pakistan whereby they support nationalist insurgencies in each others countries (so while India may be giving funds in Balochistan, Pakistan is helping out rebels in Assam). But India is not funding the Taliban. India realizes that the Taliban will be at their border next and they have nothing to gain from supporting the militants.
Regional strategy
New focus of Obama administration is regional policy get Afghanistans six neighbors involved and make them sort out regional stability and set a common agenda. But first, bilateral issues will have to be sorted: Indo-Pak will have to clear the air, Pakistan and Central Asian states will have to reach understandings, and Iran and the US will have to start negotiating. This way, Afghanistan is not only a problem, it becomes a trigger for regional problem solving. This is one of the most doable and productive aspects of the Obama policy for ******.
Fallacies of Swat deal (Nizam-i-Adl Regulation)
The ANP thought that the deal would be contained within Swat, but that was very misguided thinking. The Taliban have an expansionist agenda. They make deals in one areas so that they can secure it and then move into other areas. There has also been no cessation of their killing of ANP and other government officials and they have not agreed to lay down their arms. Instead of achieving anything, the Swat deal formalises a different form of law and governance for one part of Pakistan, thus weakening the government.
The law in Swat is Taliban law, and its nonsense to say that the Swatis have been practicing Sharia for decades. The Taliban law has nothing to do with the mild form of Sufi-influenced Sharia that Swatis have had from 1960s.
Government was definitely taken by surprise by the speed with which Taliban moved on from Swat to Buner, Dir, etc. They will not stop and government should realise their ultimate goal of toppling Islamabad. To that end, the operation in Swat is welcome. But the question is: will it be a sustained offensive?
Also, there are already one million IDPs who have escaped from Fata and northern areas. If the army is seriously going to tackle Taliban menace, it must learn counter-insurgency tactics and get the right equipment to target Taliban without damaging entire villages.
Pakistan is facing galloping Talibanisation
Ahmed Rashid
On Monday, April 4, veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid addressed a select crowd at Karachis Mohatta Palace Museum. Not surprisingly, the subject of his talk was Afghanistan and Pakistan: Quest for Peace or Recipe for War? He argued that Pakistan was facing a major existential crisis: I no longer say that theres a creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan, its a galloping Talibanisation. Here, Dawn.coms Huma Yusuf presents the salient points from Mr. Rashids presentation.
Where did the Taliban come from?
The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat, they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance. From 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban grew in numbers and influence and became radicalized because of their proximity to the Afghan Taliban. They planned and mobilized to establish a Taliban emirate or state in Fata and the expansion of that idea of statehood is what we see happening today.
Pakistani Taliban expanding
The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated with the Pakistan the several years of progressive diplomacy with India exacerbated the rise of different Taliban-affiliated factions. For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement.
Issues in Pakistani governance
Pakistan is also weaker because of a raging economic crisis, the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan, and a political crisis. The PPP government has wasted one year vying with the PML-N for power rather than tackling the Taliban threat. Meanwhile, ANP, which was supposed to serve as secular face of Frontier province, has collapsed (ANP officials are being targeted by Taliban in northern areas).
Before 2008, the Musharraf government allowed the Taliban to resettle in Pakistan from Afghanistan. Musharraf wanted to maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians. Also, the emphasis then was on getting rid of Al Qaeda, the Taliban were not seen as a major threat.
After 2004/2005, when military operations did begin in Fata, the government pursued a stop-and-start policy, which involved several peace deals that did not hold. In the meantime, the Pakistan government and army failed to protect the people of the Fata and the traditional tribal hierarchies that were pro-Pakistan. About 300 maliks of tribes were killed and by 2007, there were half a million refugees from Fata in Pakistan. Having lost the goodwill of the population in Fata, the government will find it hard to reenter the area and rebuild traditional tribal structures.
American failures
How did we get from 2001 to where we are today? The Bush government got distracted by Iraq, which provided a diversion of attention and resources from the situation in Afghanistan. Instead of having an on-the-ground plan for capacity building in Afghanistan, the US supported warlords instead of empowering the centre, regional powers were bolstered. Plus, little was done about the drug trade, which is now the main source of funding for the Taliban (it is estimated at 300 million dollars, but Rashid believes the real figures are triple that amount). Instead of defeating Taliban in Afghanistan, Americans routed them to Pakistan.
Obama policy
US President Barack Obama is now doing what Bush should have done in Afghanistan (troop surge, capacity building, securing the ground to ensure that presidential elections can take place this August). In Pakistan, however, American options are limited. There was a hope that after February 2008 elections, there would be a strong coalition government that could serve as a civilian partner for Obama to partner with. After all, army has proved unreliable ally (especially since it still thinks that India is the main enemy; army officials dislike Indian presence in Afghanistan; and army officials dont like Karzai and other Afghan leaders). However, there is no one for America to partner with. PM? President? Opposition leader? They have all proved too weak.
As a result, US is asking for aid to help Paksitan, but there is very little trust and faith in Pakistan amongst the Congress. The aid that will be given will be packed with conditionalities that Pakistan wont be able to accept. Congress is asking, who will we give this aid to?
India question
There is a tit-for-tat game between India and Pakistan whereby they support nationalist insurgencies in each others countries (so while India may be giving funds in Balochistan, Pakistan is helping out rebels in Assam). But India is not funding the Taliban. India realizes that the Taliban will be at their border next and they have nothing to gain from supporting the militants.
Regional strategy
New focus of Obama administration is regional policy get Afghanistans six neighbors involved and make them sort out regional stability and set a common agenda. But first, bilateral issues will have to be sorted: Indo-Pak will have to clear the air, Pakistan and Central Asian states will have to reach understandings, and Iran and the US will have to start negotiating. This way, Afghanistan is not only a problem, it becomes a trigger for regional problem solving. This is one of the most doable and productive aspects of the Obama policy for ******.
Fallacies of Swat deal (Nizam-i-Adl Regulation)
The ANP thought that the deal would be contained within Swat, but that was very misguided thinking. The Taliban have an expansionist agenda. They make deals in one areas so that they can secure it and then move into other areas. There has also been no cessation of their killing of ANP and other government officials and they have not agreed to lay down their arms. Instead of achieving anything, the Swat deal formalises a different form of law and governance for one part of Pakistan, thus weakening the government.
The law in Swat is Taliban law, and its nonsense to say that the Swatis have been practicing Sharia for decades. The Taliban law has nothing to do with the mild form of Sufi-influenced Sharia that Swatis have had from 1960s.
Government was definitely taken by surprise by the speed with which Taliban moved on from Swat to Buner, Dir, etc. They will not stop and government should realise their ultimate goal of toppling Islamabad. To that end, the operation in Swat is welcome. But the question is: will it be a sustained offensive?
Also, there are already one million IDPs who have escaped from Fata and northern areas. If the army is seriously going to tackle Taliban menace, it must learn counter-insurgency tactics and get the right equipment to target Taliban without damaging entire villages.
RabzonKhan
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Well, well, well..... fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.
Taliban using people as human shield, says ISPR
May 05, 2009
ISLAMABAD: The Taliban have made about 2,000 civilians in Buner hostage and are using them as human shield, the chief military spokesman said on Monday.
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Major Gen Athar Abbas told the state-run PTV that the Taliban had made the civilians hostage in Peer Baba and Sultan Was areas according to intelligence reports, and were not allowing them to leave.
In an update on the military operations in Malakand division, the ISPR said the move came after an impending operation to clear Pir Baba.
Talking to PTV, the ISPR director general said Daggar was under complete control of the security forces and the Daggar-Mardan road had been reopened. Malandri Road had also been cleared, he added.
The operation would be extended to other areas after consolidation of positions in Daggar, he said.
People have been trapped in these areas and facing difficulties due to the activities of Taliban, he said.
To a question, he said the Swat peace agreement was intact from the government side and it wanted the deal to go ahead without further bloodshed, but the Taliban had been violating the agreement by continuing armed patrolling and kidnapping and killing people.
Kidnapping of security officials is an open violation of the agreement, he said. Neither our religion nor our culture allows killing prisoners and throwing their bodies on streets.
He said the army was monitoring alarming statements from Taliban and updating government officials about the changing situation.
The ball is in their court, he said. We have all shown patience and tolerance for the success of the agreement.
Gen Abbas said the Taliban were not serious in implementing the peace agreement from day one.
In its update, the ISPR said security forces had killed seven Taliban in Buner, including a commander. On Monday, the security forces engaged militants [in a] hideout in Kalpani and reportedly seven militants, including an important commander Afsar Hameed, were killed, it said. A soldier was killed and three others injured in the fighting. Curfew in Buner was relaxed from 11am to 2pm. app/sajjad malik
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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True, but there was absolutely no popular support in Pakistan at that time for continued military operations either, with the ANP steadfastly pushing the peace deal.
The military likely knew what would eventually happen, the only people being 'fooled' (or, more accurately, allowing themselves to be fooled) were the 'Awaam' and our honorable media commentators.
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Babar Sattar says,
"Further, our politicos must give up double-speak...Let the ANP plainly state that they had no option but to surrender their writ to the Taliban because of the dithering resolve of the army to fight armed militias in their province..."
Agnostic Muslim says,
"True, but there was absolutely no popular support in Pakistan at that time for continued military operations either, with the ANP steadfastly pushing the peace deal."
What this outside observer can off-hand recall of those 2004-2008 days are two sporadic operations in the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan which led to the emergance of the TTP and the second operation in SWAT aimed at Mullah FM (Faizullah). Both had a peculiar surreal quality about them. Neither quite real but real enough when men died...and they did. Yet there was none of the permanence one associates with India's occupation of Kashmir-both in the cities out and out in the hills nor the American/Iraqi army in the urban/rural mix of Mesopotamia.
Chicken or egg at the simplest level. I do know that ANP officials die with unusual regularity.
"Further, our politicos must give up double-speak...Let the ANP plainly state that they had no option but to surrender their writ to the Taliban because of the dithering resolve of the army to fight armed militias in their province..."
Agnostic Muslim says,
"True, but there was absolutely no popular support in Pakistan at that time for continued military operations either, with the ANP steadfastly pushing the peace deal."
What this outside observer can off-hand recall of those 2004-2008 days are two sporadic operations in the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan which led to the emergance of the TTP and the second operation in SWAT aimed at Mullah FM (Faizullah). Both had a peculiar surreal quality about them. Neither quite real but real enough when men died...and they did. Yet there was none of the permanence one associates with India's occupation of Kashmir-both in the cities out and out in the hills nor the American/Iraqi army in the urban/rural mix of Mesopotamia.
Chicken or egg at the simplest level. I do know that ANP officials die with unusual regularity.
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