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I said that before and I will say that again that the British intelligence during WW2 was no match for the Soviet intelligence(That does not mean that the MI5 etc was not good). There were many people like Pojol, many who worked for abwehr. The Soviets had their man "Werther" (a Nazi or a General among Hitler's inner circle who has not yet been exposed) in the OKW...Not only in the OKW, they had their men in OKH and OKL as well. The entire summer offensive plan for 1942 envisaged in the OKW was transmitted by Dora in Switzerland to the STAVKA. Stalin was able to save Moscow in 1941, thanks to Dr Sorge in Tokyo. At times, STAVKA knew the decisions which had been made in the OKW just a few hours ago. Stalin had his agents throughout Europe who transmitted accurate information which proved decisive on the front.Operation Fortitude
In January 1944, the Germans told Joan Pujol that they believed a large-scale invasion of Europe was imminent and asked to be kept informed. This was Operation Overlord, and Pujol played a leading role in the deception and disinformation campaign Operation Fortitude, sending over 500 radio messages between January 1944 and D-Day, at times more than twenty messages per day.During planning for the Normandy beach invasion, it was decided that it was vitally important that the German High Command be misled that the landing would happen at the Strait of Dover.In order to maintain his credibility, it was decided that Garbo (or one of his agents) should forewarn the Germans of the timing and some details of the actual invasion of Normandy, although sending it too late for them to take effective action. Special arrangements were made with the German radio operators to be listening to Garbo through the night of 5/6 June 1944, using the story that a sub-agent was about to arrive with important information. However, when the call was made at 3 am, no reply was received from the German operators until 8 am. Turning this piece of bad luck on its head, Garbo was able to add more operational details to the message when finally sent and increase his standing with the Germans. Garbo told his German contacts that he was disgusted that his message was missed, saying "I cannot accept excuses or negligence. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work".An inflatable dummy M4 Shermantank.On 9 June (3 days after D-day), Garbo sent a message to German High Command that reached Adolf Hitler saying that he had conferred with his agents and developed an order of battle showing 75 divisions in Britain—in reality, there were only about 50. Part of the "Fortitude" plan was intended to convince the Germans that a fictitious formation—First U.S. Army Group, comprising 11 divisions (150,000 men), commanded by General George Patton—was stationed in the south and east of Britain.The deception was supported by fake planes, inflatable tanks and vans travelling about the area transmitting bogus radio chatter. Garbo's message pointed out that units from this formation had not participated in the invasion, and therefore the first landing should be considered a diversion. A German message to Madrid sent two days later said "all reports received in the last week from Arabel [Pujol's German code-name] undertaking have been confirmed without exception and are to be described as exceptionally valuable." A post-war examination of German records found that, during Operation Fortitude, no fewer than sixty-two of Pujol's reports were included in German military high command intelligence summaries.The German High Command accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, refused to allow General Erwin Rommel to move his divisions to Normandy. There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.In late June, Garbo was instructed by the Germans to report on the falling of V1 flying bombs. Finding no way of giving false information without arousing suspicion, and being unwilling to give correct information, Harris arranged forGarbo to be "arrested".He returned to duty a few days later, now having a "need" to avoid London, and forwarded an "official" letter of apology from the Home Secretary for his unlawful detention.The Germans paid Garbo (or Arabel, as they called him) US$340,000 to support his network of agents, which at one point totaled 27 fabricated characters.
As Arabel, Pujol was, on 29 July 1944, awarded the Iron Cross Second Class for his services to the German war effort. The award was normally reserved for front-line fighting men and required Hitler's personal authorisation. The Iron Cross was presented via radio, and he received the physical medal from one of his German handlers after the war had ended. As Garbo, he received a Member of the Order of the British Empire from King George VI, on 25 November 1944.The Nazis never realised they had been fooled, and thus Pujol earned the distinction of being one of the few – if not the only – to receive decorations from both sides during World War II.
You like examples so here is one, Stalin knew about Ardennes offensive, the allies were caught with their pants down.
Canaris, chief of the abwehr himself used to help the allies/Stalin because of his "conscience", this led to intelligence leakages and withholding of vital intelligence from reaching those concerned.
Now coming to the Normandy invasion part, what you posted is just an example, it does not prove in any way that the British intelligence was ahead of the Soviet intelligence. No doubt the British intelligence was good but it wasn't like the Soviet one. Defence of Normandy was also mishandled by Rommel, perhaps because he was part of the July plot. Hitler was surrounded by traitors. Canaris, the chief of Abwehr himself was a traitor, however German agents were not behind the British agents in any way. Cicerio, the valet of the British ambassador in Ankara gave vital pieces of intelligence to Canaris throughout the war, including the information obtained in Stalin-Churchill-Rosevellet conferences, but Canaris prevented many of this from reaching Hitler. Just by giving one example you cannot deny the fact that the Soviet intelligence was the best in WW2. @Desert Fox @Nilgiri @DesertFox97 @persona_non_grata
What I have written is different from this official(very dramatical) account. It is based on reliable sources and is an accurate depiction of what really happened unlike the dramatized ones.For those of us like me who don't want to read all that
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