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WW2: Commando raid against Rommel's Headquarters

Operation Fortitude

In January 1944, the Germans told Joan Pujol that they believed a large-scale invasion of Europe was imminent and asked to be kept informed. This was Operation Overlord, and Pujol played a leading role in the deception and disinformation campaign Operation Fortitude, sending over 500 radio messages between January 1944 and D-Day, at times more than twenty messages per day.During planning for the Normandy beach invasion, it was decided that it was vitally important that the German High Command be misled that the landing would happen at the Strait of Dover.In order to maintain his credibility, it was decided that Garbo (or one of his agents) should forewarn the Germans of the timing and some details of the actual invasion of Normandy, although sending it too late for them to take effective action. Special arrangements were made with the German radio operators to be listening to Garbo through the night of 5/6 June 1944, using the story that a sub-agent was about to arrive with important information. However, when the call was made at 3 am, no reply was received from the German operators until 8 am. Turning this piece of bad luck on its head, Garbo was able to add more operational details to the message when finally sent and increase his standing with the Germans. Garbo told his German contacts that he was disgusted that his message was missed, saying "I cannot accept excuses or negligence. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work".An inflatable dummy M4 Shermantank.On 9 June (3 days after D-day), Garbo sent a message to German High Command that reached Adolf Hitler saying that he had conferred with his agents and developed an order of battle showing 75 divisions in Britain—in reality, there were only about 50. Part of the "Fortitude" plan was intended to convince the Germans that a fictitious formation—First U.S. Army Group, comprising 11 divisions (150,000 men), commanded by General George Patton—was stationed in the south and east of Britain.The deception was supported by fake planes, inflatable tanks and vans travelling about the area transmitting bogus radio chatter. Garbo's message pointed out that units from this formation had not participated in the invasion, and therefore the first landing should be considered a diversion. A German message to Madrid sent two days later said "all reports received in the last week from Arabel [Pujol's German code-name] undertaking have been confirmed without exception and are to be described as exceptionally valuable." A post-war examination of German records found that, during Operation Fortitude, no fewer than sixty-two of Pujol's reports were included in German military high command intelligence summaries.The German High Command accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, refused to allow General Erwin Rommel to move his divisions to Normandy. There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.In late June, Garbo was instructed by the Germans to report on the falling of V1 flying bombs. Finding no way of giving false information without arousing suspicion, and being unwilling to give correct information, Harris arranged forGarbo to be "arrested".He returned to duty a few days later, now having a "need" to avoid London, and forwarded an "official" letter of apology from the Home Secretary for his unlawful detention.The Germans paid Garbo (or Arabel, as they called him) US$340,000 to support his network of agents, which at one point totaled 27 fabricated characters.


As Arabel, Pujol was, on 29 July 1944, awarded the Iron Cross Second Class for his services to the German war effort. The award was normally reserved for front-line fighting men and required Hitler's personal authorisation. The Iron Cross was presented via radio, and he received the physical medal from one of his German handlers after the war had ended. As Garbo, he received a Member of the Order of the British Empire from King George VI, on 25 November 1944.The Nazis never realised they had been fooled, and thus Pujol earned the distinction of being one of the few – if not the only – to receive decorations from both sides during World War II.
I said that before and I will say that again that the British intelligence during WW2 was no match for the Soviet intelligence(That does not mean that the MI5 etc was not good). There were many people like Pojol, many who worked for abwehr. The Soviets had their man "Werther" (a Nazi or a General among Hitler's inner circle who has not yet been exposed) in the OKW...Not only in the OKW, they had their men in OKH and OKL as well. The entire summer offensive plan for 1942 envisaged in the OKW was transmitted by Dora in Switzerland to the STAVKA. Stalin was able to save Moscow in 1941, thanks to Dr Sorge in Tokyo. At times, STAVKA knew the decisions which had been made in the OKW just a few hours ago. Stalin had his agents throughout Europe who transmitted accurate information which proved decisive on the front.
You like examples so here is one, Stalin knew about Ardennes offensive, the allies were caught with their pants down.

Canaris, chief of the abwehr himself used to help the allies/Stalin because of his "conscience", this led to intelligence leakages and withholding of vital intelligence from reaching those concerned.


Now coming to the Normandy invasion part, what you posted is just an example, it does not prove in any way that the British intelligence was ahead of the Soviet intelligence. No doubt the British intelligence was good but it wasn't like the Soviet one. Defence of Normandy was also mishandled by Rommel, perhaps because he was part of the July plot. Hitler was surrounded by traitors. Canaris, the chief of Abwehr himself was a traitor, however German agents were not behind the British agents in any way. Cicerio, the valet of the British ambassador in Ankara gave vital pieces of intelligence to Canaris throughout the war, including the information obtained in Stalin-Churchill-Rosevellet conferences, but Canaris prevented many of this from reaching Hitler. Just by giving one example you cannot deny the fact that the Soviet intelligence was the best in WW2. @Desert Fox @Nilgiri @DesertFox97 @persona_non_grata

For those of us like me who don't want to read all that

What I have written is different from this official(very dramatical) account. It is based on reliable sources and is an accurate depiction of what really happened unlike the dramatized ones.
 
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I said before and I will say again that the British intelligence during WW2 was no match for Soviet intelligence(That does not mean that MI5 etc was not good). There were many people like Pojol, many who worked for abwehr. The Soviets had their man (a Nazi or a General among Hitler's inner circle who has not yet been exposed) in the OKW...Not only in the OKW, they had their men in OKH and OKL as well. The entire summer offensive plan for 1942 envisaged in the OKW was transmitted by Dora in Switzerland to the STAVKA. Stalin was able to save Moscow in 1941, thanks to Dr Sorge in Tokyo. At times, STAVKA knew the decisions which had been made in the OKW just a few hours ago. Stalin had his agents throughout Europe who transmitted accurate information which proved decisive on the front.

Now coming to the Normandy invasion part, what you posted is just an example, it does not prove in any way that the British intelligence was ahead of the Soviet intelligence. No doubt the British intelligence was good but it wasn't like the Soviet one. Defence of Normandy was also mishandled by Rommel, perhaps because he was part of the July plot. Hitler was surrounded by traitors. Canaris, the chief of Abwehr himself was a traitor, however German agents were not behind the British agents any way. Cicerio, the valet of British ambassador in Ankara gave vital pieces of intelligence to Canaris throughout the war, including the information obtained in Stalin-Churchill-Rosevellet conferences, but Canaris prevented many of this from reaching Hitler. Just by giving one example you cannot deny the fact that the Soviet intelligence was the best in WW2. @Desert Fox @Nilgiri @DesertFox97 @persona_non_grata

Theres a reason why Stalin purged the officer core to the extreme...it was so he could effectively plant intelligence operatives throughout his army....people he could trust much more than the professional career soldiers they replaced. The trade off was a lousy organised and disciplined army....but one that was quite effective in passing information on even after encirclement and capture. These tactics were not new at all to Soviets, its how they were running their own country since the revolution.....and they gained much experience in their civil war on the important of intelligence.

People often forget that Stalin was looking to dominate Europe much before Hitler came to the scene. Heck even under Lenin's time this was the case. Thus the USSR cultivated many contacts throughout Europe at all levels that were their eyes and ears during the war. These people were there getting their own recruits as early as the 20s...all across Europe.

The Germans played much more by the book....and had very crap external intelligence gathering. Their internal was ok....but that only goes so far in a war. They got completely outmaneuvered by the Soviets eventually because of this (along with the logistics problem + Hitlers paranoia with only advancing)

British were about average to good...problem with them is their intelligence assets were based more on local reaction to Nazis. Thats why their BEF was also completely and soundly routed in the early part of the war. They learnt the lessons well and got better as war progressed....but nothing close to the deep cultivated assets Soviets always had due to their long term goal of seeing Communism take over all of Europe and then the world.

In fact it was Stalin that was quite stupid in not listening to the intelligence his own assets were giving him regarding Barbarossa. He would never question them after that.

Thats why USSR NKVD and later KGB had a huge upper hand in the cold war as well...and were always up to date on Western developments.
 
Theres a reason why Stalin purged the officer core to the extreme...it was so he could effectively plant intelligence operatives throughout his army....people he could trust much more than the professional career soldiers they replaced. The trade off was a lousy organised and disciplined army....but one that was quite effective in passing information on even after encirclement and capture. These tactics were not new at all to Soviets, its how they were running their own country since the revolution.....and they gained much experience in their civil war on the important of intelligence.
Hitler, during his final days in the bunker is quoted to have said: "I should have purged the officers like Stalin". Those who knew him, knew very well that Hitler was never the same man before and after July 20. He was physically safe but his soul was injured after knowing that people like Stauffenberg who he had known and cared for had plotted to kill him. The fact that Rommel had a contact with the conspirators hurt him deeply. He was surrounded by traitors and after July 20, he distanced himself from faithful Generals like Guderian as well because he had lost his trust in his Generals, this proved disastrous for Wehrmacht.
Hitler was surrounded by traitors and a nest of spies. The efforts of the brilliant field agents of Abwehr like Cicerio were lost because of the traitors like Admiral Canaris. Many people in Wehrmacht were traitors. The treason was however absent in the Waffen-SS.
People often forget that Stalin was looking to dominate Europe much before Hitler came to the scene. Heck even under Lenin's time this was the case. Thus the USSR cultivated many contacts throughout Europe at all levels that were their eyes and ears during the war. These people were there getting their own recruits as early as the 20s...all across Europe.
The allies(UK,France) declared war on Germany a day after she attacked Poland however they did not dare to do so against Russia when Stalin did the same and occupied half of the country without fighting. Stalin occupied Baltic states, made advances in the Balkans and attacked Finland for the same purpose of spreading Bolshevism throughout Europe. It is also said that had Germany not fought the Soviets, the latter would have expanded into Central and Western Europe by 1945-46.
. They got completely outmaneuvered by the Soviets eventually because of this (along with the logistics problem + Hitlers paranoia with only advancing)
Many people criticize Hitler for his so-called inability to understand military matters however when criticizing, one must also remember that the old-fashioned aristocratic Generals of Germany would have never ever achieved so many victories in the West, the East and else where if there was no Fuhrer interfering in their decisions. The senior officers in the General Staff used to make fun of Guderian after he had proposed his revolutionary ideas to them, it was Hitler who accepted his proposals. Donitz was ignored by Reader when he wanted to have U-boat production increased...Two years later, when he had access to Hitler, his proposals were accepted by Hitler. Manstein plan was rejected by Halder and Brauchitchs, it was Hitler who approved the "Manstein plan".
In fact it was Stalin that was quite stupid in not listening to the intelligence his own assets were giving him regarding Barbarossa. He would never question them after that.

Thats why USSR NKVD and later KGB had a huge upper hand in the cold war as well...and were always up to date on Western developments.
Agreed.
 
Well honestly i don't have much knowledge about intelligence area of WW2 never actually did a brief research on this i was more interested in the other parts :/ but hey i think i will learn a lot from this thread. But one thing i would like to add is that it was never proved that Rommel was part of the 20 july plot.
 
But one thing i would like to add is that it was never proved that Rommel was part of the 20 july plot.
It wasn't proved but Rommel mishandled the defence of the Atlantic wall. Moreover, he went to a "vacation" on June 6th. Hitler was told that Rommel had contacts with the conspirators, that was why he was poisoned. @Desert Fox what do you say?
 

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