2014 AND BEYOND: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, PART I.

[Perceptron]

2014 AND BEYOND : U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, PART I

Testimony by Ashley J. Tellis
Senior Associate, South Asia Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
November 3, 2011

Preparing for the 2014 Security Transition in Afghanistan

Led by the United States, the international community committed itself at the Lisbon Summit to complete a security transition in Afghanistan by 2014. By this date, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) will assume full responsibility for its internal and external security, thus permitting the international coalition to transition from active combat operations and to progressively begin the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. To meet this goal, the GIROA, in collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is currently in the process of identifying the areas that will be handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in three tranches.

The first tranche announced by President Hamid Karzai in March this year involved the transfer of security responsibility in all districts of Bamyan, Panjshir, and Kabul provinces (with the exception of the Surobi district in Kabul), as well as the municipalities of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh province), Herat (Herat province), Lashkar Gah (Helmand province), and Mehtar Lam (Laghman province). This handover, which began in July, involved areas that were “either relatively free of insurgent activity or have a heavy presence of U.S. and NATO troops that can intervene anytime Afghan security forces become overwhelmed,” as Alex Rodriguez summarized it in the Los Angeles Times (Alex Rodriguez, “Karzai lists areas due for security transfer,” Los Angeles Times, March 23, 2011).

The GIROA and the ISAF leadership are now completing discussions on which areas would revert to Afghan responsibility in the second tranche. Based on remarks by both American military officers and Afghan officials, it is likely that Afghan forces will assume responsibility for some dangerous and contested areas right away—when coalition forces are still present in the country in substantial strength—while preparing themselves for assuming nationwide control in the third tranche, which will likely begin in 2013 and continue well into the following year. If this timetable holds, the security transition envisaged by the international community at Lisbon will be completed by 2014, when coalition forces will cease to have primary responsibility for assuring Afghan security.

But, Can the Security Transition Deliver?

It is unclear, however, whether this transition will be successful on the above timelines for two reasons. First, although the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has made remarkable progress in building up the ANSF in recent years, it is unlikely that these indigenous forces—military, police, and militia—will be capable of independently securing the country against the wide range of terrorist and insurgent groups that will still be present in the region in 2014. Second, President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw the surge forces from Afghanistan by September 2012—which in effect means that American troops will begin rotating out of the country starting in spring next year before the second fighting season is even fully underway—will prevent U.S. military commanders from being able to complete what they have so effectively begun: decimating the mid-level command structure of the Taliban, which serves as the vital link between the rahbari shura (the leadership council) based in Quetta, Pakistan, and their foot soldiers in the field. President Obama’s decision to withdraw the entire surge force by 2012—rather than keep it deployed in Afghanistan until the security transition is concluded—thus denies the ISAF the opportunity to expand the successful clearing operations already begun in the south to eastern Afghanistan. The stillmaturing ANSF will thus be left with a much more difficult task than would be the case if U.S. forces were present in strength and were able to clear the east as well before the security transition was complete.

The vicious interaction of the ANSF’s immaturity and the premature diminution of U.S. combat power in Afghanistan makes it very likely that, although the security transition will proceed on schedule, the Afghan state will still be incapable of autonomously neutralizing the threats posed by the Taliban insurgency and the terrorist groups—such as al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network—which support its operations in different ways. If the GIROA fails to neutralize these threats, as is to be expected at least in the initial phase following the security transition, the United States and its coalition partners will have no choice but to support Afghan counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and its affiliates, because a defeat here implies the potential collapse of the Afghan state and a return to warlordism and civil strife, all of which produce the enabling conditions for an upsurge in global terrorism. Consequently, even if the security transition is successful as a process in and of itself, it will not eliminate the threats to the American homeland and the homelands of our allies if the ANSF remains incapable of independently neutralizing the myriad security threats in Afghanistan.

Enter Political Reconciliation as Deus Ex Machina

The Administration has attempted to resolve this conundrum by promoting reconciliation with the Taliban. This approach is premised on the calculation that a political solution to the conflict would, by definition, minimize the burdens facing the ANSF in regards to security en route to and after the transition; it would also enable the Administration to proceed with progressively larger troop withdrawals from Afghanistan as peace gradually returns. Consistent with this logic, the Administration has initiated a series of overtures towards both the Quetta shura and the Haqqani network in the hope of exploring the prospects for reconciliation. The Karzai government, using its own intermediaries and the High Peace Council headed by the late Burhanuddin Rabbani, has also embarked on parallel outreach efforts towards the Quetta shura, the Haqqani network, and the Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin) headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

While reaching out to these adversaries is sensible in principle, this effort has not yet yielded much fruit in practice—and is unlikely to do so in any meaningful way at least in time to assure a peaceful security transition in 2014. The reasons for this failure are many and intractable.

To begin, it is still not clear whether the Quetta shura has any genuine interest in reconciliation with the GIROA on the terms laid out by the United States: the insurgents must renounce violence; irrevocably cut their ties with al-Qaeda; and abide by the Afghan constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. The shura’s acceptance of these terms would be tantamount to accepting defeat after a decade of war. While it is possible that the Afghan Taliban might be willing to cut ties with al-Qaeda as part of a larger settlement with the GIROA—though the evidence today at the operational level only corroborates how deeply intertwined these two groups have become—it is patently unclear why the insurgent leadership would want to accept such peace terms right now, no matter how uncomfortable they may be with their Pakistani protectors and how desirous they are of returning to their own country.

For starters, they believe that so far they have only been hurt, but not decisively defeated, by the ISAF’s military operations. And, more to the point, they are convinced that NATO forces are irrevocably headed out the door by 2014 and will leave behind a fragile Afghan state that constitutes easy pickings. For an insurgency, whose members have survived over thirty years of bitter and unrelenting war, to surrender on the eve of the departure of its most capable opponents defies reason—and the recent assassination of the GIROA’s principal envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani, by the Taliban signals that the shura may not perceive an urgency for peace that matches the Administration’s need for a successful reconciliation as part of the security transition. Rabbani’s killing has now dulled even Karzai’s enthusiasm for negotiations with the Taliban, and it has deepened skepticism throughout Afghanistan about the prospects for a peaceful termination to the conflict.

Furthermore, other factors complicate the shura’s incentives for a settlement. Even if it is assumed that the Taliban can stomach an Afghan constitution that respects gender rights and the rights of minorities—a difficult proposition given their antediluvian ideology and repressive social practices—it would be much harder for the movement to accept what President Karzai and the United States are now mutually negotiating even as they encourage the Taliban to reconcile: a strategic partnership declaration (SPD) that promises a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

Almost every analysis of the motivations underlying the Taliban insurgency concludes that whatever the myriad grievances of the rebels may be in regard to government corruption, tribal rivalries, and liberal social practices, they are united in their opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. If that is the case, the prospect that the shura would reconcile with the GIROA is dim. At a time when the insurgent leadership does not believe that it has been conclusively defeated, when it is convinced that its adversaries are headed for the exit, and when its principal antagonist offers a peace but at the price of accepting continued foreign military presence in their country, the attractiveness of reconciliation quickly becomes evanescent.

This last issue of foreign military forces creates a chicken-and-egg conundrum: of course, an SPD that did not provide for an American presence would make reconciliation with the GIROA a tad more attractive for the Taliban, but given that even reconciliation does not eliminate the prospect of future power struggles in Afghanistan, there are fewer incentives for Karzai to pursue reconciliation if he could not assure himself of an enduring American presence that protects him and his regime’s interests. In other words, the American protection that makes reconciliation viable for the GIROA makes it unacceptable for the Taliban.

Given these realities, it is not surprising that the Administration’s initiatives regarding reconciliation have not borne much fruit thus far. The Haqqani network has declared that it will not be party to separate peace talks with the Administration, deferring instead to the Quetta shura as the lead interlocutor for any negotiations. The shura, by all accounts, still appears to evince some sort of interest in discussions—but not with Kabul, only with Washington. This insistence, of course, undermines the Administration’s position that reconciliation ultimately must be an Afghan-led process, but even this problem is manageable in comparison to some of the others discussed above. In any event, despite several Administration conversations with the shura’s representative thus far—indentified in press reports as Tayeb Agha, a secretary to Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban emir—it is still not clear how committed the insurgent leadership is to a negotiated end to the war or whether the shura is simply playing the United States as it bides its time waiting for the transition.

At the End of the Day, the Problem is Pakistan

Although the prospects for political reconciliation are undermined by many challenges, at the end of the day there is none as vexing as the problematic role of Pakistan. This is a quandary with multiple dimensions. The most obvious reason why the Quetta shura has reduced incentives to reconcile with the GIROA is because they—and their fighters embedded currently in communities along the frontier—enjoy substantial immunity to coalition military action because of the sanctuary provided by Pakistan. So long as the coalition either cannot or will not breach this sanctuary out of respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty, two consequences obtain: first, the shura will not feel compelled to reconcile with the GIROA because their security and their warfighting capabilities cannot be held at risk by military actions; and, second, Pakistan becomes the kingmaker, determining the success or failure of Afghan reconciliation because of the pressure it can apply on the shura and its affiliates with regard to decisions relating to war and peace.

Recognizing this fact, the Obama Administration has sought to persuade Pakistan—through a combination of public and private entreaties as well as pressure—to encourage the Quetta shura and its constituents to enter into a dialogue with the United States and with Afghanistan. Despite repeated efforts, however, the Administration’s initiatives have not produced much thus far for the simple reason that American and Pakistani objectives on this issue are fundamentally at odds. The United States seeks to leave behind after 2014 an Afghanistan that is united, capable, and independent. Pakistan, in contrast, seeks an Afghanistan that, although nominally unified, is anything but capable and independent. Specifically, it desires an Afghanistan that would be at least deferential to, if not dependent on, Islamabad where Kabul’s critical strategic and foreign policy choices are concerned.

Stated precisely, Pakistan seeks an Afghanistan that is strong enough to prevent its internal problems from spilling over into Pakistan, but not so strong as to be able to pursue independent policies that might compete with Pakistan’s own interests. Key military leaders who drive Pakistan’s national policies on this matter seem to hold the belief that a return to the pre–2001 past is still possible—a situation where Afghanistan remains somewhat chaotic, but “manageable,” non-threatening, and decidedly subordinate to Pakistan in the international arena. The persistence of this conviction enables Rawalpindi—the headquarters of the Pakistani military where all these decisions are made—to avoid unpleasant choices about cutting ties with the insurgency and grants it the latitude to attempt pushing the United States without forcing a complete break in bilateral relations.

A stable but subordinate Afghanistan thus remains Pakistan’s ultimate strategic goal: such subservience on the part of Kabul would permit Islamabad to gain an advantage in regard to managing both its independent rivalry with Afghanistan and the challenges posed by the evolving Afghan-Indian geopolitical partnership. Unfortunately for Pakistan, if the international community succeeds in its current endeavors in Afghanistan, it would end up leaving behind a state that would be anything but deferential to Pakistan—thus justifying in Rawalpindi the problematic strategy that is intended to prevent exactly this outcome. Pakistan’s continuing support for the Quetta shura and the Haqqani network remain the key instrument by which it seeks to secure its strategic aims vis-à-vis Afghanistan. By aiding these groups, protecting them, and supporting their operations, Pakistan seeks to use them as bargaining chips in its negotiations with Kabul. These negotiations are aimed ultimately at securing Afghanistan’s acceptance of Pakistan’s western boundaries, Islamabad’s authority over the Pakistani Pashtuns, and constraints on Afghan-Indian ties (and Afghanistan’s strategic policies more generally) as determined by Pakistan. Because the Pakistani military believes that the Quetta shura and the Haqqani network would be relatively sympathetic to its interests on these issues—in comparison to other elements in Afghan society—it has continued, and will continue, to protect these assets despite the larger efforts of the United States to defeat them.

It is not obvious, however, that the Quetta shura will be as supportive of Islamabad’s interests as the Pakistani “deep state” often believes; the Haqqanis may be more pliable on this count, but they are also less influential in Afghan society and hence matter less in comparison. Given the choices available to Pakistan, however, the shura and the Haqqanis are judged to be better investments for advancing Pakistani interests in Afghanistan than those currently dominating politics in Kabul and, consequently, they will enjoy Pakistan’s continued support against all U.S. efforts at interdicting them. In the game of chicken between Rawalpindi and Washington since the killing of Osama bin Laden, the United States has already blinked on this score: after initially insisting both publicly and privately that Pakistan target the insurgents through military action (including in North Waziristan), the Administration has now settled on simply urging Pakistan to bring the insurgent groups to the negotiating table.

For a country that denied having any relationship with the insurgents for almost a decade, Pakistan presently appears willing to consider the U.S. request—but on its own terms. For example, senior Pakistani military leaders have repeatedly urged U.S. officials to cease combat operations against the insurgents on the grounds that fighting while talking was incompatible; similarly, they have resisted American pleas for expanded Pakistani military action against the insurgents on the grounds that it would undermine their ability to intercede with the militants in future negotiations. The Pakistani military has also demanded from its American interlocutors greater clarity about the desired end-state in Afghanistan, thus conditioning its willingness to bring the insurgents to the table on some assurance that they will become part of a future governing regime in Afghanistan that protects Pakistan’s interests.

Because such assurances cannot be offered by the United States—and will not be offered presently by President Karzai even if he wanted to—without undermining the current constitutional order in Afghanistan, Pakistan has declined thus far to issue any public appeals to the insurgents urging them to participate in the peace process. According to senior Afghan officials who have discussed this matter privately, Pakistan has also declined to offer safe passage to any shura leaders resident in its territories who may be inclined to discuss reconciliation directly with Kabul. More tellingly, it has gone out of its way to target Afghan Taliban leaders who have displayed any inclination for independent negotiations with the GIROA. And, finally, Pakistan has betrayed no interest in providing Afghan officials with access to those Taliban leaders detained by Islamabad, despite repeated Afghan requests on this score.

The current strategy of the Pakistani military leadership thus suggests that they are prepared to assist with Afghan reconciliation only if it advances their conception of what constitutes a desirable outcome—a malleable regime in Kabul post-2014—and only if they are permitted to play the paramount role in midwifing this result. Unfortunately, this approach—however understandable from a Pakistani perspective—only ends up further alienating the GIROA and the Afghans more broadly. It makes them even more determined to resist Pakistani domination and further deepens their reliance on India—actions that, in turn, only reinforce the destructive Pakistani behaviors that generated the cycle of distrust in the first place. Unfortunately for the United States, there are no easy ways out of this predicament. If the Administration surrenders to the Pakistani demand for a controlling interest in the reconciliation process and its outcome, it will lose the GIROA as a partner in Afghanistan and alienate key Afghan constituencies including the Pashtuns; it will also stoke an ethnic backlash within the country and pave the way for deepened regional competition involving India, Iran, and the Central Asian republics, which are certain to coalesce to prevent any Pakistani domination of Afghanistan. If the Administration supports the GIROA—as it should—it runs the risk that Pakistan will continue to play its subversive games: supporting the Taliban insurgency while offering only as much counterinsurgency and counterterrorism cooperation as is necessary to keep American assistance flowing, and maintaining the appearance of assisting reconciliation while withholding true cooperation until such time as it is assured that its proxies will enjoy the guaranteed access to power that provides Pakistan with dominant influence in Afghanistan.

The Administration’s recent decision to accord Pakistan a principal role in the reconciliation negotiations, therefore, represents a dangerous gamble. Although born out of frustration rather than predilection, it could end up not in a breakthrough but in a frustrating stalemate. Clearly, Pakistan cannot be excluded from the reconciliation process, nor should it be. But it is hard to imagine how Rawalpindi can proffer a solution here that advances its own interests while being simultaneously acceptable to Kabul. A satisfactory outcome would require either Pakistan to give up on its goal of dominating Afghanistan, or Kabul to give up on its objective of avoiding subordination to Islamabad: either of these two outcomes could make political reconciliation with the Taliban feasible, but neither eventuality seems in sight. As a result, the Administration’s new reliance on Pakistan to catalyze the reconciliation process,far from providing a fillip to "fight, talk, and build," could actually provoke endless prevarication that is intended mainly to wait out the American drawdown in Afghanistan. The only two solutions that the United States had in principle to defeat this Pakistani strategy now lie beyond reach. A comprehensive military success against the Taliban could have rendered the need for reconciliation less pressing, but neither the Bush nor the Obama Administration allocated the resources necessary to procure this outcome when circumstances were favorable; neither Administration was successful in confronting Pakistan over the sanctuaries either, thus leaving the U.S. military with the horrendous task of attempting to defeat a well-protected insurgency without sufficient manpower or the ability to target its foreign sources of support.

An ironclad American commitment to invest and endure in Afghanistan would have enabled the coalition to defeat the Pakistani strategy as well because, whatever Islamabad’s local advantages may be, Pakistan cannot end up victorious in any sustained strategic competition with the United States. American misgivings about the costs of the Afghan war, the merit of the stakes involved, and the integrity of its Afghan partners, all combined, however, to provoke a strategic mistake by the Obama Administration: announcing a public deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan. The net effect of this unfortunate announcement has not been increased pressure for arriving at a political solution; rather, it has only motivated the insurgents to run down the clock while also inducing Pakistan to protect its proxies all the more zealously because of the expectation that they will become indispensable for advancing Rawalpindi’s interests in the aftermath of the coming security transition. The administration’s new reliance on Pakistan to shepherd reconciliation will only provide Rawalpindi with more opportunities to achieve these aims—and, in the process, animate greater Afghan and regional opposition to Pakistan. These dynamics cumulatively will also contribute to further undermining American aims in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Obama Administration’s strategy of “fight, talk, and build” is, therefore, subverted not by any intrinsic illogic but by the welter of contradictions embedded in the corrosive external environment within which it must be implemented. Even the administration’s otherwise sensible emphasis on strengthening the Afghan and Pakistani states and integrating them into a larger regional trading order is still subject to the risks of being undermined by the persistent Pakistani military discomfort with economic integration within the greater Southern Asian region—although to its credit, President Asif Zardari’s civilian government in Pakistan has persisted in pushing the boundaries of the possible in this regard. The larger problem, however, remains the dangerous game of “managed jihadism” still played by Pakistan. Rawalpindi continues to solicit and accept American assistance in fighting some terrorist groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Tehrik-e- Taliban Mohmand (TTM), the Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shari’at-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and the Lashkar-e-Islami (LI), which directly target Pakistan, even as it supports other militant groups, such as the Quetta shura, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which attack the interests of its coalition partners.

To date, the United States and the international community have failed to change this troublesome Pakistani behavior. Persuasion has had little impact because the Pakistani military, which dominates national security policymaking within the country, has a deeply entrenched and pernicious worldview that is not susceptible to change without a dramatic transformation of the Pakistani state itself—something that is nowhere in sight right now. Even bribery by the United States in the form of generous military and civilian assistance has made no difference, because the Pakistani military has calculated that it can pursue its current subversive policies without fear of retaliation because Pakistan is too important to be punished or to be allowed to fail. And meaningful coercion by Washington has never been tried because of our dependence on Pakistan for continued prosecution of the counterterrorism campaign inside their country and for the ground and air lines of communications supporting U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, a reliance that has reinforced Rawalpindi’s belief that it is immune to the most consequential American threats.

Where Do We Go From Here?

When all is said and done, there is no denying the fact that the situation in the region is unfavorable for the success of the Administration’s policy, at least insofar as that policy is centered on the hope of reconciliation as a means of bridging the limitations in indigenous Afghan capabilities in the context of the coming security transition. If the United States is to snatch some success in these circumstances, it will require not jettisoning reconciliation so much as recommitting to the “hardening” of the Afghan state. Confronting the problems of governmental corruption will be important in this connection, but they cannot constitute the central part of the enterprise; the international community has made its own modest contributions to the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan and this cancer will not be eradicated anytime soon even if President Karzai were to act with as much virtue as the United States demands. Rather, the focus of buttressing Afghanistan must rest on aiding the evolution of political devolution, assuring a peaceful transition of presidential power in accordance with current constitutional constraints, and comprehensively strengthening administrative organs of state, especially the ANSF. That Pakistan will continue to play an unhelpful role as this effort persists must simply be accepted as a fact of life. Yet, meaningful success can nonetheless be achieved despite Rawalpindi’s interference—if success in this context is defined as leaving behind after 2014 an Afghan state that is durable enough to ensure that the Taliban can never regain the meaningful control in Afghanistan that would permit al-Qaeda and other global terrorist groups to return and operate with impunity.

Ensuring such a modicum of success will require many policy adjustments, but the most important—which are conveyed telegraphically here—include:
-->Ensuring that the strategic partnership agreement that the Administration is currently negotiating with Afghanistan provides the United States with sufficient basing rights to deploy the appropriate mix of air and ground forces necessary to conduct counterterrorism operations and support the ANSF as appropriate over the long term.
-->Funding, in cooperation with the international community, the entire complement of Afghan national security forces committed to in current NATO-ISAF-GIROA plans.
-->Delaying the withdrawal of surge troops already provided to U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan beyond 2012 so as to enable them to consolidate coalition control in the south and in the east before the security transition.
-->Assisting Afghanistan in regard to regional economic integration, development of its administrative capacity, and management of its economy so as to strengthen its capacity in the coming era of diminished external assistance.
-->Accelerating the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network as a hedge against continued reliance on Pakistan for air and ground lines of communication into Afghanistan.

Although Pakistani cooperation is necessary for a stable security transition, it would be unwise to rely too heavily on the hope that the Pakistani military will change its current strategy towards Afghanistan or the United States in the near term. What is most important where Pakistan is concerned, therefore, is that the Administration and the Congress shed their illusions about what can be expected from either Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The history of the last decade proves abundantly that a genuinely strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan will remain beyond reach for some time to come. The U.S.- Pakistan relationship—unfortunately—will remain “transactional” in the foreseeable future, irrespective of whether either side chooses to acknowledge it—and this condition will persist so long as the Pakistani military continues to dominate the commanding heights of national decision-making within the country. While U.S. policy may not be able to transform Pakistani behavior—and the last few years provide proof positive—it should at least cease to subsidize Rawalpindi’s egregious conduct through the frittering away of resources provided at pains by the American taxpayer. At the very least, therefore, a new policy towards Pakistan must include:

-->Terminating all U.S. transfers of conventional warfighting equipment that have no relevance to Pakistani counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and which are financed by American taxpayers.
-->Reviewing the expenditures related to Coalition Support Funds, with the intent of replacing such transfers over time with direct counterterrorism assistance provided for meeting specified counterterrorism targets.
-->Continuing U.S. civilian aid to Pakistan for a while longer but conditioning it on Pakistan’s support for accelerated South Asian economic integration and structural changes in its state capacity to mobilize domestic resources.
--> Supporting the civilian government in Pakistan more forthrightly despite its serious current weaknesses.

None of these policy changes by themselves will suffice to transform Pakistan into a successful state or to shift the Pakistani military’s current strategies in more helpful directions. But they will signal the limits of American patience and spare the American taxpayer the indignity of having to subsidize Pakistani state actions that directly threaten American lives and interests, while at the same time, hopefully providing Pakistan with an opportunity to pause and reflect on whether provoking a dangerous rupture in its relations with the United States advances its own regional position and improves its security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee, for your kind attention and your consideration.

 

[Paan Singh]

very long..

 

[Perceptron]

^^^ Read it through however ; You live in interesting times, and you spend it by reading interesting games in your neighbourhood.

 

[lem34]

^^^ Read it through however ; You live in interesting times, and you spend it by reading interesting games in your neighbourhood.

This has been discussed to death:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...k-op-ed-mutual-blackmail-eto-afg-pak-ind.html

All I would say is that this guy says:

Unfortunately for Pakistan, if the international community succeeds in its current endeavors in Afghanistan, it would end up leaving behind a state that would be anything but deferential to Pakistan

The international community has by actions stated that this is americas intention not international endeavours and is a failure because russia, china, iran and most of afghanistans neighbourhood is not interested in the american intention

---------- Post added at 02:55 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:53 PM ----------

Default Re: Def.pk op-ed: Mutual Blackmail, ETO for Afg, Pak and Ind

South Asia
Nov 4, 2011




US's post-2014 Afghan agenda falters
By M K Bhadrakumar

There couldn't have been a more appropriate venue than the old Byzantine capital on the Bosphorus to hold a regional conference on Afghanistan at the present juncture. The conference at Istanbul on Thursday carried an impressive title - "Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia". The "heart" had 14 chambers - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The conference was packed with high drama, which was unsurprising, since its "brain" - the United States - acted almost imperviously to the beatings of the heart.

Intrigue and counter-intrigue dogged the conference from the outset to such an extent that its eventual failure was a forgone conclusion.

The US and its Western allies began with high hopes that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner Turkey would secure from the conference a declaration - preferably signed by the "14 heartland" states - that would prepare the ground for establishing a regional security and integration mechanism on the pattern of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In turn, this declaration would take wing at the forthcoming Bonn II conference in December (to which Germany has invited 90 countries and 15 international organizations).

In the event, Thursday ended on a somewhat miserable note in Istanbul, the heart of Asia having suffered even a minor rupture. Uzbekistan broke loose and stayed away at the last minute, with the remaining 13 countries finally settling for an anodyne joint statement that will become the latest in a series of platitudes and good intentions since the US invaded Afghanistan.

Bound to crash-land
The conference agenda was lop-sided in the first instance. Instead of focusing on the pivotal issue of a viable Afghan national reconciliation, how to set up such a process and how to secure it as "Afghan-led" and genuinely "Afghan-owned", the masterminds of the conference - the United States in particular - loaded it with geopolitics.

The conference was burdened with an ambitious agenda of imposing on the region under Western leadership a mechanism to mediate in a host of intra-regional disputes and differences which are, arguably, tangential issues that could have a bearing on Afghanistan's stabilization but are not the greatest concern today.
This was, to put mildly, like putting the cart before the horse. The Western masterminds needlessly introduced a controversial template for a new security architecture for Central and South Asia, complete with an institutional mechanism and a "contact group" for monitoring the implementation of a matrix of "confidence-building measures".

This was an idea that was bound to crash-land, given the deep suspicions about the US's intentions in the "war on terror" in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of the regional states to accept the permanent habitation of the West as the arbiter-cum-moderator-cum-mediator in their region.

During the preparatory stages at official meetings in Oslo, Norway and Kabul through September and October, it became evident that there were no takers in the region for a new regional security organization presided over by the West. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and most of the Central Asian countries demurred on the US proposal for a new regional security architecture. India, which resents outside mediation on its disputes, kept quiet so as not to offend the US, while probably remaining confident that Pakistan would do its job anyway.

Moscow came up with its own counterproposal in the shape of a statement of principles of regional cooperation listing political, economic and other measures to build confidence and encourage cooperation among the countries neighboring Afghanistan. The Russian approach found favor with China, Pakistan and Iran, and being unexceptional in any case, it gained traction and ultimately seems to have paved the way for Thursday's joint statement at Istanbul.

However, Washington (and Ankara) continued efforts until the last minute to somehow institutionalize a regional process through "working groups" and a "structured" form of consultations. But Pakistan would appear to have put its foot firmly down on these ideas, pointing out that an OSCE-type security related conference or a full-fledged security apparatus would be completely unacceptable since there was a world of difference between the Cold-War compulsions which initiated the Helsinki process and the prevailing Afghan situation.

Pakistan's contention is that Afghanistan's neighboring countries could at best have a supportive role in ensuring the peace, security and territorial integrity of that country and instead of proposing new mechanisms, the focus should be on implementation of the existing mechanisms for peace, security and development.

The US game plan served four objectives. One, Washington hoped to "shackle" Pakistan within the four walls of a regional security mechanism dominated by the West so that it becomes one protagonist among equals and its claim to an eminent status in any Afghan peace process gets diluted.

Two, the regional mechanism would give the US and its allies a handle to retain the lead role in the search for an Afghan settlement and also beyond during the post 2014 period. Three, Washington estimated that the regional security apparatus would inevitably come to overshadow the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the number one regional security process in Central Asia and South Asia which, in turn, would erode the dominant influence of Russia and China in Central Asia.

Finally, the US envisaged the regional mechanism to provide the security underpinning for its "New Silk Road" project, which is running on a parallel track - quintessentially a modern version of its "Greater Central Asia strategy" dating back to the George W Bush presidency. The New Silk Road proposes Afghanistan as a regional hub to bring Central Asia and South Asia closer together under the garb of regional development and integration.

Its real intent, however, is to roll back the pre-eminent position of Russia and China in Central Asia and to gain direct access to the vast mineral resources of the region through communication links that bypass Russia and Iran. The US's agenda included gaining for NATO some sort of formal, institutional role in regional security in Central Asia. (Safeguarding the energy pipelines is a newfound 21st century "challenge" that NATO proposes to assume.)

Conceivably, Moscow and Beijing spotted a red herring from day one. The most significant outcome of the Istanbul Conference, therefore, might turn out to be that the SCO will hasten its decision-making process and swiftly steer through the applications of Pakistan and India for membership of that organization.

A Russian statement issued on Monday following Foreign Ministry-level political consultations with China in Moscow stated that the two countries discussed the modalities of finalization of the membership of the two South Asian countries in SCO and "spoke of expediting the process" of membership of India and Pakistan (and Afghanistan's status as an SCO "Observer"). The likelihood is that a decision in this regard might even be formalized at the SCO Heads of Governments meeting due in St Petersburg on Monday.

Note of triumphalism
Underlying all this high drama has been the realization in Washington (and the regional capitals) that the political-military situation in Afghanistan is decisively shifting in Pakistan's favor, prompting a desperate Western attempt to ensure the US and NATO's permanent military presence in the strategic Hindu Kush.

Without doubt, a dangerous period lies ahead for the US and its NATO allies with the strong possibility of Mullah Omar's forces and the Haqqani network openly collaborating with a view to intensifying the insurgent activities.

The devastating suicide car bomb attack in Kabul killing 13 American and 3 Australian soldiers may well be the harbinger of a new offensive. Its timing - on the eve of the Istanbul conference - carried a barely-disguised message to the US administration that crunch time has come and the US strategy to degrade the Taliban and force them to come to the negotiating has not only failed, but the Taliban seem more than ever convinced that they are inching toward conclusive victory.

Clearly, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's visit to Islamabad 10 days ago has not helped reduce the huge trust deficit in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Pakistani military seems amused that Clinton made a virtue out of dire necessity by graciously "offering" to Islamabad the "primacy" to "squeeze" the Haqqanis and bring them to the negotiating table.

Whereas, the heart of the matter is that the US's covert attempts in the recent months to gain direct access to the Taliban leadership and to suo moto initiate a peace process from a position of strength lie in shambles today.

On the other hand, Pakistan's estimation is that US President Barack Obama is going to find himself more and more on the defensive as next year's election approaches, lessening even further the US's capacity to pressure Islamabad. A tone of triumphalism is appearing in the Pakistani discourses.

Indeed, the Obama administration, too, would sense that the factors of advantage are incrementally tilting in Pakistan's favor and that the US lacks any real leverage to influence the Pakistani military. The US roped in Turkey to push the agenda of the Istanbul Conference, given its traditionally warm and friendly relations with Pakistan. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates presence in Istanbul was also expected to influence Pakistan. But the Istanbul Conference may have resulted in causing some injury to Turkish-Pakistani ties. A Turkish observer wrote:

Cold winds have started to blow between the two [Turkey and Pakistan] due to the Afghan problem ... Islamabad is quite annoyed at Turkey for its role in the conference ... Basically, Pakistan is angry at Turkey and the US, which want a result oriented conference. For the conference to bear fruit an institutionalization of the process is a must. In other words in the absence of some kind of a mechanism, to monitor the process that might include implementing confidence-building measures, everything said in Istanbul will stay on paper.

Turkish diplomacy has tried to calm down the Pakistanis, telling them that the presence of Turkey in the regional framework should alleviate the concerns of Pakistanis vis-a-vis other players. After all the Turks do not have a secret agenda of strengthening the hands of India at the expense of Pakistan but I am doubtful that they succeeded in reassuring Pakistan.

All in all, from the Russian and Chinese point of view, it becomes desirable - almost imperative - from now onward while looking ahead, that Pakistan is enabled to have strategic autonomy to withstand the US pressure. Most certainly, they would appreciate Pakistan's steadfast role in frustrating the US design to install a regional security mechanism for continued interference in the Central Asian region.

On balance, the petering out of the Istanbul Conference constitutes a grave setback for the upcoming Bonn Conference II in December. With the Istanbul Conference failing to erect an institutionalized framework of regional cooperation, Bonn Conference II lacks a viable agenda except that 2011 happens to provide a great photo-op, being the 10th anniversary of the first conference in December 2001.

The original intent was to ensure that the Taliban representatives attended the Bonn Conference. But short of a miracle, that is not going to happen. That leaves the US and its NATO allies to work out the planned transition in Afghanistan in 2014 in isolation, as they gather for the alliance's summit in May in Chicago.

In sum, the regional powers are unwilling to collaborate with the US and its allies to choreograph the post-2014 regional security scenario. Russia and China insist that the central role of the international community in Afghanistan should be of the United Nations once the US and NATO's transition is completed in 2014.

Evidently, they would hope for the SCO to take a lead role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's expeditious admission as an SCO observer alongside Pakistan's induction as a full member conveys a loud message that regional security is best handled by the countries of the region, while extra-regional powers can act as facilitators. That is also the final message of the Istanbul conference.

 

[ramu]

very long..

then just read the highlighted

 

[Meengla]

These so-called experts 'testifying' in front of Congress often seem to beat around the bush. A lot of we amateur bloggers here contribute more meaningfully into the regional discourse.
The OP seems to harp upon Pakistani military's limited 'jihadism' as if there is a real love for these jihadis. Stupid guy: The crux of the matter is India-Pakistan regional rivalries in which Americans have been more favorable to India. In the past it was the India-USSR pincer in Afghanistan and now it is India-USA one--again Pakistan is the target. If USA, at the height of its power, could not tolerate Soviet missiles in a fully independent Cuba then why should Pakistan open itself to not only re-opening of the Durand Line dispute but also a sustained influx of terrorists from Afghanistan should India control Afghanistan? Hah?!
Fact is that Al-qaida is as beaten in Afghanistan as they can be. Panetta himself has said something to that effect. Talibans are a Pasthtun nationalist movement who have no desires beyond power in Afghanistan. And unfortunately terrorists can come from anywhere in the world. So why pour more billions into Afghanistan? Why risk more lives there?

If the answer could be some regional posture about China or Iran (Pakistan has no strategic conflict with USA) then let's discuss that. These two countries are not short on cash and would love to keep bleeding Americans in Afghanistan. In fact, I'd wager that the entire WOT is a great boon for countries like China.

 

[muse]

The Pakistani military has also demanded from its American interlocutors greater clarity about the desired end-state in Afghanistan, thus conditioning its willingness to bring the insurgents to the table on some assurance that they will become part of a future governing regime in Afghanistan that protects Pakistan’s interests.

Because such assurances cannot be offered by the United States—and will not be offered presently by President Karzai even if he wanted to—without undermining the current constitutional order in Afghanistan, Pakistan has declined thus far to issue any public appeals to the insurgents urging them to participate in the peace process.

This very interesting -- The duplicity of the US policy makers seems to know no bounds -- but it also suggests that there is a real problem in US policy making circles - after all why can't the US be clear about it's plans for Afghanistan? Or is that these policy makers fear that their plans once revealed will show their justifications for engaging in this war, as out right lies??


Tellis says that putting out plans the US has for Afghanistan will upset the constitutional order in Afghanistan

What do you think he's talking about?

 

[somebozo]

All in all..the foolish invasion of Afghanistan has made Pakistan closer to regional power houses like Russia and China and has cost America a dear potential ally. Now all the talks of relying on India for a great role in Afghanistan will go down the drain because theoritically India has not been loyal, secondly it is mistrusted by China and Russia has felt betrayed already.

The real reason for Afghanistan war is energy resources of central asia..even talibans were bought to power by the CIA on same promise of jump starting TAPI project, and the same happens to be a the priority of Karzai administration. Coincidence or planned?? The real worthy of commendation here is ISI which knows well to play on all side and keep maintaining low key visibility.

The whole of US command should now retire to playing age of empires on xbox!

 

[Pakistanisage]

Don't you love it ?

As 2014 moves closer the options for India are becoming bleaker by the minute as far as their interference in Afghanistan is concerned. And so is the accompanying rheotric which is becoming shriller by each passing day.

I think all Pakistan should do is to kick back and let the inevitable outcome take its natural course. Let India jump up and down and pakistanis should just enjoy the show.

 

[muse]

Tellis advises congress that "getting tough" with Pakistan will"

hopefully providing Pakistan with an opportunity to pause and reflect on whether provoking a dangerous rupture in its relations with the United States advances its own regional position and improves its security.

But the question Tellis and the US Congress should be asking is whether US interests will be advanced in the region, whether the security of the US will be enhanced or diminished if the US and Pakistan continue to experience hostile, unproductive relations??


Tellis then adds this gem:

When all is said and done, there is no denying the fact that the situation in the region is unfavorable for the success of the Administration’s policy

So the advice is that while "success" is now a distant proposition, that the US rush to make another enemy? Any wonder the US, the greatest country in the history of the world, should find herself exerting so much power and treasure, sacrificing so much blood, finds "success" of her wars, depends on those her "experts" prescribe greater expenditures of power and prestige to punish and contain.

 

[muse]

Tsk, tsk tsk ---- a couple of billions doesn't seem to go as far as it used - whats the world coming to


November 5, 2011
General Fired Over Karzai Remarks
By ROD NORDLAND

KABUL, Afghanistan — A senior American general stationed in Afghanistan has been fired for criticizing President Hamid Karzai in a published interview.

The NATO and American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John R. Allen, announced in a news release on Saturday that he was dismissing Maj. Gen. Peter Fuller, the deputy commander for programs at the NATO training mission in Afghanistan, effective immediately. “The decision follows recent inappropriate public comments made by Major General Fuller,” General Allen said.

The statement was issued early Saturday morning in Kabul, where General Fuller had been on a speaking tour. It came shortly after a Thursday interview with the two-star American Army general was published by the news Web site Politico.

General Fuller was responding to remarks made by President Karzai a week earlier in which he told a Pakistani interviewer that Afghanistan would come to Pakistan’s aid if attacked by the United States.

“Why don’t you just poke me in the eye with a needle! You’ve got to be kidding me,” General Fuller said. “I’m sorry, we just gave you $11.6 billion and now you’re telling me, ‘I don’t really care?’ ”

General Fuller also described President Karzai as erratic and inarticulate.

It was the second time in the last year and a half that a senior American general lost his job over remarks made to a journalist. In June 2010, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal was forced to resign by President Obama for remarks the general and his staff purportedly made that were critical of the White House, and which were quoted in a Rolling Stone magazine article. Aides to General McChrystal maintained the remarks were intended to be off the record.

That was not an issue in the Politico article, and no one argued that General Fuller was misquoted. “As far as we know, that was the statement he made, the inappropriate comments he made that were published,” said Lt. Col. Jimmie E. Cummings Jr., a spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force here. “As far as we know, it was on the record.”

Added General Allen, in the statement, “These unfortunate comments are neither indicative of our current solid relationship with the government of Afghanistan, its leadership, or our joint commitment to prevail here in Afghanistan.”

Colonel Cummings said General Allen made the decision to relieve General Fuller on his own, and not in response to any reaction or pressure from President Karzai or the Afghan government.

A spokesman for President Karzai was not immediately available for comment.

General Fuller’s other speaking engagements apparently focused on his view that the NATO training mission was successful in Afghanistan and generally reflected the NATO position that its training effort was making it increasingly possible for Afghan forces to stand on their own.

In the Politico interview, however, he was caustic in his criticism of Afghan leaders, and particularly President Karzai.

In that criticism, he was merely repeating what many American and NATO officials have said privately, particularly since August of 2009, when President Karzai won re-election in a poll regarded by American and international officials as fraudulent.

President Karzai’s remarks in Pakistan hit a raw nerve, however, especially coming when American officials have been making a concerted effort to pressure Pakistan into ending sanctuary for the Taliban.

“So much for Shona Ba Shona,” one Western official said afterward, referring to the slogan of NATO forces here, which means “Shoulder to shoulder.”

President Karzai has angered American officials on other occasions, as well, threatening to join the Taliban if they kept pressuring him, labeling NATO forces “occupiers,” and even once demanding publicly that NATO leave Afghanistan immediately. He has also wept while making speeches — most recently when he held a toddler wounded in an airstrike, and thrust him toward Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, then the top American operational commander.

On such occasions, his spokesmen have taken pains to claim that his remarks have been distorted or misquoted.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told Congress that was the case with the Pakistani invasion remark. “It was both taken out of context and misunderstood,” she said.

 

[somebozo]

US cannot continue to arm India to teeth on one side and expect Pakistan to dramatically change its national security policy..that is intentional suicide.

 

[muse]

Khaleej Times Online > EDITORIAL

The General’s taunt


6 November 2011
Military generals are supposed to be savvy when commenting on affairs beyond their domain. But it has been observed that some of the chirpy and tongue-in-cheek remarks have come from men in uniform, as they often take jibe at the job they are being made to do, inadvertently.

So was the case of a senior US commander in Afghanistan, Major General Peter Fuller, who aired his resentment at the manner in which the host leadership regards the ongoing war on terrorism. Fuller may be excused for saying so, as there is nothing to knowledge that he has added. But the point is that he trespassed his territory to dub Afghan President Hamid Karzai as a naïve, and one who is ‘isolated from reality’. The fact that the Pentagon chose to remain indifferent over his interview to a Washington journal, Politico, goes on to reflect the uneasiness that is prevalent between Afghanistan and the United States, and how troublesome it is becoming to strike a chord of rationality. Fuller who reportedly has been axed from his command, however, is unsure of his fate. But he has brought to fore some of the interesting riddles that, indeed, the political leadership in the US should ponder in all sincerity. His earnest submission that Washington is pouring in money by cutting back on its own strained resources is a fact, and should be deliberated more by the Congress and the White House than being a worry of Kabul. Irrespective of how substantial the intervention has been in terms of geopolitics, Americans are in need of revisiting their intention in the first instance. The question is why is the US obsessed with such wars, and what amount of security have they brought to Southwest Asia and, of course, the West. The world today is as lawless as it was at the dawn of September 11, 2001. And Afghanistan is still home to the reclusive leadership of Al Qaeda and the Taleban, with the only difference that now they are politically more coordinated than ever before.

Rather than taking Fuller to task, though he has to be reprimanded for his uncalled for remarks, it would be better for the administration to rethink as how a difference can be made in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as this war on terrorism to this day remains clueless

 

[regular]

US can't sustain its power in Afghanistan nomatter how many billions$$$ it can spend or whatever it can do its star /luck is doomed now by the hands of the 16 century's innocent pplz who don't wanna leave their religions and are willing to sacrifice everything they have for their rights and religious values....so sad for the US to face such a fate at the hands of those who have nothing in their hands but a noble cause of freedom.......