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China’s economy may never eclipse America’s

F-22Raptor

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In 1997, economists at the International Monetary Fund pointed out that China’s economy was growing so fast it might be bigger than the US economy by 2017.

That didn’t happen.

China’s economy did go gangbusters, however, and its population of more than 1 billion people seemed to assure it would eventually become the world’s biggest market. In 2010, Goldman Sachs estimated that China’s economy could overtake America’s as the world’s largest by 2030. The Economist was bolder, predicting China would become the world’s largest economy by 2019. The shift, whenever it came, would signal that a new economic superpower was ready to challenge US influence everywhere in the world.

Now it looks like that day may never come.

China’s economy has hit the skids in ways that suggest 25 years of supercharged growth may be ending, well before China achieves economic superpower status. China’s economy never powered out of the COVID pandemic the way the US economy did — and it’s barely growing now. Instead of marveling at China’s prosperity miracle, economists are now pondering whether China’s woes will bring down other parts of the global economy.

Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute recently told Reuters that China’s economy is unlikely to eclipse the United States anytime within the next 20 years. Economist Paul Krugman, also a New York Times columnist, likens China to Japan in the early 1990s. That's when runaway growth came to a screeching halt and worries about an Asian nation’s world domination proved wildly unfounded.

Japan, at least, had become a rich country by then. China still isn’t, and it may never join the ranks of so-called advanced economies.

China faces many structural and cyclical problems, including a declining population, likely to make India the world’s most populous country sometime this year or next. China has relied far too heavily on debt-fueled real estate projects to power its growth, which has now produced an ongoing real estate collapse some liken to a “Lehman Brothers moment” for China.

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among 16-to-24-year-olds in China has officially risen from 11% in 2018 to 21% now. The real youth unemployment rate might be as high as 46%, according to the Eurasia Group.

China’s communist government has stimulated the economy out of many slowdowns during the last 25 years, but recent efforts, including interest rate cuts and other measures, have underwhelmed investors and triggered stock sell-offs. The slowdown could be chronic. “Given how long we’ll be living with China’s economic struggles, investors will have plenty of time to get up to speed,” Capital Economics advised in an Aug. 21 report.

China’s stagnation could have unexpected effects on global investors, American policymakers, and even US elections.

When Donald Trump first ran for president in 2016, he complained that China was “eating our lunch,” citing record-high US trade deficits with China. As president, Trump imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese exports to the United States, hoping to trigger more US manufacturing and cut US reliance on China.

Trump’s trade war with China mostly raised costs on US importers — including consumers — while failing to accomplish its stated goals.

Yet Joe Biden kept those tariffs in place after he became president in 2021. And Biden has gone further. New export controls ban the sale of certain US technologies to China, to inhibit production of advanced military weapons. Bills Biden signed to promote US manufacturing of semiconductors and green energy technology appear to be diverting some investment away from China back to the United States. And a burgeoning trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is in part an economic bulwark against China’s heft in Asia.

The trajectory of China’s economy is more than a chest-thumping contest.

It matters because China under President Xi Jinping has increasingly become a militant threat to neighbors, including Taiwan, and an antagonist of Western democracies. In the early 2000s, shortly after China joined the World Trade Organization and began its export boom, many Western analysts assumed China’s communist government would become more democratic and friendlier as capitalism made it wealthier. But that hasn’t happened.

Xi, for instance, regularly promises to “reunite” China with Taiwan by invading it. As a coalition of US-led nations sanction Russia over its barbaric war in Ukraine, China has become Russia’s most important ally. It doesn’t yet provide Russia desperately needed military gear, but it is now Russia’s biggest energy customer and it provides Russia many products difficult to get elsewhere because of sanctions.

Politicians in both US political parties become have become aggressive China-bashers. Biden, running for reelection, has violated diplomatic protocol by calling Xi a “dictator.” Trump, the leading GOP contender in the 2024 race despite 91 criminal charges against him, has plans to limit US trade with China even moreif he gets elected. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, running a far second in GOP polls behind Trump, recently unveiled an economic vision centered on further reducing China’s economic power.

China isn’t fading into the sunset. It’s a nuclear power that will probably remain the world’s biggest manufacturer for a long time. If it wants to cause trouble, it will continue to have the means to do so.

But China may also have as many gremlins in its own system as it has competitors on the world stage. The US economy, by contrast, remains dynamic and resilient.

American dominance isn't over, yet.

 
China has an industrial base and if it doesn’t want to have its major cities become a rust belt, they are gonna have to capture market share for the next few decades as they try to move up the value added chain.

They will have to “capture a share” of the growth in other countries, through joint ventures. Investments, not loans, in developing countries. Offering countries incrementally larger investment packages as countries improve good governance and better economic systems.

If BRI is to feed into a double circulation strategy, China is really gonna have to do a Monroe doctrine. Investments around the world as loss leaders to help grow economics in friendly countries in hopes of keeping industrial development evolving in China.

The first project China can do is the Karakoram Railway and pipeline network. $58 Billion to China is a relatively modest cost to ensure they have fast and secure logistics. Heck if they pick up the cost of modernizing ML-1, adding a line to Gwadar and a line up to Reko-diq it would only an another $20 billion more, but they would have open access to the Arabian Sea ports of Pakistan and the Persian gulf and Africa only a day’s sailing away. (The Chinese could have their companies use this rail route to and from China and recoup their investment in no time.)

Supporting Sahel countries looking to live out of the French orbit (From Guinea to Sudan and down to the Chinese port in Djibouti) by facilitating and potentially mediating peace deals to allow the space to build out their economies and a rail line to tie them all together, lowering their cost of importing and exporting goods, and opening up opportunities for African countries and Chinese companies.

China is gonna have to spend money if it hopes to create sustainable ways to make money outside of western markets.

Growth is in the global south, especially in the South Asia and Africa.
 
China has an industrial base and if it doesn’t want to have its major cities become a rust belt, they are gonna have to capture market share for the next few decades as they try to move up the value added chain.

They will have to “capture a share” of the growth in other countries, through joint ventures. Investments, not loans, in developing countries. Offering countries incrementally larger investment packages as countries improve good governance and better economic systems.

If BRI is to feed into a double circulation strategy, China is really gonna have to do a Monroe doctrine. Investments around the world as loss leaders to help grow economics in friendly countries in hopes of keeping industrial development evolving in China.

The first project China can do is the Karakoram Railway and pipeline network. $58 Billion to China is a relatively modest cost to ensure they have fast and secure logistics. Heck if they pick up the cost of modernizing ML-1, adding a line to Gwadar and a line up to Reko-diq it would only an another $20 billion more, but they would have open access to the Arabian Sea ports of Pakistan and the Persian gulf and Africa only a day’s sailing away. (The Chinese could have their companies use this rail route to and from China and recoup their investment in no time.)

Supporting Sahel countries looking to live out of the French orbit (From Guinea to Sudan and down to the Chinese port in Djibouti) by facilitating and potentially mediating peace deals to allow the space to build out their economies and a rail line to tie them all together, lowering their cost of importing and exporting goods, and opening up opportunities for African countries and Chinese companies.

China is gonna have to spend money if it hopes to create sustainable ways to make money outside of western markets.

Growth is in the global south, especially in the South Asia and Africa.
You know China still has many underdeveloped rural regions and small towns even in central and some eastern coastal areas let alone the poor border western provinces. In my opinion, China should not waste too much of its resources and money on regions of the world such as Africa and Latin America that are not that consequential to China's survival and well being
 
You know China still has many underdeveloped rural regions and small towns even in central and some eastern coastal areas let alone the poor border western provinces. In my opinion, China should not waste too much of its resources and money on regions of the world such as Africa and Latin America that are not that consequential to China's survival and well being
But are these small towns in parts of China going to speed up China’s economy MORE than secure and fast logistics links? The growth in areas like Africa that could help Chinese companies grow their export/joint venture potential should offset the initial costs. Africa grows and china gets a share of the growth by being a joint venture partner.

For china, if any significant part of its industrial base goes idle for some time, it may lose the finance of scale to keep on modernizing and moving up the value added chain.
 
In 1997, economists at the International Monetary Fund pointed out that China’s economy was growing so fast it might be bigger than the US economy by 2017.

That didn’t happen.

China’s economy did go gangbusters, however, and its population of more than 1 billion people seemed to assure it would eventually become the world’s biggest market. In 2010, Goldman Sachs estimated that China’s economy could overtake America’s as the world’s largest by 2030. The Economist was bolder, predicting China would become the world’s largest economy by 2019. The shift, whenever it came, would signal that a new economic superpower was ready to challenge US influence everywhere in the world.

Now it looks like that day may never come.

China’s economy has hit the skids in ways that suggest 25 years of supercharged growth may be ending, well before China achieves economic superpower status. China’s economy never powered out of the COVID pandemic the way the US economy did — and it’s barely growing now. Instead of marveling at China’s prosperity miracle, economists are now pondering whether China’s woes will bring down other parts of the global economy.

Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute recently told Reuters that China’s economy is unlikely to eclipse the United States anytime within the next 20 years. Economist Paul Krugman, also a New York Times columnist, likens China to Japan in the early 1990s. That's when runaway growth came to a screeching halt and worries about an Asian nation’s world domination proved wildly unfounded.

Japan, at least, had become a rich country by then. China still isn’t, and it may never join the ranks of so-called advanced economies.

China faces many structural and cyclical problems, including a declining population, likely to make India the world’s most populous country sometime this year or next. China has relied far too heavily on debt-fueled real estate projects to power its growth, which has now produced an ongoing real estate collapse some liken to a “Lehman Brothers moment” for China.

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among 16-to-24-year-olds in China has officially risen from 11% in 2018 to 21% now. The real youth unemployment rate might be as high as 46%, according to the Eurasia Group.

China’s communist government has stimulated the economy out of many slowdowns during the last 25 years, but recent efforts, including interest rate cuts and other measures, have underwhelmed investors and triggered stock sell-offs. The slowdown could be chronic. “Given how long we’ll be living with China’s economic struggles, investors will have plenty of time to get up to speed,” Capital Economics advised in an Aug. 21 report.

China’s stagnation could have unexpected effects on global investors, American policymakers, and even US elections.

When Donald Trump first ran for president in 2016, he complained that China was “eating our lunch,” citing record-high US trade deficits with China. As president, Trump imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese exports to the United States, hoping to trigger more US manufacturing and cut US reliance on China.

Trump’s trade war with China mostly raised costs on US importers — including consumers — while failing to accomplish its stated goals.

Yet Joe Biden kept those tariffs in place after he became president in 2021. And Biden has gone further. New export controls ban the sale of certain US technologies to China, to inhibit production of advanced military weapons. Bills Biden signed to promote US manufacturing of semiconductors and green energy technology appear to be diverting some investment away from China back to the United States. And a burgeoning trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is in part an economic bulwark against China’s heft in Asia.

The trajectory of China’s economy is more than a chest-thumping contest.

It matters because China under President Xi Jinping has increasingly become a militant threat to neighbors, including Taiwan, and an antagonist of Western democracies. In the early 2000s, shortly after China joined the World Trade Organization and began its export boom, many Western analysts assumed China’s communist government would become more democratic and friendlier as capitalism made it wealthier. But that hasn’t happened.

Xi, for instance, regularly promises to “reunite” China with Taiwan by invading it. As a coalition of US-led nations sanction Russia over its barbaric war in Ukraine, China has become Russia’s most important ally. It doesn’t yet provide Russia desperately needed military gear, but it is now Russia’s biggest energy customer and it provides Russia many products difficult to get elsewhere because of sanctions.

Politicians in both US political parties become have become aggressive China-bashers. Biden, running for reelection, has violated diplomatic protocol by calling Xi a “dictator.” Trump, the leading GOP contender in the 2024 race despite 91 criminal charges against him, has plans to limit US trade with China even moreif he gets elected. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, running a far second in GOP polls behind Trump, recently unveiled an economic vision centered on further reducing China’s economic power.

China isn’t fading into the sunset. It’s a nuclear power that will probably remain the world’s biggest manufacturer for a long time. If it wants to cause trouble, it will continue to have the means to do so.

But China may also have as many gremlins in its own system as it has competitors on the world stage. The US economy, by contrast, remains dynamic and resilient.

American dominance isn't over, yet.

From purchasing power which really is what matters ..it already has...

Now the next two things that matter are

Human development index
And
Per capital income

Or simply put quality of life

That's the real question ❓
 
The prediction is actually not wrong.

Because it was calculated using real economy data.

And even before 2017, China economy is already surpassing USA's.
 
China has an industrial base and if it doesn’t want to have its major cities become a rust belt, they are gonna have to capture market share for the next few decades as they try to move up the value added chain.

They will have to “capture a share” of the growth in other countries, through joint ventures. Investments, not loans, in developing countries. Offering countries incrementally larger investment packages as countries improve good governance and better economic systems.

If BRI is to feed into a double circulation strategy, China is really gonna have to do a Monroe doctrine. Investments around the world as loss leaders to help grow economics in friendly countries in hopes of keeping industrial development evolving in China.

I like the vision. The practicality might fall short here. China's professed foreign policy of non-interference will have to go in favor of a Monroe doctrine. The only problem is that a lot of clients like North Korea, Myanmar and Pakistan will balk at it. It is hard to enforce one as long as America is around
 
US can't afford upgrading their infras, actually now US even can't afford maintaining it's miltary equipment. their Nominal GDP is only on paper
 
But are these small towns in parts of China going to speed up China’s economy MORE than secure and fast logistics links? The growth in areas like Africa that could help Chinese companies grow their export/joint venture potential should offset the initial costs. Africa grows and china gets a share of the growth by being a joint venture partner.

For china, if any significant part of its industrial base goes idle for some time, it may lose the finance of scale to keep on modernizing and moving up the value added chain.
many rural areas and small towns in China still need a lot hardcore development such as in infra. Some might like to look at purely from profit perspective in global investments, but I don't think China can do that, unless China develops to certain level over the whole nation, China will not progress to the advanced nation and moves to the upper value added chain of industries. And I don't think China is making that much profits from the investments and development in Africa today. China has to make the internal cycling of its domestic economy and development work well first.
 
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“In purchasing power parity, they spend about one dollar to our 20 dollars to get to the same capability.”

 
many rural areas and small towns in China still need a lot hardcore development such as in infra. Some might like to look at purely from profit perspective in global investments, but I don't think China can do that, unless China develops to certain level over the whole nation, China will not progress to the advanced nation and moves to the upper value added chain of industries. And I don't think China is making that much profits from the investments and development in Africa today. China has to make the internal cycling of its domestic economy and development work well first.
China needs both, but it needs more export partners if it is to make both investment plans sustainable. The small towns in central China getting investment will help but it will be one time consumption unless those towns can produce products for the domestic or international market.

Building a rail route in Xinjiang down to Pakistan would make shifting some of the high labor costs work to Central China more economically viable. The central Chinese cities would be closer to the export ports in Gwadar than the factories on the Chinese coasts at that point. It’s the same a factory in the US state of Wyoming shipping to the US west coast instead of the east coast. Pakistan could function the same as China’s “West Coast”.
 
China needs both, but it needs more export partners if it is to make both investment plans sustainable. The small towns in central China getting investment will help but it will be one time consumption unless those towns can produce products for the domestic or international market.

Building a rail route in Xinjiang down to Pakistan would make shifting some of the high labor costs work to Central China more economically viable. The central Chinese cities would be closer to the export ports in Gwadar than the factories on the Chinese coasts at that point. It’s the same a factory in the US state of Wyoming shipping to the US west coast instead of the east coast. Pakistan could function the same as China’s “West Coast”.
The problems with building a rail line from Kashgar to Pakistan are that cost is too much with initial estimate of $58 billions and the terrain might be too difficult for the construction.
 
The problems with building a rail line from Kashgar to Pakistan are that cost is too much with initial estimate of $58 billions and the terrain might be too difficult for the construction.
But look at the pay off, it could be built on a 30 year BOT basis (and employ many workers for a decade or so during the construction); China could even buy Russian oil, refine it in Xinjiang and export petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals via the rail line down to the world market via the rail line. A lot do othe raw materials in centralnadia and Russia could be bought by China and processed in Xinjiang for export via the line. China could also use the line to import goods and charge a small markup to Russia and Central Asian countries for products from around the Indian Ocean.

China wouldn’t have to risk or even depend on its logistics traveling via Central Asia and especially not Afghanistan.

Tourist trains to the Himalayas could continue into tourism in Xinjiang and Tibet boosting the economy of both nations. It could be marketed as the top of the world tourist train.

A rail line not going through Central Asia, and those one of its most closest strategic partners would mean it could be physically and politically guarded very well.

In the event of a war, shipping between China and the Indian Ocean could be threatened, this would hedge against that risk.
 
But look at the pay off, it could be built on a 30 year BOT basis (and employ many workers for a decade or so during the construction); China could even buy Russian oil, refine it in Xinjiang and export petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals via the rail line down to the world market via the rail line. A lot do othe raw materials in centralnadia and Russia could be bought by China and processed in Xinjiang for export via the line. China could also use the line to import goods and charge a small markup to Russia and Central Asian countries for products from around the Indian Ocean.

China wouldn’t have to risk or even depend on its logistics traveling via Central Asia and especially not Afghanistan.

Tourist trains to the Himalayas could continue into tourism in Xinjiang and Tibet boosting the economy of both nations. It could be marketed as the top of the world tourist train.

A rail line not going through Central Asia, and those one of its most closest strategic partners would mean it could be physically and politically guarded very well.

In the event of a war, shipping between China and the Indian Ocean could be threatened, this would hedge against that risk.
About 15 to years construction might be doable with the cost spread out. Yes, there are many benefits for the line, it will be a real strategic link and trade route for two countries.
 
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China is already the world's largest economy and had been since 2014:

IMG_0312.jpeg
 

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