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By Nasir Khan
Divers are working day in and day out with the latest Norwegian state-of-the-art technology at their disposal to recover the bodies of 118 sailors who perished in the Russian submarine Kursk’s recent August 2000 disaster at the bottom of the Arctic Barents Sea. This is being done in an effort to heal the sufferings of the bereaved families so that their loved ones could be given a decent burial.
However, PNS Ghazi’s bereaved families have not been that fortunate to bury their loved ones. Ghazi’s bereaved families pain continues to this day as their dear ones had a muddy burial inside a steel hull somewhere off the fairway buoy of Vishakapatham in the Bay of Bengal – where Ghazi still rests buried under the mud.
The fate of PNS Ghazi (lost in 1971 war with India) had remained shrouded in mystery for many years till the early Nineties when some fine books were written by retired personnel of Indian Navy giving a first hand account of the entire tragic event. The detail sequence of events leading to the sinking of Ghazi has since been well-established.
One such book is War in the Indian Ocean, written by Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy who was Director of Intelligence during this period reporting directly to Admiral S. M. Nanda – Chief of the Indian Naval Staff (1970-73). The book gives a well-documented, informative and balanced version of the entire Ghazi episode without any pomp and sentiment and plenty of substance. Events narrated in this book dovetail to a great extent with The Story of Pakistan Navy compiled by the Pakistan History Section, Islamabad, and published in 1991. Admiral Roy in the preface of his book pays tributes to The Story of Pakistan Navy stating that it has been very lucidly compiled.
There is, of course, a world of information available on the Internet on submarines. Amazon website alone gives names and details of about 998 books written on submarine disasters both historical and fictional. There is a wonderful website on British Navy Submarines of World War Two, which gives the dates, names of commanding officers and other details of all Royal Navy submarines which till now have been sunk or lost in action. Websites on the famous and most dreaded Second World War German U-Boats and many more are also there, but alas not an iota of information is there on Ghazi.
A submarine may be described as visually the least impressive of all types of sea-going vessels. On those few occasions when it is visible this most of ships appears perhaps no more threatening than say a huge sea turtle. This is due to the simple reason that its hull does not bristle with weapons, instruments and sensors of all kinds like other surface ships. It’s true imposing bulk can only be seen in Dry Dock. Submarine surfacing is one of the most vulnerable times for a submarine since at this time it makes a lot of noise. The rush of compressed air into the ballast tanks along with the noise of the expanding hull called “hull popping” brings down the sensibility of different gadgets and makes submarines more prone to accidents at this time then at any other. The same hull design that provides such a smooth ride in the depth of the ocean rolls like drunkenly in a mild surface swell.
The dispatch of Ghazi to India was presumably in response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan’s naval balance in the Bay of Bengal. Also the presence of the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant in that area was well known to Pakistan authorities. Aircraft carriers as naval history tells us have always been a lucrative target for submarines. US submarine Squalus was sunk in 1930s, she was raised and renamed USS Sailfish. This very USS Sailfish then achieved a distinct combat record and sunk the first Japanese aircraft carrier. As they say, from the depths of disaster come the tools of victory. The strategic soundness of the decision was correct in sofar Ghazi was the only ship, that had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters deep inside enemy territory. However, those who planned this ill-fated operation only know best about the material state of this old submarine ordered to operate in the Bay of Bengal with little maintenance assistance (if any).
Ghazi had to traverse 3,000 miles in the Indian Ocean in close proximity of a host of Indian shore installations like Kunjali, Bombay, Jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Vishakapatnam and many more. The risks Ghazi was exposed to were undoubtedly of exponential proportions, considering the fact that it was an old diesel engine powered sub which had to surface often for snorkelling. How important is the type of propulsion for submarine can be ascertained from the following paragraph which is extracted from Tom Clancy’s best-seller “Submarine” (Berkley Books, New York-1993 edition):
Ghazi valiantly sailed forth from Karachi on 14th Nov, 1971, with a gallant crew of 92 officers and men. It was directed to operate in absolute silence and use its snorkel at night. It was to make its last report between 26th Nov To 28th Nov 1971, at that point in time it hoped to run past Madras there after it was entirely on its own. As stated by Admiral Roy, Ghazi’s presence in the Bay of Bengal only came to light when a signal addressed to naval authorities in Chittagong was intercepted in November 1971, requesting information of a grade of lubrication oil which is used only by submarines and minesweepers. It was immediately concluded by Indian Naval authorities that Ghazi was stalking Vikrant since the minesweepers and the Daphne submarines in the Pakistani Flotilla did not possess the range to operate in the Bay of Bengal.
Along with this Indian intelligence had other reports too indicating that Vikrant was constantly under Pakistani surveillance. Thus Vikrant was ordered to change course and was steamed away to the Andamans where the forest department had arranged logs of wood to act as a catamaran for a small oiler to keep the carrier topped with fuel. Ghazi thus was not able to locate its prey across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal. Unable to locate Vikrant, it presumably turned back to Vishakapatnam – the headquarters of India’s Eastern Naval Command to atleast bottle up the Indian Navy’s heavy units, which were concentrated in this base.
Admiral Roy goes on to state that while laying mines in the late evening of Dec 3, 1971, when the hostilities between the two countries had commenced, Ghazi must have picked up the sonar transmissions or the propeller noise of the patrolling ships. She, therefore, got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters. A point to be noted here is the tremendous amount of zeal, courage and enthusiasm with which Ghazi’s crew carried out their mission always knowing that the threat of certain death was at hand-shaking distance.
This is indirectly acknowledged by the Admiral while narrating the whole incident. At about midnight (3rd Dec 1971) when the Indian patrolling ships returned to harbour, Ghazi approached the partly-mined area to complete the bottling assignment of Indian Eastern Fleet in their homeport of Vishakapatham. By that time somehow the ship count mechanism could have been activated and was ready to claim its victim, irrespective of being friend or foe. There were two simultaneous explosions around midnight 3rd Dec, 1971, and the fate of Ghazi was sealed.
There was no Indian ship in the vicinity at that point in time. Indians had no part to play in the destruction of Ghazi and the earlier claims and theories put forward by the Indians highlighting the heroic achievements of their destroyer Rajput, patrol craft Akshay and depth charge attacks from the Alize-anti submarine aircraft, made a mockery of themselves. Admiral Roy has acknowledged this fact in the following words:
“The theories propounded earlier by some who were unaware of the ruse de guerre leading to the sinking of the first submarine in the Indian Ocean gave rise to smirks from within our own (Indian) naval service for an operation which instead merited a Bravo Zulu (flag hoist for bravery)”.
One thing which remains doubtful is what actuated the count mechanism of the mines. The submarine inadvertently passing over them herself while laying mines in the second attempt or the patrolling vessels or alternatively the earlier depth charges may have activated the same. In the early hours of 4th Dec 1971, life jackets and other evidence were fished out and brought to the naval base and later shown to all naval attaches at Delhi. Admiral Nanda demanded more positive proof. Hence the submarine rescue vessel, INS Nishtar proceeded to the site of the debris and used her underwater television and sent down divers to physically check the wreckage lying on the seabed.
It has been explicitly stated in this book that three bodies were recovered. Other items included lifejackets, notices to mariners signed by Pakistan’s chief hydrographer, Sawar Khan, and logbook, etc. Nothing more about the bodies, their identities, etc., has been mentioned except that they were given an appropriate burial according to the traditions of the service.
An interesting fact has been mentioned here that the Americans offered to raise the submarine to the surface at their own expense. So did the Soviets, but the Government of India rejected these offers and deliberately allowed the submarine to sink into the mud off the fairway buoy of Vishakapatham and where it still rests buried under the mud. These findings were unveiled and made public as late as on 9th Dec, 1971, in the Indian Parliament session. This perhaps caused a little ambiguity as to the date of the sinking of Ghazi.
There is a popular quote that says: “Failure is an orphan, but success has many fathers”. The journey of a thousand miles also ends the way it starts – with a single step. While making this distinction, an often forgotten fact is that success owes a great deal to playing dice at many stages, for life is a game of whist. This seems to be the case with Ghazi for even when the incident was still fresh, there was totally inadequate recognition of Ghazi’s miraculous feat, now 30 years down the road nobody even recalls Ghazi.
_______________________
Article Courtesy: Dawn Weekly [18 December 2000]
@war&peace @Imran Khan @BHarwana @Horus
Divers are working day in and day out with the latest Norwegian state-of-the-art technology at their disposal to recover the bodies of 118 sailors who perished in the Russian submarine Kursk’s recent August 2000 disaster at the bottom of the Arctic Barents Sea. This is being done in an effort to heal the sufferings of the bereaved families so that their loved ones could be given a decent burial.
However, PNS Ghazi’s bereaved families have not been that fortunate to bury their loved ones. Ghazi’s bereaved families pain continues to this day as their dear ones had a muddy burial inside a steel hull somewhere off the fairway buoy of Vishakapatham in the Bay of Bengal – where Ghazi still rests buried under the mud.
The fate of PNS Ghazi (lost in 1971 war with India) had remained shrouded in mystery for many years till the early Nineties when some fine books were written by retired personnel of Indian Navy giving a first hand account of the entire tragic event. The detail sequence of events leading to the sinking of Ghazi has since been well-established.
One such book is War in the Indian Ocean, written by Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy who was Director of Intelligence during this period reporting directly to Admiral S. M. Nanda – Chief of the Indian Naval Staff (1970-73). The book gives a well-documented, informative and balanced version of the entire Ghazi episode without any pomp and sentiment and plenty of substance. Events narrated in this book dovetail to a great extent with The Story of Pakistan Navy compiled by the Pakistan History Section, Islamabad, and published in 1991. Admiral Roy in the preface of his book pays tributes to The Story of Pakistan Navy stating that it has been very lucidly compiled.
There is, of course, a world of information available on the Internet on submarines. Amazon website alone gives names and details of about 998 books written on submarine disasters both historical and fictional. There is a wonderful website on British Navy Submarines of World War Two, which gives the dates, names of commanding officers and other details of all Royal Navy submarines which till now have been sunk or lost in action. Websites on the famous and most dreaded Second World War German U-Boats and many more are also there, but alas not an iota of information is there on Ghazi.
A submarine may be described as visually the least impressive of all types of sea-going vessels. On those few occasions when it is visible this most of ships appears perhaps no more threatening than say a huge sea turtle. This is due to the simple reason that its hull does not bristle with weapons, instruments and sensors of all kinds like other surface ships. It’s true imposing bulk can only be seen in Dry Dock. Submarine surfacing is one of the most vulnerable times for a submarine since at this time it makes a lot of noise. The rush of compressed air into the ballast tanks along with the noise of the expanding hull called “hull popping” brings down the sensibility of different gadgets and makes submarines more prone to accidents at this time then at any other. The same hull design that provides such a smooth ride in the depth of the ocean rolls like drunkenly in a mild surface swell.
The dispatch of Ghazi to India was presumably in response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan’s naval balance in the Bay of Bengal. Also the presence of the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant in that area was well known to Pakistan authorities. Aircraft carriers as naval history tells us have always been a lucrative target for submarines. US submarine Squalus was sunk in 1930s, she was raised and renamed USS Sailfish. This very USS Sailfish then achieved a distinct combat record and sunk the first Japanese aircraft carrier. As they say, from the depths of disaster come the tools of victory. The strategic soundness of the decision was correct in sofar Ghazi was the only ship, that had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters deep inside enemy territory. However, those who planned this ill-fated operation only know best about the material state of this old submarine ordered to operate in the Bay of Bengal with little maintenance assistance (if any).
Ghazi had to traverse 3,000 miles in the Indian Ocean in close proximity of a host of Indian shore installations like Kunjali, Bombay, Jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Vishakapatnam and many more. The risks Ghazi was exposed to were undoubtedly of exponential proportions, considering the fact that it was an old diesel engine powered sub which had to surface often for snorkelling. How important is the type of propulsion for submarine can be ascertained from the following paragraph which is extracted from Tom Clancy’s best-seller “Submarine” (Berkley Books, New York-1993 edition):
Ghazi valiantly sailed forth from Karachi on 14th Nov, 1971, with a gallant crew of 92 officers and men. It was directed to operate in absolute silence and use its snorkel at night. It was to make its last report between 26th Nov To 28th Nov 1971, at that point in time it hoped to run past Madras there after it was entirely on its own. As stated by Admiral Roy, Ghazi’s presence in the Bay of Bengal only came to light when a signal addressed to naval authorities in Chittagong was intercepted in November 1971, requesting information of a grade of lubrication oil which is used only by submarines and minesweepers. It was immediately concluded by Indian Naval authorities that Ghazi was stalking Vikrant since the minesweepers and the Daphne submarines in the Pakistani Flotilla did not possess the range to operate in the Bay of Bengal.
Along with this Indian intelligence had other reports too indicating that Vikrant was constantly under Pakistani surveillance. Thus Vikrant was ordered to change course and was steamed away to the Andamans where the forest department had arranged logs of wood to act as a catamaran for a small oiler to keep the carrier topped with fuel. Ghazi thus was not able to locate its prey across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal. Unable to locate Vikrant, it presumably turned back to Vishakapatnam – the headquarters of India’s Eastern Naval Command to atleast bottle up the Indian Navy’s heavy units, which were concentrated in this base.
Admiral Roy goes on to state that while laying mines in the late evening of Dec 3, 1971, when the hostilities between the two countries had commenced, Ghazi must have picked up the sonar transmissions or the propeller noise of the patrolling ships. She, therefore, got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters. A point to be noted here is the tremendous amount of zeal, courage and enthusiasm with which Ghazi’s crew carried out their mission always knowing that the threat of certain death was at hand-shaking distance.
This is indirectly acknowledged by the Admiral while narrating the whole incident. At about midnight (3rd Dec 1971) when the Indian patrolling ships returned to harbour, Ghazi approached the partly-mined area to complete the bottling assignment of Indian Eastern Fleet in their homeport of Vishakapatham. By that time somehow the ship count mechanism could have been activated and was ready to claim its victim, irrespective of being friend or foe. There were two simultaneous explosions around midnight 3rd Dec, 1971, and the fate of Ghazi was sealed.
There was no Indian ship in the vicinity at that point in time. Indians had no part to play in the destruction of Ghazi and the earlier claims and theories put forward by the Indians highlighting the heroic achievements of their destroyer Rajput, patrol craft Akshay and depth charge attacks from the Alize-anti submarine aircraft, made a mockery of themselves. Admiral Roy has acknowledged this fact in the following words:
“The theories propounded earlier by some who were unaware of the ruse de guerre leading to the sinking of the first submarine in the Indian Ocean gave rise to smirks from within our own (Indian) naval service for an operation which instead merited a Bravo Zulu (flag hoist for bravery)”.
One thing which remains doubtful is what actuated the count mechanism of the mines. The submarine inadvertently passing over them herself while laying mines in the second attempt or the patrolling vessels or alternatively the earlier depth charges may have activated the same. In the early hours of 4th Dec 1971, life jackets and other evidence were fished out and brought to the naval base and later shown to all naval attaches at Delhi. Admiral Nanda demanded more positive proof. Hence the submarine rescue vessel, INS Nishtar proceeded to the site of the debris and used her underwater television and sent down divers to physically check the wreckage lying on the seabed.
It has been explicitly stated in this book that three bodies were recovered. Other items included lifejackets, notices to mariners signed by Pakistan’s chief hydrographer, Sawar Khan, and logbook, etc. Nothing more about the bodies, their identities, etc., has been mentioned except that they were given an appropriate burial according to the traditions of the service.
An interesting fact has been mentioned here that the Americans offered to raise the submarine to the surface at their own expense. So did the Soviets, but the Government of India rejected these offers and deliberately allowed the submarine to sink into the mud off the fairway buoy of Vishakapatham and where it still rests buried under the mud. These findings were unveiled and made public as late as on 9th Dec, 1971, in the Indian Parliament session. This perhaps caused a little ambiguity as to the date of the sinking of Ghazi.
There is a popular quote that says: “Failure is an orphan, but success has many fathers”. The journey of a thousand miles also ends the way it starts – with a single step. While making this distinction, an often forgotten fact is that success owes a great deal to playing dice at many stages, for life is a game of whist. This seems to be the case with Ghazi for even when the incident was still fresh, there was totally inadequate recognition of Ghazi’s miraculous feat, now 30 years down the road nobody even recalls Ghazi.
_______________________
Article Courtesy: Dawn Weekly [18 December 2000]
@war&peace @Imran Khan @BHarwana @Horus
