A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[Armchair]

By simply looking at the date of a design, it doesn't help much. AK-47 is designed in 1945-47. Yet PA is using it... by your account you should hand over all your AK-47s to "bangali"

 

[Reichmarshal]

By simply looking at the date of a design, it doesn't help much. AK-47 is designed in 1945-47. Yet PA is using it... by your account you should hand over all your AK-47s to "bangali"

poor logic friend.
The basic science behind most small arms around the world has remained the same since ww2. Use can also add light/heavy machine guns up to 12.7 to that list.
While on the other hand, the aviation industry has progressed by leaps and bounds. It is practically unimaginable/recognizable to wt it was a few decades ago to wt it is now and at the pace, it's progressing it will be unimaginable in a few years with the advent of IA.

and ur suggesting that the PAF buy worthless junk and in the process bring it to the level of a third rate airforce like afg, NK, bangladesh etc.

 

[Raja Porus]

The writer is following Soviet doctrine of quantity is quality itself

 

[wasileo80]

there is a huge difference between "hawi" firing and firing" straight" under fire.
majority of the ppl only good at hawi firing.

If you read my post properly, i wrote in my post, using of small arms effectively. Its more than enough to understand what is effective use of arms. its not sort of "hawi firing". Enough said.

 

[Armchair]

The importance of NLOS (Non Line of Sight) systems, smart munitions ranging from Harpy drones to laser guided rockets, are a very important aspect of modern warfare that should not be underestimated. A standard NLOS platform should be introduced in the PA at the earliest, most ideally it should be a local design that is simple to mass produce. The aim should be that every battalion should have NLOS precision fire capability.

In addition, a proactive means of countering drones and NLOS systems should also be found. This means not only AAA, but perhaps also a CAS platform that has an air-to-air role. A simple CAS platform, whether manned or unmanned, would allow PA to counter enemy attempts to use drones and NLOS systems against the PA. By flying low, nap-of-the-earth terrain following capabilities engendered by adequate terrain following avionics, a CAS platform would attempt to stay outside of the battle between the PAF and IAF, while taking out enemy drones, ground assets and artillery batteries. They would also be able to take out enemy air defense assets, thus allowing greater permissibility for own drone assets to perform.

@PanzerKiel

 

[Armchair]

Commonalities between the Afrin and Nagorno-Karabakh Operations​

10/7/2020
by Armchair

Turkish Armed forces (TSK) has conducted a number of successful operations in recent times in Syria and Libya. We are seeing a new template for warfare that is network driven and drone heavy, among other characteristics. The Afrin operation was a highly successful operation by Turkey; where TSK took 1,840 sq. km of land from a well fortified militia affiliated with the PKK terrorist organization.

There are a number of similarities between Afrin and Nagorno-Karabagh (NK) from a military standpoint. Both regions are mountainous, heavily fortified and have similar sized populations – about 150,000 – 200,000 inhabitants. NK is larger at 4,400 sq. km to 1,840 for Afrin. Both areas have been fortified with trenches, hardened command centers and a well distributed defensive position with multiple tiers. Both areas are supported by a larger enemy military, and have Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) to their main sponsors / backers.

In both NK and Afrin, the military approach has been to use artillery, drones and helicopters to attack key nodes of the entrenched forces. This has been followed by shallow assaults to take strategic ground such as high terrain. Another common salient has been a lesser emphasis on armored warfare, and highly effective use of ATGMs as ambush weapons.

We have also seen the use of proxy militias as an infantry component in both conflicts, showing a resurgence of mercenary militias as not only an irregular component in conflicts, but as an infantry component for conventional war. If the progression of war continues to follow the same pattern as Afrin, we may see a relatively slow progression of area conquered for the first 2 weeks before assault on the ground picks up pace.

The operational similarities may indicate that the military planners in Azerbaijan are either from Turkey or are influenced by their successful model. The question is, to what extent are the military professionals around the world taking lessons from this success? It may be that we are seeing a turning point in doctrine for military operations, and a much wider acceptance of drones, net-centric warfare and de-emphasis of armor.

Perhaps we may see this new pattern of warfare seeping down to the very military structures of armed forces in the future. One could perhaps have integral UCAV, UAV and EW components at the corps, division, brigade and perhaps even the battalion level. Simultaneously, we may see a greater emphasis on organic air defense, not only up to 10,000 feet but perhaps to 20,000 feet, to keep pace with UAV developments.

We may also see reduction in the tank and APC components of the infantry division or brigade, while inclusion of NLOS precision munitions – Harpy style loitering munitions being one such possibility.

The question still remains unanswered however: to what extent can this pattern of warfare be successful where the enemy has a meaningful air defense network in place, and an effective air force. Therefore, military planners will likely seek to hedge their bets and find a balance that is right for them. They will also look out to see how successful and replicable the results are. Nagorno-Karabkh is a test for the same. Nevertheless, it is perhaps clear that the art of war has changed irreversibly; the genie is out of the bottle; never to return again. Drones, EW, net-centric warfare, loitering munitions, NLOS assets, all are conspiring to change the fundamental dynamics of war as we knew it.

@PanzerKiel

 

[Armchair]

@PanzerKiel has PA ever tried using tracked-wheel vehicles? They are like half way between tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles. You can take out the wheel and install the tracks in like 20 minutes.

Perhaps these could be useful in the Sindh desert. If the idea works, they could be used to create "tanks" that are somewhere betweened wheeled light tanks and MBTs.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel has PA ever tried using tracked-wheel vehicles? They are like half way between tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles. You can take out the wheel and install the tracks in like 20 minutes.

Perhaps these could be useful in the Sindh desert. If the idea works, they could be used to create "tanks" that are somewhere betweened wheeled light tanks and MBTs.

They can always be useful in desert terrain. However, they haven't been tried. Proposals always spring up now and then, but they get axed due to obvious reasons.

 

[Vapour]

The importance of NLOS (Non Line of Sight) systems, smart munitions ranging from Harpy drones to laser guided rockets, are a very important aspect of modern warfare that should not be underestimated. A standard NLOS platform should be introduced in the PA at the earliest, most ideally it should be a local design that is simple to mass produce. The aim should be that every battalion should have NLOS precision fire capability.

In addition, a proactive means of countering drones and NLOS systems should also be found. This means not only AAA, but perhaps also a CAS platform that has an air-to-air role. A simple CAS platform, whether manned or unmanned, would allow PA to counter enemy attempts to use drones and NLOS systems against the PA. By flying low, nap-of-the-earth terrain following capabilities engendered by adequate terrain following avionics, a CAS platform would attempt to stay outside of the battle between the PAF and IAF, while taking out enemy drones, ground assets and artillery batteries. They would also be able to take out enemy air defense assets, thus allowing greater permissibility for own drone assets to perform.

@PanzerKiel

Would be great to have suicide drones to use along LOC when matters rise to conflict-level.

 

[Armchair]

I think a new military math is needed. Here is my new mod to the Lancaster square:

Segment capability by offence and defense:
Infantry division. 1 offence, 2 defense. Takes into account ATGM revolution.
Armoured division. 3 offence. 2 defense.
A new combined arms division with NLOS and CAS should get a 3 for offense and a 3 for defense.

This would make more sense if this is further segmented by terrain but that would need us to make a table out of all this, and before we would know it, we would be studying matrix algebra.
@PanzerKiel

 

[Armchair]

Two man tank concept.

A simple tank designed to meet the needs of the modern battlefield. Tanks today have become too big, complex and expensive. A small two man tank allows increased armor protection, while reducing costs and complexities.

The main gun is a twin barrelled, high velocity 40mm cannon, working on the Gast Gun principle. It is complemented by an ATGM launcher that auto-loads 10x ATGMs. A 12.7mm gun is mounted coaxial to the main gun. The vehicle is also armed with a smoke grenade launcher with 20x smoke grenades.

Weapons are cued using HMDs available with both the gunner and the driver.

This "small is beautiful" design allows for a simple and low cost tank that is mass production capable, allowing for rapid increase in armor in anticipation of, and during armed conflicts.
@PanzerKiel

 

[PanzerKiel]

Two man tank concept.

A simple tank designed to meet the needs of the modern battlefield. Tanks today have become too big, complex and expensive. A small two man tank allows increased armor protection, while reducing costs and complexities.

The main gun is a twin barrelled, high velocity 40mm cannon, working on the Gast Gun principle. It is complemented by an ATGM launcher that auto-loads 10x ATGMs. A 12.7mm gun is mounted coaxial to the main gun. The vehicle is also armed with a smoke grenade launcher with 20x smoke grenades.

Weapons are cued using HMDs available with both the gunner and the driver.

This "small is beautiful" design allows for a simple and low cost tank that is mass production capable, allowing for rapid increase in armor in anticipation of, and during armed conflicts.
@PanzerKiel
View attachment 682282

One of the main problems being faced with a 3 man or less crew or an armored vehicle is its daily maintenance. The 4 or 5 man crew is not only needed for operating the armored vehicle, but it is also required for its maintenance. Its really a big and complex machine which cannot be easily looked after by a two-man crew.

 

[Armchair]

One of the main problems being faced with a 3 man or less crew or an armored vehicle is its daily maintenance. The 4 or 5 man crew is not only needed for operating the armored vehicle, but it is also required for its maintenance. Its really a big and complex machine which cannot be easily looked after by a two-man crew.

Interesting angle. Here are a few ways I can think of to counter this problem:

1. If we couple tanks with an anti-tank ATGM APC, or an APC of other varying purposes, perhaps that would undo the manpower issue.
2. Buddy every two tanks together
3. Increase more engineering teams to assist.

 

[Armchair]

Lastly, this is a smaller, simpler tank, so it will likely take less maintenance, men to maintain, and maintenance man hours. It basically doesn't have a 120 mm gun and its auto loader, two systems that require heavy maintenance.
@PanzerKiel

 

[Armchair]

I was just reading @Signalian 's posts and want to do a quick analysis of the different types of units that exist in the PA, as well as the type of Combined Arms Division he has proposed.

Combined Arms Division of Signalian's Proposal:
36 MBT
72-90 APC
36 ATGM Carriers,
36 Artillery
12 Gunships
12 transport Helis.
12 UAV/UCAV's

PA Infantry Division:
44 MBT
0? APC
24 ATGM Carriers,
36 Artillery

PA Armored Division
220-225 MBT
132? APC
24 ATGM Carriers,
54 Artillery