A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
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RabzonKhan
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Pakistans ISI links with Haqqani militants: US
In this photo released by Inter Services Public Relations, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, left, listens to Pakistans Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Khalid Shameem Wynne during a meeting in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on Wednesday, April 20, 2011. AP Photo
ISLAMABAD: The top US military officer accused Pakistans intelligence agency of maintaining ties to militants in Afghanistan during a trip to Islamabad on Wednesday that was focused on easing diplomatic tensions.
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Pakistans perceived foot-dragging in tackling strongholds in North Waziristan belonging to the Haqqani network and its continuing relationship with it was the most difficult part of the US-Pakistani relationship.
Its fairly well known that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network, he said in an interview with Pakistans daily Dawn newspaper.
Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesnt happen.
So thats at the core its not the only thing but thats at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship, Mullen said.
Pakistans powerful Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has long been suspected of maintaining ties to the Haqqani network, cultivated during the 1980s when Jalaluddin Haqqani was a feared battlefield commander against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
I dont know what kind of relationship hes talking about, a senior Pakistani intelligence official told Reuters. If he means were providing them with protection, with help, thats not correct. Even if you are enemies, you have a relationship.
He said that Pakistan had attacked Haqqanis positions and raided his mosques in the past. Right now, we are not attacking him because we are fully engaged against another group, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), he said.
Pakistan has been criticised in the past for distinguishing between good Taliban militants and bad ones, with the Haqqani network falling squarely into the former category.
While based in Pakistans wild North Waziristan area on the Afghan border, Haqqani refrains from attacking the Pakistani state and is seen as a way to maintain Pakistani influence in any future political settlement in Kabul.
The TTP, on the other hand, is a declared enemy of the Pakistani state and has been at war with the its army since 2007.
Before the trip, Mullen acknowledged that weve had a very turbulent time, but added that despite the tensions, all sides acknowledged the relationship was vital.
I think that all of us believe that we cannot afford to let this relationship come apart, Mullen said, referring to US and Pakistani military and intelligence chiefs.
Its just too dangerous. Its too dangerous, in each country, for each country. Its too dangerous for the region.
He acknowledged that the relationship was difficult, but added: We walk away from it at our peril, quite frankly. Reuters
In this photo released by Inter Services Public Relations, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, left, listens to Pakistans Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Khalid Shameem Wynne during a meeting in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on Wednesday, April 20, 2011. AP Photo
ISLAMABAD: The top US military officer accused Pakistans intelligence agency of maintaining ties to militants in Afghanistan during a trip to Islamabad on Wednesday that was focused on easing diplomatic tensions.
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Pakistans perceived foot-dragging in tackling strongholds in North Waziristan belonging to the Haqqani network and its continuing relationship with it was the most difficult part of the US-Pakistani relationship.
Its fairly well known that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network, he said in an interview with Pakistans daily Dawn newspaper.
Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesnt happen.
So thats at the core its not the only thing but thats at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship, Mullen said.
Pakistans powerful Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has long been suspected of maintaining ties to the Haqqani network, cultivated during the 1980s when Jalaluddin Haqqani was a feared battlefield commander against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
I dont know what kind of relationship hes talking about, a senior Pakistani intelligence official told Reuters. If he means were providing them with protection, with help, thats not correct. Even if you are enemies, you have a relationship.
He said that Pakistan had attacked Haqqanis positions and raided his mosques in the past. Right now, we are not attacking him because we are fully engaged against another group, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), he said.
Pakistan has been criticised in the past for distinguishing between good Taliban militants and bad ones, with the Haqqani network falling squarely into the former category.
While based in Pakistans wild North Waziristan area on the Afghan border, Haqqani refrains from attacking the Pakistani state and is seen as a way to maintain Pakistani influence in any future political settlement in Kabul.
The TTP, on the other hand, is a declared enemy of the Pakistani state and has been at war with the its army since 2007.
Before the trip, Mullen acknowledged that weve had a very turbulent time, but added that despite the tensions, all sides acknowledged the relationship was vital.
I think that all of us believe that we cannot afford to let this relationship come apart, Mullen said, referring to US and Pakistani military and intelligence chiefs.
Its just too dangerous. Its too dangerous, in each country, for each country. Its too dangerous for the region.
He acknowledged that the relationship was difficult, but added: We walk away from it at our peril, quite frankly. Reuters
RabzonKhan
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Crossing the red line
By Editorial
The Express Tribune, April 22nd, 2011.
After the failure of the ISI-CIA meeting in Washington, the Pak-US military top brass, too, has apparently not seen eye to eye on their diverging policies on terrorism. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen flew in seemingly holding an olive branch and saying the two countries could not afford to allow their anti-terrorism alliance to unravel, but ended up saying things that denote just such an unravelling. Before going in for the important meetings in Rawalpindi, he stuck to the red line often read out to Pakistan: Its fairly well-known that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani Network. Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesnt happen.
But he also appended to this his resolve not to let the bilateral equation collapse when he said: The ability to sustain a very difficult period as we have recently, between Pakistan and the United States, is in some ways indicative of the strength of the relationship. That doesnt mean we dont have challenges to continue to address, because we do. This very difficult recent period was characterised by a furore in Pakistan over the arrest of a CIA agent who had killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and the subsequent demand by Pakistan that the CIA cut back on its activities in Pakistan and put on record the functions of American officials coming in on diplomatic passports. The US admiral, in fact, publicly admitted this, saying that it was a setback to relations between the two countries.
Part of Pakistans response to Admiral Mullens remarks, as reported in the press, may not be considered very convincing except to the Pakistanis, 70 per cent of whom express dislike of the US and some even recommend cutting off relations with it. Officials say the Haqqani connection is not there and that even if you are enemies, you have a relationship. The upshot is that Pakistan is not willing to change its current policy on North Waziristan and may not be interested in explaining the real reason why it doesnt want to send in the troops to remove the Haqqanis and other foreign terrorists from there, in that they could be used as bargaining chips when the Afghan chessboard is reconfigured, say, following an American troops pullout. However, sooner or later, the militants who have found a safe haven in North Waziristan will have to be attacked. The more credible part of the response, that the military is too thinly spread since it is operating in other militancy-prone areas, might actually be a more fruitful subject of discussion with the Americans.
The US military chief could not be drawn out on drone attacks, but that is the burning issue in Pakistan on which the military again reiterated its stance, that they are harmful for security and peace in the region. In fact, the military is now backed by all political parties, both in power and those in the opposition. The widening opposition to the drones, coming now also from the PPP and the ANP, has perhaps been crystallised by the virtual non-implementation of the Kerry-Lugar funds after the legislation was passed in 2008. At that time, the fact that it would give a hefty allocation for civilian sectors in Pakistan was much-hyped, but so far only a tenth of the funds have actually made their way into Pakistan.
If Admiral Mullen thinks that both sides will equally strive not to allow the alliance from unravelling, he will have to make sure that advantages from this alliance are equally shared. Also, the Americans have to do something to negate the impression among many Pakistanis that when things get tough for them in Afghanistan, they start passing the buck to Pakistan. For the latter, it is important to separate incapacity from strategy and come clean on why it is not taking on the terrorists on its soil.
By Editorial
The Express Tribune, April 22nd, 2011.
After the failure of the ISI-CIA meeting in Washington, the Pak-US military top brass, too, has apparently not seen eye to eye on their diverging policies on terrorism. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen flew in seemingly holding an olive branch and saying the two countries could not afford to allow their anti-terrorism alliance to unravel, but ended up saying things that denote just such an unravelling. Before going in for the important meetings in Rawalpindi, he stuck to the red line often read out to Pakistan: Its fairly well-known that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani Network. Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesnt happen.
But he also appended to this his resolve not to let the bilateral equation collapse when he said: The ability to sustain a very difficult period as we have recently, between Pakistan and the United States, is in some ways indicative of the strength of the relationship. That doesnt mean we dont have challenges to continue to address, because we do. This very difficult recent period was characterised by a furore in Pakistan over the arrest of a CIA agent who had killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and the subsequent demand by Pakistan that the CIA cut back on its activities in Pakistan and put on record the functions of American officials coming in on diplomatic passports. The US admiral, in fact, publicly admitted this, saying that it was a setback to relations between the two countries.
Part of Pakistans response to Admiral Mullens remarks, as reported in the press, may not be considered very convincing except to the Pakistanis, 70 per cent of whom express dislike of the US and some even recommend cutting off relations with it. Officials say the Haqqani connection is not there and that even if you are enemies, you have a relationship. The upshot is that Pakistan is not willing to change its current policy on North Waziristan and may not be interested in explaining the real reason why it doesnt want to send in the troops to remove the Haqqanis and other foreign terrorists from there, in that they could be used as bargaining chips when the Afghan chessboard is reconfigured, say, following an American troops pullout. However, sooner or later, the militants who have found a safe haven in North Waziristan will have to be attacked. The more credible part of the response, that the military is too thinly spread since it is operating in other militancy-prone areas, might actually be a more fruitful subject of discussion with the Americans.
The US military chief could not be drawn out on drone attacks, but that is the burning issue in Pakistan on which the military again reiterated its stance, that they are harmful for security and peace in the region. In fact, the military is now backed by all political parties, both in power and those in the opposition. The widening opposition to the drones, coming now also from the PPP and the ANP, has perhaps been crystallised by the virtual non-implementation of the Kerry-Lugar funds after the legislation was passed in 2008. At that time, the fact that it would give a hefty allocation for civilian sectors in Pakistan was much-hyped, but so far only a tenth of the funds have actually made their way into Pakistan.
If Admiral Mullen thinks that both sides will equally strive not to allow the alliance from unravelling, he will have to make sure that advantages from this alliance are equally shared. Also, the Americans have to do something to negate the impression among many Pakistanis that when things get tough for them in Afghanistan, they start passing the buck to Pakistan. For the latter, it is important to separate incapacity from strategy and come clean on why it is not taking on the terrorists on its soil.
RabzonKhan
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EDITORIAL: Fence-mending?
Daily Times
April 22, 2011
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ostensibly journeyed to Pakistan to do some fence-mending. The need for this was obvious. Relations have been unprecedentedly strained and hit a new low because of the Raymond Davis affair and the question of drone attacks in Pakistans tribal areas. Although shariah legerdemain helped resolve the Davis conundrum to the USs satisfaction, it left a residue of bitterness and exacerbated anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, particularly amongst right wing groups and religious extremists. However, they were nonplussed by the fact that the Qisas and Diyat laws were relied upon to pull this particular chestnut out of the fire. That let the air out of the balloon of the rights campaign on the basis of demands for upholding our sovereignty and ensuring justice. The drone attacks, in which successive governments have been complicit while publicly condemning them, are going to continue, according to the US authorities, and there seems little except a heightened level of protest and demands from the Pakistani side for their cessation.
If Admiral Mullens visit was intended to put balm on the smarting wounds of the Pak-US relationship, it has ended up doing the exact opposite. The main reason for this is his tough, candid talk to the media in which he unequivocally framed the ISIs continuing links with the Haqqani network as the main obstacle in better ties between the two allies in the war on terror. Our military top brass, in meetings with the Admiral, reportedly rejected any such suggestion. But it is undeniable that the Haqqani network is located in North Waziristan, using that base area to attack US and NATO forces in eastern Afghanistan. The Pakistani militarys reluctance to attack the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, ostensibly because it is overstretched in its campaign against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has become an increasingly bitter cause of differences between the US and Pakistan. The Haqqani network particularly worries the US because of its links with al Qaeda.
But important as the Haqqani issue is, it is not the only cause of friction regarding jihadi groups operating in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the TTP are perceived in Washington as harbouring or acquiring ambitions to expand their scope of operations to the global stage. As though the al Qaeda threat were not enough, this development portends more trouble on the terrorist front in the region and further abroad.
Admiral Mullens visit and the arguably worse state of affairs it leaves in its wake is a reflection of the increasingly strained relationship between Pakistan and the US. There are a number of factors impacting the relationship. But the most important is the support of our military establishment since the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan following 9/11 to the Afghan Taliban by providing them safe havens on our soil and the freedom to use Pakistani soil to attack the US and NATO inside Afghanistan. The US response, given the carte blanche they received from General Musharrafs regime after 9/11, is to use CIA operatives clandestinely (and sometimes only barely so) inside Pakistan and in recent years increasingly rely on drone attacks to take out terrorists in FATA, a strategy that has caused a storm of protest of late in Pakistan. There have been reports that the British secret service MI6 may be charged with taking over many of the tasks of the CIA inside Pakistan. On the other hand, noises from Washington indicate the CIA has no intention to withdraw completely (personnel withdrawn because they have been exposed may be replaced by unknown operatives).
Whichever way the current hot winds end up blowing, endgame in Afghanistan underlies the increasing intensity of jockeying to ensure all stakeholders interests in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. In the process, the inescapably strategically crucial Pak-US relationship may just precariously inch along. The US needs Pakistan for a successful conclusion to its Afghan endgame. Pakistan is highly dependent economically and militarily on US goodwill. Neither side can afford a complete unravelling of the relationship. That implies more of the same up and down, see-saw set of interactions between Washington and Islamabad.
Daily Times
April 22, 2011
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ostensibly journeyed to Pakistan to do some fence-mending. The need for this was obvious. Relations have been unprecedentedly strained and hit a new low because of the Raymond Davis affair and the question of drone attacks in Pakistans tribal areas. Although shariah legerdemain helped resolve the Davis conundrum to the USs satisfaction, it left a residue of bitterness and exacerbated anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, particularly amongst right wing groups and religious extremists. However, they were nonplussed by the fact that the Qisas and Diyat laws were relied upon to pull this particular chestnut out of the fire. That let the air out of the balloon of the rights campaign on the basis of demands for upholding our sovereignty and ensuring justice. The drone attacks, in which successive governments have been complicit while publicly condemning them, are going to continue, according to the US authorities, and there seems little except a heightened level of protest and demands from the Pakistani side for their cessation.
If Admiral Mullens visit was intended to put balm on the smarting wounds of the Pak-US relationship, it has ended up doing the exact opposite. The main reason for this is his tough, candid talk to the media in which he unequivocally framed the ISIs continuing links with the Haqqani network as the main obstacle in better ties between the two allies in the war on terror. Our military top brass, in meetings with the Admiral, reportedly rejected any such suggestion. But it is undeniable that the Haqqani network is located in North Waziristan, using that base area to attack US and NATO forces in eastern Afghanistan. The Pakistani militarys reluctance to attack the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, ostensibly because it is overstretched in its campaign against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has become an increasingly bitter cause of differences between the US and Pakistan. The Haqqani network particularly worries the US because of its links with al Qaeda.
But important as the Haqqani issue is, it is not the only cause of friction regarding jihadi groups operating in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the TTP are perceived in Washington as harbouring or acquiring ambitions to expand their scope of operations to the global stage. As though the al Qaeda threat were not enough, this development portends more trouble on the terrorist front in the region and further abroad.
Admiral Mullens visit and the arguably worse state of affairs it leaves in its wake is a reflection of the increasingly strained relationship between Pakistan and the US. There are a number of factors impacting the relationship. But the most important is the support of our military establishment since the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan following 9/11 to the Afghan Taliban by providing them safe havens on our soil and the freedom to use Pakistani soil to attack the US and NATO inside Afghanistan. The US response, given the carte blanche they received from General Musharrafs regime after 9/11, is to use CIA operatives clandestinely (and sometimes only barely so) inside Pakistan and in recent years increasingly rely on drone attacks to take out terrorists in FATA, a strategy that has caused a storm of protest of late in Pakistan. There have been reports that the British secret service MI6 may be charged with taking over many of the tasks of the CIA inside Pakistan. On the other hand, noises from Washington indicate the CIA has no intention to withdraw completely (personnel withdrawn because they have been exposed may be replaced by unknown operatives).
Whichever way the current hot winds end up blowing, endgame in Afghanistan underlies the increasing intensity of jockeying to ensure all stakeholders interests in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. In the process, the inescapably strategically crucial Pak-US relationship may just precariously inch along. The US needs Pakistan for a successful conclusion to its Afghan endgame. Pakistan is highly dependent economically and militarily on US goodwill. Neither side can afford a complete unravelling of the relationship. That implies more of the same up and down, see-saw set of interactions between Washington and Islamabad.
S-2
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Reliance by Pakistan upon America's impingement of sovereign rights through PREDATOR strikes remains a fundamental rhetorical weakness. So long as elements of the Afghan taliban government and their Haqqani and Hekmatyar associates enjoy unimpeded sanctuary inside FATAville and Balochistan any claims to sovereign rights without the attendant responsibilities is spurious.
America argues that war is made without interference by the Pakistani government on Afghanistan from these territories. In the absence of such interference (or tacit acceptance of the same) America will continue to protect its forces and interests in the most plausible and realistic manner possible. Currently that means continued attacks by PREDATOR.
America argues that war is made without interference by the Pakistani government on Afghanistan from these territories. In the absence of such interference (or tacit acceptance of the same) America will continue to protect its forces and interests in the most plausible and realistic manner possible. Currently that means continued attacks by PREDATOR.
muse
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Now if you change the argument to the effect that Afghanistan's sovereignty or territorial integrity is endangered by Nato invaders and so long as these remain and rob Afghans of their sovereignty by launching military actions within and outside the borders of Afghanistan, they will be subject to....
I think, S2, you are trapped in a narrative that increasing has few takers.
Rhetorical weakness ? well, maybe something for all to consider - the narratives we "lock" ourselves into are counter productive, lets recall that the narratives we employ are meant to solve problems and to extent that we continue to employ narratives that no longer solve problems, we contribute to the problem.
I think, S2, you are trapped in a narrative that increasing has few takers.
Rhetorical weakness ? well, maybe something for all to consider - the narratives we "lock" ourselves into are counter productive, lets recall that the narratives we employ are meant to solve problems and to extent that we continue to employ narratives that no longer solve problems, we contribute to the problem.
Abu Zolfiqar
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funny how topic and notion of sovereignty (intertwined with ''responsibility'') is being delved into when an entire country's sovereignty has been violated for over past decade.....if you break into my house and then cry foul if I or my concerned neighbour come and try to defend the property then it doesnt make either of us deviates or criminals
hedge your bets now ladies & gentlemen........because the foreign forces wont always be calling the shots or be the policemen in Afghanistan or the region forever .
a nation undergoes moral decline and decay when it reneges and deviates from its principles, general philosophy and moral ethos......
in Pakistan's case for too long we have been lenient on some extremist elements; for too long the people have become lenient towards corrupt, feudal leaders and system.....to some extent there has been a breakdown of moral ethos among some segment of society
in West (especially USA case) -- it applies one standard for its own country and people and then applies different standards to those whom it views as less valuable or even expendable......the PREDATOR which a particular jingoistic member pompously brings up from time to time doesnt discriminate between good or bad......by firing those hellfires the policy makers have deemed those on the receiving end as guilty before proven innocent (of course in a matter of seconds, innocent/guilty disposition would make little difference).....
presumed guilty......i.e. extrajudicial killing
there seems to be a lot of confusions, a lot of double-standards, a lot of loopholes in this policy; however due to the perfidiousness and gray area in which our govt. operates the war is fought more on others' terms than our own. The national security of others is giving more priority than that of our own
this can never be acceptable, and this is why a lot of the wary public is becoming more vocal and rising up against these flawed and dangerous policies
Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be setting aside a lot of past differences and coming closer together; we share many concerns. One cannot be stable or safe without the other --given geography and other in-escapable realities. It's time to become more assertive and for us to do the dictating and rules-setting.
I'll be very direct here; this may not win me friends amongst the higher-ups. But I say Pakistan Nation and her people have paid a HUGE cost in material and social terms for a war we were arm-twisted and coerced into joining; one that was INITIALLY not ours but became ours due to the negligence and carelessness of allies and due to the lack of vision or solutions provided by leaders (or lack thereof) on our side
one failed strategy after the other..........but like i said, hedge your bets now. And stand firm.
Fear is no policy
Surrender is no option.
When your moral cause is right
then you know that you are righteous.
hedge your bets now ladies & gentlemen........because the foreign forces wont always be calling the shots or be the policemen in Afghanistan or the region forever .
a nation undergoes moral decline and decay when it reneges and deviates from its principles, general philosophy and moral ethos......
in Pakistan's case for too long we have been lenient on some extremist elements; for too long the people have become lenient towards corrupt, feudal leaders and system.....to some extent there has been a breakdown of moral ethos among some segment of society
in West (especially USA case) -- it applies one standard for its own country and people and then applies different standards to those whom it views as less valuable or even expendable......the PREDATOR which a particular jingoistic member pompously brings up from time to time doesnt discriminate between good or bad......by firing those hellfires the policy makers have deemed those on the receiving end as guilty before proven innocent (of course in a matter of seconds, innocent/guilty disposition would make little difference).....
presumed guilty......i.e. extrajudicial killing
there seems to be a lot of confusions, a lot of double-standards, a lot of loopholes in this policy; however due to the perfidiousness and gray area in which our govt. operates the war is fought more on others' terms than our own. The national security of others is giving more priority than that of our own
this can never be acceptable, and this is why a lot of the wary public is becoming more vocal and rising up against these flawed and dangerous policies
Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be setting aside a lot of past differences and coming closer together; we share many concerns. One cannot be stable or safe without the other --given geography and other in-escapable realities. It's time to become more assertive and for us to do the dictating and rules-setting.
I'll be very direct here; this may not win me friends amongst the higher-ups. But I say Pakistan Nation and her people have paid a HUGE cost in material and social terms for a war we were arm-twisted and coerced into joining; one that was INITIALLY not ours but became ours due to the negligence and carelessness of allies and due to the lack of vision or solutions provided by leaders (or lack thereof) on our side
one failed strategy after the other..........but like i said, hedge your bets now. And stand firm.
Fear is no policy
Surrender is no option.
When your moral cause is right
then you know that you are righteous.
muse
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We now have a situation in which the issues such as sovereignty, and Drone attacks are going to be used as a bargaining chip to pressure the Fauj to start operations in NW -- but lets look at past operations, Have these don much good?? How can we do better? What's the role of political and geo-political players? The piece below is highly partisan, read it critically, not because it's partisan but so you can better understand the position:
Fruitless engagements
By Hasan Khan
THE time has come for Pakistan’s political and military leadership to objectively evaluate the shortcomings of the country’s operations for prolonged stability in the tribal areas.
The military engagements, as a recent White House report and subsequent comments by the US military leadership point out, are packed with flaws and despite years of struggle, have failed to eliminate the militants’ networks. The elements of ‘clear, hold and build’ are the basic elements of any military operation. In our case, one or two of these essentials are clearly missing, otherwise there would be no need to undertake an operation again in an area that was earlier claimed to have been cleared.
Addressing a corps commanders’ meeting some time ago in Rawalpindi, Gen Kayani expressed his satisfaction with the campaign to bring stability to the tribal areas. However, this satisfaction seems off the target when these operations are examined from the people’s perspective. There is serious concern about these campaigns: they are costly and continue for years without producing any tangible results. The tribal areas are still miles away from stabilisation.
Except for North Waziristan, where Pakistan is resisting American pressure to undertake a military operation, the security forces have for the past four years been engaged with militants in the Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and South Waziristan agencies. The hostile territory spans some 27,000 square kilometres and the military has been using jet bombers, gunship helicopters and heavy artillery against alleged militant hideouts. The operations have caused immense socio-economic and infrastructural damage, and have also displaced an estimated 500,000 Pakhtun tribal families. Most of these people are living in miserable conditions in the settled areas. Viewed from the tribesmen’s perspective, the situation on the ground is far from improving.
The Pakistan military launched four major operations, codenamed Sirat-i-Mustaqeem, Daraghlum, Bia-daraghlum and Khwakh Ba de Sham in Bara tehsil of the Khyber agency. Besides the massive consequential displacement, the residents of Bara have had to brave an uninterrupted curfew for the past 22 months; over 6,000 shops and some 5,000 industrial units are closed. Everything has been destroyed — except the militants’ networks which are not only intact but demonstrably capable of killing and kidnapping for ransom in both the settled and the tribal areas.
In the Orakzai agency, aerial bombing has caused more damage to the lives and properties of innocent tribesmen than to militants’ hideouts. Large portions of the area including Momozai, Mirqalam, Arhang, Kasha, Saif Dara, Otmela, Zafar Garhi, Daran and Wam Panrha, remain in the militants’ control. Despite a year of intense fighting with the active support of heavy artillery and jet bombers, the security forces did not manage to dismantle the militants’ networks here.
The military entered the South Waziristan agency in October 2009. Some 200,000 families were immediately asked to relocate in order to minimise collateral damage. During a visit to Ladha in South Waziristan, I asked an elderly man the whereabouts of the militants and the Taliban.
He pointed to a nearby mountain and, smiling sarcastically, said “they are there”. The common perception in the area is that the military has taken control in major population centres and highways, but the militants have retreated to the mountains. Everyone I asked feared that the militants would be back once the internally displaced people returned.
Five operations were launched by the security forces in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies; the latest ones are still ongoing. Thousands of families have been rendered homeless but the militants are still calling the shots.
In addition to the other problems they cause, the extended military operations are also gradually giving rise to anti-military sentiment. Tribesmen complain of the humiliation they have to endure, particularly when they are searched at checkpoints. Security personnel often abuse, slap or kick people on minor provocations, regardless of whether the hapless victim is male or female. Every tribesperson, whether man or woman, is considered a would-be suicide bomber and treated as such. For several years, now, ordinary tribal people have been sandwiched between the military and the militants since disobeying either is tantamount to inviting death.
The prime objectives of the military campaigns were to secure the tribal areas against both local and foreign militants, re-establish the writ of the government, dismantle militants’ hideouts and training centres and stop them from launching attacks across the border in Afghanistan. The military has virtually taken all the tribal areas in its control, leaving no space for the political administration, but the writ of the government remains absent.
Leaving aside what the US says, Pakistan’s leadership needs to evaluate these prolonged operations in the light of the objectives mentioned above.
Americans may have no right to dictate, but the millions of tribal people have a legitimate right to ask the army about the outcome of the military engagements in their areas.
To cover up Pakistan’s failures against militants in its tribal belt, our military and political leadership have been working on a ready-to-accept narrative. Both are marketing the idea that no success against militants in tribal areas is possible unless the situation in Afghanistan improves. This amounts to burying one’s head in the sand.
Afghanistan has five neighbours, one of which is Pakistan. Why did Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan not import militancy or extremism on the scale that Pakistan has? A popular Pushto proverb says: “It is better to stop your hen from hatching its eggs in a neighbour’s field than to fight the neighbour.” This, I believe, is an accurate reflection on Pakistan’s situation.
The military must now allow a parliamentary evaluation of the operations against militancy. People have already paid a heavy price for the flawed counter-terrorism strategy which has exclusively the military in the driving seat. The army needs to seek a fresh mandate from the people since the current campaigns lack political backing from mainstream political parties and the national media. The problem started when an over-confident military leadership ignored the unanimous resolution passed in a joint sitting of the parliament and resorted to dealing with the militants using force. The joint resolution had called for dialogue, development and, as a last resort, deterrence.
We have a successful model of an anti-militant operation in Malakand division, where the military was backed fully by the political parties and the media. In the tribal areas, however, the military is fighting alone.
The writer is the director of news and current affairs at Khyber TV.
hasan.khyber@gmail.com
Fruitless engagements
By Hasan Khan
THE time has come for Pakistan’s political and military leadership to objectively evaluate the shortcomings of the country’s operations for prolonged stability in the tribal areas.
The military engagements, as a recent White House report and subsequent comments by the US military leadership point out, are packed with flaws and despite years of struggle, have failed to eliminate the militants’ networks. The elements of ‘clear, hold and build’ are the basic elements of any military operation. In our case, one or two of these essentials are clearly missing, otherwise there would be no need to undertake an operation again in an area that was earlier claimed to have been cleared.
Addressing a corps commanders’ meeting some time ago in Rawalpindi, Gen Kayani expressed his satisfaction with the campaign to bring stability to the tribal areas. However, this satisfaction seems off the target when these operations are examined from the people’s perspective. There is serious concern about these campaigns: they are costly and continue for years without producing any tangible results. The tribal areas are still miles away from stabilisation.
Except for North Waziristan, where Pakistan is resisting American pressure to undertake a military operation, the security forces have for the past four years been engaged with militants in the Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and South Waziristan agencies. The hostile territory spans some 27,000 square kilometres and the military has been using jet bombers, gunship helicopters and heavy artillery against alleged militant hideouts. The operations have caused immense socio-economic and infrastructural damage, and have also displaced an estimated 500,000 Pakhtun tribal families. Most of these people are living in miserable conditions in the settled areas. Viewed from the tribesmen’s perspective, the situation on the ground is far from improving.
The Pakistan military launched four major operations, codenamed Sirat-i-Mustaqeem, Daraghlum, Bia-daraghlum and Khwakh Ba de Sham in Bara tehsil of the Khyber agency. Besides the massive consequential displacement, the residents of Bara have had to brave an uninterrupted curfew for the past 22 months; over 6,000 shops and some 5,000 industrial units are closed. Everything has been destroyed — except the militants’ networks which are not only intact but demonstrably capable of killing and kidnapping for ransom in both the settled and the tribal areas.
In the Orakzai agency, aerial bombing has caused more damage to the lives and properties of innocent tribesmen than to militants’ hideouts. Large portions of the area including Momozai, Mirqalam, Arhang, Kasha, Saif Dara, Otmela, Zafar Garhi, Daran and Wam Panrha, remain in the militants’ control. Despite a year of intense fighting with the active support of heavy artillery and jet bombers, the security forces did not manage to dismantle the militants’ networks here.
The military entered the South Waziristan agency in October 2009. Some 200,000 families were immediately asked to relocate in order to minimise collateral damage. During a visit to Ladha in South Waziristan, I asked an elderly man the whereabouts of the militants and the Taliban.
He pointed to a nearby mountain and, smiling sarcastically, said “they are there”. The common perception in the area is that the military has taken control in major population centres and highways, but the militants have retreated to the mountains. Everyone I asked feared that the militants would be back once the internally displaced people returned.
Five operations were launched by the security forces in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies; the latest ones are still ongoing. Thousands of families have been rendered homeless but the militants are still calling the shots.
In addition to the other problems they cause, the extended military operations are also gradually giving rise to anti-military sentiment. Tribesmen complain of the humiliation they have to endure, particularly when they are searched at checkpoints. Security personnel often abuse, slap or kick people on minor provocations, regardless of whether the hapless victim is male or female. Every tribesperson, whether man or woman, is considered a would-be suicide bomber and treated as such. For several years, now, ordinary tribal people have been sandwiched between the military and the militants since disobeying either is tantamount to inviting death.
The prime objectives of the military campaigns were to secure the tribal areas against both local and foreign militants, re-establish the writ of the government, dismantle militants’ hideouts and training centres and stop them from launching attacks across the border in Afghanistan. The military has virtually taken all the tribal areas in its control, leaving no space for the political administration, but the writ of the government remains absent.
Leaving aside what the US says, Pakistan’s leadership needs to evaluate these prolonged operations in the light of the objectives mentioned above.
Americans may have no right to dictate, but the millions of tribal people have a legitimate right to ask the army about the outcome of the military engagements in their areas.
To cover up Pakistan’s failures against militants in its tribal belt, our military and political leadership have been working on a ready-to-accept narrative. Both are marketing the idea that no success against militants in tribal areas is possible unless the situation in Afghanistan improves. This amounts to burying one’s head in the sand.
Afghanistan has five neighbours, one of which is Pakistan. Why did Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan not import militancy or extremism on the scale that Pakistan has? A popular Pushto proverb says: “It is better to stop your hen from hatching its eggs in a neighbour’s field than to fight the neighbour.” This, I believe, is an accurate reflection on Pakistan’s situation.
The military must now allow a parliamentary evaluation of the operations against militancy. People have already paid a heavy price for the flawed counter-terrorism strategy which has exclusively the military in the driving seat. The army needs to seek a fresh mandate from the people since the current campaigns lack political backing from mainstream political parties and the national media. The problem started when an over-confident military leadership ignored the unanimous resolution passed in a joint sitting of the parliament and resorted to dealing with the militants using force. The joint resolution had called for dialogue, development and, as a last resort, deterrence.
We have a successful model of an anti-militant operation in Malakand division, where the military was backed fully by the political parties and the media. In the tribal areas, however, the military is fighting alone.
The writer is the director of news and current affairs at Khyber TV.
hasan.khyber@gmail.com
RabzonKhan
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What game is Imran Khan trying to play here, who is he really trying to protect!?
If he really cares for the poor people of FATA, then why doesnt he and his supporters go to North and South Waziristan (where most drone strike occur), and once and for all show the entire world that there is no al-Qaeda, Afghan-Taliban, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Chechen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union, Chinese Uighurs, Tajik and Punjabi terrorists groups living there, and that the US is only killing innocent Pakistanis without any reason.
Do Imran Khan and his supporters have the courage and guts to enter terrorist control FATA, especially North Waziristan?
Imran Khan delivers ultimatum on drone strikes
April 24 2011
If he really cares for the poor people of FATA, then why doesnt he and his supporters go to North and South Waziristan (where most drone strike occur), and once and for all show the entire world that there is no al-Qaeda, Afghan-Taliban, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Chechen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union, Chinese Uighurs, Tajik and Punjabi terrorists groups living there, and that the US is only killing innocent Pakistanis without any reason.
Do Imran Khan and his supporters have the courage and guts to enter terrorist control FATA, especially North Waziristan?
Imran Khan delivers ultimatum on drone strikes
April 24 2011
muse
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Singing a different tune -- but my guess is that it wont last, readers are invited to judge US messages for themselves:
Pakistan’s concerns about Afghanistan should be addressed: Munter
* US ambassador says Washington committed to civilian government in Pakistan
* Emphasises on trilateral engagement for solution of Afghan issue
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s legitimate security demands must be taken into account on the question of Afghanistan, said United States Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter on Sunday, adding that legitimate demands of Pakistan on the Afghan question must be given due consideration.
He said this while talking to PTV.
Munter said that the US has great respect for Pakistan and wants to see it as a sovereign and stable state. “We are working for stability in the region,” he added.
He said, “We are supporting both the civilian government and the army in Pakistan.”
About the US financial support for civilian projects in Pakistan, he said that the US was helping in building dams and roads.
“We are very committed to your country and your civilian government,” the US ambassador said and referred to the Kerry-Lugar Act under which the US is putting in an annual $1.5 billion aid for Pakistan’s development, including roads, dams and other infrastructure projects.
Munter, in this respect, also referred to the US support in the Gomal Zam Dam project as well as a $40 million aid for irrigation of 25,000 farms. “We are doing concrete things. We are completing roads in South Waziristan. We are honest with you because we are your friends,” he stressed.
Discussing the situation in Afghanistan, the ambassador said that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s recent trip to Kabul was “a good step” towards the process of restoration of peace in Afghanistan.
To a question, as if the US supports the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Reconciliation Commission, Ambassador Munter said, “Yes, we support it,” and also quoted the US secretary of state as endorsing such cooperation at diplomatic and civilian levels.
“We support the idea of a core group, based on working together,” he added.
The US ambassador emphasising on the trilateral engagement for a solution of Afghanistan said, the key countries including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US should work together, adding, “this is the essence of our relationship”.
“We want stability in the region and we are committed to that,” he said. To a question, Munter said regional countries like Turkey and India also have a positive role for economic development in Afghanistan. Everyone in this region has to play a role for its stability”, he said. app
Pakistan’s concerns about Afghanistan should be addressed: Munter
* US ambassador says Washington committed to civilian government in Pakistan
* Emphasises on trilateral engagement for solution of Afghan issue
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s legitimate security demands must be taken into account on the question of Afghanistan, said United States Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter on Sunday, adding that legitimate demands of Pakistan on the Afghan question must be given due consideration.
He said this while talking to PTV.
Munter said that the US has great respect for Pakistan and wants to see it as a sovereign and stable state. “We are working for stability in the region,” he added.
He said, “We are supporting both the civilian government and the army in Pakistan.”
About the US financial support for civilian projects in Pakistan, he said that the US was helping in building dams and roads.
“We are very committed to your country and your civilian government,” the US ambassador said and referred to the Kerry-Lugar Act under which the US is putting in an annual $1.5 billion aid for Pakistan’s development, including roads, dams and other infrastructure projects.
Munter, in this respect, also referred to the US support in the Gomal Zam Dam project as well as a $40 million aid for irrigation of 25,000 farms. “We are doing concrete things. We are completing roads in South Waziristan. We are honest with you because we are your friends,” he stressed.
Discussing the situation in Afghanistan, the ambassador said that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s recent trip to Kabul was “a good step” towards the process of restoration of peace in Afghanistan.
To a question, as if the US supports the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Reconciliation Commission, Ambassador Munter said, “Yes, we support it,” and also quoted the US secretary of state as endorsing such cooperation at diplomatic and civilian levels.
“We support the idea of a core group, based on working together,” he added.
The US ambassador emphasising on the trilateral engagement for a solution of Afghanistan said, the key countries including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US should work together, adding, “this is the essence of our relationship”.
“We want stability in the region and we are committed to that,” he said. To a question, Munter said regional countries like Turkey and India also have a positive role for economic development in Afghanistan. Everyone in this region has to play a role for its stability”, he said. app
RabzonKhan
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I fully agree with the author on this one, that's close to what I said in a different thread:
http://www.defence.pk/forums/current-events-social-issues/18396-age-madness-10.html#post1541518
Muse, you know and I know we ordinary people are hardly a match to the battlefield-hardened religious extremists, they will wipe us out.
I believe our armed forces with the unbending determination of our people and with the support of political parties (I know you hate politicians
) can defeat them. Swat is a good example, there, the people, armed forces and politicians worked together to defeat the barbarians.But unfortunately, that will never happen as long as our Generals fight a selective war on terrorism and follow Zias evil (military/mullah alliance) legacy.
muse
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Rabzon
It's Incredible to me that the Fauj has been footing around with these religious luns - look, it's either, or
Either the Fauj is playing with kid gloves
Or the Fauj doesn't know what it's doing
Bottom line is that for entirely too long, we have had to contend with this rubbish about these cave dweller types being super fighters -- now if the Fauj can't handle them, them of course it can't protect us from the indian and so do we need the fauj?
It's a no win for them but they still persist in this ridiculous position - anyway, not until these religious lunes have been milked of all possible utility will we see them deal with - that's the most persuasive idea, to the best of my understanding.
It's Incredible to me that the Fauj has been footing around with these religious luns - look, it's either, or
Either the Fauj is playing with kid gloves
Or the Fauj doesn't know what it's doing
Bottom line is that for entirely too long, we have had to contend with this rubbish about these cave dweller types being super fighters -- now if the Fauj can't handle them, them of course it can't protect us from the indian and so do we need the fauj?
It's a no win for them but they still persist in this ridiculous position - anyway, not until these religious lunes have been milked of all possible utility will we see them deal with - that's the most persuasive idea, to the best of my understanding.
muse
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vast numbers of Pakistanis remain supporters of Al-Qaida and her local affiliates, the one who are actually waging war against Pakistanis, against Sufis, against Shi'ah, against all who will not submit to their vision - and for all the claims of winning against these butchers, I think the real question we should be asking ourselves is "how did we allow all of this to happen"? because, lets not tell each other lies, we allowed this to happen -- if we can win against these islamists and that's a big if, what will Pakistani society be like? Will it be a free society?? Will it be tolerant of religion, especially this virulent Saudi variety?? I really think that Pakistan will become a much more intolerant society and a closed society from which others seek to escape, the reason for my pessimism? As a society, as a culture, we are not persuaded that extremism is a wrong, we are not even persuaded that it's wrong against others, let alone ourselves:
Wolf at the doorstep
S Iftikhar Murshed
Monday, April 25, 2011
In a desperate attempt to re-brand its image aimed at capturing the hearts and minds of Muslims, Al-Qaeda has asked its affiliates such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan to cease attacks on the local population and focus instead on operations against Western targets. In statements made over the last several months Al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi have emphasised the “sanctity of Muslim blood.”
These appeals were obviously prompted by no higher a motive than Al-Qaeda’s nervousness at the rapid erosion of its support base in Pakistan and in other Islamic countries. There has been a wave of revulsion against its espousal of takfir under which Muslims are declared apostates and killed.
In early September 2007, Sheikh Salman al-Ouda, a widely respected religious scholar and one of the founders of Shawa, the fundamentalist movement that engulfed Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, challenged Osama bin Laden during a rare appearance on television: “How much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, the elderly and women have been killed...in the name of Al- Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty, carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands of victims on your back?”
A few days later, Sayyed Imam al-Sharif, an influential Afghan Arab who, according to analysts, was the “ideological godfather of Al-Qaeda” and a staunch proponent of takfir, withdrew his support from Osama bin Laden. His book, Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World, details the reasons for his renunciation of Al-Qaeda as well as abandoning the concept of takfir.
This had a far-reaching impact and prompted new thinking among jihadist organisations. For instance, in September 2009 the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), once closely associated with Al-Qaeda, announced a new “code” for jihad which is elaborated in a 417-page document titled Corrective Studies. Scholars do not doubt the credibility of the LIFG and feel that its re-formulated concept for jihad is likely to become a major impediment for Al-Qaeda’s recruitment drive.
On Sept 10 last year, former LIFG leader Noman Benotman, or Abu Mohammad al-Libi as he is known in Afghanistan, sent an open letter to Osama bin Laden in which he described himself as a previous “comrade in arms” of the Al-Qaeda leader and then bluntly stated: “Your duty is to prevent your organisation from going further down the road of ghulu (extremism), takfir (excommunication) and shedding of innocent blood that was forbidden by God.” Several other important jihadists of the Arab world have also been vehemently critical of Al-Qaeda.
Three major events in the Muslim world in 1979 not only resulted in an irreversible surge of religion-motivated extremism but also altered the course of global politics. The first was the Iranian revolution in February, which led to the establishment of the world’s first modern Muslim theocracy; the second was seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on Nov 20 by fundamentalist dissidents who sought to overthrow the Saudi monarchy; the third was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Dec 27, which sparked the decade-long Afghan jihad culminating in the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the eventual collapse of the bipolar, Cold War world order.
It was against this backdrop that Al-Qaeda was to emerge some years later. After the dramatic Grand Mosque episode, the Saudi government launched a purge of potential radicals. The highly influential Palestinian scholar and theologian, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941-1989), was expelled from the faculty of the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and he relocated to Pakistan in order to be close to the yet nascent Afghan jihad.
Azzam taught briefly at the International Islamic University in Islamabad in 1980 and then moved to Peshawar where he founded the Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahideen for the purpose of facilitating the Afghan jihad. The trademark slogan which he never abandoned was: “Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues.”
In 1981 Osama bin Laden also proceeded to Peshawar after graduating from the university in Jeddah, where Abdullah Azzam had been his teacher and mentor. On Azzam’s request he financed the training of the recruits and later, in 1984, established the Bait-ul-Ansar to reinforce support for the Arab volunteers in the war and eventually created his own independent militia.
Azzam succeeded in building a scholarly, ideological and practical paramilitary infrastructure for the globalisation of Islamic movements that had previously focused on separate national and revolutionary liberation struggles. His philosophical rationalisation of global jihad and practical approach to recruitment and training of Muslim militants from around the world blossomed during the Afghan war and proved crucial to the subsequent creation of Al-Qaeda.
After the successful struggle against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan, differences arose among the Mujahideen leaders over where to launch the next jihad. Abdullah Azzam’s vision of a global struggle against the “far enemy” (al adu al baeed) put him at odds with another influential faction of Afghan Arabs, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was convinced that the target should be the “enemy nearby” (al adu al qareeb).
The focus on the “near enemy” implied that the immediate priority was not jihad against “unbelievers” such as Israeli Jews, European Christians or Indian Hindus, but the “self-professed” Muslims of the Egyptian government and secular dispensations of the Islamic world. In other words, Muslims who did not follow the narrow, literalist interpretation of Islam were apostates and had to be killed under the concept of takfir.
Abdullah Azzam, whose belief that “one hour of jihad is worth more than 70 years of praying at home” was adopted by Al-Qaeda, nevertheless fervently opposed takfir because of its potential of spreading fitna (sedition) and disunity among the Muslim community. This resulted in his assassination in Peshawar on Nov 24, 1989. Analysts are convinced that the murder was perpetrated by Al-Qaeda operatives loyal to Zawahiri. Several other scholars, notably Khaled Ahmed, are inclined to believe that Azzam was “a non-terrorist internationalist” whose concept of jihad did not envisage the killing of innocent civilians and, with his assassination, Al-Qaeda “moved away from defensive jihad against the invading Soviet Union and embraced terrorism as its methodology.”
Researchers agree that Al-Qaeda was formally launched on Aug 11, 1988, during a meeting between Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and several leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad where it was decided the organisation would devote itself to fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide. Initially the group’s real name was not mentioned in public because its existence was still a closely guarded secret. All this was to change with Azzam’s assassination, and Muslims increasingly became the main victims of terrorism carried out by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
It is against this background that the insincerity of Al-Qaeda appeals to its associates to refrain from attacking Muslims becomes immediately obvious. Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, a former prime minister of Thailand, once said that “a wolf at the doorstep is more dangerous than a tiger in the forest.” It is the homegrown terrorist outfits supported by Al-Qaeda, or the “enemy nearby” in Zawahiri’s words, that pose the gravest threat to Pakistan. Yet a counterterrorism strategy has not even been thought through by the country’s inept leadership.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion quarterly. Email: iftimurshed @gamail.com
Wolf at the doorstep
S Iftikhar Murshed
Monday, April 25, 2011
In a desperate attempt to re-brand its image aimed at capturing the hearts and minds of Muslims, Al-Qaeda has asked its affiliates such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan to cease attacks on the local population and focus instead on operations against Western targets. In statements made over the last several months Al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi have emphasised the “sanctity of Muslim blood.”
These appeals were obviously prompted by no higher a motive than Al-Qaeda’s nervousness at the rapid erosion of its support base in Pakistan and in other Islamic countries. There has been a wave of revulsion against its espousal of takfir under which Muslims are declared apostates and killed.
In early September 2007, Sheikh Salman al-Ouda, a widely respected religious scholar and one of the founders of Shawa, the fundamentalist movement that engulfed Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, challenged Osama bin Laden during a rare appearance on television: “How much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, the elderly and women have been killed...in the name of Al- Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty, carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands of victims on your back?”
A few days later, Sayyed Imam al-Sharif, an influential Afghan Arab who, according to analysts, was the “ideological godfather of Al-Qaeda” and a staunch proponent of takfir, withdrew his support from Osama bin Laden. His book, Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World, details the reasons for his renunciation of Al-Qaeda as well as abandoning the concept of takfir.
This had a far-reaching impact and prompted new thinking among jihadist organisations. For instance, in September 2009 the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), once closely associated with Al-Qaeda, announced a new “code” for jihad which is elaborated in a 417-page document titled Corrective Studies. Scholars do not doubt the credibility of the LIFG and feel that its re-formulated concept for jihad is likely to become a major impediment for Al-Qaeda’s recruitment drive.
On Sept 10 last year, former LIFG leader Noman Benotman, or Abu Mohammad al-Libi as he is known in Afghanistan, sent an open letter to Osama bin Laden in which he described himself as a previous “comrade in arms” of the Al-Qaeda leader and then bluntly stated: “Your duty is to prevent your organisation from going further down the road of ghulu (extremism), takfir (excommunication) and shedding of innocent blood that was forbidden by God.” Several other important jihadists of the Arab world have also been vehemently critical of Al-Qaeda.
Three major events in the Muslim world in 1979 not only resulted in an irreversible surge of religion-motivated extremism but also altered the course of global politics. The first was the Iranian revolution in February, which led to the establishment of the world’s first modern Muslim theocracy; the second was seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on Nov 20 by fundamentalist dissidents who sought to overthrow the Saudi monarchy; the third was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Dec 27, which sparked the decade-long Afghan jihad culminating in the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the eventual collapse of the bipolar, Cold War world order.
It was against this backdrop that Al-Qaeda was to emerge some years later. After the dramatic Grand Mosque episode, the Saudi government launched a purge of potential radicals. The highly influential Palestinian scholar and theologian, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941-1989), was expelled from the faculty of the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and he relocated to Pakistan in order to be close to the yet nascent Afghan jihad.
Azzam taught briefly at the International Islamic University in Islamabad in 1980 and then moved to Peshawar where he founded the Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahideen for the purpose of facilitating the Afghan jihad. The trademark slogan which he never abandoned was: “Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues.”
In 1981 Osama bin Laden also proceeded to Peshawar after graduating from the university in Jeddah, where Abdullah Azzam had been his teacher and mentor. On Azzam’s request he financed the training of the recruits and later, in 1984, established the Bait-ul-Ansar to reinforce support for the Arab volunteers in the war and eventually created his own independent militia.
Azzam succeeded in building a scholarly, ideological and practical paramilitary infrastructure for the globalisation of Islamic movements that had previously focused on separate national and revolutionary liberation struggles. His philosophical rationalisation of global jihad and practical approach to recruitment and training of Muslim militants from around the world blossomed during the Afghan war and proved crucial to the subsequent creation of Al-Qaeda.
After the successful struggle against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan, differences arose among the Mujahideen leaders over where to launch the next jihad. Abdullah Azzam’s vision of a global struggle against the “far enemy” (al adu al baeed) put him at odds with another influential faction of Afghan Arabs, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was convinced that the target should be the “enemy nearby” (al adu al qareeb).
The focus on the “near enemy” implied that the immediate priority was not jihad against “unbelievers” such as Israeli Jews, European Christians or Indian Hindus, but the “self-professed” Muslims of the Egyptian government and secular dispensations of the Islamic world. In other words, Muslims who did not follow the narrow, literalist interpretation of Islam were apostates and had to be killed under the concept of takfir.
Abdullah Azzam, whose belief that “one hour of jihad is worth more than 70 years of praying at home” was adopted by Al-Qaeda, nevertheless fervently opposed takfir because of its potential of spreading fitna (sedition) and disunity among the Muslim community. This resulted in his assassination in Peshawar on Nov 24, 1989. Analysts are convinced that the murder was perpetrated by Al-Qaeda operatives loyal to Zawahiri. Several other scholars, notably Khaled Ahmed, are inclined to believe that Azzam was “a non-terrorist internationalist” whose concept of jihad did not envisage the killing of innocent civilians and, with his assassination, Al-Qaeda “moved away from defensive jihad against the invading Soviet Union and embraced terrorism as its methodology.”
Researchers agree that Al-Qaeda was formally launched on Aug 11, 1988, during a meeting between Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and several leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad where it was decided the organisation would devote itself to fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide. Initially the group’s real name was not mentioned in public because its existence was still a closely guarded secret. All this was to change with Azzam’s assassination, and Muslims increasingly became the main victims of terrorism carried out by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
It is against this background that the insincerity of Al-Qaeda appeals to its associates to refrain from attacking Muslims becomes immediately obvious. Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, a former prime minister of Thailand, once said that “a wolf at the doorstep is more dangerous than a tiger in the forest.” It is the homegrown terrorist outfits supported by Al-Qaeda, or the “enemy nearby” in Zawahiri’s words, that pose the gravest threat to Pakistan. Yet a counterterrorism strategy has not even been thought through by the country’s inept leadership.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion quarterly. Email: iftimurshed @gamail.com
Abu Zolfiqar
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Muse sir what do you define as "vast numbers"
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