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Lessons to learn from India's PT-76 operations in 1971 Liberation War

Bilal9

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Indian PT-76s rolling towards future Bangladeshi capital of Dacca. Photo via Indian military forums
India’s Armored Cavalry Rolled — And Swam — Into Bangladesh
Amphibious tanks helped Indian troops wage a lightning war in a land full of rivers

Sebastien A. Roblin
Mar 18, 2017
by SÉBASTIEN ROBLIN

This is the second in a two-part series on the PT-76 amphibious tank.
Part one described the characteristics of the lightly armored vehicle, and detailed its exploits and defeats in the Vietnam War.


In the late 1960s, the lightly-armored, Soviet-made PT-76 presented a shock to U.S. troops in Vietnam. A thousand miles to the west, the tank would soon play a role in the fate of what was then East Pakistan — today, Bangladesh.

By the fall of 1971 the Indian military was actively assisting the Mukti Bahini insurgency that took up arms following a brutal crackdown by West Pakistan earlier that March. The Indian government of Indira Gandhi expected full-scale war to break out — and it needed a way to provide armored support for its troops despite the rivers of the Ganges Delta that stood in the way.
As a result, the Indian Army concentrated its two regiments of PT-76s in the area — the 45th Cavalry Regiment and the 69th Armored Regiment, as well as two independent squadrons, the 1st and 5th. Facing them were five Pakistani squadrons of M24 Chaffee light tanks, totaling 66 in all (Pakistan Army 29th Cavalry Regiment), and three platoons of PT-76s, some of them captured from India during a war in 1965.

Before hostilities officially commenced, the Indian Army on Nov. 21 infiltrated the 800 men of the 14th Punjab Battalion across the border near the hamlet of Garibpur to secure a key highway leading to Jessore. Fourteen PT-76s of the 45th Cavalry’s C Squadron rode in support.

The Pakistani army was aware of the Indian presence, and counterattacked early the following morning with a full brigade of 2,000 troops, supported by dozens of M24 Chaffees. The M24 was an American World War II-era light tank armed with a 75-millimeter gun — shared with the Sherman tank — and protected by thin armor that did not exceed 38 millimeters in thickness.

For once, the PT-76 faced an armored opponent on a relatively even footing. However, the Pakistanis outnumbered the Indian force roughly three to one.


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Indian troops pose next to a Pakistani M24 tank knocked out at the battle of Garibpur. This photo was sent to Western media. Indian Army photo
However, the element of surprise is everything in warfare, and the Indian tankers had fortunately anticipated the attack, digging their vehicles in an ambush position and setting up anti-tank recoilless rifles. As the Pakistani tanks rolled through thick early morning fog, the Indian tank crews scrambled to their vehicles under the command of Major D.S. “Chiefy” Narag.

The approaching M24s only became visible at ranges as short as 30 or 50 meters. The PT-76s opened fire, destroying 10 Chaffees during an intense 30-minute engagement. The Pakistani tanks struggled to spot their adversaries in the mist.

Narang personally destroyed two tank before being killed by a burst of machine gun fire. The Indian tankers later wiped out a second attack by a platoon of M24s.

By the time the mists cleared in the afternoon, the Indian squadron counted 14 Chaffees destroyed or abandoned for the loss of six of its amphibious tanks. The accompanying infantry and their recoilless guns inflicted further losses and repelled the Pakistani force.

Pakistani F-86 Sabre jet fighters swooped down to the battleground to provide air support. But Indian Gnat fighters intercepted the Sabres at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, shooting down two of the Pakistani aircraft and damaging a third.

The victory by the outnumbered force at Garibpur boosted Indian morale before the war was even formally declared. Hostilities commenced in earnest after a fizzled Pakistani preemptive strike on Dec. 3, 1971. The encircling Indian Army lunged across East Pakistan’s border, aided by native Mukti Bahini guerrillas.

The Pakistani army had entrenched itself in one fortified city after another, separated by large rivers that posed formidable obstacles to Indian tanks and heavy weapons. Nonetheless, India intended to wage a Blitzkrieg-style campaign of rapid advances to cut off and surround the Pakistani strongpoints, relying on Mi-4 transport helicopters and PT-76 tanks to ferry troops across the enormous rivers.


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Indian Army PT-76s with infantry squads mounted on top. Photo via Indian military forums
However, not all of India’s attempts to use the PT-76's amphibious capabilities panned out. The 5th Squadron’s tanks repeatedly bogged down in marshes and fell behind the infantry. When they tried to ford the Meghna River on Dec. 12, the tanks’ hull seals proved leaky, forcing them to take an overland route instead.

Furthermore, the lightly armored vehicles suffered losses to Pakistani 106-millimeter recoilless guns, even when making successful attacks.

Elsewhere, the amphibious tanks showed their worth. When Indian troops were delayed at Gobindganj by a battalion of Pakistani defenders reinforced with tanks and artillery, the 63rd Battalion executed a flanking maneuver across 55 kilometers of rivers and marshy terrain.

Riding on top of the PT-76s were 12-man squads of Nepalese Gurkha troops renowned for their close-quarters fighting skills with curved kukri knives. Not only did the combined tank-infantry team take the town in a surprise attack, knocking out a Chaffee and overrunning a battery of 105-millimeter howitzers, but a detached squadron of PT-76s set up a road block behind the enemy lines, capturing the defenders as they fled.

Earlier, charging tanks of the 1st Squadron ejected a stubborn Pakistani infantry company from the town of Mian Bazar on Dec. 4, losing four vehicles to recoilless rifles in the process. Five days later, the same unit stormed the city docks of Chandpur, again with Gurkhas hitching a ride, where they encountered three Pakistani gunboats on the Meghna River.

The tanks sank all three boats in a furious exchange of fire, rescuing 180 survivors out of the 540 troops and crew onboard.

Two days later, the tankers encountered another gunboat and pounded it with 54 76-millimeter shells until it grounded ashore. The amphibious tanks then began ferrying infantry and equipment back and forth across the vast river, though their engines occasionally overheated in the middle of the water, requiring towing by civilian boats.

The Pakistani tankers did have a chance to claim revenge on the 45th Cavalry’s A Squadron on Dec. 9 as they approached the town of Kushtia. Maj. Sher Ur Rahman set up his two platoons of M24s and a supporting infantry company in an ambush positions facing a road on a raised embankment surrounded by open ground.

Six Indian PT-76s accompanying a battalion of 22nd Rajput infantry advanced into the open kill zone. The Pakistani guns unleashed hell, blasting one of the Indian tanks in the opening volley. Four of the PT-76s held their ground, knocking out an M24 before being destroyed one after another, while the lead vehicle retreated at top speed, sowing panic in the accompanying infantry.

It took two days for the Indian Army to organize a full assault on Kushtia — only to discover its defenders had already quietly extricated themselves.

The 45th Cavalry was soon back in the action, swimming down the Bhairab River in order to seize the ferry at Syamganj, resulting in the capture of 3,700 fleeing troops. The tankers got their hulls wet again when A Squadron crossed the Madhmuti River on the night of Dec. 14 with infantry on top to capture the Kumarkhali ferry, bagging 393 more prisoners in the process.

Two days later, the commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered the capital of Dacca, leading to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. The Indian Army had advanced with shocking swiftness across the rivers of the Ganges Delta, a victory in which the PT-76 had ably supported.

The lightly armored PT-76 amphibious tanks suffered heavy losses — one source claims 30 destroyed or damaged — and did not always prove reliable. However, by aggressively flanking enemy positions, cutting of retreating troops, and working in close cooperation with infantry, the Indian tankers got impressive results out of their thinly-armored mount.

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Now what lesson can Bangladesh Army take from this??
 
Our Marines covers the leaked seals in PT 76 with grease, the trick worked wonderfully until now
 
The take away part is strategy...

Before war, Indira Gandhi asked meteorology department about water ways in Bangladesh so that they can plan for humanitarian help during flash floods.... So no one even heard about the plan
 
Authpr forhet to mention chawanda a graveyard of indian tanks

India never desfeatedpak from outside but it was from inside creating mukti bani
 
The Pakistani army had entrenched itself in one fortified city after another, separated by large rivers that posed formidable obstacles to Indian tanks and heavy weapons.
However, not all of India’s attempts to use the PT-76's amphibious capabilities panned out. The 5th Squadron’s tanks repeatedly bogged down in marshes and fell behind the infantry. When they tried to ford the Meghna River on Dec. 12, the tanks’ hull seals proved leaky, forcing them to take an overland route instead.
Furthermore, the lightly armored vehicles suffered losses to Pakistani 106-millimeter recoilless guns, even when making successful attacks.
Many so called defence experts here says, 'Bangladesh has no military strategic depth' or 'it will be a cake walk for an invading army's armored thrust' . They should read these lines.

And also Indian Sanghi bigots need to stop thinking that Bangladesh will be an easy target for Indian army. Sanghi extremists habitually suggest annexing one-third of Bangladesh or occupying Khulna and Sylhet or forcing Bangladesh to accept their unwanted Muslims or Punishing Bangladesh for so called ''persecution of Hindus''. They should read. This time 170 million people will not wait with garland in hands like they did in 1971. Nor will Mukti Bahini will clear the paths for their advance.
 
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3rd Independent Armoured Squadron lost 10 tanks in the Garibpur skirmish, 'C' Sqdn 45 Cav lost 6 tanks plus one more to PAF. The ambush at Kushtia resulted in 5 PT-76 being lost.
 
3rd Independent Armoured Squadron lost 10 tanks in the Garibpur skirmish, 'C' Sqdn 45 Cav lost 6 tanks plus one more to PAF. The ambush at Kushtia resulted in 5 PT-76 being lost.

Why did they keep M24 Chaffees around, these were WWII era tanks and such easy targets for Indian T-55's and PT-76's, which were two more generations ahead of the M24's. M24's could not even do well against larger T34-76's in Korea.

The Indians used the classic Afrika Corps Rommel tactic, send out bait, draw them in, then skeet-shoot the hapless victims with recoilless guns (Rommel used the converted 88mm FLAK I believe, deadly accurate and muzzle velocity far higher than any tank gun.)

Add the winter fog in December in that area, and you're toast....
 
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Many so called defence experts here says, 'Bangladesh has no military strategic depth' or 'it will be a cake walk for an invading army's armored thrust' . They should read these lines.

And also Indian Sanghi bigots need to stop thinking that Bangladesh is an easy military target for Indian army. Sanghi extremists habitually suggest annexing One third of Bangladesh or occupying Khulna and Sylhet or forcing Bangladesh to accept their unwanted Muslims or Punishing Bangladesh for so called ''persecution of Hindus''. They should read. This time 170 million people will not wait with garland in hand like they did in 1971. Nor will Mukti Bahini clear the paths of their advance.
Also Bangladesh should remember that India wont help her for the 2nd time and shouldn't also forget that without Indian help , Bangladesh wouldn't have got their independence , stop demonizing India and let us live peacefully , Bangladesh is not our enemy
 
Also Bangladesh should remember that India wont help her for the 2nd time and shouldn't also forget that without Indian help , Bangladesh wouldn't have got their independence , stop demonizing India and let us live peacefully , Bangladesh is not our enemy
I did not say 'India', I said 'Indian Sanghi'. I hope you understand the difference. So question of demonizing India do not come. Secular Indians are friends of Bangladesh and we like them, but Sanghi extremists are enemy of Bangladesh and we dislike them. If you are not a Sanghi, then my that post is not for you.
 
Why did they keep M24 Chaffees around, these were WWII era tanks and such easy targets for Indian T-55's and PT-76's, which were two more generations ahead of the M24's. M24's could not even do well against larger T34-76's in Korea.

The Indians used the classic Afrika Corps Rommel tactic, send out bait, draw them in, then skeet-shoot the hapless victims with recoilless guns (Rommel used the converted 88mm FLAK I believe, deadly accurate and muzzle velocity far higher than any tank gun.)

Add the winter fog in December in that area, and you're toast....
Pakistan High Command knew the East would fall, paralysis in GHQ decision making meant the much emphasized II Corps offensive to potentially save the troops in the East couldn't be launched.

The General Staff was having flashbacks of the Valtoha-Assal Uttar disaster, and chickened out, from a suicidal assault.
 
should talking about technical issue, less politics. touche

PT 76 is a great platform, indeed even after five decades, there is still some countries who operate them in large number as there is not much newly built amphib tank platform who can give punch rightly just after beaching. The only drawback is her thin paper like armor, but with right deployment strategy this issue can be minimalized
 
Bangladesh liberation war was a master class from the then COAS Sam Manekshaw and PM Indira Gandhi with Sheikh Mujib
 
India outnumbered Pakistan ftom three sides with local support
The war was over as soon as bengal rifles revolted

Lesson learned by Pakistan were
1. Paranoia is needed when facing india
2. develop nukes/ a backup absolute deterrence
3. Never trust india on not doing a preemptive strike on any pretext
 
Here are some interesting tidbits from Wiki,

  • Indian PT-76's were retired in 2009. No idea what the replacement is or will be.
  • Indonesia still has 30 left in their inventory, (again) no idea what the replacement will be.
  • Pakistan had actually bought some 32 PT-76's second hand from Indonesia prior to 1971, I don't know if the use of PT-76's by the Indian Army in 1971 was a surprise to the Pakistani Army high command.
  • China got their hands on a PT-76 back in the 60's and developed a series of successive amphibious platforms, the latest of which is the Type 05 armored fighting vehicle is a family of dedicated designed amphibious infantry fighting vehicle developed by Norinco for People's Liberation Army. The family includes ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle and ZTD-05 amphibious tank (assault gun) as well as several other variants including command vehicle and recovery vehicle. The vehicle could be launched at sea, from an amphibious assault ship over the horizon (this is the new assault doctrine).

As a dedicated amphibious vehicle developed for the PLA Marine Corps, the Type 05 is aiming to provide unique amphibious capability that emphasizes speed.

The ZBD-05 is fully amphibious, and the vehicle is propelled by two large water jets mounted to the rear side of the hull. In the water, the engine is able to generate 1475 horsepower as well as switching to land mode with only 550 horsepower. The vehicle can run at a maximum road speed of 65 km/h and 45km/h in the water. It has a maximum cruising range of 500 km and can negotiate a gradient of 60 % and side slope of 30%. It can cross a vertical obstacle of 0.7 m and trench of 2 m.

For the export market, Norinco designated two variants as VN16/18 for the Venezuelan Navy - story below form Jane's.

HOME EVENTS EXHIBITION NEWS EUROSATORY 2014 ARTICLE

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Amphibious assault (ES14E3)
CHRISTOPHER F FOSS

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NORINCO's VN18 tracked amphibious infantry fighting vehicle is being offered on the export market
While China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) (Hall 5, Stand H850) has not been able to bring any of its expanding range of tracked and wheeled armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to Eurosatory, it has released details of some of the latest vehicles for the first time and exhibits highly detailed scale models.

Now being offered on the export market is the VN18 tracked amphibious infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), pictured, which is already in service with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marine Corps under the designation of ZBD-05.

NORINCO has confirmed that the VN18 is fitted with a two-person turret armed with a stabilised 30mm cannon and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun (MG), with a Red Arrow 73 series anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) mounted either side of the turret.


It has a maximum water speed of 25km/h, which is a considerable improvement over that of the US Marine Corps AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) that is rapidly becoming obsolete.

The VN18 is powered by a diesel engine that develops 1,176kW for amphibious operations and 440kW for land operations, giving a maximum road speed of 65km/h.

The PLA has also fielded a 105mm direct fire version called the ZTL-05; the export version is called the VN16. There are also command and control and combat engineer versions.

The Chinese company is also marketing its latest VP10 armoured personnel carrier (APC) and VN12 tracked IFV.

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ZBD-05
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ZTD-05
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The point I wanted make from all these bits of news is that amphibious operations has always been important for Bangladesh Army and will become even more so in the future (whether or not we raise our own marine corps). Hence enhancing this area of operations and capability will become very important, as we saw in 1971 on our own soil.

The Chinese PLA Marine corps is also enhancing their own amphibious capability with amphibious assault ships but that level of operations for us may be a bit premature.
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Red seas: China’s advancing amphibious force capabilities

China is equipping its marines with some of the most advanced amphibious platforms in the world.

Samuel Cranny-Evans examines these systems, the force that uses them, and how the PLANMC compares to Western competitors The US Army Futures Command has defined China as its long-term pacing threat, the country with which the US Army must prepare to compete in the coming decades.

The task is considerable for the well-armoured US Army, but for the US Marine Corps (USMC), China’s reliance on a family of heavily armed amphibious vehicles presents a significant challenge. For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), its Marine Corps (PLAMC) is a source of pride. The PLAMC is equipped and trained to assert Chinese authority over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Senkaku islands owned by Japan.

Because of this, the PLAMC enjoys a higher level of funding and equipment than other PLA units. Selection and training for the PLANMC is rigorous, with recruitment based on standards for Special Operations troops. According to some sources recruits are required to have graduated senior middle school or higher, swim 5 km in full personal combat gear within 2.5 hours, and run the same in 23 minutes.

The original 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades are deployed in Zhanjiang, along with a unit of amphibious landing ships. The 1st Brigade was created in 1980, while the 2nd Brigade transferred from the army in 1998 (originally the 164th Division) and, until recently, was equipped with second-hand equipment from the 1st Brigade. Both units are now similarly equipped and almost the entire corps is part of the South China Sea fleet. China’s marine corps has a complement of about 12,000 professional marines, and the size of the PLAMC can be increased by the addition of amphibious mechanised infantry divisions from the PLA, which bolster the force to about 20,000.

The size of the PLAMC is planned to increase to 100,000 through the addition of other units within the PLA. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is also believed to be capable of landing divisional formations through amphibious operations, which would likely represent all 12,000 marines.

However, it is more likely to focus on brigade sized – 6,000 personnel – deployments to maintain surprise and maximise chances of achieving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) effects in the South China Sea. The PLAMC is a different entity compared with most marine forces in the world. For example, the UK Royal Marines are essentially light infantry, reliant mostly on their section combat skills for success.

The US Marine Corps (USMC) employs a much greater level of armour than others, but its most potent land asset – the M1A1 main battle tank – is reliant on large and vulnerable Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) landing craft.

For the PLAMC, the USMC could reasonably be seen as its primary competitor in the land domain. In contrast to the USMC, it is equipped with an entire family of tracked amphibious vehicles; the Type 05, which includes the ZBD-05 armed with a 30 mm cannon, the ZTD05 armed with a 105 mm direct-fire gun, and the PLZ-07B armed with a 122 mm howitzer. The Type 05s are intended to be deployed at sea from a naval ship and conduct an opposed landing. The vehicles are designed around their amphibious capabilities.

The infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) variant is capable of travelling in Sea State 4, and has a buoyancy reserve equivalent to 27% of its 26.5 tonne gross vehicle weight. Although some sources state that the vehicle can reach 40 km/h (21.6 kt) on water, it is considered likely that the speed is closer to 25 km/h, but this is still almost double that of the legacy AAV7A1 RAM/RS used by the USMC.

The Type 05 includes unique amphibious design features. Prior to entering water, the bow blade at the front of the vehicle (when folded it gives the bow a distinctive sharp nose) is hydraulically extended, and the driver's periscope is elevated so they can see above the blade. Bilge pumps are activated and a second flat blade is lowered at the rear of the vehicle as it enters the water.

ZBD05+Tracked+Amphibious+Infantry+Fighting+Vehicle+Advanced+Amphibious+Assault+Vehicle+%2528AAAV%2529+People%2527s+Liberation+Army+%2528PLA%2529+china+chinese++export+marines++%25288%2529.JPG


ZBD05+Tracked+Amphibious+Infantry+Fighting+Vehicle+Advanced+Amphibious+Assault+Vehicle+%2528AAAV%2529+People%2527s+Liberation+Army+%2528PLA%2529+china+chinese++export+marines++%25289%2529.JPG

ZBD05+Tracked+Amphibious+Infantry+Fighting+Vehicle+Advanced+Amphibious+Assault+Vehicle+%2528AAAV%2529+People%2527s+Liberation+Army+%2528PLA%2529+china+chinese++export+marines++%25282%2529.jpg


Once an appropriate water depth is reached the suspension raises the road wheels to reduce drag. A snorkel is also elevated at the rear right of the platform to provide the engine with oxygen. The bow blade and blade at the rear create a hydroplane effect that elevates the body of the vehicle above the water during travel to reduce water resistance.

The vehicle is powered by two waterjets at the rear of the vehicle and steered through a combination of closing one water jet and by a section of the side skirt, which can be opened out towards the front of the vehicle. The amphibious capability of the Type 05 family means that the vehicles can be used by the PLAMC to reach a location – a disputed island for example – from beyond the horizon.

Once there, the PLAMC would seek to establish an A2/AD bubble. Essentially, an area with a large concentration of air-defence and anti-ship assets, as well as the capabilities provided by the PLAMC and its armour, would make the prospect of intervention extremely costly and unpalatable for many forces.

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A2/AD Area Denial? Remind anyone of anything off our Cox's Bazaar area??
 
Many so called defence experts here says, 'Bangladesh has no military strategic depth' or 'it will be a cake walk for an invading army's armored thrust' . They should read these lines.

And also Indian Sanghi bigots need to stop thinking that Bangladesh will be an easy target for Indian army. Sanghi extremists habitually suggest annexing one-third of Bangladesh or occupying Khulna and Sylhet or forcing Bangladesh to accept their unwanted Muslims or Punishing Bangladesh for so called ''persecution of Hindus''. They should read. This time 170 million people will not wait with garland in hands like they did in 1971. Nor will Mukti Bahini will clear the paths for their advance.

Oh. Have you forgotten your own arguements for creating Greater Bangladesh? Or annexing Assam and giving the rest of NE to China? I have seen a lots of BDshis sharing that fantasy... And what would you call that? Bangladeshi Islamist Bigots?

India has never threatened BD ever in its existence and infact want a friendly relation with BD. But its you guys who cannot fathom living beside Kafir neighbours and sharing about this idiotic fantasy of flooding India with Bangladeshis and annexing it and has the audacity to blame India on almost everything.
 

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