AfrazulMandal
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2 Indian dead. 3 injured.
2 Pakistani dead. 5 injured.
This is horrible.
2 Pakistani dead. 5 injured.
This is horrible.
9 Indian soldiers killed on LOC - 1 Pakistani Soldier & 5 civilians martyred
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PakSword
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Sahi bataday kitnay maray aap ki side!
waz
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Pakistan lost one soldier, not two.
Falcon26
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Pakistan army must institute a policy of destroying all Indian bases that target civilians. It must use each and every weapon in its disposal to do so regardless of escalation. The indiscriminate targeting and slaughter of innocents can not continue anymore. The Indian army has got away with murder for far too long. Response must not be restricted by agreements and understandings. The Indian military is a coward that only respects the language of power. February 27 is the best example of this.
alee92nawaz
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Don't say more. Troll brigade is ready to attack you
maximuswarrior
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Tit for tat is not enough. Are we going to do this every other election? You can expect Modi to carry out attacks every election season. There needs to be a brute force response. Really a crushing and an overwhelming response. This tit for tat won’t cut it. You have to send a message across. These attacks are otherwise becoming routine at every election.
GumNaam
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I wrote in another thread but for context sake adding the same response here as well.
What goes on at the LoC is essentially a delicate act of maintaining an equilibrium. Our Army knows what it is doing and also the quantum of response to India. Nothing is forgotten, nothing is forgiven. The Indians know this, and we know it. There is no "overwhelming" punishment by any side without getting the same in response. If Indians try to do it in one place, they will get an equal response in the same or the other sectors.
For those who also question why is Pakistan not responding, leaving the exaggerated news behind, rest assured that damage is and will be done to the other side.
Here is a bit more from the Indian author (their perspective) Happymon Jacob's excerpts for additional insight. While I cannot completely agree with everything he writes (there is an inherent bias towards the Indian PoV in many parts of his book) but one can understand the rough contours of how Pakistan and India meet on the LoC:
BOOK EXCERPT
What an Indian professor learned about the Line of Control by travelling with the Pakistani army
Happymon Jacob traveled with the Pakistani and Indian armies on both sides of the Line of Control for his new book.
Happymon Jacob
Before we started our journey, Noor had left his commander’s vehicle behind a bridgehead under the cover of trees. He had travelled to Battal village below the Indian posts in an unmarked jeep without the brigadier insignia. I noticed it right away. “Why has he left his official vehicle behind? Does he think he would be targeted?” I asked my liaison officer. He just smiled and said nothing.
Perhaps Noor didn’t want the Indian Army to identify him and take shots at a high-value target. Not that soldiers normally shoot at high-value targets on either side. In fact, there is an unwritten understanding among the forces on both sides that they will not shoot at helicopters – helicopters often carry senior officers. But why take a chance, he must have thought.
Having left his official vehicle behind, Noor was going about like an unidentified Pakistan Army officer along with soldiers carrying personal weapons, and “someone” in civilian attire.
I pictured the Indian soldiers following our progress through their binoculars. Did it cross their mind to take a shot at the Pakistan patrol party? After all, they were in a position of strength there: they could shoot and get away with it. Moreover, they had no idea Noor was a brigadier, nor did they know that the “someone” in civilian attire was an Indian.
At a time when CFVs [ceasefire violations] were the order of the day, who could blame them if they took a potshot?
What would the Pakistan Army soldiers who were deputed to protect me from Indian firing be thinking? For them, at least for the moment, I might have been an Indian academic, not an enemy. They of course wouldn’t shoot me while I was on their side – rather they would protect me – but if I were to be on the other side, things would have been different.
Emotions and feelings of enmity, however strong they may be, are spatio-temporally contingent. For the Indians and Pakistanis working together in other parts of the world, the need for economic coexistence trumps enmity at home. Enmity towards those you do not know, have never met and have no particular ill will against is a product of modern nationalism. Human beings have fought and killed unknown people for survival since time immemorial, but
nationalism has given a new meaning to modern forms of enmity.
We drove past the jungle post and several other posts along the ridge overlooking the road, slowly, carefully and watching intently to see if there was any activity on the Indian side – not that bullets would be preceded by a warning siren. Across the elevated ridge, Pakistani posts were facing the Indian posts. Given what Noor had told me I knew that the two sides would be carefully observing each other’s movements and would be ready to respond in case the need arose. They were in each other’s firing range and did exchange fire during stand-offs.
What changes the equation though is not the balance of forces, posts or even weapons, but the presence of Pakistani civilian villages in the bowl between the two ridgelines atop which the indian and Pakistani forces are perched.
The Pakistani forces are on tenterhooks here because they know any misadventure from their side will have grave implications for Pakistani civilians.
Troops manning geographically “disadvantaged” areas, therefore, have to perforce “behave themselves” so as to not get shot by the adversary or get the civilian population shot at. Vagaries of geography often determines one’s behaviour. General Tariq Waseem Ghazi once recalled an example: “When I was commanding an area in the Poonch sector we had an area surrounded on three sides by Indian positions. We had to deliberately keep this area quiet because the slightest disturbance meant those positions would not get their reinforcements and so on, and that may also lead to other CFVs.”
Not that the Indian side would fire for the heck of it – they know that what they do in the Battal sector will have implications in other sectors. There is a “delicate balance of terror” in operation here, to use a phrase from the American strategist Albert Wohlstetter’s 1959 Foreign Affairs essay describing the nuclear arms race between the Cold War rivals.
General Arshad pointed out during a conversation in Bangkok, on the sidelines of one of our track-II dialogues, that the location of response can be anywhere within a 200-kilometre radius of the location where the initial firing took place: “if fired at in one area it is not necessary that you respond in the same area. If there are no good targets on the other side to respond, the brigade commander will decide to respond where we have an upper hand so we could give a better response to the other side.”
Pakistani general Yasin who was part of the conversation between me and Arshad chipped in: “When the Indians would fire at my A post, my guy at B post would fire at the Indian side. It is the dynamic of the terrain and the tactical position. If it’s a large-scale violation then you may shift it by 50 kilometres.”
In other words, firing by the Pakistan Army in the Poonch sector could potentially be responded to by the Indian Army in the Rajouri sector. This “releasing of pressure elsewhere” dynamic could work at the brigade, battalion or even at the division level.
“You seem to be at a disadvantage here... so what do you do when the Indian side fires at you with no end in sight?” I asked Noor in the jeep. Despite all the tension around, he seemed to be in no hurry. He was carefully negotiating the village roads, with their occasional boulders and potholes.
“Well, we have earmarked places for retaliation not too far from here. There is a system of things on the LoC...nothing goes un-responded to.” Perfect symmetry, I thought to myself. Upon return, I created a website to present the data on CFVs, which included a graph to indicate the daily occurrence of CFVs. What the graph shows is indeed a perfect symmetry of firing by the Indian and Pakistani forces. Nothing goes un-responded to.
What goes on at the LoC is essentially a delicate act of maintaining an equilibrium. Our Army knows what it is doing and also the quantum of response to India. Nothing is forgotten, nothing is forgiven. The Indians know this, and we know it. There is no "overwhelming" punishment by any side without getting the same in response. If Indians try to do it in one place, they will get an equal response in the same or the other sectors.
For those who also question why is Pakistan not responding, leaving the exaggerated news behind, rest assured that damage is and will be done to the other side.
Here is a bit more from the Indian author (their perspective) Happymon Jacob's excerpts for additional insight. While I cannot completely agree with everything he writes (there is an inherent bias towards the Indian PoV in many parts of his book) but one can understand the rough contours of how Pakistan and India meet on the LoC:
BOOK EXCERPT
What an Indian professor learned about the Line of Control by travelling with the Pakistani army
Happymon Jacob traveled with the Pakistani and Indian armies on both sides of the Line of Control for his new book.
Happymon Jacob
Before we started our journey, Noor had left his commander’s vehicle behind a bridgehead under the cover of trees. He had travelled to Battal village below the Indian posts in an unmarked jeep without the brigadier insignia. I noticed it right away. “Why has he left his official vehicle behind? Does he think he would be targeted?” I asked my liaison officer. He just smiled and said nothing.
Perhaps Noor didn’t want the Indian Army to identify him and take shots at a high-value target. Not that soldiers normally shoot at high-value targets on either side. In fact, there is an unwritten understanding among the forces on both sides that they will not shoot at helicopters – helicopters often carry senior officers. But why take a chance, he must have thought.
Having left his official vehicle behind, Noor was going about like an unidentified Pakistan Army officer along with soldiers carrying personal weapons, and “someone” in civilian attire.
I pictured the Indian soldiers following our progress through their binoculars. Did it cross their mind to take a shot at the Pakistan patrol party? After all, they were in a position of strength there: they could shoot and get away with it. Moreover, they had no idea Noor was a brigadier, nor did they know that the “someone” in civilian attire was an Indian.
At a time when CFVs [ceasefire violations] were the order of the day, who could blame them if they took a potshot?
What would the Pakistan Army soldiers who were deputed to protect me from Indian firing be thinking? For them, at least for the moment, I might have been an Indian academic, not an enemy. They of course wouldn’t shoot me while I was on their side – rather they would protect me – but if I were to be on the other side, things would have been different.
Emotions and feelings of enmity, however strong they may be, are spatio-temporally contingent. For the Indians and Pakistanis working together in other parts of the world, the need for economic coexistence trumps enmity at home. Enmity towards those you do not know, have never met and have no particular ill will against is a product of modern nationalism. Human beings have fought and killed unknown people for survival since time immemorial, but
nationalism has given a new meaning to modern forms of enmity.
We drove past the jungle post and several other posts along the ridge overlooking the road, slowly, carefully and watching intently to see if there was any activity on the Indian side – not that bullets would be preceded by a warning siren. Across the elevated ridge, Pakistani posts were facing the Indian posts. Given what Noor had told me I knew that the two sides would be carefully observing each other’s movements and would be ready to respond in case the need arose. They were in each other’s firing range and did exchange fire during stand-offs.
What changes the equation though is not the balance of forces, posts or even weapons, but the presence of Pakistani civilian villages in the bowl between the two ridgelines atop which the indian and Pakistani forces are perched.
The Pakistani forces are on tenterhooks here because they know any misadventure from their side will have grave implications for Pakistani civilians.
Troops manning geographically “disadvantaged” areas, therefore, have to perforce “behave themselves” so as to not get shot by the adversary or get the civilian population shot at. Vagaries of geography often determines one’s behaviour. General Tariq Waseem Ghazi once recalled an example: “When I was commanding an area in the Poonch sector we had an area surrounded on three sides by Indian positions. We had to deliberately keep this area quiet because the slightest disturbance meant those positions would not get their reinforcements and so on, and that may also lead to other CFVs.”
Not that the Indian side would fire for the heck of it – they know that what they do in the Battal sector will have implications in other sectors. There is a “delicate balance of terror” in operation here, to use a phrase from the American strategist Albert Wohlstetter’s 1959 Foreign Affairs essay describing the nuclear arms race between the Cold War rivals.
General Arshad pointed out during a conversation in Bangkok, on the sidelines of one of our track-II dialogues, that the location of response can be anywhere within a 200-kilometre radius of the location where the initial firing took place: “if fired at in one area it is not necessary that you respond in the same area. If there are no good targets on the other side to respond, the brigade commander will decide to respond where we have an upper hand so we could give a better response to the other side.”
Pakistani general Yasin who was part of the conversation between me and Arshad chipped in: “When the Indians would fire at my A post, my guy at B post would fire at the Indian side. It is the dynamic of the terrain and the tactical position. If it’s a large-scale violation then you may shift it by 50 kilometres.”
In other words, firing by the Pakistan Army in the Poonch sector could potentially be responded to by the Indian Army in the Rajouri sector. This “releasing of pressure elsewhere” dynamic could work at the brigade, battalion or even at the division level.
“You seem to be at a disadvantage here... so what do you do when the Indian side fires at you with no end in sight?” I asked Noor in the jeep. Despite all the tension around, he seemed to be in no hurry. He was carefully negotiating the village roads, with their occasional boulders and potholes.
“Well, we have earmarked places for retaliation not too far from here. There is a system of things on the LoC...nothing goes un-responded to.” Perfect symmetry, I thought to myself. Upon return, I created a website to present the data on CFVs, which included a graph to indicate the daily occurrence of CFVs. What the graph shows is indeed a perfect symmetry of firing by the Indian and Pakistani forces. Nothing goes un-responded to.
Crusher
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We live in the age of internet propaganda sharing where "establishments" all over the world are making a fool out of their own people with fake videos and BS claims, I have been observing this trend since last 10 years so I don't believe in any BS coming from establishment sources.
Bratva
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It's pakistani soldiers picking up their dead colleague. Don't spread propoganda.
Thamizh Puli
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I have seen this video before, I think you are wrong - this shows Pak soldiers retrieving their dead comrades. See this:
Also , you should show some respect to soldiers, whether Pakistani or Indian. They are doing their job and putting their lives on the line.
GumNaam
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then this is REALLY GOOD cuz 9 indian soldiers have been sent to hell...
uhm yyyyyeah...you sure about that? india is infamous for painting its own casualties as the enemy's casualties like this 71 trophy (notice, it's a mig 21 tail, an aircraft that Pakistan never operated in 71):
no wonder no one in the world takes anything coming from the indian government or media seriously...
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Bullets do not guide.
Their probability of kill increases with usage and velocity.
Men who are exposed or in weak shelter will get hit and die. If 15 Pakistanis expose themselves to an Indian gun, they will die.
Indians have better positions and do not differentiate between civilians and military targets; it is their training and modus operandi to kill indiscriminate hence our troops are likely to get killed more than theirs as we wont target their soldiers sitting near civilians on their side.
Their probability of kill increases with usage and velocity.
Men who are exposed or in weak shelter will get hit and die. If 15 Pakistanis expose themselves to an Indian gun, they will die.
Indians have better positions and do not differentiate between civilians and military targets; it is their training and modus operandi to kill indiscriminate hence our troops are likely to get killed more than theirs as we wont target their soldiers sitting near civilians on their side.
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