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My vote goes to Gen Petraeus, Hillary Clinton and Gen Kayani sound like Chamberlain! Taliban’s are evil people, we must destroy them, if they want peace (which is highly unlikely) they are most welcome but it has to be on our terms.Readers are invited to review our comments on the thread below and compare it with the NYT editorial below
http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/105046-does-pakistan-really-want-stable-afghanistan-time.html
April 22, 2011
Bring in the Taliban
By ANATOL LIEVEN and MALEEHA LODHI
Washington’s military strategy in Afghanistan now aims to avoid the appearance of defeat for America, but for Afghanistan it is a recipe for unending civil war.
In essence, it is a version of the strategy pursued by the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s: to build up the Afghan army to the point where it can contain the insurgents without the help of outside ground forces, while seeking to win over individual insurgent commanders and their supporters.
This strategy may create forces that can defend key cities against the Taliban. But it is unlikely that Afghan security forces will be able to do this on their own. And it offers little real prospect of either eliminating or winning over enough of the Taliban to control the Pashtun countryside and end the insurgency. Nor can such a large security force be sustained by an impoverished country through its own resources.
Faced with awesome U.S. military power, most Taliban fighters neither fight to the death nor surrender. They just go home to their villages, and wait to see what happens next. This is exactly what happened after the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001.
To contain continuing Taliban influence across a large swathe of the country would require effective, honest, representative and locally rooted Afghan civilian authorities. Is this possible, given the experience of the past 10 years?
The overwhelming probability therefore is that existing U.S. strategy will lead to a situation in which, once American troops withdraw from an active ground role, the Taliban will re-establish their control of the countryside and besiege the southern and eastern cities, which will be defended by a mixture of the Afghan National Army on the ground and U.S. firepower in the air. Because they will need their help in this war, the Taliban will be compelled to preserve their links to Al Qaeda, and continue to draw revenue from the heroin trade.
There will be an enduring risk that the weakness of the Afghan government and the deep ethnic divisions in the Afghan Army will intensify internal strife and face Washington with the choice of either reoccupying the country with ground troops or pulling out and leaving Afghanistan to its fate.
Faced with this reality, there is a growing consensus in the international community and among many U.S. experts on the idea of peace talks with the Taliban — not just to break away individual commanders, but to draw the movement as a whole into a peace settlement. And as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a key speech at the Asia Society in February, Pakistan will have to play an essential role in any settlement. In this way, Pakistan can be turned from Washington’s “problem” into an asset.
Declaring U.S. readiness to “reconcile with an adversary,” Ms. Clinton spelled out three “red lines for reconciliation” with the Taliban: “They must renounce violence ... abandon their alliance with Al Qaeda, and abide by the Constitution.”
Then came a crucially significant shift in the U.S. position. The three redlines were no longer described as pre-conditions but as objectives — as “necessary outcomes of any negotiation.”
There is also a growing recognition in the American establishment that the Afghan Constitution is not set in stone and can be renegotiated by Afghans themselves — including the Taliban.
Ms. Clinton’s speech narrows the difference in approach between the United States and Pakistan, which has long insisted that the war can only be brought to an end by political, not military means, and that talks must begin without preconditions. It also closed the gap with America’s NATO allies in Europe, virtually all of whom have privately been calling for talks with the Taliban to secure a political solution.
In talks with the United States, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has suggested interim peace-building measures, intended both to lay the basis for later talks on a final settlement and to allow the U.S. to explore which leaders and elements in the Taliban are in fact ready for compromise. He has said that Pakistan stands ready to help in such a process.
His call for a sequenced approach to a peace settlement involves in the first instance a mutual deescalation of violence to open the way for negotiations and offer an incentive to the Taliban to disavow Al Qaeda. Peace-building measures can include local cease-fires to instill trust for serious talks, which must be led by the Afghans themselves.
Other steps can also be taken to prepare the ground for political negotiations. An important step would be the creation of a Taliban office possibly in a Gulf country to encourage their transformation into a political actor from a fighting force. Such measures need be initiated without delay, for without them the prospect of an unending conflict looms, an outcome that is in nobody’s interest.
However, Gen. David Petraeus and the Pentagon have yet to accept the notion of talks with Taliban leaders. So far they have only embraced a policy of “reintegration,” which aims at splitting and weakening the Taliban, and not “reconciliation” which means negotiating with them.
A European diplomat depicted this stance rather graphically: “the U.S. military only wants to talk with their boots on the Taliban’s neck.” This approach no longer enjoys the confidence either of the international community or of a majority of Americans. Above all the Afghans want an end to the fighting and a chance at peace.
Anatol Lieven is a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College London and author of “Pakistan: A Hard Country.” Maleeha Lodhi is the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington and London and editor of “Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State.”
Our GDP growth rate (2001-2002) was around 3.6 %, so what’s the big deal, where are you getting your information from?al qaeda is all us/cia backed and they fund it just to show the world that americans are doing everything right. . but originally it is all inside job and they are trying to destabilise pakistan .. . pakistan seemed a global threat for everyone specially when it was rated as the best economy growth in 2001-2002 (u can google it ) . .since then some or the other things have happend to destablise our country . . but we are still standing strong and insHALLAH will always. . .. yes indian part is also invovled. . they have their own indian consulates in afghanistan . .for what reason? god knows the best. . . . .
Muse, that’s really news to me, so what makes you think Afghan-Talibans are less evil than ours, please elaborate?Hmmm - I don't know if you are reading Petraeus (AKA betray us) right -- it's too late for him to deliver a victory, he's not going to get CIA directorship and the Republicans and their tea party mess, well, less said the better -- and of course Petraeus isn't in this alone, Do Afghans also think in the same way about the Talib? Well some do whereas others help 400 escape from under the noses of the US.
But look, the editorial is asking the US to be responsible, it's going to evacuate, it must not set the stage for the civil war and bifurcation of Afghanistan - it will regret it - lets set the stage for the Afghans to slowly be rid of their Talib -- but lets make laws to the effect that any Pakistani individual or institution risk death if convicted in any sort of religiously inspired ideology.
To my mind, the Afghan Talib are not anywhere as dangerous as the Pakistani varieties of the Saudi disease.
AG
Many claim that the Talib went ethnic early on - but this is not entirely true - the very nature of the context within which the talib appeared had a strong ethnic component to it - It wan't as if the Shura e nazar was less ethnic or the hazara less ethnic or less sectarian -- Don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting the Afghan Talib are good guys, quite the oppositie, but lets be clear headed about ALL the other players as well.
Again, keeping in mind Rabzon's concern and the issue of "ethnic" that you highlight - One of the most important developments coming out of years of the anti-Soviet Jihad and the years of civil war is a development that not many speak of, unfortunately, and that development is the awakening of various minorities, ethnic and religious, of the effort and sacrifices they made towards a new more egalitarian Afghanistan in which they could be more than just the despised minority
--- the Afghan Talib must make progress on this but what really is a concern now that Pakistan is once again getting close to Saudi Arabia, is that this will become difficult, the Saudi regime and it's elite really do see the world through sectarian lens, and that too.. well, you know. And this goes to the issue of disentangling the reputation of the Afghan Talib from association with Al-Qaida ---
If I understand correctly, Pakistan seem to have offered assurances to the US that they will exert every influence to ensure that once the Talib are accepted as in "reconciliation" part, that such pressure will be exerted.
well, it might be unfortunate for pakistani friends, as pakistani state, policy makers, media and evern ordinary people want the dominance of pashtons, that is good for pakistan(their perception anyway), but bad for us and our unity,
i personally dont know.... if the Talibs who were much more close, obedient and had brotherly relations with pakistan, didnt listen to pakistan(2001), i dont know how pakistgan can guarantee taht the talibs dont do the repeat of their past, right now, they are the closest ally of aqaeda, i cant say precisely about the number, but as far as i have seen documentries and reports about taliban/al qaeda, a significant number of aqaeada operators and suicide bombers have been among them, that is visible in areas such as kunar/nuristan and NW/khost.
I personally believe, that if the taliban ever win this war, they will be different from yesterday's taliban, the fever of victory will put them in odds with paksitan
Well, that's absolutely true, obviously - but also I think education can go a long way towards helping people see this "truth" -- It would help all Afghans if they carefully project these realities without being hostile towards Pakistan -- The way to lose in Afghanistan, is to be hostile to Pakistan, it may be harsh but it's also true.