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Unsung heroes
P.S. Expect serious allegations against Dr.Munir being an american agent and alleged incompetencies of PAEC teams as well as indulging in high praise of himself and his team in building atomic bomb. Expect some content differences in Urdu and english articles as well.
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 07, 2014
Part - I
Random thoughts
It is customary for countries keep records of important events and of the people who have played prominent roles. These records mention their achievements and contributions to the national cause.
We are often reminded of the heroes who fought for and sacrificed their lives for Pakistan and the valiant deeds of our soldiers. Unfortunately, those heroes who made this country’s defence impregnable and ensured its existence for all times are largely unknown.
Just before WW II, the German scientists Hahn and Strassmann succeeded in splitting an atom of uranium with neutrons. This was the beginning of the atomic age and scientists from the US and the western world all worked hard to explore the possible uses of this discovery. This ultimately led to the making of the atomic and hydrogen bombs by the US, Russia, the UK, France and China.
Now that many of my former colleagues and I are in the autumn of our lives, some already having passed away, I, as former head of one of the country’s most important projects, would like to do justice to their unparalleled contribution. It is due to them that we have an impregnable defence and can no longer be blackmailed or threatened. Lest you forget, or do not know, their names and contributions will be listed. Before I do so, I would like to give a brief account of the circumstances which led to my giving up a promising career in Holland to return to Pakistan.
Despite warnings by ZA Bhutto, western powers did not heed India’s efforts to make nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the US, Canada and the UK actively supported the country. It was under these circumstances that Bhutto uttered that famous warning: “If India goes nuclear, we will also go nuclear, even if we have to eat grass”. Eating grass was easy, but making a nuclear bomb in this technologically backward country was an almost impossible task.
The defeat and surrender of the Pakistan Army on December 17, 1971 in former East Pakistan was still fresh in my mind. I was shattered and could not eat or sleep for days. I was in Belgium at the time, waiting to defend my Dr Eng thesis. When the Indians exploded an atom bomb on May 18, 1974 I realised that Pakistan was in mortal danger, as was felt and described by many prominent leaders. By that time I had many years of invaluable experience in the enrichment of uranium and was in a position to help Pakistan.
In September 1974 I wrote to Bhutto suggesting that Pakistan should go nuclear through the enrichment technology process rather than via the plutonium route. The PAEC, established in 1958, was in no position to do this. In January 1972 Bhutto made Munir Ahmad Khan Chairman of PAEC, thanks to the efforts of his brother, Shaikh Khursheed Ahmad, a colleague of Bhutto in Ayub Khan’s Cabinet. Munir Ahmed Khan held a BSc in Electrical Engineering from Lahore and a nine-month diploma in Power Engineering from North Carolina State Polytechnic. Having worked in the IAEA in an administrative post did not make him a nuclear expert yet he told Bhutto (Bhutto told me this himself) that he would explode a nuclear device by December 1976. The impossibility of this was exposed by Kausar Niazi in his book ‘Aur Line Kat Gae’.
At the rate they were going, PAEC would not have been in a position to explode a bomb in 50 years. When I explained this to Bhutto, he became quite furious and asked Agha Shahi and Gen Imtiaz Ali to find a new, suitable chairman for PAEC. Bhutto’s pre-occupation with early elections put this critical issue on hold. I came to Pakistan in December 1975 and by July 1976 I had realised that nothing could be achieved if the project remained under PAEC. I therefore told Bhutto that I would be leaving Pakistan if the project was not made autonomous.
Consequently I was appointed project director of the enrichment and weapons programme under a cover organisation named Engineering Research Laboratories. A G N Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi, the three most senior civil servants, were entrusted to supervise the work and provide all financial and administrative assistance. Thanks to their full support we managed to deliver nuclear weapons in the short span of seven years, almost a miracle in such an underdeveloped country as ours where even sewing needles could not be produced.
After Gen Zia took over, I requested him to give me some EME officers since I had to start an organisation from scratch – no facilities, no office, no staff. Brig Islamullah Khan, DG EME (later Maj Gen) deputed three officers – Col Qazi Rashid Ali (mechanical engineer), Col Abdul Majid (electrical engineer) and Col Bashir Khan (electronics engineer). Col Qazi was a gem of an officer, very competent and amicable. He made invaluable contributions to our programme. He passed away after retirement from diabetic complications. Col Majid (known as Majid Chalaki, or the cunning) made some useful contributions but soon retired and left. Col Bashir Khan was difficult to work with.
Some good scientists and engineers came to the project from PAEC. It was said that Munir considered them to be too outspoken and/or troublemakers. Most of them were competent and experienced but all were novices in the field of enrichment. As a matter of fact, they had never heard of the technology. A fine electrical engineer, Brig Abdul Aziz, came to work for me and I put him to manufacturing sophisticated electrical/electronic equipment. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack while on a trip to Germany with Eng Ejaz Ahmad Khokhar, a very competent and innovative mechanical engineer, comparable to the best in the west.
Brig Abdul Qayyum replaced Brig Aziz, a gem of a person, extremely friendly, soft-spoken, always smiling and a very competent electronics engineer. By this time we were under embargoes and were forced to manufacture everything ourselves. Brig Qayyum was given the task of manufacturing sophisticated centrifuge motors to run smoothly at 65,000 RPM, highly sophisticated high frequency converters to run the centrifuges, sophisticated laser range finders for the Pakistan Army (Artillery) and, above all, the most important and most sophisticated detonation system for the nuclear weapons. He delivered everything that he was entrusted with. He demanded perfection and never compromised on quality. He died on June 24, 2014.
Another fine colleague, Brig Ansari, a metallurgist, conveyed this sad news to me. Brig. Qayyum had had a stroke about 2 years ago but seemed to have recovered. He had become quite frail but still visited me regularly. It was sad to lose such a fine colleague and it saddens me when I hear of the death of any former colleague. It is like losing a part of my life and career. May Allah rest all their souls in eternal peace – Ameen.
Unsung heroes - Dr A Q Khan
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 14, 2014
Part - II
Random thoughts
In this column, I give more details about the problems faced in setting up the project and the people who facilitated. My wife, two daughters and I came to Pakistan in December 1975. After checking to see how much of the advised work had been done by PAEC over the past year, I went to see ZA Bhutto.
Unfortunately, I had to inform him that nothing had been achieved, with ‘work’ being done in a workshop. After listening to me, Bhutto suddenly asked me to remain in Pakistan. It came as quite a shock. We had come on one month’s holiday. I had been offered, and was considering accepting, an offer of a professorship and already held a job with a bright future.
I told Bhutto I wanted to first discuss the matter with my wife, who was staying in the Silver Grill Hotel in Saddar, where we had been put up. She was as shocked as I was and her immediate reaction was “no way”. How could we leave everything behind? Then she asked me if staying would make a ‘real’ difference to Pakistan. I told her that, with the knowledge I had, I was the only one who could undertake this task – no exaggeration and time proved it to be correct. She then agreed that I would stay on while she went back to pack up, say farewell to her elderly parents and make all the necessary arrangements. She and the girls returned after six weeks, on March 9, 1976, our twelfth wedding anniversary.
A new chapter full of challenges, hard work, achievements and treachery had started in our lives. My family and I paid heavily for our patriotic decision and we sometimes wonder whether it was all worthwhile seeing the ingratitude we received in return from those who benefitted most from my work. I gave modern technology, developed by hundreds of scientists and engineers in the west over a period of 20 years and at a cost of about $ 2 billion, for which I didn’t receive a single rupee other than a meagre salary.
We were given a house in F-8 which, at that time, was at the very outskirts of Islamabad. Our household goods were being shipped, so we lived in an empty house – no curtains, no furniture, borrowed beds and no car. That year the winter rains were very heavy and life was tough and miserable. It took six months before I was paid my first salary of Rs3,000 per month. Meanwhile we survived on what we had brought with us. We also had to buy a second-hand car as we were not given transport facilities by the PAEC, under whose aegis the project fell at that time.
The offices for this important project were established in Second World War vehicle sheds behind Islamabad Airport. They were not only dilapidated, but also housed many snakes and scorpions. The sheds had high steel gates and pits for repairing trucks, etc. The steel sheets on the roof had many holes. We adapted by cutting doors into the steel gates, filling up the pits with broken bricks and cementing them over and putting tar coal-dipped jute sheets on the roof. This was how we started!
However, once the project was independent, I received full support from the authorities concerned and was able to put together a team of dedicated colleagues and a plan for the future. Initially a few PAEC officers, foreign trained and competent, had been sent on deputation, but none of them had any experience of the job in hand. When the project became independent they were given the option of staying or returning to PAEC. Not a single one opted to return except the person who was put in charge by Munir Ahmad Khan.
Before I took over, I had written a letter to Munir, chairman PAEC, describing the dismal state of affairs, complaining of the incompetence of the person he had put in charge and requesting a meeting. I never received any response. I then wrote to Bhutto explaining the case and telling him that, under the given circumstances, I could not work and wanted to return to Holland. I received an almost immediate call from Gen Imtiaz, military secretary to Bhutto, saying that the matter would be sorted out in two or three days.
After two days, Agha Shahi, foreign secretary general, called me to a meeting at the Foreign Office. I drove myself there and was taken to Shahi’s office by his director, Farhatullah Baig. There I found A G N Qazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Gen Imtiaz also present. After I had given them a briefing and they had discussed the matter amongst themselves, they offered me the job of PAEC chairman. I regretted the offer on the grounds that people in Europe knew I was an expert on centrifuge technology and the immediate result would be embargoes. Gen Imtiaz then suggested the name of Dr Amir Muhammad Khan, a senior PAEC officer, for chairmanship.
I quite frankly told them that unless the project was put directly under me with full freedom of action, I could see it getting bogged down in bureaucracy. I was then asked to return the next day at 7 pm, when I found the same gentlemen present. They had agreed with my proposal of an autonomous organisation and I was to be project director. Gen Imtiaz informed Bhutto of our agreement on the green phone line. Bhutto then asked to speak to me. He asked me if I was satisfied with the new setup, to which I said yes, but stressed the need for a free hand.
After a few days Bhutto called a meeting, constituted a Coordination Board consisting of A G N Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi. They also posted a joint secretary from the finance ministry to work as my director finance & administration, Imtiaz Ahmed Bhatti. He was a handsome, fair-skinned, tall man with a Clark Gable moustache. He had been a national football player in his younger days. His father was professor of English at FC College and his elder brother was a diplomat. I was later instrumental in having him promoted to federal secretary. He has meanwhile passed away. He was a fine colleague.
The newly created organisation went by the name of Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL). After Gen Zia took over, he deputed one of his best, confident officers, Brig Zahid Ali Akbar Khan, a dashing go-getter. He brought with him a team of good engineers, Col Mahmood, Col Javed, Col Sajawal, Col Aslan, Maj Saeed Baig (later Brig), et to look after our civil works. They all did excellent jobs, always delivering on schedule, sometimes even earlier. Brig Zahid engaged Dr Iqbal Wahla, a Cornell-trained, very competent civil and structural engineer, who did most of the designing of the buildings for the Kahuta Plant.
The formation of a Coordination Board with the three most senior and experienced civil servants was a most important step taken by Bhutto. This laid a solid foundation for our programme, culminating in the manufacture of nuclear weapons within the short span of seven years and that too in a technologically underdeveloped country
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 21, 2014
Part - III
Random thoughts
After taking charge, I immediately started searching for a suitable site to build the plant. My criterion was that it should be within a 50 km radius from Islamabad in order to facilitate government and army support.
One place I particularly liked was near Khanpur. It was flat and water and high voltage lines were available. Unfortunately, it was in a very open area and vulnerable to air attack. I later chose this site, with the consent of Admiral Sirohey, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the missile factory. Adm. Sirohey appointed me chief coordinator of the ballistic missile programme and the first M-11 prototype was produced there before handing over the project to the army.
I held that position until 2000. Rear Admiral Sohail A Khan and Maj Gen Raza were the first two fine and capable officers to head that organization (PMO). That missile could carry nuclear weapons up to a range of 500 km.
Brig Zahid continued our search and we ultimately chose Kahuta (Sumblega Village), about 45 km from Rawalpindi. Mr Shakir, former head of the Small Dams Project and Dir Works PAEC, had mentioned this site to me. We had found the perfect place – near the federal government, the GHQ and an international airport and away from routes travelled by foreigners. Brig Zahid and I met a middle-aged gentleman there who turned out to be Subedar Sb, their instructor at PMA, Kakul. We told him that we wanted to acquire the area to put up an army repair workshop. Handsome compensation would be paid for the land and all able-bodied males would be employed. They could buy land on the other side of the small river and walk over the bridge, which we would build for them. The 15 or 20 families of the area, all ex-servicemen, agreed.
The next day Brig Zahid met with Gen Fazle Muqeen Khan (a handsome, tall, efficient officer), secretary defence, to issue an order for the acquisition of the area for defence purposes. This was done to avoid any later litigation. After about a week Mr Bhutto called a meeting and asked me about the progress made. I told him that I had selected Kahuta and the reasons behind my choice. Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan suggested forming a committee to recommend the site. At this, Mr Bhutto smiled and said: “Khan Sb, neither you nor I or anybody else here knows the ABC of the work at hand. If Dr Khan has selected it, the matter is closed.” Spot decisions like this made by Mr Bhutto were the basis of our success.
In October 1976 we took possession of the area and erected a wire fence. Brig Zahid was a dashing, dynamic person and he immediately hired Dr Iqbal Wahla of Rist, Lahore as consultant. Dr Wahla, a competent and efficient architect had earned his degree from Cornell University in America. While I made line drawing of our requirements for the buildings, he prepared the construction drawings and Brig Zahid communicated with the contractors. By the middle of 1977 the main structures were in place. After imposing martial law, Gen Zia sent Brig Zahid to Larkana as deputy martial law administrator.
In his place came Brig Anis Ali Syed, a short, soft-spoken thorough gentleman. He was as efficient as Brig Zahid had been and the work continued at full speed. Col Mahmood, Col Aslam, Col Sajawal (later Brig), Col Javaid and Maj Saeed Baig (later Brig) formed an excellent, efficient team and always delivered on time. Sajawal and Saeed Baig remained in charge of our civil works even after their promotions to brigadier. First Gen Zahid, and later Gen Anis, used to pick me up at least twice a week in a self-driven jeep and take me to Kahuta to see the progress made.
An important and rather amusing thing happened just after our project was made autonomous. Mr Bhutto had asked me to see Mr Aziz Ahmed, minister of state for foreign affairs, and explain to him what we were planning to do. I had heard that he was a stiff collared bureaucrat and rather autocratic. I explained the importance and difficulty of the centrifuge technology, going nuclear being our only option and that I was an expert in this field.
After my explanations, Mr Aziz Ahmed asked me: “What is your education and experience?” I mentioned my BSc from Karachi, two years in the famous Berlin Technical University, an MS from top-class Delft (Holland) University of Technology and a DrEng from the University of Leuven (Belgium). I also had a large number of publications to my name and four years of practical experience as a senior scientist in centrifuge technology. After hearing me out he asked: “That’s all?” I retorted that there was nothing else left, otherwise I would have done it. We later became good friends.
After imposing martial law, Gen Zia appointed his old colleague and friend from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradune days, Gen Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, as adviser security on nuclear affairs. Gen Naqvi, an MA in English from Allahabad University, looked very much like a European – fair, light coloured hair, green eyes. He was a soft-spoken and pleasant person. He had an office at the PAEC Head Office and took Col Qamar Faruqui, director security PAEC, as his staff officer.
Within a few weeks he realised that Munir Ahmad Khan was averse to producing a nuclear bomb. When he mentioned this to me I told him that Munir had, on numerous occasions, tried to convince me that nuclear weapons were a bad thing for Pakistan. He also said that, were his wife (a European lady) to find out, all hell would break loose. This had serious but positive consequences, about which more in the next column. I personally believed, and still believe, that without nuclear deterrence we would have lost Pakistan. Statements made by Indian leaders are testimony to this.
There were many intrigues and plots against me and our nuclear programme, more so by locals than by foreigners. Now, while putting things in writing, all those events come to mind. Let me just tell you about one. A very fine, competent colleague of mine was, at that time, working in a defence organisation. He was frustrated as the head of that organisation, a former professor and a disciple of Prof Salam, had no practical experience or knowledge of defence projects. I obtained orders from Gen Zia to have him transferred to us. He turned out to be an invaluable, capable asset.
He told me that when Mr Bhutto had put pressure on Munir to explode the promised device by December 1976, Munir had discussed the matter with Prof Salam and my colleague’s boss. They decided to get about 2000 tons of explosives, put radioactive cobalt in it (obtained from X-ray machines) and explode it in a small tunnel. They would then take Mr Bhutto there and show him with a Geiger Counter that the explosion had been successful. They then informed Mr Bhutto that the explosion would take place after three or four months. To their good fortune, Mr. Bhutto announced elections and we all know what happened after that. Had their plot been successful, Mr Bhutto may very well have considered the centrifuge route redundant and Pakistan would have been put in mortal danger.
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 28, 2014
Part - IV
Random thoughts
In continuation of my previous columns on the same subject, here follow three interesting events that are not common knowledge. I had mentioned earlier that both Gen Naqvi and Col Faruqui had doubted Munir’s loyalty. Gen Zia himself had warned me to be wary and I was not to discuss any important or confidential matters with him.
The event discussed here was told to us by our foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, after his return from a trip to the USA. The same incident was also told to Mr Zahid Malik by the Foreign Secretary, Niaz A Naik, and included in Mr Malik’s book ‘Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb’ (1992).
Sahbizada Yaqub was in Washington with Foreign Secretary George Schultz and they were discussing matters of mutual interest. He had his team members with him. During the course of the discussions Schultz suddenly changed the topic and started talking about our nuclear programme. He threatened to stop all aid to Pakistan if we did not restrict our nuclear programme.
Yaqub tried to defend our stance and said that our programme was for peaceful purposes only. A senior official of the CIA retorted that he should not insult their intelligence as they had all details of our programme. They even had a mock-up of our nuclear device, he said. They then asked Yaqub to follow them through the corridor to another room. The officer removed a cloth that covered a table and Yaqub saw a design of a plant on it. He said that that was our Kahuta Plant.
He then went to the next table and removed a cloth from what looked like a sphere in two parts with cables, etc. and told Yaqub that it was a model of our nuclear weapon. Yaqub feigned ignorance, even though he realised it looked like what he had so often seen in Kahuta. He told them that he was not a technical man or a scientist and could not say anything about it. But if you say that is what it is, then let it be so.
Mr Schultz said that he could not fool him. They had irrefutable proof. When they left the room and walked down the corridor towards Schultz’ office, Yaqub’s sixth sense told him to look over his shoulder. He got the shock of his life when he saw a renowned Pakistani scientist coming out of the adjacent room and going straight into the room they had just left. He instantly understood the whole game. Information had been passed on to the Americans.
The second event – an important one – took place after some time in Kahuta. After ERL (Engineering Research Laboratories) had been established, I asked Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Commander 10th Corps, Rawalpindi, to give me a good officer to look after our security matters. He sent Col Abdul Rahman, an extremely competent, efficient officer.
After having explained to him what I wanted him to take care of, he hired many observers and informants around Kahuta. One day a “shepherd” returned from a routine inspection and sat down on a medium-sized stone to rest. He thought that the stone looked a bit different and used his small axe to chip off a small piece. The stone was easily cut and underneath he could see copper. He immediately reported the matter to a subedar who, in turn, informed Col Rahman. The stone was taken to the laboratories and put in a safe place.
I was informed and told them not to do anything until the next morning after I had inspected it. Next morning, after having ascertained that it did not contain any explosives, we dismantled it. The outside layer, about 4 inches thick, consisted of resin with sand from the local area. Inside was an aluminium box in two parts screwed together. Upon removing the screws we saw a wonder of technology – a long-lasting battery, antenna, neutron counters, an air-analyser and a recording/transmitter set.
This sophisticated equipment could analyse air samples to find the concentration of enriched or natural uranium hexafluoride, neutrons (from cold and hot tests), could store this information and, on command, could transmit it in a single pulse.
It must have cost millions of dollars. It had definitely been put there at night by a Pakistani agent driving to Kahuta Town. I conveyed details of the “find” to Gen Zia and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who immediately came to see it. They highly commended the work of Col Rahman and his staff.
A few days later the notorious US ambassador, Dean Hinton, came to see Gen Zia and again harped on our nuclear programme. He boasted that the Americans knew everything about our work. On hearing that, Gen Zia said that if they were relying on that spy stone for their information, it wouldn’t do them much good as it had meanwhile been dismantled and was now non-functional. The Ambassador, visibly shaken, soon departed.
Just a few weeks earlier the US defence attache had taken aerial photos of the buildings at Kahuta and Dean Hinton had gone to the president and asked what type of facilities they were. Gen Zia did not even bother to look at the photos. He only remarked that the US had violated diplomatic norms and if any plane (it was a UN plane that used to fly to Kashmir) flew over Kahuta in future, it would be shot down.
He later conveyed these orders to the Air defence command stationed at Kahuta which had anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles.
With time, news of our efforts to acquire nuclear weapons filtered through to the west and they all undertook espionage efforts. The British sent two of their most notorious journalists, Mark Tully, who could speak Urdu, and Chris Sherwell. Sherwell was tasked to cover me. He used to roam around where we lived on his motor cycle.
One night Col Rahman’s people caught him snooping, had him thoroughly thrashed and registered a case of female molestation against him. After his release some time later both he and Tully were deported. Before this episode, Tully had once tried to embarrass Ghulam Ishaq Khan by asking him how much was reserved for Kahuta.
GIK just smiled and quoted from Ghalib: “Magas ko bagh men jaane na dijeo; Keh nahaq khaun perwane ka hoga” (Don’t let the bee into the garden otherwise the poor moths will lose their lives.) Tully was baffled and asked other journalists what Khan Saheb had meant. By the time he found out the meaning of the verse, the press conference was over and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had left.
Next week two more interesting and memorable events will be talked about, after which I will tell you more about my colleagues and ‘unsung heroes’.
P.S. Expect serious allegations against Dr.Munir being an american agent and alleged incompetencies of PAEC teams as well as indulging in high praise of himself and his team in building atomic bomb. Expect some content differences in Urdu and english articles as well.
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 07, 2014
Part - I
Random thoughts
It is customary for countries keep records of important events and of the people who have played prominent roles. These records mention their achievements and contributions to the national cause.
We are often reminded of the heroes who fought for and sacrificed their lives for Pakistan and the valiant deeds of our soldiers. Unfortunately, those heroes who made this country’s defence impregnable and ensured its existence for all times are largely unknown.
Just before WW II, the German scientists Hahn and Strassmann succeeded in splitting an atom of uranium with neutrons. This was the beginning of the atomic age and scientists from the US and the western world all worked hard to explore the possible uses of this discovery. This ultimately led to the making of the atomic and hydrogen bombs by the US, Russia, the UK, France and China.
Now that many of my former colleagues and I are in the autumn of our lives, some already having passed away, I, as former head of one of the country’s most important projects, would like to do justice to their unparalleled contribution. It is due to them that we have an impregnable defence and can no longer be blackmailed or threatened. Lest you forget, or do not know, their names and contributions will be listed. Before I do so, I would like to give a brief account of the circumstances which led to my giving up a promising career in Holland to return to Pakistan.
Despite warnings by ZA Bhutto, western powers did not heed India’s efforts to make nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the US, Canada and the UK actively supported the country. It was under these circumstances that Bhutto uttered that famous warning: “If India goes nuclear, we will also go nuclear, even if we have to eat grass”. Eating grass was easy, but making a nuclear bomb in this technologically backward country was an almost impossible task.
The defeat and surrender of the Pakistan Army on December 17, 1971 in former East Pakistan was still fresh in my mind. I was shattered and could not eat or sleep for days. I was in Belgium at the time, waiting to defend my Dr Eng thesis. When the Indians exploded an atom bomb on May 18, 1974 I realised that Pakistan was in mortal danger, as was felt and described by many prominent leaders. By that time I had many years of invaluable experience in the enrichment of uranium and was in a position to help Pakistan.
In September 1974 I wrote to Bhutto suggesting that Pakistan should go nuclear through the enrichment technology process rather than via the plutonium route. The PAEC, established in 1958, was in no position to do this. In January 1972 Bhutto made Munir Ahmad Khan Chairman of PAEC, thanks to the efforts of his brother, Shaikh Khursheed Ahmad, a colleague of Bhutto in Ayub Khan’s Cabinet. Munir Ahmed Khan held a BSc in Electrical Engineering from Lahore and a nine-month diploma in Power Engineering from North Carolina State Polytechnic. Having worked in the IAEA in an administrative post did not make him a nuclear expert yet he told Bhutto (Bhutto told me this himself) that he would explode a nuclear device by December 1976. The impossibility of this was exposed by Kausar Niazi in his book ‘Aur Line Kat Gae’.
At the rate they were going, PAEC would not have been in a position to explode a bomb in 50 years. When I explained this to Bhutto, he became quite furious and asked Agha Shahi and Gen Imtiaz Ali to find a new, suitable chairman for PAEC. Bhutto’s pre-occupation with early elections put this critical issue on hold. I came to Pakistan in December 1975 and by July 1976 I had realised that nothing could be achieved if the project remained under PAEC. I therefore told Bhutto that I would be leaving Pakistan if the project was not made autonomous.
Consequently I was appointed project director of the enrichment and weapons programme under a cover organisation named Engineering Research Laboratories. A G N Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi, the three most senior civil servants, were entrusted to supervise the work and provide all financial and administrative assistance. Thanks to their full support we managed to deliver nuclear weapons in the short span of seven years, almost a miracle in such an underdeveloped country as ours where even sewing needles could not be produced.
After Gen Zia took over, I requested him to give me some EME officers since I had to start an organisation from scratch – no facilities, no office, no staff. Brig Islamullah Khan, DG EME (later Maj Gen) deputed three officers – Col Qazi Rashid Ali (mechanical engineer), Col Abdul Majid (electrical engineer) and Col Bashir Khan (electronics engineer). Col Qazi was a gem of an officer, very competent and amicable. He made invaluable contributions to our programme. He passed away after retirement from diabetic complications. Col Majid (known as Majid Chalaki, or the cunning) made some useful contributions but soon retired and left. Col Bashir Khan was difficult to work with.
Some good scientists and engineers came to the project from PAEC. It was said that Munir considered them to be too outspoken and/or troublemakers. Most of them were competent and experienced but all were novices in the field of enrichment. As a matter of fact, they had never heard of the technology. A fine electrical engineer, Brig Abdul Aziz, came to work for me and I put him to manufacturing sophisticated electrical/electronic equipment. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack while on a trip to Germany with Eng Ejaz Ahmad Khokhar, a very competent and innovative mechanical engineer, comparable to the best in the west.
Brig Abdul Qayyum replaced Brig Aziz, a gem of a person, extremely friendly, soft-spoken, always smiling and a very competent electronics engineer. By this time we were under embargoes and were forced to manufacture everything ourselves. Brig Qayyum was given the task of manufacturing sophisticated centrifuge motors to run smoothly at 65,000 RPM, highly sophisticated high frequency converters to run the centrifuges, sophisticated laser range finders for the Pakistan Army (Artillery) and, above all, the most important and most sophisticated detonation system for the nuclear weapons. He delivered everything that he was entrusted with. He demanded perfection and never compromised on quality. He died on June 24, 2014.
Another fine colleague, Brig Ansari, a metallurgist, conveyed this sad news to me. Brig. Qayyum had had a stroke about 2 years ago but seemed to have recovered. He had become quite frail but still visited me regularly. It was sad to lose such a fine colleague and it saddens me when I hear of the death of any former colleague. It is like losing a part of my life and career. May Allah rest all their souls in eternal peace – Ameen.
Unsung heroes - Dr A Q Khan
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 14, 2014
Part - II
Random thoughts
In this column, I give more details about the problems faced in setting up the project and the people who facilitated. My wife, two daughters and I came to Pakistan in December 1975. After checking to see how much of the advised work had been done by PAEC over the past year, I went to see ZA Bhutto.
Unfortunately, I had to inform him that nothing had been achieved, with ‘work’ being done in a workshop. After listening to me, Bhutto suddenly asked me to remain in Pakistan. It came as quite a shock. We had come on one month’s holiday. I had been offered, and was considering accepting, an offer of a professorship and already held a job with a bright future.
I told Bhutto I wanted to first discuss the matter with my wife, who was staying in the Silver Grill Hotel in Saddar, where we had been put up. She was as shocked as I was and her immediate reaction was “no way”. How could we leave everything behind? Then she asked me if staying would make a ‘real’ difference to Pakistan. I told her that, with the knowledge I had, I was the only one who could undertake this task – no exaggeration and time proved it to be correct. She then agreed that I would stay on while she went back to pack up, say farewell to her elderly parents and make all the necessary arrangements. She and the girls returned after six weeks, on March 9, 1976, our twelfth wedding anniversary.
A new chapter full of challenges, hard work, achievements and treachery had started in our lives. My family and I paid heavily for our patriotic decision and we sometimes wonder whether it was all worthwhile seeing the ingratitude we received in return from those who benefitted most from my work. I gave modern technology, developed by hundreds of scientists and engineers in the west over a period of 20 years and at a cost of about $ 2 billion, for which I didn’t receive a single rupee other than a meagre salary.
We were given a house in F-8 which, at that time, was at the very outskirts of Islamabad. Our household goods were being shipped, so we lived in an empty house – no curtains, no furniture, borrowed beds and no car. That year the winter rains were very heavy and life was tough and miserable. It took six months before I was paid my first salary of Rs3,000 per month. Meanwhile we survived on what we had brought with us. We also had to buy a second-hand car as we were not given transport facilities by the PAEC, under whose aegis the project fell at that time.
The offices for this important project were established in Second World War vehicle sheds behind Islamabad Airport. They were not only dilapidated, but also housed many snakes and scorpions. The sheds had high steel gates and pits for repairing trucks, etc. The steel sheets on the roof had many holes. We adapted by cutting doors into the steel gates, filling up the pits with broken bricks and cementing them over and putting tar coal-dipped jute sheets on the roof. This was how we started!
However, once the project was independent, I received full support from the authorities concerned and was able to put together a team of dedicated colleagues and a plan for the future. Initially a few PAEC officers, foreign trained and competent, had been sent on deputation, but none of them had any experience of the job in hand. When the project became independent they were given the option of staying or returning to PAEC. Not a single one opted to return except the person who was put in charge by Munir Ahmad Khan.
Before I took over, I had written a letter to Munir, chairman PAEC, describing the dismal state of affairs, complaining of the incompetence of the person he had put in charge and requesting a meeting. I never received any response. I then wrote to Bhutto explaining the case and telling him that, under the given circumstances, I could not work and wanted to return to Holland. I received an almost immediate call from Gen Imtiaz, military secretary to Bhutto, saying that the matter would be sorted out in two or three days.
After two days, Agha Shahi, foreign secretary general, called me to a meeting at the Foreign Office. I drove myself there and was taken to Shahi’s office by his director, Farhatullah Baig. There I found A G N Qazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Gen Imtiaz also present. After I had given them a briefing and they had discussed the matter amongst themselves, they offered me the job of PAEC chairman. I regretted the offer on the grounds that people in Europe knew I was an expert on centrifuge technology and the immediate result would be embargoes. Gen Imtiaz then suggested the name of Dr Amir Muhammad Khan, a senior PAEC officer, for chairmanship.
I quite frankly told them that unless the project was put directly under me with full freedom of action, I could see it getting bogged down in bureaucracy. I was then asked to return the next day at 7 pm, when I found the same gentlemen present. They had agreed with my proposal of an autonomous organisation and I was to be project director. Gen Imtiaz informed Bhutto of our agreement on the green phone line. Bhutto then asked to speak to me. He asked me if I was satisfied with the new setup, to which I said yes, but stressed the need for a free hand.
After a few days Bhutto called a meeting, constituted a Coordination Board consisting of A G N Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi. They also posted a joint secretary from the finance ministry to work as my director finance & administration, Imtiaz Ahmed Bhatti. He was a handsome, fair-skinned, tall man with a Clark Gable moustache. He had been a national football player in his younger days. His father was professor of English at FC College and his elder brother was a diplomat. I was later instrumental in having him promoted to federal secretary. He has meanwhile passed away. He was a fine colleague.
The newly created organisation went by the name of Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL). After Gen Zia took over, he deputed one of his best, confident officers, Brig Zahid Ali Akbar Khan, a dashing go-getter. He brought with him a team of good engineers, Col Mahmood, Col Javed, Col Sajawal, Col Aslan, Maj Saeed Baig (later Brig), et to look after our civil works. They all did excellent jobs, always delivering on schedule, sometimes even earlier. Brig Zahid engaged Dr Iqbal Wahla, a Cornell-trained, very competent civil and structural engineer, who did most of the designing of the buildings for the Kahuta Plant.
The formation of a Coordination Board with the three most senior and experienced civil servants was a most important step taken by Bhutto. This laid a solid foundation for our programme, culminating in the manufacture of nuclear weapons within the short span of seven years and that too in a technologically underdeveloped country
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 21, 2014
Part - III
Random thoughts
After taking charge, I immediately started searching for a suitable site to build the plant. My criterion was that it should be within a 50 km radius from Islamabad in order to facilitate government and army support.
One place I particularly liked was near Khanpur. It was flat and water and high voltage lines were available. Unfortunately, it was in a very open area and vulnerable to air attack. I later chose this site, with the consent of Admiral Sirohey, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the missile factory. Adm. Sirohey appointed me chief coordinator of the ballistic missile programme and the first M-11 prototype was produced there before handing over the project to the army.
I held that position until 2000. Rear Admiral Sohail A Khan and Maj Gen Raza were the first two fine and capable officers to head that organization (PMO). That missile could carry nuclear weapons up to a range of 500 km.
Brig Zahid continued our search and we ultimately chose Kahuta (Sumblega Village), about 45 km from Rawalpindi. Mr Shakir, former head of the Small Dams Project and Dir Works PAEC, had mentioned this site to me. We had found the perfect place – near the federal government, the GHQ and an international airport and away from routes travelled by foreigners. Brig Zahid and I met a middle-aged gentleman there who turned out to be Subedar Sb, their instructor at PMA, Kakul. We told him that we wanted to acquire the area to put up an army repair workshop. Handsome compensation would be paid for the land and all able-bodied males would be employed. They could buy land on the other side of the small river and walk over the bridge, which we would build for them. The 15 or 20 families of the area, all ex-servicemen, agreed.
The next day Brig Zahid met with Gen Fazle Muqeen Khan (a handsome, tall, efficient officer), secretary defence, to issue an order for the acquisition of the area for defence purposes. This was done to avoid any later litigation. After about a week Mr Bhutto called a meeting and asked me about the progress made. I told him that I had selected Kahuta and the reasons behind my choice. Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan suggested forming a committee to recommend the site. At this, Mr Bhutto smiled and said: “Khan Sb, neither you nor I or anybody else here knows the ABC of the work at hand. If Dr Khan has selected it, the matter is closed.” Spot decisions like this made by Mr Bhutto were the basis of our success.
In October 1976 we took possession of the area and erected a wire fence. Brig Zahid was a dashing, dynamic person and he immediately hired Dr Iqbal Wahla of Rist, Lahore as consultant. Dr Wahla, a competent and efficient architect had earned his degree from Cornell University in America. While I made line drawing of our requirements for the buildings, he prepared the construction drawings and Brig Zahid communicated with the contractors. By the middle of 1977 the main structures were in place. After imposing martial law, Gen Zia sent Brig Zahid to Larkana as deputy martial law administrator.
In his place came Brig Anis Ali Syed, a short, soft-spoken thorough gentleman. He was as efficient as Brig Zahid had been and the work continued at full speed. Col Mahmood, Col Aslam, Col Sajawal (later Brig), Col Javaid and Maj Saeed Baig (later Brig) formed an excellent, efficient team and always delivered on time. Sajawal and Saeed Baig remained in charge of our civil works even after their promotions to brigadier. First Gen Zahid, and later Gen Anis, used to pick me up at least twice a week in a self-driven jeep and take me to Kahuta to see the progress made.
An important and rather amusing thing happened just after our project was made autonomous. Mr Bhutto had asked me to see Mr Aziz Ahmed, minister of state for foreign affairs, and explain to him what we were planning to do. I had heard that he was a stiff collared bureaucrat and rather autocratic. I explained the importance and difficulty of the centrifuge technology, going nuclear being our only option and that I was an expert in this field.
After my explanations, Mr Aziz Ahmed asked me: “What is your education and experience?” I mentioned my BSc from Karachi, two years in the famous Berlin Technical University, an MS from top-class Delft (Holland) University of Technology and a DrEng from the University of Leuven (Belgium). I also had a large number of publications to my name and four years of practical experience as a senior scientist in centrifuge technology. After hearing me out he asked: “That’s all?” I retorted that there was nothing else left, otherwise I would have done it. We later became good friends.
After imposing martial law, Gen Zia appointed his old colleague and friend from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradune days, Gen Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, as adviser security on nuclear affairs. Gen Naqvi, an MA in English from Allahabad University, looked very much like a European – fair, light coloured hair, green eyes. He was a soft-spoken and pleasant person. He had an office at the PAEC Head Office and took Col Qamar Faruqui, director security PAEC, as his staff officer.
Within a few weeks he realised that Munir Ahmad Khan was averse to producing a nuclear bomb. When he mentioned this to me I told him that Munir had, on numerous occasions, tried to convince me that nuclear weapons were a bad thing for Pakistan. He also said that, were his wife (a European lady) to find out, all hell would break loose. This had serious but positive consequences, about which more in the next column. I personally believed, and still believe, that without nuclear deterrence we would have lost Pakistan. Statements made by Indian leaders are testimony to this.
There were many intrigues and plots against me and our nuclear programme, more so by locals than by foreigners. Now, while putting things in writing, all those events come to mind. Let me just tell you about one. A very fine, competent colleague of mine was, at that time, working in a defence organisation. He was frustrated as the head of that organisation, a former professor and a disciple of Prof Salam, had no practical experience or knowledge of defence projects. I obtained orders from Gen Zia to have him transferred to us. He turned out to be an invaluable, capable asset.
He told me that when Mr Bhutto had put pressure on Munir to explode the promised device by December 1976, Munir had discussed the matter with Prof Salam and my colleague’s boss. They decided to get about 2000 tons of explosives, put radioactive cobalt in it (obtained from X-ray machines) and explode it in a small tunnel. They would then take Mr Bhutto there and show him with a Geiger Counter that the explosion had been successful. They then informed Mr Bhutto that the explosion would take place after three or four months. To their good fortune, Mr. Bhutto announced elections and we all know what happened after that. Had their plot been successful, Mr Bhutto may very well have considered the centrifuge route redundant and Pakistan would have been put in mortal danger.
Dr A Q Khan
Monday, July 28, 2014
Part - IV
Random thoughts
In continuation of my previous columns on the same subject, here follow three interesting events that are not common knowledge. I had mentioned earlier that both Gen Naqvi and Col Faruqui had doubted Munir’s loyalty. Gen Zia himself had warned me to be wary and I was not to discuss any important or confidential matters with him.
The event discussed here was told to us by our foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, after his return from a trip to the USA. The same incident was also told to Mr Zahid Malik by the Foreign Secretary, Niaz A Naik, and included in Mr Malik’s book ‘Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb’ (1992).
Sahbizada Yaqub was in Washington with Foreign Secretary George Schultz and they were discussing matters of mutual interest. He had his team members with him. During the course of the discussions Schultz suddenly changed the topic and started talking about our nuclear programme. He threatened to stop all aid to Pakistan if we did not restrict our nuclear programme.
Yaqub tried to defend our stance and said that our programme was for peaceful purposes only. A senior official of the CIA retorted that he should not insult their intelligence as they had all details of our programme. They even had a mock-up of our nuclear device, he said. They then asked Yaqub to follow them through the corridor to another room. The officer removed a cloth that covered a table and Yaqub saw a design of a plant on it. He said that that was our Kahuta Plant.
He then went to the next table and removed a cloth from what looked like a sphere in two parts with cables, etc. and told Yaqub that it was a model of our nuclear weapon. Yaqub feigned ignorance, even though he realised it looked like what he had so often seen in Kahuta. He told them that he was not a technical man or a scientist and could not say anything about it. But if you say that is what it is, then let it be so.
Mr Schultz said that he could not fool him. They had irrefutable proof. When they left the room and walked down the corridor towards Schultz’ office, Yaqub’s sixth sense told him to look over his shoulder. He got the shock of his life when he saw a renowned Pakistani scientist coming out of the adjacent room and going straight into the room they had just left. He instantly understood the whole game. Information had been passed on to the Americans.
The second event – an important one – took place after some time in Kahuta. After ERL (Engineering Research Laboratories) had been established, I asked Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Commander 10th Corps, Rawalpindi, to give me a good officer to look after our security matters. He sent Col Abdul Rahman, an extremely competent, efficient officer.
After having explained to him what I wanted him to take care of, he hired many observers and informants around Kahuta. One day a “shepherd” returned from a routine inspection and sat down on a medium-sized stone to rest. He thought that the stone looked a bit different and used his small axe to chip off a small piece. The stone was easily cut and underneath he could see copper. He immediately reported the matter to a subedar who, in turn, informed Col Rahman. The stone was taken to the laboratories and put in a safe place.
I was informed and told them not to do anything until the next morning after I had inspected it. Next morning, after having ascertained that it did not contain any explosives, we dismantled it. The outside layer, about 4 inches thick, consisted of resin with sand from the local area. Inside was an aluminium box in two parts screwed together. Upon removing the screws we saw a wonder of technology – a long-lasting battery, antenna, neutron counters, an air-analyser and a recording/transmitter set.
This sophisticated equipment could analyse air samples to find the concentration of enriched or natural uranium hexafluoride, neutrons (from cold and hot tests), could store this information and, on command, could transmit it in a single pulse.
It must have cost millions of dollars. It had definitely been put there at night by a Pakistani agent driving to Kahuta Town. I conveyed details of the “find” to Gen Zia and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who immediately came to see it. They highly commended the work of Col Rahman and his staff.
A few days later the notorious US ambassador, Dean Hinton, came to see Gen Zia and again harped on our nuclear programme. He boasted that the Americans knew everything about our work. On hearing that, Gen Zia said that if they were relying on that spy stone for their information, it wouldn’t do them much good as it had meanwhile been dismantled and was now non-functional. The Ambassador, visibly shaken, soon departed.
Just a few weeks earlier the US defence attache had taken aerial photos of the buildings at Kahuta and Dean Hinton had gone to the president and asked what type of facilities they were. Gen Zia did not even bother to look at the photos. He only remarked that the US had violated diplomatic norms and if any plane (it was a UN plane that used to fly to Kashmir) flew over Kahuta in future, it would be shot down.
He later conveyed these orders to the Air defence command stationed at Kahuta which had anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles.
With time, news of our efforts to acquire nuclear weapons filtered through to the west and they all undertook espionage efforts. The British sent two of their most notorious journalists, Mark Tully, who could speak Urdu, and Chris Sherwell. Sherwell was tasked to cover me. He used to roam around where we lived on his motor cycle.
One night Col Rahman’s people caught him snooping, had him thoroughly thrashed and registered a case of female molestation against him. After his release some time later both he and Tully were deported. Before this episode, Tully had once tried to embarrass Ghulam Ishaq Khan by asking him how much was reserved for Kahuta.
GIK just smiled and quoted from Ghalib: “Magas ko bagh men jaane na dijeo; Keh nahaq khaun perwane ka hoga” (Don’t let the bee into the garden otherwise the poor moths will lose their lives.) Tully was baffled and asked other journalists what Khan Saheb had meant. By the time he found out the meaning of the verse, the press conference was over and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had left.
Next week two more interesting and memorable events will be talked about, after which I will tell you more about my colleagues and ‘unsung heroes’.
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