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Aayo Gorkhali! Cry that won us a war.
Tales of valour of the 4/5 Gorkha Rifles during the 1971 war are legendary. The brave soldiers of the battalion fought so valiantly in Sylhet that the Pakistani forces actually believed that they had encountered a brigade
With 15 days to go for Vijay Divas, Indias first comprehensive war victory in 1,000 years, it is appropriate to recall one of the epic battles of 1971 in East Pakistan, the battle of Sylhet which enabled it. Fought between December 7 and 15, it is the first ever heliborne operation resulting in the surrender of the 7,000-strong Sylhet garrison at the hands of just 500 johnnies of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF). They have reason to celebrate the battle feat this week as also to usher in 50 glorious years of their raising in Dehradun on January 1, 1963. The battle record is not restricted just to Sylhet but also spreads to its sterling contribution in nailing the Pakistan Ghaznavi force in 1965, the IPKF in Sri Lanka, the counter-insurgency in Kashmir and the North-East and in Siachen, where it distinguished itself with zero casualties on the glacier.
But Sylhet is the crown jewel in its bahaduri ka khazana. The khukuri attack at Atgram and the demolition job at Gazipur were warm-ups for the aerial insertion into the jaws of death a 20th century version of the Charge of the Light Brigade: The charge of Aayo Gorkhali. The ferocity of Four Five at Atgram and Gazipur had preceded the battalion helidrop at Sylhet.
On December 6, Eastern Command, Calcutta, intercepted a tele-conversation between the overall Force Commander in East Pakistan, Lt Gen Niazi and GoC 14 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Qazi, during which the latter was ordered to send 313 Infantry Brigade from Moulvi Bazar for the defence of Dacca. In earlier intelligence assessments, 202 Infantry Brigade was not found around Sylhet but elsewhere. The overall evaluation that Sylhet was without regular troops and with only 300 Razakars got confirmed after a satellite picture, courtesy the Soviets, had indicated no presence of troops.
On December 7, when Commanders Brig Quinn, Commanding Officer, Lt Col Harolikar and Group Captain Chandan Singh carried out helicopter reconnaissance over Sylhet, they neither noticed troop movement nor drew any fire. In fact, Maj Gen Kazi was strengthening Sylhet into a fortress as part of the overall plan to block the advance of Indian forces. He disobeyed Gen Niazis orders by deploying 313 Infantry Brigade around Sylhet instead of dispatching it to Dacca, and was removed from command.
With the door to Sylhet seen as wide open, Four Five was chosen to be heli-landed near Sylhet and to establish a firm base for its capture, which turned out to be a turning point in the war. If Indians misread the troop strength at Sylhet, so did the Pakistanis overestimate the battalion landings, as at least one brigade, Four Five, held its ground tenaciously, outmatching war cries of Allah ho Akbar with Aayo Gorkhali.
The plan on paper was simple: Commencing 1500 hours the battalion was to be heli-lifted from Kalaura in waves to form a firm base at Mirpara near Sylhet on December 7 and await a link-up with 8 Infantry Division within 48 hours. C Company under Maj Malik led the first wave of Mi4 helicopter landings at Mirpara and drawing heavy enemy fire. His Company literally went into a running battle but beat back enemy attacks. In the next wave arrived Lt Col Harolikar and Bravo Company. But then, for about 12 hours, there were no flights due to heavy shelling and small arms fire. Only at around four the following morning did the rest of the battalion land. A company of 9 Guards and two 75/24 mm Mountain guns also fetched up. The battalion had only pouch ammunition, shakkarparas for 48 hours and good cheer and high morale.
The battalion formed an unconventionally dispersed battalion defended area, which confirmed the Pakistanis assessment that it was a Brigade. A and D Companies were under immense pressure withstanding repeated counter-attacks on nights of December 8 and 9. But the big attack of more than 1 battalion came on December 11 pulverising D company, in which Maj Kaul was wounded.
Maj Malik was asked to assist Delta Company in evacuating its dead and wounded, and with Subedar Teertha Bahadurs gallant support, succeeded in his mission. Lt Col Harolikar decided to pull in the defences, making them compact and tenable. On December 10, the battalion received its first airdrop of supplies and ammunition and later in the day, three Hunter aircraft strafed and bombed Pakistani defences. This was most demoralising for Pakistani forces, and soon they began praying: Parvardigar, hun bas khair kare (now only God can help).
One more airdrop took place on December 12 to shouts of Aayo Aayo amidst enemy shelling and heavy fire. Two helicopters also arrived to lift the dead and the wounded, but the linkup remained elusive. Airstrikes over Pakistans positions continued. By 15th morning, panic had overtaken the Pakistan garrison when nearly 1,500 soldiers, some with white flags, started approaching C Company wishing to surrender. Assuming this was a ruse Maj Malik ordered a few bursts of fire especially when they rushed towards the Company.
Their officers were told that the surrender had to be officially negotiated, and this was done later in the day between the Brigade Commanders. The surrender in Sylhet was accepted a clear 24 hours earlier than in other theatres of the war, though the formal surrender took place on morning of 16 at Sylhet, while Gen Niazi handed over his belt and pistol to Gen Aurora around 1600 hours at the Race Course in Dacca.
While Four Five lost one officer, two JCOs and 11 Other Ranks, three officers and 36 soldiers were wounded, reducing the battalion to seven officers, 15 JCOs and 350 men. Never have so few battled and beaten so many.
Gorkhas will be Gorkhas. At Kalaura, Brigade Commander Quinn asked Maliks boys Jum Bahadur and Naina Singh why they were heli-lifting live chicken. Promptly they replied, Uta chahincha, (We will need them) at Sylhet.
The highlights of the battle are worth recounting. Four Five tied down two crack Infantry Brigades of the Pakistani Army when troops were at a premium. The battalion was aerially inserted close to a fortress defence on the assumption that only irregulars would be present.
Not only did Four Five overcome the failure of intelligence but it also turned the tables by making the enemy believe it was a Brigade. That it held on for nine days and eight nights without any link-up reflected the resilience, resolve and robustness of the battalion.
Author: Ashok K Mehta
JAI MAHAKALI !!! AAYO GORKHALI !!!
Tales of valour of the 4/5 Gorkha Rifles during the 1971 war are legendary. The brave soldiers of the battalion fought so valiantly in Sylhet that the Pakistani forces actually believed that they had encountered a brigade
With 15 days to go for Vijay Divas, Indias first comprehensive war victory in 1,000 years, it is appropriate to recall one of the epic battles of 1971 in East Pakistan, the battle of Sylhet which enabled it. Fought between December 7 and 15, it is the first ever heliborne operation resulting in the surrender of the 7,000-strong Sylhet garrison at the hands of just 500 johnnies of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF). They have reason to celebrate the battle feat this week as also to usher in 50 glorious years of their raising in Dehradun on January 1, 1963. The battle record is not restricted just to Sylhet but also spreads to its sterling contribution in nailing the Pakistan Ghaznavi force in 1965, the IPKF in Sri Lanka, the counter-insurgency in Kashmir and the North-East and in Siachen, where it distinguished itself with zero casualties on the glacier.
But Sylhet is the crown jewel in its bahaduri ka khazana. The khukuri attack at Atgram and the demolition job at Gazipur were warm-ups for the aerial insertion into the jaws of death a 20th century version of the Charge of the Light Brigade: The charge of Aayo Gorkhali. The ferocity of Four Five at Atgram and Gazipur had preceded the battalion helidrop at Sylhet.
On December 6, Eastern Command, Calcutta, intercepted a tele-conversation between the overall Force Commander in East Pakistan, Lt Gen Niazi and GoC 14 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Qazi, during which the latter was ordered to send 313 Infantry Brigade from Moulvi Bazar for the defence of Dacca. In earlier intelligence assessments, 202 Infantry Brigade was not found around Sylhet but elsewhere. The overall evaluation that Sylhet was without regular troops and with only 300 Razakars got confirmed after a satellite picture, courtesy the Soviets, had indicated no presence of troops.
On December 7, when Commanders Brig Quinn, Commanding Officer, Lt Col Harolikar and Group Captain Chandan Singh carried out helicopter reconnaissance over Sylhet, they neither noticed troop movement nor drew any fire. In fact, Maj Gen Kazi was strengthening Sylhet into a fortress as part of the overall plan to block the advance of Indian forces. He disobeyed Gen Niazis orders by deploying 313 Infantry Brigade around Sylhet instead of dispatching it to Dacca, and was removed from command.
With the door to Sylhet seen as wide open, Four Five was chosen to be heli-landed near Sylhet and to establish a firm base for its capture, which turned out to be a turning point in the war. If Indians misread the troop strength at Sylhet, so did the Pakistanis overestimate the battalion landings, as at least one brigade, Four Five, held its ground tenaciously, outmatching war cries of Allah ho Akbar with Aayo Gorkhali.
The plan on paper was simple: Commencing 1500 hours the battalion was to be heli-lifted from Kalaura in waves to form a firm base at Mirpara near Sylhet on December 7 and await a link-up with 8 Infantry Division within 48 hours. C Company under Maj Malik led the first wave of Mi4 helicopter landings at Mirpara and drawing heavy enemy fire. His Company literally went into a running battle but beat back enemy attacks. In the next wave arrived Lt Col Harolikar and Bravo Company. But then, for about 12 hours, there were no flights due to heavy shelling and small arms fire. Only at around four the following morning did the rest of the battalion land. A company of 9 Guards and two 75/24 mm Mountain guns also fetched up. The battalion had only pouch ammunition, shakkarparas for 48 hours and good cheer and high morale.
The battalion formed an unconventionally dispersed battalion defended area, which confirmed the Pakistanis assessment that it was a Brigade. A and D Companies were under immense pressure withstanding repeated counter-attacks on nights of December 8 and 9. But the big attack of more than 1 battalion came on December 11 pulverising D company, in which Maj Kaul was wounded.
Maj Malik was asked to assist Delta Company in evacuating its dead and wounded, and with Subedar Teertha Bahadurs gallant support, succeeded in his mission. Lt Col Harolikar decided to pull in the defences, making them compact and tenable. On December 10, the battalion received its first airdrop of supplies and ammunition and later in the day, three Hunter aircraft strafed and bombed Pakistani defences. This was most demoralising for Pakistani forces, and soon they began praying: Parvardigar, hun bas khair kare (now only God can help).
One more airdrop took place on December 12 to shouts of Aayo Aayo amidst enemy shelling and heavy fire. Two helicopters also arrived to lift the dead and the wounded, but the linkup remained elusive. Airstrikes over Pakistans positions continued. By 15th morning, panic had overtaken the Pakistan garrison when nearly 1,500 soldiers, some with white flags, started approaching C Company wishing to surrender. Assuming this was a ruse Maj Malik ordered a few bursts of fire especially when they rushed towards the Company.
Their officers were told that the surrender had to be officially negotiated, and this was done later in the day between the Brigade Commanders. The surrender in Sylhet was accepted a clear 24 hours earlier than in other theatres of the war, though the formal surrender took place on morning of 16 at Sylhet, while Gen Niazi handed over his belt and pistol to Gen Aurora around 1600 hours at the Race Course in Dacca.
While Four Five lost one officer, two JCOs and 11 Other Ranks, three officers and 36 soldiers were wounded, reducing the battalion to seven officers, 15 JCOs and 350 men. Never have so few battled and beaten so many.
Gorkhas will be Gorkhas. At Kalaura, Brigade Commander Quinn asked Maliks boys Jum Bahadur and Naina Singh why they were heli-lifting live chicken. Promptly they replied, Uta chahincha, (We will need them) at Sylhet.
The highlights of the battle are worth recounting. Four Five tied down two crack Infantry Brigades of the Pakistani Army when troops were at a premium. The battalion was aerially inserted close to a fortress defence on the assumption that only irregulars would be present.
Not only did Four Five overcome the failure of intelligence but it also turned the tables by making the enemy believe it was a Brigade. That it held on for nine days and eight nights without any link-up reflected the resilience, resolve and robustness of the battalion.
Author: Ashok K Mehta
JAI MAHAKALI !!! AAYO GORKHALI !!!
