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THE GREATEST COMMANDO RAIDS & OPERATIONS EVER

RAZA SAHI

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DEAR MEMBERS,

I am starting this thread out of my enthusiam & i am sure many you share the same enthusiasm. I request all of you to be constructive & informative.

thank you,


OPERATION OAK
SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Otto Skorzeny was the man personally chosen by Hitler to lead the mission to rescue Mussolini, after the Duce had been removed from power by the King of Italy in July 1943 and replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, whom Hitler feared may surrender Italy to the Allies. If this happened then southern Europe would be opened up to allied invasion. The rescue mission was to be codenamed Operation Eiche (Oak), and was one of four operations ordered by Hitler to counter any attack on Italy by the Allies.

The other three:
Operation Achse (Axis), was aimed at destroying or capturing the Italian fleet in the event of capitulation or invasion.
Operation Schwarz (Black), was aimed at the complete German occupation of Italy and disarming of Italian forces.
Operation Student, was aimed at the occupation of Rome and with the successfull execution of Operation Eiche, the restoration of Mussolini's regime.

Skorzeny was subordinated to the Luftwaffe for the mission and took his orders from General Kurt Student.

Locating the Duce

The first problem to overcome was the location of the Duce. After his arrest he was taken away to an unknown destination and it was several weeks before the first lead came in. He was supposedly being held on the Island of Ponza off the West Coast of Italy.
By the time investigations had been carried out on this report he had been moved on, this time to the island of La Maddalena off the north east coast of Sardinia.
Plans were drawn up for a rescue attempt but before they could be carried out Mussolini was once again spirited away to a new destination.
The leads had now dried up and his location was a mystery, until German radio intercepts confirmed that he had been moved to the Gran Sasso d'Italia, (an unusually high amount of signal traffic, which regularly referred to an person of importance) a high peak in the Appenine mountain region 80 miles north east of Rome. It was the best lead they had and preparations could now begin for the mission.

Planning

Built on the peak of the Gran Sasso was the Campo Imperatore hotel, part of a winter ski resort constructed a few years before the war. The only access to this hotel was via a cable car that ran up the side of the mountain from the valley below.

Any plans had to include the taking of the cable car station in the valley to stop any re-inforcements getting through. If Mussolini was being held on the Gran Sasso then it was guaranteed that he was being well guarded.
On September 10th 1943, Skorzeny, his adjutant and Luftwaffe planners carried out the first aerial reconnaissance over the Gran Sasso, which revealed an ideal landing place for an assault, a small meadow only yards from the front of the hotel.

Now only the method of assault was left, Skorzeny decided that a parachute assault was out of the question because of the risk of scattering the men, so a glider assault was planned.
It was decided to use 12 fully manned DFS-230 light assault gliders for the assault, consisting of several men from Skorzeny's Friedenthal Battalion and men of the 1st Kompanie, 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, (the Fallschirm - Lehr Battalion), under the command of Oberleutnant Georg von Berlepsch.The remainder of the Battalion under the command of Major Otto-Harald Mors were to travel by road and take the nearby airfield at Aquila and the cable car station in the valley below. Another group of Skorzeny’s men were tasked with the job of freeing the Duce's family.

Action

On the afternoon of the 12th September the gliders and their towing aircraft took off from the Practica de Mare airfield near Rome on their 1-hour flight to the Gran Sasso.They took with them a pro-german Italian officer called General Soletti who could be useful in negotiations if things became bloody. Four of the gliders didn’t make it to the final destination.

s they approached the Gran Sasso visibilty was still bad, it was only recognised because of the previous reconnaissance carried out by Skorzeny, they immediately prepared to be cast from their tows.
As they approached the target they saw that the meadow previously planned as the landing area was in fact covered in large rocks not observed during the reconnaissance. They made a crash landing only yards from the front of the hotel, the obstacles helping to brake the gliders.

Skorzeny led his men into the hotel, overcoming the resistance at the entrance and headed straight for the Duces room, which was guarded by two Italian officers. They offered no resistance and within minutes the commanding officer of the garrison had promised no resistance from the rest of his men . The whole complex fell into in German hands quickly and without bloodshed.
The hotel had been taken in four minutes, gliders #6 & #7 were just coming in to land. Glider #8 made its approach shortly afterwards but crash-landed, badly injuring all those on board.

Escape

Mussolini had been released from his detention and now only the problem of getting him off the Gran Sasso remained.
There were 3 options for escape, the first was by road to Rome through the valley below which was now in the safe hands of Major Mors and the Fallschirm Lehr Battalion, this was risky due to the partisan activity in the area. The second was to transport the Duce to the nearby airfield at Aquila which was due to be attacked by paratroops and fly him out.
Skorzeny chose the third option, fly him directly off the Gran Sasso using the Feisler Storch recconaisance aircraft piloted by Student’s personal pilot Captain Gerlach, which was flying overhead.
The danger of a take off from the small meadow was increased when Skorzeny insisted on accompanying the Italian leader and the pilot. The Storch was not really built to carry such a load, and in fact the pilot pointed out this fact, and how short was the runway, but the brave SS Officer was adamant. The men boarded the plane and the engine was revved to produce maximum power. The brake was released suddenly and the Storch shot forward along the boulder strewn runway, careered over the edge of the cliff and vanished from sight. For a few frightening seconds the light plane plunged towards the valley floor, but the pilot regained control and landed at Practica di Mare whence Mussolini, still escorted by Skorzeny, was flown to Hitler's Headquarters.

Conculsion

This raid was a success with very few casualties. Skorzeny and the SS came off best and got a lot of the credit though others may argue that the Fallschirmtruppe played a major part in the planning and execution of the operation and deserved more credit than they got.
 
OPERATION SOURCE

Operation Source was a series of attacks to neutralise the heavy German warships – Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Lutzow – based in northern Norway, using X-class midget submarines.

The attacks took place in September 1943 and succeeded in keeping the Tirpitz out of action for at least 6 months.

The operation was later portrayed in the 1955 war film, Above Us the Waves, featuring John Mills, which was based on both Operation Source, and the earlier Chariot human torpedo attacks on the Tirpitz.

Contents [hide]
1 The attack
2 X-craft and crews
3 See also
4 References


[edit] The attackSix X-craft were used. HMS X5, X6 and X7 were allocated the battleship Tirpitz, in Kåfjord. HMS X9 and X10 were to attack the battleship Scharnhorst, also in Kåfjord. HMS X8 was to attack the aged pocket battleship Lützow in Langefjord.

The craft were towed to the area by conventional submarines (HMS Truculent (X6)[1] Syrtis (X9),[2] Sea Nymph (X8),[3] Thrasher (X5; flag of the operation's commander, Lt. Henty-Creer),[4] Stubborn (X7),[5] and Sceptre) (X10)[6] and manned by passage crews on the way. Close to the target, the operation crews would take over. X9, probably trimmed heavily by the bow in the heavy sea for the tow, was lost with all hands on the passage when her tow parted and she suffered an abrupt plunge due to her bow-down trim.[7] X8 (passage crew commanded by Lt. J. E. "Jack" Smart) developed serious leaks in her side-mounted demolition charges, which had to be jettisoned; these exploded, leaving her so damaged she had to be scuttled.[8] The remaining X-craft began their run in on 20 September and the attacks took place on 22 September 1943.

Scharnhorst was engaged in exercises at the time, and hence was not at her normal mooring, X10's attack was abandoned, although this was due to mechanical and navigation problems, and the submarine returned to rendezvous with her 'tug' submarine and was taken back to Scotland.

X6 and X7 managed to drop their charges underneath Tirpitz, but were unable to make good their escape as they were observed and attacked. Both craft were abandoned and six crew survived to be captured. Although the fate of X5 is unclear, it is believed to have been sunk by a direct hit from one of Tirpitz's four-inch guns before having had a chance to place her charges. In 2004, a saddle charge identical to those used by the X-class was found on the bottom of Kåfjord, a short distance from the site of the attack. Although it has not been positively identified, it is believed to be from the X5. In June 2011 the remains of a submarine believed to be X5 were detonated by the Royal Norwegian Navy.[9]

Tirpitz was heavily damaged. While not in danger of sinking, she took on over 1,400 tons[10] of water and suffered significant mechanical damage, including shock to the roller bearings in "D" turret aft.[11] Tirpitz could not leave her anchorage until April 1944. For this action, the commanders of the craft, Lieutenant Donald Cameron (X6) and Lieutenant Basil Place (X7), were awarded the Victoria Cross, whilst Robert Aitken, Richard Haddon Kendall, and John Thornton Lorimer received the Distinguished Service Order and Edmund Goddard the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal.[12] The commander of the X8, John Elliott Smart was appointed a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE).[13]
 
OPERATION FRANKTON

Operation Frankton was a commando raid on shipping in the German occupied French port of Bordeaux during the Second World War. The raid was carried out by a small unit of Royal Marines known as the Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD).

The plan was for six canoes to be taken to the area of the Gironde estuary by submarine. They would then paddle by night to Bordeaux. On arrival they would attack the docked cargo ships with limpet mines and then escape overland to Spain. Twelve men from no.1 section were selected for the raid; including the C.O. Blondie Hasler and the reserve Colley the total of the team numbered thirteen. Two men survived the raid: Hasler, and his no.2 in the canoe, Sparks. Of the other eight, six were executed by the Germans while two died from hypothermia. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed the mission shortened the Second World War by six months and Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations, deemed the raid "the most courageous and imaginative of all the raids ever carried out by the men of Combined Operations."[1]



Background
Cockles MK IIThe Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD) was formed on 6 July 1942, and based at Southsea, Portsmouth.[2] The RMBPD was under the command of Royal Marines Major Herbert 'Blondie' Hasler with Captain J.D. Stewart as second in command.[2] The detachment consisted of 34 men and was based at Lumps fort, and often exercised in the Portsmouth harbour and patrolled the boom at nights.[2][3]

The port of Bordeaux was a major destination for goods to support the German war effort. In the 12 months from June 1941–1942 vegetable and animal oils, other raw materials, and 25,000 tons of crude rubber had arrived at the port.[4] Hasler submitted a plan of attack on 21 September 1942. The initial plan called for a force of three canoes to be transported to the Gironde Estuary by submarine then paddle by night and hide by day until they reached Bordeaux 60 miles (97 km) from the sea,[5] thus hoping to avoid the 32 mixed German navy ships that patrolled or used the port. On arrival they hoped to sink between six and 12 cargo ships then escape overland to Spain.[5] Permission for the raid was granted on 13 October 1942, but Admiral Louis Mountbatten Chief of Combined operations increased the number of canoes to be taken to six. Mountbatten had originally ordered that Hasler could not take part in the raid, because of his experience as the chief canoeing specialist, but changed his mind after Hasler formally submitted his reasons for inclusion.[5] The RMBPD started training for the raid on 20 October 1942, which included canoe handling, submarine rehearsals, limpet mine handling and escape and evasion exercises.[5] The RMBPD practised for the raid with a simulated attack against Deptford, starting from Margate and canoeing up the Swale.[6]

Mark II canoes, which were given the codename of Cockle,[7] were selected for the raid.[8] The Mark II was a semi rigid two man canoe, with the sides made of canvas, a flat bottom, and 15 feet (4.6 m) in length. When collapsed it had to be capable of getting in and out of the 24 inches (610 mm) wide submarine hatch.[9] During the raid each canoe's load would be two men, eight limpet mines, three sets of paddles, a compass, a depth sounding reel, repair bag, torch, camouflage net, waterproof watch, fishing line, two hand grenades, rations and water for six days, a spanner to activate the mines and a magnet to hold the canoe against the side of cargo ships. The men also carried a .45 Colt pistol and a Fairbairn-Sykes Fighting Knife.[6]

The men selected to go on the raid were divided into two divisions each having their own targets.

A Division;
Major Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in canoe Catfish.
Corporal A F Laver and Marine W H Mills in canoe Crayfish.
Corporal C J Sheard and Marine D Moffatt in canoe Conger.[6]
B Division was;
Lieutenant J W Mackinnon and Marine J Conway in canoe Cuttlefish.
Sergeant S Wallace and Marine R Ewart in canoe Coalfish.
Marine W A Ellery and Marine E Fisher in canoe Cachalot.[6]
A thirteenth man was taken as a reserve, Marine N Colley.[6]

[edit] MissionOn 30 November 1942 the Royal Navy submarine HMS Tuna (N94) sailed from Holy Loch in Scotland with the six canoes and raiders on board.[6] The submarine was supposed to reach the Gironde estuary and the mission was scheduled to start on 6 December 1942. This was delayed because of bad weather on route and the need to negotiate a minefield.[10] By 7 December 1942 the submarine had reached the Gironde estuary and surfaced some 10 miles (16 km) from the mouth of the estuary. One canoe Cachalot's hull was damaged while being passed out of the submarine hatch, leaving just five canoes to start the raid. The reserve member of the team Marine Colley, was not needed so he remained aboard the submarine with the Cachalot crew Marine Ellery and Marine Fisher.[6]

The five remaining canoes were disembarked at 1730 hours 7 December.[11] The plan was for the crews to paddle and rest for five minutes in every hour.[11] The first night 7/8 December fighting against strong cross tides and cross winds, one canoe Conger had disappeared. Further on the surviving crews encountered 5 feet (1.5 m) high waves and another canoe Cuttlefish capsized and was lost. The crew consisting of Lieutenant Mackinnon and Marine Conway held on to two of the remaining canoes, which were carried to safety and left ashore.[10] Carrying on with the raid the canoes approached a major checkpoint in the river and come upon three German frigates. Lying flat on the canoes and paddling silently they managed to get by without being discovered.[12] On the first night the three remaining canoes Catfish, Crayfish and Coalfish covered 20 miles (32 km) in five hours and landed near St Vivien du Medoc.[3][11] While they were hiding during the day and unknown to the others, Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart in Coalfish had been captured at daybreak beside the Pointe de Grave lighthouse where they had come ashore.[3][13] By the end of the second night 8/9 December, the two remaining canoes Catfish and Cuttlefish had paddled a further 22 miles (35 km) in six hours.[14] The third night 9/10 December they paddled 15 miles (24 km) and on the fourth night 10/11 December because of the strong ebb tide they only managed to cover 9 miles (14 km).[11] The original plan had called for the raid to be carried out on 10 December, but Hasler now changed the plan. Because of the strength of the ebb tide they still had a short distance to paddle, so Hasler ordered they hide for another day and set off to and reach Bordeaux on the night of 11/12 December.[11] After a night's rest the men spent the day preparing their equipment and limpet mines which were set to detonate at 21:00 hours. Hasler decided that Catfish would cover the western side of the docks and Crayfish the eastern side.[15]

Bordeaux
Limpet mine used during Operation FranktonThe two remaining canoes reached Bordeaux on the fifth night 11/12 December the river was flat calm and there was a clear sky. The attack started at 21;00 hours 11 December, Hasler and Sparks in Catfish attacking shipping on the western side of the dock, placed eight limpet mines on four vessels including the fast patrol boat Sperrbrecher. A sentry on the deck of the Sperrbrecher had spotted something and shone his torch down but the darkness and the camouflaged canoe evaded being seen. They had planted all their mines and left the harbour with the ebb tide at 00:45 hours.[11][15] At the same time Laver and Mills in Crayfish had reached the eastern side of the dock without finding any targets, so returned to deal with the ships lying near the South Basin. They placed eight limpet mines on two vessels, five on a large cargo ship and three on a small liner.[15]

On their way downriver the two canoes met by chance on the Isle de Caseau. They continued down river together until 06:00 hours when they beached their canoes near St Genes de Blaye and tried to hide them by sinking them.[14] The two crews then set out separately on foot, for the Spanish border.[15] Laver and Mills after two days were picked up at Montlieu-la-Garde by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans.[14] Hasler and Sparks arrived at the French town of Ruffec 100 miles (160 km) from where they had beached their canoe, on 18 December 1942,[16] and tried to make contact with someone from the French resistance at the Hotel de la Toque Blance and were then taken to a local farm and spent the next 18 days[17] in hiding. They were then guided across the Pyrenees into Spain.[14] It was not until 23 February 1943, that Combined Operations Headquarters, heard via a secret message sent via Mary Lindell to the War Office,[18] that Hasler and Sparks were safe. On 2 April 1943 Hasler arrived back[19] in Britain by air from Gibraltar having passed through the French Resistance escape organisation. Sparks was sent back by sea and arrived much later[20]

Aftermath
On 10 December the Germans announced that a sabotage squad had been caught on 8th December near the mouth of the Gironde and 'finished off in combat'. It was not until January 1943 in the absence of other information all 10 men on the raid were posted missing, until news arrived of two of them. Later it was confirmed that five ships had been damaged in Bordeaux by mysterious explosions.[15] This information remained until new research of 2010 revealed that a sixth ship had been damaged even more extensively than any of the other five reported. This research also revealed that the other five ships holed were back in service very shortly afterwards.

For their part in the raid Major Hasler was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Marine Sparks the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM).[21] Corporal Laver and Marine Mills were also recommended for the DSM which at the time could not be awarded posthumously, so instead they were mentioned in dispatches.[1]

Of men who never returned Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart were captured on the 8 December at the Pointe de Grave (near Le Verdon) and revealed only certain information during their interrogation,[22] and were executed under the Commando Order, on the night 11 December [23] in a sandpit in a wood north of Bordeaux and not at Chateau Magnol, Blanquefort. Unfortunately (seemingly to encourage tourist traffic) a plaque has been erected on the bullet marked wall at the Chateau as to evidence this, but this can be unquestionably proved this is not the case.[24] This account shows the Blanquefort reference is false and this should be noted lest the reader be misled, despite a French Website quoting this as fact. A small memorial can also be seen at the Pointe de Grave, where they were captured. In March 2011 a major c.100,000 euro memorial is to be unveiled at this same spot.[25]

After having been set ashore, Lieutenant MacKinnon and Marine Conway managed to evade capture for four days, but they were betrayed and arrested by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans at La Reole hospital 30 miles (48 km) south east of Bordeaux, attempting to make their way to the Spanish border. Mackinnon had been admitted to the hospital for treatment for an infected knee.[3] The exact date of their execution is not known. New evidence shows that Lieutenant Mackinnon, Corporal Laver, Marine Mills and Marine Conway were not executed in Paris in 1942 but in the same location as Wallace and Ewart under the Commando Order.[3]

Corporal Sheard and Marine Moffatt were not drowned on the first night but died of the cold.[26] The body of Marine Moffatt was found on the Ile de Ré on 14 December but Corporal Sheard’s body is believed to have been recovered and buried elsewhere further up the coastline [27] Corporal Sheard is remembered on the Hero's Stone at his place of birth, North Corner, Devonport.[28]

In 1955 a fictionalised version of the story was told in the film The Cockleshell Heroes made by Warwick Films, and starring Anthony Newley, Trevor Howard, David Lodge and Jose Ferrer who was also the Director.[29]

In June 2002, the Frankton Trail was opened, a walking path which traces the 100 miles (160 km) route taken through occupied France, on foot, by Hasler and Sparks. The Frankton Souvenir is an Anglo-French organisation, set up to keep alive the story of the raid. It plans to develop the trail, and install explanatory plaques at key points.[3]

On March 31, 2011 a memorial to the Cockleshell Heroes and three French individuals is dedicated. Made from Portland Stone it was transported across care of Brittany Ferries. The memorial cost about £80,000[30]
 
OPERATION JAYWICK
Operation Jaywick was a special operation undertaken in World War II. In September 1943, 14 commandos and sailors from the Z Special Unit raided Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbour, sinking seven ships.



Background
The Krait, the vessel which carried the men of Z Special Unit on Operation Jaywick, the successful raid on Singapore Harbour on the night of 1943-09-26.Special Operations Australia (SOA), a joint Allied military intelligence organisation, was established in March 1942. SOA operated under the cover name Inter-Allied Services Department (IASD). It contained several British SOE officers who had escaped from Japanese occupied Singapore, and they formed the nucleus of the IASD, which was based in Melbourne. In June 1942, a commando arm was organised as Z Special Unit (which was later commonly known as Z Force). It drew its personnel primarily from the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy.

In 1943, a 28-year-old British officer, Captain Ivan Lyon (of the Allied Intelligence Bureau and Gordon Highlanders), and a 61-year-old Australian civilian, Bill Reynolds, devised a plan to attack Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbour. Commandos would travel to the harbour in a vessel disguised as an Asian fishing boat. They would then use collapsible canoes to attach limpet mines to Japanese ships.

Reynolds was in possession of a 21.3 metres (70 ft) Japanese coastal fishing boat, the Kofuku Maru, which he had used to evacuate refugees out of Singapore. Lyon ordered that the boat be shipped from India to Australia. Upon its arrival, he renamed the vessel MV Krait, after the small but deadly Asian snake.

The attack
Japanese ship Sinkoku Maru, which was mined by Major Ivan Lyon and Able Seaman Huston on 26 September 1943.
The crew of the Krait during Operation JaywickIn mid-1943, the Krait travelled from a training camp at Broken Bay, New South Wales to Thursday Island. Aboard was a complement from Z Special Unit of three British and eleven Australian personnel, comprising:

Major Ivan Lyon (Mission Commander)
Lieutenant Hubert Edward Carse (Krait's Captain)
Lieutenant Donald Montague Noel Davidson
Lieutenant Robert Charles Page
Corporal Andrew Anthony Crilley
Corporal R.G. Morris
Leading Seaman Kevin Patrick Cain
Leading Stoker James Patrick McDowell
Leading Telegraphist Horace Stewart Young
Able Seaman Walter Gordon Falls
Able Seaman Mostyn Berryman
Able Seaman Frederick Walter Lota Marsh
Able Seaman Arthur Walter Jones
Able Seaman Andrew William George Huston
On 13 August 1943, the Krait left Thursday Island for the U.S. Naval Base at Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia where it was refuelled and repairs were undertaken.

On 2 September 1943, the Krait left Exmouth Gulf and departed for Singapore. The team's safety depended on maintaining the disguise of a local fishing boat. The men stained their skin brown with dye to appear more Asiatic and were meticulous in what sort of rubbish they threw overboard, lest a trail of European garbage lead arouse suspicion. After a relatively uneventful voyage the Krait arrived off Singapore on September 24. That night six men left the boat and paddled 50 kilometres (31 mi) to establish a forward base in a cave on a small island near the harbour. On the night of 26 September 1943, they paddled into the harbour and placed limpet mines on several Japanese ships before returning to their hiding spot.

In the resulting explosions, the limpet mines sank or seriously damaged seven Japanese ships, comprising over 39,000 tons between them.[1] The commandos waited until the commotion over the attack had subsided and then returned to the Krait, which they reached on 2 October. Their return to Australia was mostly uneventful, except for a tense incident in the Lombok Strait when the ship was closely approached by a Japanese patrol boat; however the Krait was not challenged. On October 19, the ship and crew arrived safely back at Exmouth Gulf.

Raid repercussions
On ANZAC Day 1964 the MV Krait was dedicated a War Memorial; this plaque was affixed to its wheelhouse.The Japanese authorities in Singapore were completely surprised by the raid. Never suspecting such an attack could be mounted from Australia, they assumed it had been carried out by local saboteurs, most probably pro-Communist Chinese guerillas. In their efforts to uncover the perpetrators, a wave of arrests, torture and executions began. Local Chinese and Malays, as well as interned POWs and European civilians were targeted in this program. The incident became known as the Double Tenth, for 10 October, the day that Japanese secret police began the mass arrests.

Given the misery visited upon the local population by the Japanese, criticism has arisen as to whether Operation Jaywick was justified, especially with its relatively limited strategic results. In the aftermath of the raid, the Allies never claimed responsibility for the attack on shipping, most likely because they wanted to preserve the secret of the Krait for future similar missions. Therefore the Japanese did not divert significant military resources to defending against such attacks, instead just using their secret police to enact reprisals against civilians.

Operation Jaywick was followed by Operation Rimau. Three ships were sunk, but the participants, including Lyon, were killed or captured and executed.
 
HUMAN TORPEDOES RAID ON ALEXANDRIA BY REGIA MARINA

The first attack on the British naval stronghold of Alexandria was planned for August 25-26, 1940 with the support of the submarine IRIDE by five attack teams riding S.L.C.s, Birindelli-Paccagnini, Franzini-Lazzaroni, Tesei-Pedretti, Toschi-Lazzari, with tlieutenant Durand De la Penne in riserve.

The IRIDE left La Spezia on August 12 for the Gulf of Bomba (100 km west of Tobruk) where it rendezvoused with the torpedo boat CALIPSO which was carrying the crews and the S.L.C. and all the needed material. In harbor was also present the support ship MONTE GARGANO.

Unfortunately (for the Italians), in the afternoon of August 21st the ships were flown over by low-flying British aircrafts returning from a raid against targets not to far from the harbor. The unusual presence of vessels in waters usually empty was communicated to the British command which, in the early morning of the 22nd, completed a more accurate aerial surveillance. Later, it ordered an attack by three Swordfish torpedo planes from the aircraft carrier EAGLE.

The Italian ships were taken by full surprise. One of the Swordfish closed up to 200 meters from the IRIDE and dropped a torpedo from no more than 10 meters. The submarine, hit, sank in a few minutes to a depth of 20 meters. The S.L.C. crews, all trained divers, though without their breathing apparatuses which were inside the submarine, gave their best to save the trapped crewmembers trapped in the hull. Thus failed the first attempt against Alexandria.

A second attempt was made the 29th of September in conjunction with a similar attack on Gibraltar. The submarine Gondar was to carry the crews just off the entrance to the harbor of Alexandria. There, after having received instructions to abort mission due to the absence of capital ships in port, the submarine was detected by British surveillance. After many hours of depth charge bombardments, and with damages making her resurfacing very difficult, the Gondar made one last attempt to reach the surface where it was scuttled by her crew. The crew, including Elios Toschi, were taken prisoner for the rest of the conflict. The British had been warned; such was the thinking of Commander Valerio Berghese, in charge of the also botched Gibraltar mission. An important question arose: were the British aware of the attacks? Had they received intelligence to that effect? Alberton Santoni's "Il vero Traditore. A book about ULTRA does not say.

A new attempt, a very successful one indeed, was made the night of 18th December 1941, when three two-man human torpedoes penetrated the defenses of the harbor at Alexandria and deposited their delayed-action charges under the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant and the tanker Sagona. The submarine Scirè, commanded by Liutenant Borghese, deposited the attack vessels within a few yards of the designated point and safely returned to La Spezia. The three attack units, taking advantage of the temporary opening of the outer defenses to the harbor, entered the highly protected harbor and directed their weapons toward the designated targets. Since the expected aircraft carrier Eagle was no longer in the harbor, the third team placed its charge under a large tanker instead.

Despite having been captured and jailed in the same ship they had just mined, Lieutenant De La Penne and diver Bianchi refused to provide any information of military value. Only a few minutes before the weapon went off, Lieutenant De La Penne asked the commanding officer of the Valiant to save his crew. This was done, but De La Penne was returned to his jailed were escaped just after the terrifying explosion.

At 06.00 hours of the following morning, the first charge detonated under the tanker Sagona and badly damaged both the tanker and the destroyer Jervis, which was moored alongside for refueling. The charge under Valiant detonated at 06.20, and the one under the Queen Elizabeth at 6:24. The depth of water was fifteen to fifty feet and the charges weighed about 300 kilograms. All crew members were taken prisoners, some a few days after the attack, and were confined to a prisoner of war camp for the rest of the conflict. Their action, undoubtedly, has transcended history and become a legend.

(Reference: Alan Raven and John Roberts, British Battleships of World War II, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1976)

Valiant's charge exploded under the port bulge, abreast 'A' turret, and holed and forced upwards the lower bulge over an area of sixty feet by thirty feet. Internal damage extended from the midline to the lower bulge compartments and the inner bottom, lower bulge, 'A' shell room and magazine, and the adjacent compartment up to lower deck level immediately flooded. The main and auxiliary machinery was undamaged, but the revolving trunk of 'A' turret was distorted, and some minor shock damage was done to electrical equipment. The ship had a trim by the bow, but could have proceeded to sea in an emergency. Temporary repairs were made at Alexandria, and eventually she sailed for Durban where permanent repairs were carried out between 15th April and 7th July 1942.


The charge below Queen Elizabeth detonated under 'B' boiler room and blew in the double bottom structure in this area, and, to a lesser extent under 'A' and 'X' boiler rooms, upwards into the ship. Damage to the ship's bottom covered an area of one hundred and ninety feet by sixty feet and included both the port and starboard bulges. 'A', 'B' and 'X' boiler rooms, and the forward 4.5inch magazines flooded immediately, and 'Y' boiler room and several other compartments in the vicinity, flooded slowly up to main deck level. The boilers, and the auxiliary machinery, together with its electrical equipment were severely damaged by the explosion and subsequent flooding. The armament was undamaged. But all hydraulic power was lost, and the guns of the main and secondary batteries could have been used only at greatly reduced efficiency. The ship sank to the harbor bottom, but was raised and temporary repairs were carried out in the floating dock at Alexandria. She subsequently proceeded to the USA, where permanent repairs were carried out, between 6th September 1942 and 1st June 1943, at the Norfolk navy yard, Virginia. Queen Elizabeth was out of action for a total of seventeen and a half months.
 
OPERATION PANZERFAUST

Operation Panzerfaust, known as Unternehmen Eisenfaust in Germany, was a military operation to keep the Kingdom of Hungary at Germany's side in the war, conducted in October 1944 by the German military (Wehrmacht). When German dictator Adolf Hitler received word that Hungary's Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, was secretly negotiating his country's surrender to the advancing Red Army, he sent commando leader Waffen-SS Lieutenant-Colonel Otto Skorzeny to Hungary. Hitler feared that Hungary's surrender would expose his southern flank, where the Kingdom of Romania had just joined with the Soviets and cut off a million German troops still fighting the Soviet advance in the Balkan peninsula.

Hitler sends in Waffen-SSHaving anticipated Horthy's move,
Skorzeny had been instructed to remove Horthy from power. Horthy's son Miklós Horthy, Jr. was meeting with Soviet representatives. Miklós Jr. was informed by the German Security Service through intermediaries that envoys of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia wanted to meet with him. Miklós Jr. had failed to keep a prior meeting when he observed suspicious individuals near the proposed meeting place. A second meeting was set for early 15 October at the offices of Felix Bornemisza, the Director of the Hungarian Danube ports. He hoped that the Yugoslavian representatives might have important news, but upon entering the building, Skorzeny and his troops attacked and beat him into submission. They then kidnapped Miklós at gunpoint, trussed him up in a carpet, immediately drove him to the airport and flew him to Vienna. From there, he was transported to the concentration camp at Mauthausen.[1]

Horthy declares armistice
Working through his trustworthy General Béla Miklós, who was in contact with Soviet forces in eastern Hungary, Regent Horthy attempted to negotiate the end of the war, seeking to surrender to the Soviets while preserving the government's autonomy. The Soviets willingly promised this. But the Germans were aware of Horthy's behind-the-scenes maneuvering and set in place Operation Panzerfaust which would remove him from power and replace his government with forces loyal to the German cause, effectively occupying Hungary. Horthy governed from Castle Hill in central Budapest, an ancient and now well-guarded fortress. He blamed the German government for "forcing" Hungary into war, and during a meeting of the Crown Council declared that:

Today it is obvious to any sober-minded person that the German Reich has lost the war. All governments responsible for the destiny of their countries must draw the appropriate conclusions from this fact, for as a great German statesman, Bismarck, once said, "No nation ought to sacrifice itself on the altar of an alliance." ... I decided to safeguard Hungary’s honour even against her former ally, although this ally, instead of supplying the promised military help, meant finally to rob the Hungarian nation of its greatest treasure, its freedom and independence. I informed a representative of the German Reich that we were about to conclude a military armistice with our former enemies and to cease all hostilities against them.[1]

At 2:00 p.m. on 15 October 1944, Horthy's declaration that Hungary had signed an armistice with the Soviet Union was announced over the radio. With Nazi help, the Arrow Cross Party seized the radio station. A party member wrote a counter-proclamation and used the name of the Hungarian Army's Chief of the General Staff, General Vörös. The commanding officer and his assistant of the two remaining Hungarian army units in Budapest were arrested or disappeared, and their soldiers fell in line with the Arrow-Cross party.[1]

Failure of the Hungarian Army to respond
Given that many Hungarian units were controlled by the German army, it is unclear whether orders, if issued, ever reached most of the line troops. There had also been considerable propaganda about the harsh, punitive treatment of prisoners by the Soviets.

[edit] Germans take Buda Castle
Skorzeny then brazenly led a convoy of German troops and four Tiger II tanks to the Vienna Gates of Castle Hill. Horthy recognized that he had no means to fight the German armor and superior forces. He issued orders that "no resistance should be made."[1]:290 One unit did not get these orders, and fought the Germans for about 30 minutes. The Germans quickly and with minimal bloodshed captured Castle Hill. Only seven soldiers were killed and 26 men were wounded.[2]

Horthy capturedHorthy
was taken into custody by Edmund Veesenmayer and his staff later on the 15th. Kept overnight in the Waffen SS offices, he returned to the Palace to collect his personal belongings. There he was confronted with a demand to sign a typewritten statement handed to him by Premier Géza Lakatos. Surprised that his loyal friend would encourage him to sign the document, Horthy was told by Lakatos that his son's life was at stake. When Horthy asked Veesenmayer if this was true, Veesenmayer confirmed the threat. The regent understood that this was an effort to put the stamp of his prestige on a Nazi-sponsored Arrow Cross coup, placing Ferenc Szálasi and the Arrow Cross in control of the country.[1]

Horthy later explained his capitulation: "I neither resigned nor appointed Szálasi Premier, I merely exchanged my signature for my son’s life. A signature wrung from a man at machine-gun point can have little legality."[1]

Despite Veesenmayer's solemn promise to obtain Horthy's son's release from the German concentration camp, Miklós Jr. remained a prisoner until the war's end on 8 May 1945. Horthy himself was transported to the Schloss Hirschberg near Weilheim, Germany, and guarded by 100 Waffen SS men at all times. On 1 May 1945, Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch, the commander of the US 36th Division, visited Horthy in his castle prison. Because Hungary had fought on to the end defending Germany, Horthy was considered a prisoner of war. Seven months later, on 17 December 1945, he was released from the Nuremberg penitentiary and was reunited with his family in a private home in Weilheim.[1]
 
OPERATION CHARIOT

The St Nazaire Raid or Operation Chariot was a successful British amphibious attack on the heavily defended Normandie dry dock at St Nazaire in German-occupied France during the Second World War. The operation was undertaken by the Royal Navy and British Commandos under the auspices of Combined Operations Headquarters on 28 March 1942. St Nazaire was targeted because the loss of its dry dock would force any large German warship in need of repairs, such as the Tirpitz, to return to home waters rather than having a safe haven available on the Atlantic coast.

The obsolete destroyer HMS Campbeltown, accompanied by 18 smaller craft, crossed the English Channel to the Atlantic coast of France and was rammed into the Normandie dock gates. The ship had been packed with delayed-action explosives that detonated later that day, putting the dock out of service for the remainder of the war. At the same time a force of commandos landed to destroy machinery and other structures. Heavy German gunfire sank or immobilised all the small craft intended to transport the commandos back to England; the commandos had to fight their way out through the town to try to escape overland. They were forced to surrender when their ammunition was expended and they were surrounded.

After the raid only 228 men returned to Britain; 169 were killed and 215 became prisoners of war. German casualties were over 360 dead, mostly killed after the raid when Campbeltown exploded. To recognise their bravery, 89 decorations were awarded to members of the raiding party, including five Victoria Crosses. After the war St Nazaire was one of 38 battle honours awarded to the Commandos; the operation has since become known as The Greatest Raid of All.

Background
St Nazaire is on the north bank of the Loire river 250 miles (400 km) from the nearest British port, it had a population of 50,000 in 1942. The St Nazaire port has an outer harbour known as the Avant Port, formed by two piers jutting out into the Atlantic Ocean. This leads to two lock gates before the Basin de St Nazaire. These gates control the water level in the basin so that it is not affected by the tide. Beyond the basin is the larger inner dock called the Basin de Penhoët, which can accommodate ships up to 10,000 long tons (10,160 t). There is also an old entrance to the Basin de St Nazaire located northwest of the Normandie dry dock. Built to house the ocean liner SS Normandie, this dock was the largest dry dock in the world when it was completed in 1932.[3] The "Old Mole" jetty juts into the Loire halfway between the southern pier of the Avant Port and the old entrance into the basin.[4]

On 24 May 1941, the Battle of the Denmark Strait was fought between the German ships Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and the British ships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Hood. The Hood was sunk and the damaged Prince of Wales was forced to retire. The Bismarck, also damaged, ordered her consort to proceed independently while she headed for the French port of St Nazaire, which was the only port on the Atlantic coast with a drydock able to accommodate a ship of her size. She was intercepted by the British and sunk en route.[3]

Britain's Naval Intelligence Division first proposed a commando raid on the dock in the autumn of 1941.[5] When the German battleship Tirpitz was declared operational in January 1942, the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) were already drawing up plans to attack her. Planners from Combined Operations Headquarters were looking at potential scenarios if the Tirpitz escaped the naval blockade and reached the Atlantic.[6] They decided the only port able to accommodate her was St Nazaire, especially if, like the Bismarck, she was damaged en route and needed to pull in for repairs. They came to the conclusion that if the dock at St Nazaire was unavailable the Germans were unlikely to risk sending Tirpitz into the Atlantic.[6]


SS Normandie in her namesake dockCombined Operations examined a number of options while planning the destruction of the dock. At this stage of the war the British government still tried to avoid civilian casualties. This ruled out a bombing attack by the RAF, which at the time did not possess the accuracy needed to destroy the dock without serious loss of civilian life.[7] The Special Operations Executive were approached to see if its agents could destroy the dock gates. They decided that the mission was beyond their capabilities because the weight of explosives required too many agents just to carry them.[8] The RN were also unable to mount an operation, as St Nazaire is 5 miles (8.0 km) up the Loire Estuary. Any naval ships large enough to cause sufficient damage would be detected well before they were within range.[7]

The planners then examined whether a commando force could be used. There was an unusually high spring tide due in March 1942, which would allow a light ship to pass over the sand banks in the estuary and approach the docks, bypassing the dredged and presumably well-defended channel. It would still be too shallow for infantry landing ships, but specially lightened destroyers might succeed.[9]

Plan
St Nazaire docks, 1942The raid had three objectives: the destruction of the Normandie dock, the destruction of the old gates into the Basin de St Nazaire together with the water pumping machinery and other installations, and any U-boats or other shipping in the area.[10] The initial Combined Operations plan required two specially lightened destroyers to carry out the raid. The first would be packed with explosives and rammed into the dock gates. Commandos on board would subsequently disembark and use demolition charges to destroy nearby dock installations, searchlights and gun emplacements.[11] The destroyer would then be blown up and the second ship would come in and evacuate the ship's crew and the commandos. At the same time the RAF would carry out a number of diversionary air raids in the area.[9]

When the plan was presented to the Admiralty, they refused to support it. The certain loss of one or both destroyers to eliminate the dry dock was out of the question. They suggested they could provide an old Free French ship, the Ouragan and a flotilla of small motor launches to transport the commandos and evacuate them afterwards.[9] Approval for the mission, codenamed Operation Chariot, was given on 3 March 1942. Using a French ship would involve using the Free French forces and increase the number of people aware of the raid. Consequently it was decided the navy would have to provide a ship of their own. The RAF complained that the raid would draw heavily on their resources; the number of aircraft assigned by Bomber Command was reduced time and again before the day of the raid. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill further complicated matters when he ordered that bombing should only take place if targets were clearly identified.[8]

Combined Operations Headquarters worked closely with several intelligence organisations to plan the raid. The Naval Intelligence Division compiled information from a variety of sources. A detailed plan of the town of St Nazaire was provided by the Secret Intelligence Service, information on the coastal artillery nearby was sourced from the War Office's Military Intelligence branch. Intelligence about the dock itself came from pre-war technical journals. The RN's Operational Intelligence Centre selected the route and timing for the raid based on intelligence about the location of minefields and German recognition signals sourced from Enigma decrypts and knowledge of Luftwaffe patrols compiled by the Air Ministry's Air Intelligence Branch.[5] When all the plans had been pulled together and the timing worked out, the raid was expected to last no longer than two hours. The commandos and crew from Campbeltown would board the motor launches at the Old Mole jetty and then return to base.[12]

Composition of the raiding force
HMS Campbeltown being converted for the raid. Note the twin lines of armour plate down each side of the ship and the Oerlikon mountings. Two of her funnels have been removed, with the remaining two cut at an angleThe revised Combined Operations plan required one destroyer to ram the dock gates and a number of smaller craft to transport the Commandos. The Royal Navy would therefore provide the largest contingent for the raid, under the overall command of the senior naval officer, Commander Robert Ryder. The ship selected to ram into the dock gates was HMS Campbeltown, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Stephen Halden Beattie. The Campbeltown was a First World War vintage destroyer and had previously been the USS Buchanan in the United States Navy. She had come into RN service in 1940 as one of 50 destroyers transferred to the United Kingdom under the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.[12]

Converting Campbeltown for the raid took ten days. She had to be lightened to raise her draught to get over the sand banks in the estuary. This was achieved by completely stripping all her internal compartments.[13] The dockyard removed her three 4 inch (100 mm) guns, torpedoes and depth charges from the deck and replaced the forward gun with a light quick–firing 12 pounder. Eight 20 mm Oerlikons were installed on mountings raised above deck level.[14] The bridge and wheelhouse were given extra armour-plate protection and two rows of armour were fixed along the sides of the ship to protect the Commandos on the open deck.[15] Two of her four funnels were completely removed and the forward two were cut at an angle to resemble those of a German destroyer.[16] The bow was packed with 4.5 tons of high explosives, which were set in concrete.[13] It was decided that the explosive charge would be timed to detonate after the raiders had left the harbour. To prevent the Germans towing her away, the crew would open the ship's scuttles before abandoning the ship.[12] Should she become disabled or sunk before getting to the dock, four motor launches had been detailed to take off the crew and put the commandos ashore. The charge would be reset to explode after the last boat had left.[17]

Other naval units involved were two Hunt class destroyers, HMS Tynedale and Atherstone, which would accompany the force to and from the French coast and remain out at sea during the raid.[12] A Motor Gun Boat (MGB 314) was the headquarters ship for the raid, with Commander Ryder and the commanding officer of the Commandos on board.[18] A Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB 74), commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Michael Wynn,[19] had two objectives: If the outer Normandie dock gates were open, she had to torpedo the inner dock gates. If the gates were closed she would instead torpedo the gates at the old entrance into the St Nazaire basin.[12] To assist in transporting the Commandos, 12 motor launches (ML)s were assigned from the 20th and 28th Motor Launch flotillas. These boats were re-armed with two Oerlikon 20 mm guns mounted forward and aft to complement their twin Lewis guns.[20][nb 2] At the last minute another four MLs were assigned from the 7th Motor Launch flotilla (see Footnotes for flotilla details). These four boats were also armed with two torpedoes each. Instead of transporting the Commandos, these boats were to engage any German shipping found in the estuary.[11] All the MLs had a 500 gallon auxiliary fuel tank fixed to the upper deck to increase their range.[22] The S class submarine HMS Sturgeon would leave before the rest of the convoy and be in position to act as a navigational beacon to guide the convoy into the Loire estuary.[12]


British Commandos, 1942The man selected to lead the Commando force was Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newman; his own No. 2 Commando would provide the largest Commandos contingent, 173 men, for the raid.[12][18] The Special Service Brigade headquarters used the raid to provide experience for their other units and 92 men were drawn from Nos 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 12 Commandos.[18][23][24] The Commandos were divided into three groups; One and Two would travel on the MLs, three would be on the Campbeltown. Under the command of Captain Hodgeson, Group One had the objectives of securing the Old Mole and eliminating the anti-aircraft gun positions around the southern quays. They were then to move into the old town and blow up the power station, bridges and locks for the new entrance into the basin from the Avant port.[25] The capture of the mole was a major objective, as it was to be the embarkation point for the evacuation after the mission.[26] Group Two, under the command of Captain Burn, would land at the old entrance to the St Nazaire basin. Their objectives were to take out the anti-aircraft positions in the area and the German headquarters, to blow up the locks and bridges at the old entrance into the basin and then to guard against a counter-attack from the submarine base.[25] Group Three was under the command of Major William 'Bill' Copland, who was also the Commandos' second in command. They were to secure the immediate area around the Campbeltown, destroy the dock's water-pumping and gate-opening machinery and the nearby underground fuel tanks.[26] All three groups were subdivided into assault, demolition and protection teams. The assault teams would clear the way for the other two. The demolition teams carrying the explosive charges only had sidearms for self defence, so the protection teams, armed with Thompson submachine guns, were to defend them while they completed their tasks.[26] The Commandos were aided in their planning for the operation by Captain Bill Pritchard of the Royal Engineers, who had pre-war experience as an apprentice in the Great Western Railway dockyards and his father was the dock master of Cardiff Docks. In 1940, while part of the British Expeditionary Force in France, his duties had included examining how to disable the French dockyards if they were captured. One of the dockyards he had studied was St Nazaire and he had submitted a report detailing how to put the dock out of action.[24]

German forces
German 20 mm anti-aircraft gunThe Germans had around 5,000 troops in the immediate area of St Nazaire.[27] The port was defended by the 280th Naval Artillery Battalion under the command of Kapitän zur See Edo Dieckmann. The battalion was composed of 28 guns of various calibres from 75 mm to 280 mm railway guns,[28] all positioned to guard the coastal approaches. The heavy guns were supplemented by the guns and searchlights of the 22nd Naval Flak Brigade[nb 3]under the command of Kapitän zur See Karl-Konrad Mecke. The brigade was equipped with 43 anti-aircraft guns ranging in calibre from 20 to 40 mm. These guns had a dual role as both anti-aircraft and coastal defence weapons. Many were in concrete emplacements on top of the submarine pens and other dockside installations of the St Nazaire submarine base.[28][29]

The harbour defence companies were responsible for local defence and for the security of the ships and submarines moored in the harbour. These companies and the harbour defence boats used to patrol the river were under the command of Harbour Commander Korvettenkapitän Kellerman. The 333rd Infantry Division was the German Army unit responsible for the defence of the coast between St Nazaire and Lorient. The division had no troops based in the town, but some were located in villages nearby and would be able to respond to any attack on the port.[30]

The German Navy had at least three surface ships in the Loire estuary: a destroyer, an armed trawler and a Sperrbrecher (minesweeper), the latter being the guard ship for the port.[31] On the night of the raid there were also four harbour defence boats and ten ships from the 16th and 42nd Minesweeper flotillas berthed in the basin, while two tankers were berthed inside the Normandie dock.[28] The 6th and 7th U-Boat flotillas, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Georg-Wilhelm Schulz and Korvettenkapitän Herbert Sohler respectively, were permanently based in the port. It is not known how many submarines were present on the day of the raid. The submarine base had been inspected by the U-Boat Commander in Chief, Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz, the day before the raid. He asked what would they do if the base was subject to an attack by British Commandos. Sohler replied that "an attack on the base would be hazardous and highly improbable".[32]

[edit] The raid[edit]Outward journey
The three destroyers and 16 small boats left Falmouth, Cornwall at 14:00 on 26 March 1942.[2] They formed into a convoy of three lanes, with the destroyers in the middle. On arrival at St Nazaire the portside MLs were to head for the Old Mole to disembark their Commandos, while the starboard lane would make for the old entrance to the basin to disembark theirs. Not having the range to reach St Nazaire unaided, the MTB and MGB were taken under tow by the Campbeltown and Atherstone.[26] On 27 March at 07:20 Tynedale reported a U-Boat on the surface and opened fire.[33] The two escort destroyers left the convoy to engage the U-Boat, later identified as U-593. The U-Boat promptly dived and was unsuccessfully attacked by depth charges. The two destroyers returned to the convoy at 09:00.[27] The convoy next encountered two French fishing trawlers. Both crews were taken off and the ships sunk for fear they might report the composition and location of the convoy.[27] At 17:00 the convoy received a signal from Commander-in-Chief Plymouth that five German torpedo boats were in the area. Two hours later another signal informed them that another two Hunt class destroyers,HMS Cleveland and HMS Brocklesby, had been dispatched at full speed to join the convoy.[34][nb 4]

The convoy reached a position 65 nautical miles (120 km; 75 mi) off St Nazaire at 21:00 and changed course toward the estuary, leaving Atherstone and Tynedale as a sea patrol.[36] The convoy adopted a new formation with the MGB and two torpedo MLs in the lead, followed by Campbeltown. The rest of the MLs formed two columns on either side and astern of the destroyer, with the MTB bringing up the rear.[37] The first casualty of the raid was ML 341, which had developed engine trouble and was abandoned. At 22:00 the submarine Sturgeon directed her navigation beacon out to sea to guide the convoy in. At about the same time the Campbeltown raised the German naval ensign in an attempt to deceive any German lookouts into thinking she was a German destroyer.[27]

At 23:30 on 27 March, five RAF squadrons (comprising 35 Whitleys and 27 Wellingtons) started their bombing runs. The bombers had to stay above 6,000 feet (1,800 m) and were supposed to remain over the port for 60 minutes to divert attention toward themselves and away from the sea. They had orders to only bomb clearly identified military targets and to drop only one bomb at a time. As it turned out, poor weather over the port (10/10ths cloud) meant that only four aircraft bombed targets in St Nazaire. Six aircraft managed to bomb other nearby targets.[27][38]

The unusual behaviour of the bombers concerned Kapitän zur See Mecke. At 00:00 on 28 March, he issued a warning that there might be a parachute landing in progress. At 01:00 on 28 March, he followed up by ordering all guns to cease firing and searchlights to be extinguished in case the bombers were using them to locate the port. Everyone was placed on a heightened state of alert. The harbour defence companies and ships' crews were ordered out of the air raid shelters. During all this a lookout reported seeing some activity out at sea, so Mecke began suspecting some type of landing and ordered extra attention to be paid to the approaches to the harbour.[39]

The run-in
HMS Campbeltown wedged in the dock gates. Note the exposed forward gun position on Campbeltown and the German anti-aircraft gun position on the roof of the building at the rear.The convoy had just entered the Loire at 01:22 on 28 March when searchlights on both banks of the estuary highlighted the ships and a naval signal light demanded their identification. Before they could reply to the challenge, some shore batteries opened fire. A German-speaking signaller replied to the challenge using German signals:

"Urgent—have two damaged ships following enemy engagement. Demand immediate entry" and "ship considering herself to be under fire from friendly forces"

This deception lasted only a few minutes before the German guns opened fire again.[31] At 01:28, with the convoy under sporadic fire and only 1 mile (1.6 km) from the dock gates, Beattie ordered the German flag lowered and the White Ensign raised, the intensity of the German fire increased. The guard ship opened fire but was quickly silenced when every ship in the convoy responded, shooting into her as they passed.[40] By now all the ships in the convoy were within range to engage targets ashore and were firing at the gun emplacements and searchlights. Despite being hit a number of times Campbeltown had increased speed to 19 kn (35 km/h). The helmsman on her bridge was killed and his replacement was wounded, he was also replaced.[41] Blinded by the searchlights, Beattie only knew they were close to their objective when the MGB turned into the estuary. Still under heavy fire, Campbeltown cleared the end of the Old Mole, crashed through an anti-torpedo net strung across the entrance, and at 01:34 rammed the dock gates, only three minutes later than scheduled. The force of the impact drove the ship 33 feet (10 m) onto the gates.[31]

Disembarkation from the Campbeltown and the MLs
Commando prisoners under German escortThe Commandos on Campbeltown now disembarked: two assault teams, five demolition teams with their protectors and a mortar group.[37] Three demolition teams were tasked with destroying the dock pumping machinery and other installations associated with the drydock. Another team successfully destroyed four gun emplacements, losing four men. The fifth team also succeeded in completing all their objectives but almost half its men were killed. The other two Commando groups were not as successful. The MLs transporting Groups One and Two had almost all been destroyed on their approach. ML 457 was the only boat to land its Commandos on the Old Mole and only ML 177 had managed to reach the gates at the old entrance to the basin.[42] That team succeeded in planting charges on two tugboats moored in the basin.[43] There were only two other MLs in the vicinity: ML 160 had continued past the dock and was engaging targets upriver, ML 269 appeared to be out of control and was running in circles. By this time the crew of the Campbeltown had detonated the scuttling charges and gathered at the rear of the ship to be taken off. ML 177 came alongside the destroyer and took 30 men on board including Beattie and some of the wounded. Major Copland went through the Campbeltown and evacuated the wounded towards the Old Mole, not knowing that there were no other boats there to take the Commandos off.[42]

Lt Col Newman aboard the MGB, need not have landed, but he was one of the first ashore. One of his first actions was to direct mortar fire onto a gun position on top of the submarine pens that was causing heavy casualties among the Commandos. He next directed machine-gun fire onto an armed trawler, which was forced to withdraw upriver. Newman organized a defence that succeeded in keeping the increasing numbers of German reinforcements at bay until the demolition parties had completed their tasks.[44]

Some 100 Commandos were still ashore when Newman realised that evacuation by sea was no longer an option. He gathered the survivors and issued three orders:

To do our best to get back to England;
Not to surrender until all our ammunition is exhausted;
Not to surrender at all if we can help it.[45]

Newman and Copland led the charge from the old town across a bridge raked by machine gun fire and advanced into the new town. The Commandos attempted to get through the narrow streets of the town and into the surrounding countryside, but were eventually surrounded. When their ammunition was expended they were forced to surrender.[42][44][46] Not all the Commandos were captured; five men reached neutral Spain, from where they eventually returned to England.[47]

Small ships
Motor Torpedo Boat 74Most of the MLs had been destroyed on the run in and were burning. The first ML in the starboard column was the first boat to catch fire; her captain managed to beach her at the end of the Old Mole. Some starboard boats managed to reach their objective and disembark their Commandos. ML 443, the leading boat in the port column, got to within 10 feet (3.0 m) of the mole in the face of heavy direct fire and hand grenades before being set on fire. The crew were rescued by ML 160, one of the torpedo MLs which had been looking for targets of opportunity such as the two large tankers reported to be in the harbour.[48] The commanders of MLs 160 and 443, Lieutenants T Boyd and T D L Platt, were awarded the Distinguished Service Order for their bravery.[49][nb 5] The rest of the port column had been destroyed or disabled before reaching the mole.[51] MLs 192 and 262 were set on fire, there were only six survivors. ML 268 was blown up, one man survived.[52] ML 177, the launch that had successfully taken off some of the crew from Campbeltown, was sunk on her way out of the estuary.[53] ML 269, another torpedo armed boat, had the unenviable task of moving up and down the river at high speed to draw German fire away from the landings. Soon after passing Campbeltown it was hit and its steering damaged. It took ten minutes to repair the steering. They turned and started in the other direction, opening fire on an armed trawler in passing. Return fire from the trawler set their engine on fire.[54]


German torpedo boat JaguarML 306 also came under heavy fire when it arrived near the port. Sergeant Thomas Durrant of No. 1 Commando, manning the aft Lewis gun, engaged gun and searchlight positions on the run in. He was wounded but refused to leave the gun for treatment. The ML reached the open sea but was attacked at short range by the German torpedo boat Jaguar. Durrant returned fire, aiming for the destroyer's bridge. He was wounded again but remained at his gun even after the German commander asked for their surrender. Firing drum after drum of ammunition, he refused to give up until after the ML had been boarded. Durrant died of his wounds and was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.[34][55]

After the Commando headquarters group had landed, Commander Ryder went to check for himself that Campbeltown was firmly stuck in the dock. Some of her surviving crewmen were being taken on board the MGB. Ryder returned to the boat and ordered the MTB to carry out its alternative objective and torpedo the lock gates at the old entrance to the basin. After a successful torpedo attack, Ryder ordered the MTB to leave. On their way out of the estuary they stopped to collect survivors from a sinking ML and were hit and set on fire.[56] Back at the docks the MGB had positioned itself in midriver to engage enemy gun emplacements. The forward 2 pounder was manned by Able Seaman William Alfred Savage. Commander Ryder reported that

"The rate of supporting fire had evidently been felt, and the Commandos in the area of the Tirpitz dock had undoubtedly overcome the resistance in that area. There was an appreciable slackening in the enemy's fire."[57]


Motor Gun Boat 314Ryder could see no ships other than seven or eight burning MLs. He then realised that the landing places at the Old Mole and the entrance to the basin had both been recaptured by the Germans.[2] There was nothing more they could do for the Commandos, so they headed out to sea. On their way they were continuously illuminated by German searchlights and were hit at least six times by the German guns. Passing ML 270, they ordered her to follow and made smoke to hide both boats. When they reached the open sea the smaller calibre guns were out of range and stopped firing but the heavier artillery continued to engage them. The boats were about 4 miles (6.4 km) off-shore when the last German salvo straddled them and killed Savage, who was still at his gun. He was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his exploits. His citation recognised both Savage and the bravery of "the many unnamed crews of the Motor Gun Boat, Motor Torpedo Boat and Motor Launches who continued to carry out their duties in exposed positions, in the face of close range enemy fire."[49]

Return journey
Remains of an unidentified Motor Launch, 28 March 1942.At 06:30 the five German torpedo boats that the convoy had evaded the previous day were sighted by HMS Atherstone and Tynedale. The two destroyers turned toward them and opened fire at a range of 7 miles (11 km). After ten minutes the German boats turned away, making smoke.[57] The destroyers sighted the MGB and two accompanying MLs soon after and transferred their casualties to the Atherstone. Not expecting any more boats to arrive, they headed for home. Just after 09:00 the destroyers Brocklesby and Cleveland arrived, sent by Commander-in-Chief Plymouth. Shortly after this the ships were spotted by a Heinkel 115 floatplane of the Luftwaffe.[2] The next aircraft on the scene, a Junkers 88, was engaged by a RAF Bristol Beaufighter which had appeared in the area earlier. Both machines crashed into the sea. Other German planes arrived but were driven off by Beaufighters and Hudsons from Coastal Command. The Atlantic weather conditions deteriorated. Amid concerns about the growing German threat and the realisation that the damaged small ships would not be able to keep up, Commander Sayer ordered the crews off the smaller boats and had them sunk.[58]

Three of the small vessels managed to return to England: MLs 160, 307 and 443.[59] They had reached the rendezvous and waited until 10:00 for the destroyers to appear. Having already been attacked once, they moved further out into the Atlantic to try and avoid the German Air Force, but a Junkers 88 appeared overhead at 07:30 and approached them at low level for a closer look. The ships opened fire and hit the Junkers in the cockpit. The plane went into the sea. The next aircraft to appear was a Blohm and Voss seaplane which attempted to bomb the ships, but left after being damaged by machine-gun fire. The surviving MLs eventually reached England unaided the following day.[60]

Campbeltown explodes
Close up of HMS Campbeltown after the raid. Note the shell damage in the hull and upper worksThe explosive charges in HMS Campbeltown detonated at noon on 28 March 1942, and the dry dock was destroyed.[61] Both tankers that were in the dock were swept away by the wall of water and sunk.[62] A party of 40 senior German officers and civilians who were on a tour of the ship were killed. In total, the explosion killed about 360 men.[63] The wreck of the Campbeltown could still be seen inside the dry dock months later when RAF photo reconnaissance planes were sent to photograph the port.[64]

The day after the explosion, Organisation Todt workers were assigned to clean up the debris and wreckage. On 30 March at 16:30 the torpedoes from MTB 74, which were on a delayed fuse setting, exploded at the old entrance into the basin. This raised alarms among the Germans. The Organisation Todt workers ran away from the dock area. German guards, mistaking their khaki uniforms for British uniforms, opened fire, killing some of them. The Germans also thought that some Commandos were still hiding in the town, and made a street by street search, during which some townspeople were also killed.[61]

Aftermath
The Normandie Dock months after the raid. The wreck of HMS Campbeltown is dwarfed by the size of the dockThe explosion put the dry dock out of commission until the end of the war.[65] The St Nazaire raid had been a success, but at a cost. Of the 622 men of the Royal Navy and Commandos who took part in the raid, only 228 men returned to England. Five escaped overland via Spain and Gibraltar. 169 men were killed (105 RN and 64 Commandos) and another 215 became prisoners of war (106 RN and 109 Commandos). They were first taken to La Baule and then sent to Stalag 133 at Rennes.[13][46]

To recognise their achievement, 89 decorations were awarded for the raid. This total includes the five Victoria Crosses awarded to Lieutenant Commander Beattie, Lieutenant Colonel Newman and Commander Ryder, and posthumous awards to Sergeant Durrant and Able Seaman Savage. Other decorations awarded were four Distinguished Service Orders, four Conspicuous Gallantry Medals, five Distinguished Conduct Medals, 17 Distinguished Service Crosses, 11 Military Crosses, 24 Distinguished Service Medals and 15 Military Medals. Four men were awarded the Croix de Guerre by France, another 51 were mentioned in dispatches.[13][66]

Adolf Hitler was furious that the British had been able to sail a flotilla of ships up the Loire unhindered. His immediate reaction was to dismiss Generaloberst Carl Hilpert, chief-of-staff to the Commander in Chief West.[67] The raid refocused German attention on the Atlantic Wall, and special attention was given to ports to prevent any repeat of the raid. By June 1942 the Germans began using concrete to fortify gun emplacements and bunkers in quantities previously only used in U-boat pens. Hitler laid out new plans in a meeting with Armaments Minister Albert Speer in August 1942, calling for the construction of 15,000 bunkers by May 1943 to defend the Atlantic coast from Norway to Spain.[68]

The battleship Tirpitz never entered the Atlantic. She was bombed and capsized by the RAF in a Norwegian fjord on 12 November 1944 during Operation Catechism.[69]

Legacy [/B
The St Nazaire memorial at FalmouthSt Nazaire was one of the 38 battle honours presented to the Commandos after the war.[70] The raid has since been called The Greatest Raid of All.[29] The survivors formed their own association, the St Nazaire Society, which is a registered charity in the United Kingdom.[71]

A memorial to the raid erected in Falmouth bears the following inscription:[72]

“ OPERATION CHARIOT

FROM THIS HARBOUR 622 SAILORS
AND COMMANDOS SET SAIL FOR
THE SUCCESSFUL RAID ON ST. NAZAIRE
28th MARCH 1942  168 WERE KILLED
5 VICTORIA CROSSES WERE AWARDED
———— · ————
DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
THEIR COMRADES BY
THE ST. NAZAIRE SOCIETY
”

A new HMS Campbeltown, a Type 22 Frigate, was launched on 7 October 1987.[73] She carries the ship's bell from the first Campbeltown which was rescued during the raid and had been presented to the town of Campbelltown, Pennsylvania at the end of the Second World War. In 1988 the people of Campbelltown voted to lend the bell to the present ship for as long as she remained in Royal Navy service.[74] HMS Campbelltown being decommissioned, the bell was returned to Campbelltown, PA on 21 June 2011

On 4 September 2002, a tree and seat at the National Memorial Arboretum were dedicated to the men of the raid. The seat bears the inscription:

In memory of the Royal Navy Sailors and Army Commandos killed in the raid on St Nazaire on the 28th March 1942
 
FORT EBEN-EMAEL RAID

The Battle of Fort Eben-Emael was a battle between Belgian and German forces that took place between 10 May and 11 May 1940, and was part of the Battle of the Netherlands, Battle of Belgium and Fall Gelb, the German invasion of the Low Countries and France. An assault force of German Fallschirmjäger were tasked with assaulting and capturing Fort Eben-Emael, a Belgian fortress whose artillery pieces dominated several important bridges over the Albert Canal which German forces intended to use to advance into Belgium. As some of the German airborne troops assaulted the fortress and disabled the garrison and the artillery pieces inside it, others simultaneously captured three bridges over the Canal. Having disabled the fortress, the airborne troops were then ordered to protect the bridges against Belgian counter-attacks until they linked up with ground forces from the German 18th Army.

The battle was a decisive victory for the German forces, with the airborne troops landing on top of the fortress via the use of gliders and using explosives and flamethrowers to disable the outer defences of the fortress. The Fallschirmjäger then entered the fortress, killing a number of defenders and containing the rest in the lower sections of the fortress. Simultaneously, the rest of the German assault force had landed near the three bridges over the Canal, destroyed a number of pillboxes and defensive positions and defeated the Belgian forces guarding the bridges, capturing them and bringing them under German control. The airborne troops suffered heavy casualties during the operation, but succeeded in holding the bridges until the arrival of German ground forces, who then aided the airborne troops in assaulting the fortress a second time and forcing the surrender of the remaining members of the garrison. German forces were then able to utilize two bridges over the Canal to bypass a number of Belgian defensive positions and advance into Belgium to aid in the invasion of the country. The bridge at Kanne was destroyed.



Background
On 10 May 1940 Germany launched Fall Gelb, an invasion of the Low Countries. By attacking through the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht believed that German forces could outflank the Maginot Line and then advance through southern Belgium and into northern France, cutting off the British Expeditionary Force and a large number of French forces and forcing the French government to surrender.[5] To gain access to northern France, German forces would have to defeat the armed forces of the Low Countries and either bypass or neutralize a number of defensive positions, primarily in Belgium and the Netherlands. Some of these defensive positions were only lightly defended and intended more as delaying positions than true defensive lines designed to stop an enemy attack.[5] However, a number of them were of a more permanent design, possessing considerable fortifications and garrisoned by significant numbers of troops. The Grebbe-Peel Line in the Netherlands, which stretched from the southern shore of the Zuider Zee to the Belgian border near Weert, had a large number of fortifications combined with natural obstacles, such as marsh-lands and the Geld Valley, which could easily be flooded to impede an attack.[6] The Belgian defences consisted of one delaying position running along the Albert Canal, and then a main defensive line running along the River Dyle, which protected the port of Antwerp and the Belgian capital, Brussels. This delaying position was protected by a number of forward positions manned by troops, except in a single area where the canal ran close to the Dutch border, which was known as the 'Maastricht Appendix' due to the proximity of the city of Maastricht. The Belgian military could not build forward positions due to the proximity of the border, and therefore assigned an infantry division to guard the three bridges over the canal in the area, a brigade being assigned to each bridge.[7] The bridges were defended by blockhouses equipped with machine-guns, and artillery support was provided by Fort Eben Emael, whose artillery pieces covered each of the two bridges.[8] Having become aware of the Belgian defensive plan, which called for Belgian forces to briefly hold the delaying positions along the Albert Canal and then retreat to link up with British and French forces at the main defensive positions on the River Dyle, the German High Command made its own plans to disrupt this and seize and secure these three bridges, as well as a number of other bridges in Belgium and the Netherlands, to allow their own forces to breach the defensive positions and advance into the Netherlands.[9]

[edit] Prelude[edit] Belgian Preparation
Map of Fort Eben-EmaelThe Belgian 7th Infantry Division was assigned to guard the three bridges over the canal, supplementing the troops who garrisoned Fort Eben Emael at the time of the battle.[Notes 2] The bridge defences consisted of four large concrete pillboxes on the western side of the canal per bridge, three equipped with machine-guns and a fourth with an anti-tank gun; the bunker containing the anti-tank gun was positioned close to the road leading from the bridge, with one machine-gun equipped bunker immediately behind the bridge and two others flanking the bridge a short distance either side.[8] A company position existed on the western bank of the canal by each of the bridges, with a small observation post on the eastern side which could be quickly recalled, and all three bridges could be destroyed with demolition charges set into their structures, triggered by a firing mechanism situated in the anti-tank bunkers.[8] Fort Eben Emael, which measured 200 by 400 yards (180 by 370 m) had been built during the 1930s, and completed by 1935, by blasting the required space out of marl and possessed walls and roofs composed of 5 feet (1.5 m) thick reinforced concrete, as well as four retractable casemates and sixty-four strongpoints.[7][12]

The Fort was equipped with six 120mm artillery pieces with a range of ten miles, two of which could traverse 360 degrees; sixteen 75mm artillery pieces; twelve 60mm high-velocity anti-tank guns; twenty-five twin-mounted machine-guns; and a number of anti-aircraft guns. One side of the fort faced the canal, whilst the other three faced land and were defended by minefields; deep ditches; a 20 feet (6.1 m) high wall; concrete pillboxes fitted with machine-guns; fifteen searchlights emplaced on top of the Fort; and 60mm anti-tank guns.[13] A large number of tunnels ran beneath the Fort, connecting individual turrets to the command centre of the Fort and the ammunition stores. The Fort also possessed its own hospital and a number of living quarters for the garrison, as well as a power station that provided electricity to power the guns, provide internal and external illumination, and to power the wireless network and air-purifying system used by the garrison.[14] Belgian plans did not call for the garrison of the fort and the attached defending forces to fight a sustained battle against an attacking force; it was assumed that sufficient warning of an attack would be given so that the detachment on the eastern side of the canal could be withdrawn, the bridges destroyed and the garrison ready to fight a delaying action. The defending force would then retire to the main defensive positions along the River Dyle, where they would link up with other Allied forces.[8][9]

[edit] German Preparation
Flight plan of 17. KG zbV 5 to Eben-Emael and the Albert canal bridgesThe airborne assault on Fort Eben Emael and the three bridges it helped protect was part of a much larger German airborne operation which involved the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Airlanding Division.[9] The 7th Air Division, comprising three parachute regiments and one infantry regiment, was tasked with capturing a number of river and canal bridges that led to the Dutch defensive positions centered around Rotterdam, as well as an airfield at Waalhaven.[9] The 22nd Airlanding Division, which was composed of two infantry regiments and a reinforced parachute battalion, was tasked with capturing a number of airfields in the vicinity of The Hague at Valkenburg, Ockenburg and Ypenburg. Once these airfields had been secured by the parachute battalion, the rest of the division would land with the aim of occupying the Dutch capital and capturing the entire Dutch government, the Royal Family and high-ranking members of the Dutch military.[9] The division would also interdict all roads and railway lines in the area to impede the movement of Dutch forces. The intention of the German OKW was to use the two airborne divisions to create a corridor, along which the 18th Army could advance into the Netherlands without being impeded by destroyed bridges.[9] General Kurt Student, who proposed the deployment of the two airborne divisions, argued that their presence would hold open the southern approaches to Rotterdam, prevent the movement of Dutch reserves based in north-west Holland and any French forces sent to aid the Dutch defenders, and deny the use of airfields to Allied aircraft, all of which would aid a rapid advance by the 18th Army.[15] 400 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft would be used to deploy the parachute elements of the airborne troops, as well as transport the elements of the two airborne divisions not landing by parachute or glider.[6]

The force tasked with assaulting the Fort and capturing the three bridges was formed from elements of the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Airlanding Division, and was named Sturmabteilung Koch (Assault Detachment Koch) after the leader of the force, Hauptmann Walter Koch.[16] The force had been assembled in November 1939 and was primarily composed of parachutists from the 1st Parachute Regiment and engineers from the 7th Air Division, as well as a small group of Luftwaffe pilots.[17] Although the force was composed primarily of parachutists, it was decided that the first landings by the force should be by glider. Adolf Hitler, who had taken a personal interest in the arrangements for the assault force, had ordered that gliders be used after being told by his personal pilot, Hanna Reitsch, that gliders in flight were nearly silent; it was believed that, since Belgian anti-aircraft defences used sound-location arrays and not radar, it would be possible to tow gliders near to the Dutch border and then release them, achieving a surprise attack as the Belgian defenders would not be able to detect them.[17] Fifty DFS 230 transport gliders were supplied for use by the assault force, and then a period of intensive training began. A detailed study of the Fort, the bridges and the local area was made, and a replica of the area was constructed for the airborne troops to train in.[17] Joint exercises between the parachutists and the glider pilots were carried out in the early spring of 1940, and a number of refinements made to the equipment and tactics to be used, such as barbed wire being added to the nose-skids of the gliders to reduce their landing run, and the airborne troops trained with flamethrowers and specialized explosives, the latter of which were so secret that they were only used on fortifications in Germany and not on fortifications in Czechoslovakia similar to Fort Eben Emael.[18] Secrecy was also maintained in a number of other ways. When exercises were completed gliders and equipment would be broken down and taken away in furniture vans, the sub-units of the force were frequently renamed and moved from one location to another, unit badges and insignia were removed, and the airborne troops were not permitted to leave their barracks or to take leave.[18]


German DFS 230 troop-carrying gliderHauptmann Koch divided his force into four assault groups. Group Granite, under Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig, composed of eighty-five men in eleven gliders whose task would be to assault and capture Fort Eben Emael; Group Steel, commanded by Oberleutnant Gustav Altmann, and formed of ninety-two men and nine gliders, would capture the Veldwezelt bridge; Group Concrete, commanded by Leutnant Gerhard Schächt and composed of ninety-six men in eleven gliders, would capture the Vroenhoven bridge; and Group Iron, under Leutnant Martin Schächter, composed of ninety men in ten gliders, who would capture the Cannes bridge.[16] The crucial element for the assault force, and particularly Group Granite, was time. It was believed that the combination of a noiseless approach by the gliders used by the assault force, and the lack of a declaration of war by the German government, would give the attackers the element of surprise. However, German estimates believed that this would last, at the most, for sixty minutes, after which the superior numbers of the Belgian forces defending the Fort and the bridges, as well as any reinforcements sent to the area, would begin to come to bear against the relatively small number of lightly armed airborne troops.[14] The German plan, therefore, was to eliminate within those sixty minutes as many anti-aircraft positions and individual cupolas and casemates as was possible, and at all costs to put out of action the long-range artillery pieces which covered the three bridges.[19] The destruction of these guns was expected to be completed within ten minutes; within this time the airborne troops would have to break out of their gliders, cover the distance to the guns, fix the explosive charges to the barrels of the guns and detonate them, all while under enemy fire.[14]

The finalized plan for the assault called for between nine and eleven gliders to land on the western bank of the Albert Canal by each of the three bridges just prior to 05:30 on 10 May, the time scheduled for Fall Gelb to begin.[20] The groups assigned to assault the three bridges would overwhelm the defending Belgian troops, remove any demolition charges and then prepare to defend the bridges against an expected counter-attack. Forty minutes later, three Ju-52 transport aircraft would fly over each position, dropping a further twenty-four airborne troops as reinforcements as well as machine-guns and significant amounts of ammunition.[20] Simultaneously, the force assigned to assault Fort Eben Emael was to land on top of the Fort in eleven gliders, eliminate any defenders attempting to repel them, cripple what artillery they could with explosive charges, and then prevent the Garrison from dislodging them.[20] Having achieved their initial objectives of seizing the bridges and eliminate the long-range artillery pieces possessed by the Fort, the airborne troops would then defend their positions until the arrival of German ground forces.[20]

[edit] BattleFor reasons of security,
Sturmabteilung Koch was dispersed around several locations in the Rhineland until it received orders for the operation against Fort Eben-Emael and the three bridges to begin. Preliminary orders were received on 9 May, ordering the separated detachments to move to a pre-arranged concentration area, and shortly afterwards a second order arrived, informing the assault force that Fall Gelb was to begin at 05:25 on 10 May.[1] At 04:30, forty-two gliders carrying the 493 airborne troops that formed the assault force were lifted off from two airfields in Cologne, the armada of gliders and transport aircraft turning south towards their objectives. The aircraft maintained strict radio silence, forcing the pilots to rely on a chain of signal fires that pointed towards Belgium; the radio silence also ensured that senior commanders of the assault force could not be informed that the tow-ropes on one of the gliders had snapped, forcing the glider to land inside Germany.[1] Another pilot of a second glider released his tow-rope prematurely, and was unable to land near its objective.[21] Both gliders were carrying troops assigned to Group Granite and were destined to assault Fort Eben Emael, thereby leaving the Group understrength; it also left it under the command of Oberleutnant Witzig's second-in-command, as Witzig was in one of the gliders forced to land.[1] The remaining gliders were released from their tow-ropes twenty miles away from their objectives at an altitude of 7,000 feet (2,100 m), which was deemed high enough for the gliders to land by the three bridges and on top of the Fort, and also maintain a steep dive angle to further ensure they landed correctly.[1] After the Ju-52's released the gliders and began turning away, Belgian anti-aircraft artillery positions detected them and opened fire. This alerted the defences in the area to the presence of the gliders.[21]

Bridges
All nine gliders carrying the troops assigned to Group Steel landed next to the bridge at Veldwezelt at 05:20, the barbed-wire wrapped around the landing skids of the gliders succeeding in rapidly bringing the gliders to a halt.[12] The glider belonging to Leutnant Altmann had landed some distance from the bridge, and a second had landed directly in front of a Belgian pillbox, which began engaging both groups of airborne troops with small-arms fire.[12] The non-commissioned officer in charge of the troops from the second glider hurled grenades at the pillbox whilst another of his men laid an explosive charge at the door to the pillbox and detonated it, allowing the bunker to be assaulted and removed as an obstacle. Simultaneously, Altmann gathered his troops and led them along a ditch running parallel to the Bridge until two men were able to reach the canal bank and climb onto the girders of the bridge and disconnect the demolition charges placed there by the Belgian garrison.[12] Thus the airborne troops prevented the Belgians from destroying the bridge, though they still faced the rest of the Belgian defenders. The defenders held on until the a platoon of reinforcements arrived and forced them to retire to a nearby village. However, the assaulting force could not overcome two field-guns located five hundred metres from the bridge by small-arms fire, thus forcing Altmann to call for air support. Several Junkers Ju 87 Stukas responded and knocked out the guns.[22] Group Steel was to be relieved by 14:30, but Belgian resistance delayed their arrival in strength until 21:30. During the fighting, the attacking force lost eight airborne troops dead and thirty wounded.[22]


Photo of a German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber, ca. 1940Ten of the eleven gliders transporting Group Concrete landed next to the Vroenhoven bridge at 05:15, the eleventh glider having been hit by anti-aircraft fire en-route to the bridge and being forced to land prematurely inside Dutch territory.[22] The gliders were engaged by heavy anti-aircraft fire as they landed, causing one of the gliders to stall in mid-air. The resulting crash severely wounded three airborne troops. The rest of the gliders landed without damage.[22] One of the gliders landed near to the fortification housing the bridge detonators. This allowed the airborne troops to rapidly assault the position. They killed the occupants and tore out the wires connecting the explosives to the detonator set, ensuring the bridge could not be destroyed.[22] The remaining Belgian defenders resisted fiercely by mounting several counter-attacks in an attempt to recapture the bridge. They were repelled with the aid of several machine-guns dropped by parachute to the airborne troops at 06:15.[23] Constant Belgian attacks meant that Group Concrete were not withdrawn and relieved by an infantry battalion until 21:40. They suffered losses of seven dead and twenty-four wounded.[23]

All but one of the ten gliders carrying the airborne troops assigned to Group Iron were able to land next to their objective, the bridge at Canne. Due to a navigation error by the pilots of the transport aircraft towing the gliders, one of the gliders was dropped in the wrong area.[23] The other nine gliders were towed through heavy anti-aircraft fire and released at 05:35. As the gliders began to descend towards their objective, the bridge was destroyed by several demolition explosions set off by the Belgian garrison. Unlike the garrisons of the other two bridges, the Belgian defenders at Canne had been forewarned, as the German mechanized column heading for the bridge to reinforce Group Iron arrived twenty minutes ahead of schedule. Its appearance ruined any chance of a surprise assault and gave the defenders sufficient time to destroy the bridge.[23] As the gliders came in to land, one was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed into the ground killing most of the occupants. The remaining eight landed successfully, and the airborne troops stormed the Belgian positions and eliminated the defenders.

By 05:50 the airborne troops had secured the area as well as the nearby village of Canne, but they were then subjected to a strong counter-attack which was only repulsed with the aid of air support from Stuka divebombers.[23][24] The defenders launched several more counter-attacks during the night, ensuring that the airborne troops could not be relieved until the morning of 11 May. Group Iron suffered the heaviest casualties of all three assault groups assigned to capture the bridges with twenty-two dead and twenty-six wounded.[23] One of the airborne troops assigned to the Group was taken prisoner by the Belgians. He was later freed by German forces at a British Prisoner of War camp at Dunkirk.[24]

Fort Eben-Emael
The bridge at Canne destroyed by the Belgian military, 23 May 1940The nine remaining gliders transporting the airborne troops assigned to Group Granite successfully landed on the roof of Fort Eben-Emael, utilizing arrester parachutes to slow their descent and rapidly bring them to a halt.[25] The airborne troops rapidly emerged from the gliders and began attaching explosive charges to those emplacements on the top of the Fort which housed the artillery pieces that could target the three captured bridges.[25] In the southern part of the Fort, Objective No. 18, an artillery observation casemate housing three 75mm artillery pieces was damaged with a light demolition charge and then permanently destroyed with a heavier charge, which collapsed the casemates observation dome and part of the roof of the Fort itself.[26] Objective No. 12, a traversing turret holding two more artillery pieces was also destroyed by airborne troops, who then moved to Objective No. 26, a turret holding another three 75mm weapons; although explosives were detonated against this and the airborne troops assigned to destroy it moved off, this proved to be premature as one of the guns was rapidly brought to bear against the attackers, who were forced to assault it for a second time to destroy it.[26] Another pair of 75mm guns in a cupola were disabled, as was a barracks known to house Belgian troops. However, attempts to destroy Objective No. 24 proved to be less successful; the objective, twin turrets with heavy-calibre guns mounted on a rotating cupola, was too large for airborne troops from a single glider to destroy on their own, forcing troops from two gliders to be used. Shaped charges were affixed to the turrets and detonated, but whilst they shook the turrets they did not destroy them, and other airborne troops were forced to climb the turrets and smash the gun barrels.[26]


One of the Fort Eben-Emael's casemates, "Maastricht 2"In the northern section of the fort, similar actions were taking place, as the airborne troops raced to destroy or otherwise disable the fortifications housing artillery pieces. Objective No. 13 was a casemate housing multiple machine-guns whose arcs of fire covered the western side of the Fort; to destroy the casemate, the airborne troops used a flamethrower to force the Belgian soldiers manning the weapons to retreat, and then detonated shaped charges against the fortification to disable it.[26] Another observation cupola fitted with machine-guns, Objective No. 19, was destroyed, but two further objectives, Nos. 15 and 16 were found to be dummy installations. Unexpected complications came from Objective No. 23, a retractable cupola housing two 75mm artillery pieces.[27] It had been assumed that the weapons in this fortification could not stop the airborne assault, but this assumption was found to be false when the weapons opened fire, forcing the airborne troops in the area to go to cover. The rapid fire of the weapons led to air support being summoned, and a Stuka squadron bombed the cupola. Although the bombs did not destroy the cupola, the explosions did force the Belgians to retract it throughout the rest of the fighting.[26] Any exterior entrances and exits located by the airborne troops were destroyed with explosives to seal the garrison inside the Fort, giving the garrison few opportunities to attempt a counter-attack.[25] The airborne troops had achieved their initial objective of destroying or disabling the artillery pieces that the fort could have used to bombard the captured bridges, but they still faced a number of small cupolas and emplacements that had to be disabled. A number of these included anti-aircraft weapons and machine-guns.[27]


Albert canal as seen from a Fort Eben-Emael machine gun position, 23 May 1940As these secondary objectives were attacked, a single glider landed on top of the Fort, from which emerged Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig. Once glider had landed in German territory, he had radioed for another tug, and it landed in the field with a replacement glider. Once the airborne troops with had broken down fences and hedges obstructing the aircraft, they had boarded the new glider and were towed through anti-aircraft fire to the fort.[19][27] Having achieved their primary objectives of disabling the artillery pieces possessed by the fort, the airborne troops then held it against Belgian counter-attacks, which began almost immediately. These counter-attacks were made by Belgian infantry formations without artillery support and were uncoordinated. This allowed the airborne troops to repel them with machine-gun fire.[19][28] Artillery from several smaller Forts nearby and Belgian field artillery units also targeted the airborne troops, but this too was uncoordinated and achieved nothing and often aided the airborne troops in repelling counter-attacks by Belgian infantry units.[29] Patrols were also used to ensure that the garrison stayed in the interior of the fort and did not attempt to emerge and mount an attempt to retake the fort.[28] Any attempt by the garrison to launch a counter-attack would have been stymied by the fact that the only possible route for such an attack was up a single, spiral staircase, and any embrasures looking out onto the Fort had either been captured or disabled.[30] The plan for the assault had called for Group Granite to be relieved by 51st Engineer Battalion within a few hours of seizing the Fort, but the Group was not actually relieved until 7:00 on May 11. Heavy Belgian resistance, as well as several demolished bridges over the River Meuse, had forced the battalion to lay down new bridges, delaying it significantly.[4] Once the airborne troops had been relieved, the battalion, in conjunction with an infantry regiment that arrived shortly after the engineers, mounted an attack on the main entrance to the fort. Faced with this attack, the garrison surrendered at 12:30, suffering sixty men killed and forty wounded. The Germans took more than a thousand Belgian soldiers into captivity. Group Granite suffered six killed and nineteen wounded.[4]

Aftermath [/B]
Fallschirmjäger of Sturmabteilung KochThe airborne assault on the three bridges and Fort Eben-Emael had been an overall success for the Fallschirmjäger of Sturmabteilung Koch; the artillery pieces possessed by Fort Eben-Emael had been disabled, and two of the three bridges designated to be captured by the sub-units of Sturmabteilung Koch had been captured before they could be destroyed.[23][28] The capture of the bridges, and the neutralization of the artillery pieces in the Fort allowed infantry and armour from the 18th Army to bypass other Belgian defences and enter the heart of Belgium.[31] In a post-war publication, General Kurt Student wrote of the operation, and the efforts of Group Granite in particular, that "It was a deed of exemplary daring and decisive significance [...] I have studied the history of the last war and the battles on all fronts. But I have not been able to find anything among the host of brilliant actions—undertaken by friend or foe—that could be said to compare with the success achieved by Koch's Assault Group."[32] A number of officers and non-commissioned officers were awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for their participation in the operation, including Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig who led the assault on Fort Eben-Emael in the absence of Koch.[33] Sturmabteilung Koch was expanded after the end of Fall Gelb to become 1st Battalion of the newly formed 1st Airlanding Assault Regiment, which itself consisted of four battalions of Fallschirmjaeger trained as a gliderborne assault force. Hauptmann Koch was promoted to the rank of Major for his part in the operation and assumed command of the 1st Battalion.[34]
 
HERE IS A DOCUMENTRY PRESENTED BY JEREMY CLARKSON ABOUT THE OPERATION CHARIOT OR THE St NAZAIRE RAID.

 
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Good thread - commando raids make for some intense reading. These men were incredibly bold and daring.

Another good one was the Makin Island raid by U.S. Marines on a Japanese held island early in the war.

The Marines were launched in rubber boats powered by small, 6 hp (4.5 kW) outboard motors shortly after 00:00 (midnight) on 17 August. At 05:13, Companies A and B of the 2nd Raider Battalion—commanded by Lt. Col. Evans Carlson—successfully landed on Butaritari. The landing had been very difficult due to rough seas, high surf, and the failure of many of the outboard motors. Lt. Col. Carlson decided to land all his men on one beach, rather than two beaches as originally planned. At 05:15, Lt. Oscar Peatross and a 12-man squad landed on Butaritari. In the confusion of the landing, they did not get word of Carlson's decision to change plans and land all the Raiders on one beach. Thus, Peatross and his men landed where they originally planned. It turned out to be a fortunate error. Undaunted by the lack of support, Peatross led his men inland.

Interestingly, there was a follow-up in modern times. The bodies of the marines who died on the raid had been buried by the natives with their weapons in a dignified manner. They were recovered a few years ago, and an old man on the island, who had been a boy during the raid, led investigators to the grave site. The man still had some items the Marines had given him.
 
I would have contributed to this thread but the only thing I can think of right now is.....

Operation Geronimo
 
My vote goes to either:

Operation Entebbe, certainly one of the most outlandish and successful SOF ever planned and executed:

The IDF acted on intelligence provided by the Israeli secret agency Mossad. In the wake of the hijacking by members of the militant organizations Revolutionary Cells and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, along with the hijackers' threats to kill the hostages if their prisoner release demands were not met, the rescue operation was planned.[4] These plans included preparation for armed resistance from Ugandan military troops.[5]
The operation took place at night, as Israeli transport planes carried 100 commandos over 2,500 miles (4,000*km) to Uganda for the rescue operation. The operation, which took a week of planning, lasted 90 minutes and 102 hostages were rescued. Five Israeli commandos were wounded and one, the commander, Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu, was killed. All the hijackers, three hostages and 45 Ugandan soldiers were killed, and thirty Soviet-built MiG-17s and MiG-21s of Uganda's air force were destroyed.[6] A fourth hostage was murdered[7][8] by Ugandan army officers at a nearby hospital.[9]


Or the recent May 22nd OBL take-out (don't be offend anyone, in terms of skill and precision it is amongst the best).




Also if "Operation Eagle Claw" had worked that would be my number 1 given just how ambitious it was

Operation Eagle Claw - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


But as we are talking about succes I would also pit foresees the MEARSK ALABAMA rescue by US SEALS:

Maersk Alabama hijacking - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

On Sunday, 12 April 2009, Capt. Richard Phillips was rescued, reportedly in good condition, from his pirate captors.[21][22] The commander of United States Fifth Fleet Vice Admiral William E. Gortney reported the rescue began when Commander Frank Castellano, captain of the Bainbridge, determined that Phillips' life was in imminent danger and ordered the action. President Barack Obama had previously reaffirmed Navy standing orders to take action if it was determined the hostage's life was in immediate danger.[23][24] [24] The Vice Admiral reported that U.S. Navy SEAL snipers, reportedly from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group,[25] on the Bainbridge's fantail opened fire and killed the three pirates remaining in the lifeboat with a simultaneous volley of three shots. The SEALs had arrived Friday afternoon after being parachuted into the water near the Halyburton, which later joined with the Bainbridge.[6] At the time, the Bainbridge had the lifeboat under tow, approximately 25 to 30 yards astern.[26]

THREE SHOTS, THREE KILLS!! from the deck of a moving, yawing, pitching ship to the deck of another, smaller pitching, yawing, moving boat- insane!!
 
Looking into the laws of warfare with regards to commando raids is dry but interesting to me. How you are treated when captured depends a lot on your uniform, of all things. If captured out of uniform, you can and often were summarily executed as a spy or saboteur. Many commandos infiltrated in civilian clothes, but donned their uniform before engaging the enemy. Regardless, this didn't always prevent them from being executed.

Nations and militaries don't look kindly on small commando squads, to say the least.

There was only one attempt to do this sort of thing on U.S. soil... a squad of Germans were landed on U.S. soil to commit acts of sabotage. The effort was named Operation Pastorius. It was a total disaster, with some Germans actually turning themselves in!

Two of the Germans in New York, Dasch and Burger, had decided to defect to the United States immediately. Dasch went to Washington, D.C., and turned himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was dismissed as a crackpot by numerous agents until he dumped his mission's entire budget of $84,000 on the desk of Assistant Director D. M. Ladd. At this point he was taken seriously and interrogated for hours.[7] None of the others knew of the betrayal.

In the end, some were executed after a famous and lengthy trial.
 
If captured out of uniform, you can and often were summarily executed as a spy or saboteur. Many commandos infiltrated in civilian clothes, but donned their uniform before engaging the enemy. Regardless, this didn't always prevent them from being executed.

Your views on Hitler's commando order ?
 
^^ True. Operation Thunderbolt in Entebbe was indeed the most daring commando raid. They really proved they meant business getting those people out of harm's way.
 

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