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The fight for Siachen

ice_man

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On April 13, 1984 a small force of the Indian Army occupied the Bilafond La pass. Four days later, another small force occupied the Sia La pass. Both passes, the former at over 18,000 ft and the latter at over 20,000 ft are located in the Saltoro Range and serve as the gateway to the Siachen Glacier. The Indians had moved fast after receiving intelligence that the Pakistan Army was planning to occupy them. The first Pakistani reaction to the occupation of the passes came on April 24/25, 1984 when a small force attempted to get to the Bilafond La in an uphill assault but was thwarted by the difficult glaciated terrain and adverse weather conditions.

In the days that followed, the Indian Army built up a large force to defend the 80 kilometre-long Saltoro Range ridgeline. Since then, the Saltoro Range has been the focal point of operations — the Pakistanis seeking to gain a foothold on the ridge line, the Indians denying it.

In early April 1987, another attempt was made by the Pakistan Army to gain a foothold on the Saltoro ridgeline. A small force consisting of about a dozen SSG commandos, using ropes and ladders, went up a vertical cliff and occupied a position at over 21,000 ft that dominated the Indian positions at Bilafond La. They named it Quaid post. The Indian Army made several attempts to evict the commandos but each time they were repulsed with heavy casualties. On June 25, 1987, they succeeded in taking the post as the commandos had run out of ammunition and could not be resupplied as the base supporting them came under fire. With the only foothold on the ridgeline lost, the Pakistan Army launched a major attack in September 1987 to get to Bilafond La. The attack was repulsed. In March 1989, another attempt was made, this time in the Chumik glacier, three kilometres east of Giari (recently hit by an avalanche). At over 19,000 ft, the place chosen is the most difficult to scale in the Saltoro Range for either side. In a daring operation the peak was occupied by two men, an officer and a non-commissioned officer, slung from a helicopter on a rope, turn by turn. The two thwarted all Indian efforts to get to the top for 36 hours after which they were reinforced by a handful of soldiers dropped in similar fashion. But in May 1989 when the Indians succeeded in neutralising the supply base supporting the soldiers on the peak, the post was vacated.

In November 1992, yet another attempt was made to get to the ridgeline by means of a major attack. Launched in haste, the attack ended in failure. As a consequence, the general officer commanding was sacked. Most of the casualties suffered by Pakistani troops in combat were in the two major attacks (September 1987, November 1992).

The Indians have rarely embarked on a major offensive venture. They have left this to the Pakistanis who have obliged them at least twice . The loss of Quaid post and withdrawal from the Chumik glacier post due to lack of logistic support to a handful of men, are cases in point. Despite twelve rounds of negotiations, the two have not been able to reach an amicable settlement because of domestic political compulsions and mutual mistrust (exacerbated by the Kargil conflict). The dispute revolves round the extension of the Line of Control (LOC) beyond a point on the Saltoro Range known by its map reference as NJ 9820420. The demarcated LOC ends at this point —“thence north to the glaciers” is what the Karachi agreement of 1949 states about the extension. According to the Indians, this meant that the LoC should extend northwards along the Saltoro Range up to Sia Kangri.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s stand is that beyond NJ 9820420, the LOC should extend eastward up to the Karakoram pass. Extending the LOC northwards would give the entire Siachen Glacier-Saltoro area to India, while extending it eastward would give it to Pakistan.

The only way out of this morass is to demilitarise the zone with the UN acting as the guarantor. Can the leadership of the two countries show for once statesmanship to resolve not only the Siachen dispute but all other outstanding disputes and can the two armies assist them in doing so?

Until then, for the soldiers on the Saltoro Range ‘theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die’.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 23rd, 2012.
 
The only way out of this morass is to demilitarise the zone with the UN acting as the guarantor.

The problem with this line is that the "zone" in question is held completely by the Indian army. The Pakistani position, therefore is that while Pakistan will vacate the risky slopes on the lower side of the Saltoro ridge, Indians will not only have to vacate the higher positions of the Saltoro ridge but will also have to vacate the entire Siachen glacier behind those lines. Anyone seriously thinks that will happen?
 
The demarcated LOC ends at this point —“thence north to the glaciers” is what the Karachi agreement of 1949 states about the extension. According to the Indians, this meant that the LoC should extend northwards along the Saltoro Range up to Sia Kangri.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s stand is that beyond NJ 9820420, the LOC should extend eastward up to the Karakoram pass. Extending the LOC northwards would give the entire Siachen Glacier-Saltoro area to India, while extending it eastward would give it to Pakistan.

Thank God ! Atleast one soldier on that side sees things as they are.

According to the wordings in the Agreement (thence North to the glaciers) Siachen-Saltoro would be India's and not Pakistan's. So unless there are some really direction-challegened people at the helm in Pakistan who consider East as North, there is no doubt on to whom Siachen belongs (India).
 
This is an extraordinarily fair & neutral article from a person who served in the Pakistani army. Many here need to read this before rushing in to comment.


............. The Indians had moved fast after receiving intelligence that the Pakistan Army was planning to occupy them.

...... the Saltoro Range has been the focal point of operations — the Pakistanis seeking to gain a foothold on the ridge line, the Indians denying it.

....With the only foothold on the ridgeline lost, the Pakistan Army launched a major attack in September 1987 to get to Bilafond La. The attack was repulsed.

In November 1992, yet another attempt was made to get to the ridgeline by means of a major attack. Launched in haste, the attack ended in failure. As a consequence, the general officer commanding was sacked. Most of the casualties suffered by Pakistani troops in combat were in the two major attacks (September 1987, November 1992).

The Indians have rarely embarked on a major offensive venture. They have left this to the Pakistanis who have obliged them at least twice . The loss of Quaid post and withdrawal from the Chumik glacier post due to lack of logistic support to a handful of men, are cases in point. Despite twelve rounds of negotiations, the two have not been able to reach an amicable settlement because of domestic political compulsions and mutual mistrust (exacerbated by the Kargil conflict). The dispute revolves round the extension of the Line of Control (LOC) beyond a point on the Saltoro Range known by its map reference as NJ 9820420. The demarcated LOC ends at this point —“thence north to the glaciers” is what the Karachi agreement of 1949 states about the extension. According to the Indians, this meant that the LoC should extend northwards along the Saltoro Range up to Sia Kangri.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s stand is that beyond NJ 9820420, the LOC should extend eastward up to the Karakoram pass. Extending the LOC northwards would give the entire Siachen Glacier-Saltoro area to India, while extending it eastward would give it to Pakistan.


Published in The Express Tribune, April 23rd, 2012.


By Javed Hussain

The writer is a retired brigadier and served in the Special Services Group
 
This writer clearly says that Siachen belongs to India.

Anyways, Indian Army itself does not have any problem, further more we have High altitude Military training school and have heard that a High altitude medical research facility is also present. So no leaving Siachen. Pakistan can do whatever it wants.
 
This seems to be Siachen fortnight.

This must be the Nth thread on this subject ..
 
Is there a Siachen Mela here on PDF this week, this is the fourt or fifth thread on the same subject, change the record.
 
i don't understand how did ANY indian induce that Pakistanis believe that siachen is India's! the writer clearly stated both the view point of Pakistan & of india! that Pakistanis feel the LoC should extend eastward & indians feel it should extend northwards!


i thought indians could read and understand i guess not everyone on the otherside of the border is capable to do that.

Is there a Siachen Mela here on PDF this week, this is the fourt or fifth thread on the same subject, change the record.

yes siachen is being discussed since our soldiers got buried under an avalanche! you while sitting in your armchair might not know the hardship faced by men on both sides of the border!
 
i don't understand how did ANY indian induce that Pakistanis believe that siachen is India's! the writer clearly stated both the view point of Pakistan & of india! that Pakistanis feel the LoC should extend eastward & indians feel it should extend northwards!


i thought indians could read and understand i guess not everyone on the otherside of the border is capable to do that.

The dispute revolves round the extension of the Line of Control (LOC) beyond a point on the Saltoro Range known by its map reference as NJ 9820420. The demarcated LOC ends at this point —“thence north to the glaciers” is what the Karachi agreement of 1949 states about the extension.
 
The conflict in Siachen stems from the incompletely demarcated territory on the map beyond the map coordinate known as NJ9842. The 1972 Simla Agreement did not clearly mention who controlled the glacier. and Neither did the karachi Agreement state it! as for "hence north" of the glacier is not clearly marked as pakistan's or india's!


In 1957 Pakistan permitted a British expedition under Eric Shipton to approach the Siachen through the Bilafond La, and recce Saltoro Kangri.[9] Five years later a Japanese-Pakistani expedition put two Japanese and a Pakistani Army climber on top of Saltoro Kangri.[10] These were early moves in this particular game of oropolitics.

The United States Defense Mapping Agency (now National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) began in about 1967 to show, with no legal or historical justification or any boundary documentation, an international boundary on their Tactical Pilotage Charts available to the public and pilots as proceeding from NJ9842 east-northeast to the Karakoram Pass at 5,534 m (18,136 ft) on the China border.[11] Numerous governmental and private cartographers and atlas producers followed suit. This resulted in the US cartographically "awarding" the entire 5,000 square kilometers (1,900 sq mi) of the Siachen-Saltoro area to Pakistan.

In the 1970s and early 1980s several mountaineering expeditions applied to Pakistan to climb high peaks in the Siachen area due in part to U.S Defense Mapping Agency and most other maps and atlases showing it on the Pakistani side of the line. Pakistan granted a number of permits. This in turn reinforced the Pakistani claim on the area, as these expeditions arrived on the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of Pakistan. Teram Kangri I (7,465 m/24,491 ft) and Teram Kangri II (7,406 m/24,298 ft) were climbed in 1975 by a Japanese expedition led by H. Katayama, which approached through Pakistan via the Bilafond La

(got this of wiki) but clearly everyone can see that india felt "threatened!" by maps showing it as a part of pakistan hence did what Pakistan repeated in kargil more then a decade later.
 
(got this of wiki) but clearly everyone can see that india felt "threatened!" by maps showing it as a part of pakistan hence did what Pakistan repeated in kargil more then a decade later.

2 key differences..

1. Kargil intrusion was done by Pakistan into areas marked and authenticated by both sides and recognized by the world. Hence the international condemnation came Pakistan's way. otoh, India's foray into Siachen was in an unmarked piece of real estate which both sides claimed that it fell on their side of LOC
2. India's operation in 1984 succeeded :)
 
This is an extraordinarily fair & neutral article from a person who served in the Pakistani army. Many here need to read this before rushing in to comment.

Already read the article but this is even better article by someone who doesn't wants to ride a wanna be liberal horse.

The Indian cyber Gog and Magog tell us that India acted in Siachen because Pakistan had plans to occupy the area. Let me reconstruct the story from the account of Lt-Gen Dr M L Chibber (retd), GOC-in-C Northern Command in 1984.

1978, Gen Chibber is DMO: India notices that Pakistan is permitting mountaineering expeditions into the area. (NB: Pakistan had traditionally allowed expeditions west of the imaginary line that extended from NJ9842 “thence north to the glaciers”.)

“We sent a patrol next year and it was confirmed that Japanese expeditions had visited the Siachen Glacier. So routine patrolling started. Similarly routine protest notes used to be exchanged. The problem precipitated on 21st August 1983 when a protest note from Northern Sector Commander of Pakistan was handed over to his counterpart in Kargil stating that Line of Control joins with the Karakoram Pass, also that all the area West of this extended line belongs to Pakistan. When Army Headquarters saw this and also got information that Pakistan [sic] troops had occupied [sic] Bila Fond Pass, they ordered [the] Northern Command to prevent the occupation [sic] of the Glacier area by Pakistan during the mountaineering season in 1984 (italics mine).”

The italics show that Pakistan was not attempting to alter any ground reality. It was Pakistan’s clear understanding that the area, according to the 1972 delineation and demarcation of the LoC, belonged to her. It is a matter of record that all foreign expeditions coming into the area applied for permission from Islamabad, not New Delhi. Gen Chibber’s use of the word “occupation” for the deployment in Bilafond La was therefore inaccurate. That deployment was the result of Indian patrols that had begun to ingress in the area. Beyond this lies realpolitik. The best account of the run-up to the Siachen conflict is by General Jahandad Khan (Pakistan leadership challenges) and is fully corroborated by Gen Chibber (General Chibber spoke about it in May 2000 when he was visiting Pakistan. For his complete interview and detailed excerpt from Gen Khan’s book, see An Interview with Padma Bhushan Lt Gen (Retd) Dr M.L Chibber)

The initial deployment at Bilafond La was a 10-day sojourn by an SSG company which was asked to withdraw because the personnel had no equipment to survive when it began snowing in the first week of September. Indian troops, comprising the Ladakh Scouts, had camped in the Siachen area. Seeing Pakistani troops they “left their location in a great hurry abandoning all their rations and tentage”.

Increased Indian patrol activity led to meetings in the GHQ to decide the “plan of action for the summer of 1984 when the Indians were bound to come in greater numbers”. Gen Jahandad realised that “whoever succeeded in occupying the passes first” would be the winner because dislodging him would be almost impossible. As Corps Commander, his assessment to the GHQ was: “Next year (1984), India is most likely to pre-empt the occupation of the main passes of Baltoro Ridge with two-battalion strength for occupation and a third battalion as reserve. It would need another brigade to provide them with logistic support. Maximum helicopter force will have to be utilised for logistic support. Their air force will be available for air cover and also air drop of supplies/equipment.”

He estimated that Pakistan would require a “brigade group with a battalion plus to occupy these passes and the rest of the force to provide relief and logistic support. We would also need maximum porter force to carry supplies and ammunition from Goma to the glacier position. All our helicopters force, both Aloutte and Puma, will have to be mobilised for recce and logistic cover. The PAF has to stand-by to provide air cover. I had also cautioned GHQ that this operation will be very costly in logistic support. Our Military Intelligence must be alerted to keep us informed of all enemy movements beyond Leh to forestall their occupation of the glacier area.” However, at a meeting held in December 1983, General Ziaul Haq thought the operation would be on a limited scale. His assessment of both the “quantum of force required” and “the logistic problem of this operation” was incorrect. The Indians were quicker. We miscalculated the timing of the Indian ingress and also failed to notice a brigade-size movement from Leh in the second half of April 1984. By the time our troops arrived, the Indians had already occupied Gyong La in the south “strategically important because it could interfere with the enemy’s line of logistic support”.

Fact 1: India aggressed.

Fact 2: We didn’t plan any presence until India began patrolling the area.

Fact 3: Our intelligence failed and our deployment was late.

Lesson: lower the guard and be prepared to face the consequences.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 14th, 2012.

Siachen
 
.....


On the other hand, Pakistan’s stand is that beyond NJ 9820420, the LOC should extend eastward up to the Karakoram pass. Extending the LOC northwards would give the entire Siachen Glacier-Saltoro area to India, while extending it eastward would give it to Pakistan.



Published in The Express Tribune, April 23rd, 2012.

i thought simla accord said north of the demarcated LOC, now pakistan needs to decide if north is north, or north is really east!
 

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