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Will the US deploy Iron Dome to protect bases in the Gulf?

Iron dome has 85% interception rate, which means 15% will still pass through, resulting in tens of rockets hitting israeli cities, got it?

That article you posted was written before your experts questioned the system failures, in other words once more information was obtained they realised actually they system failed much more than it should. Morever, the 85% figure being given is just on the interception rate, i.e once the missile has been fired how many times did it successfully destroy the rockets. However clearly there are multiple ways the system can fail and not just this way. So again, I suggest you pay attention to your own generals and experts. Hubris will not make your systems more effective.
 
Does that mean American has come to this conclusion that their ADs are ineffective? so they need to go for iron dome?
 
And we will be able to test our Jericho 3 capabilities
are you planning to hit India or China . the mythical Chimney III missile is supposed to have 8000 of range . I doubt a Jew be so wasteful to use it against a country 1100km away
Iron Dome shoot down rockets that are aimed to populated areas,
And no one claimed Iron dome has 100% success rate.
690 missiles were launched toward Israel and only 4 dead, that's some good defense system boy
well even before Iron dome Palestinian were not good at killing their adversaries , they only could make some noises and usually the dead were because of heart attack
 
LOL the Russian anti-missile systems are more combat proven than Israeli iron dome.
Russian anti missile systems never could intercept a SINGLE missile put of hundreds of attacks.

The iron dome has only intercepted Palestinian rockets. You are obviously being disingenuous.
Iron dome intercepted more than THOUSAND of supersonic Grad and Fajar missiles.
 
Even though this is an old thread and I have been away for a while, I was asked to comment, so here goes...

In my opinion, the Iron Dome system proved successful beyond expectations. Am not going to use hyperbolic language like 'wildly' or 'fantastic' but keep as neutral as possible.

The Daily Mail article, citing whoever Israeli experts, is not being fair to the air defense concept in general and to the Iron Dome system in particular.


"At the weekend around 690 missiles were launched into Israel over the course of two days, leaving four civilians dead and injuring nearly 200 people.
But of the hundreds of projectiles fired into the country, the Iron Dome only intercepted 240, according to Haaretz. "

This is an outstanding combat record considering the nature of the attacker which in this case is unguided rockets launched at civilian populated areas. Ideally, we want zero human casualties and the worst of the casualty type is a death. The wounded is also categorized as a casualty. But if we cannot achieve the ideal, then we want to minimize deaths. In warfare, often the intention is to inflict HUMAN casualties and we will expend resources that, from a 'bean counting' perspective, seems to be grossly disproportionate just to kill one or a few humans. In the same vein, we will also expend much resources to rescue a single downed pilot, always risking several troops and expensive hardware. In this case, five deaths out of several hundreds unguided rockets is outstanding statistics.

That is not how it works, you judge the effectiveness of a system by its intended purpose e.g. shooting down rockets. These rockets fired are unguided rockets meaning even if they are fired at a particular area, they may not cause much harm due to multiple factors. However, the iron dome is not a crystal ball, it cannot predict what exactly will happen so that is why it is suppose to shoot down any rockets being sent towards civilian areas and as you can see from the article, those rockets that were fired towards civilians sectors were not shot down i.e a failure on this systems part. So you can resort to all sort of mental gymnastics that you want, however the experts are right in this case. The system clearly failed, and failed badly.

This is not a good criticism. Let us take the words 'civilian sectors' for a moment and place a real estate figure of 10 sq/km, for example. Inside this 10 sq/km area, we have the usual human infrastructures like schools, markets, homes, parks, etc.

If the air raid siren sent everyone into shelters and a bomb/rocket landed on an empty parking lot, how does this factored into being a successful attack AND a successful defense? No one was killed but the bomb/rocket did landed onto a civilian structure. The parking lot would be considered a POPULATED civilian structure under the Geneva Convention. The context of the word 'populated' mean the structure is intended for human use in a CONSISTENT pattern. There maybe some humans at night but filled during the day. One day after another, and so on. But when the air raid siren sent the humans into protected or even armored environment, the odds of having human casualties diminished. The attacker, the one who sent the bomb/rocket, would calculate the event as a success. The defender, whether it was active defense or not, would also calculate the event as a success. Each calculus came from a different perspective.

Because this is about perspective, it rendered questionable the DM article as to its fairness. Even if the entire volley of ID interceptors failed some, the successful intercepts saved lives. A 'volley' mean a time period where some things (plural) happen. A volley of rockets mean X quantity of rockets are launched sequentially inside a timed period. So if there were ten rockets launched and five were intercepted, that would have been time for the humans to seek protected/armored environment, reducing the odds of deaths. So what really failed? The interceptions that failed? Or the reduced/zero human casualties?

Do you understand what the words "failed to" mean?

And here is your own general explaining why he think the system failed:


"Major General Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser and retired head of the Military Intelligence's Research Department, admitted short range rockets were able to exploit gaps in the Iron Dome."
If we are to go by this simple comment, Amidror did not say the ID system 'failed'. This is not being pedantic, but about being precise with words. Words that have consequences.

"Major General Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser and retired head of the Military Intelligence's Research Department, admitted short range rockets were able to exploit gaps in the Iron Dome.
He told The Jerusalem Post: 'We don't have enough time to intercept it.'"

Short range weaponry ALWAYS produce response time problems and defensive errors. An interceptor is reactive. It cannot know what to do until it is given some information and that takes time.

This image...

OE7utxf.jpg


...Is revealing and instructive.

On the left are the attackers. On the right are the interceptors. The points of lights -- successful interceptions. Note the interceptors' trails -- short. If we can trace the attackers' flight trail from launch to intercept points, we will see that the attackers' trails would be much longer. But we do not need to see them. The points of intercepts are indicative enough. The interceptors' short flight time places much technical demands on the ID system overall, from ground controller radar's ability to discriminate the small rockets, to the interceptor's quickness in maneuvers to try to make collision. There will gaps and misses. The photo does not mean all intercepts happened the moment the photo was taken. The starlight trails in the sky mean the photo was taken over time.

If any individual interceptor failed, what was the failure mode? Lack of radar guidance? Failed flight control? The attacker was too low in altitude? The interceptor's propulsion failed? The interceptor's IR guidance failed? We will never know because each attempt is destructive even if the interceptor failed because it will be destroyed when it ran out of fuel and fell to the ground. Nevertheless, the successful intercepts are what made the system overall combat proven and -- DESIRABLE. Make no mistake about this. Behind the scene, many countries quietly queried Israel about purchasing the system or better yet, getting the engineering program. The base technology for all the discrete components already exists. The hard part is the engineering to put them all into a functional package and Israel succeeded.

The Iron Dome system is not a failure.
 
Even though this is an old thread and I have been away for a while, I was asked to comment, so here goes...

In my opinion, the Iron Dome system proved successful beyond expectations. Am not going to use hyperbolic language like 'wildly' or 'fantastic' but keep as neutral as possible.

The Daily Mail article, citing whoever Israeli experts, is not being fair to the air defense concept in general and to the Iron Dome system in particular.


"At the weekend around 690 missiles were launched into Israel over the course of two days, leaving four civilians dead and injuring nearly 200 people.
But of the hundreds of projectiles fired into the country, the Iron Dome only intercepted 240, according to Haaretz. "

This is an outstanding combat record considering the nature of the attacker which in this case is unguided rockets launched at civilian populated areas. Ideally, we want zero human casualties and the worst of the casualty type is a death. The wounded is also categorized as a casualty. But if we cannot achieve the ideal, then we want to minimize deaths. In warfare, often the intention is to inflict HUMAN casualties and we will expend resources that, from a 'bean counting' perspective, seems to be grossly disproportionate just to kill one or a few humans. In the same vein, we will also expend much resources to rescue a single downed pilot, always risking several troops and expensive hardware. In this case, five deaths out of several hundreds unguided rockets is outstanding statistics.



This is not a good criticism. Let us take the words 'civilian sectors' for a moment and place a real estate figure of 10 sq/km, for example. Inside this 10 sq/km area, we have the usual human infrastructures like schools, markets, homes, parks, etc.

If the air raid siren sent everyone into shelters and a bomb/rocket landed on an empty parking lot, how does this factored into being a successful attack AND a successful defense? No one was killed but the bomb/rocket did landed onto a civilian structure. The parking lot would be considered a POPULATED civilian structure under the Geneva Convention. The context of the word 'populated' mean the structure is intended for human use in a CONSISTENT pattern. There maybe some humans at night but filled during the day. One day after another, and so on. But when the air raid siren sent the humans into protected or even armored environment, the odds of having human casualties diminished. The attacker, the one who sent the bomb/rocket, would calculate the event as a success. The defender, whether it was active defense or not, would also calculate the event as a success. Each calculus came from a different perspective.

Because this is about perspective, it rendered questionable the DM article as to its fairness. Even if the entire volley of ID interceptors failed some, the successful intercepts saved lives. A 'volley' mean a time period where some things (plural) happen. A volley of rockets mean X quantity of rockets are launched sequentially inside a timed period. So if there were ten rockets launched and five were intercepted, that would have been time for the humans to seek protected/armored environment, reducing the odds of deaths. So what really failed? The interceptions that failed? Or the reduced/zero human casualties?


If we are to go by this simple comment, Amidror did not say the ID system 'failed'. This is not being pedantic, but about being precise with words. Words that have consequences.

"Major General Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser and retired head of the Military Intelligence's Research Department, admitted short range rockets were able to exploit gaps in the Iron Dome.
He told The Jerusalem Post: 'We don't have enough time to intercept it.'"

Short range weaponry ALWAYS produce response time problems and defensive errors. An interceptor is reactive. It cannot know what to do until it is given some information and that takes time.

This image...

OE7utxf.jpg


...Is revealing and instructive.

On the left are the attackers. On the right are the interceptors. The points of lights -- successful interceptions. Note the interceptors' trails -- short. If we can trace the attackers' flight trail from launch to intercept points, we will see that the attackers' trails would be much longer. But we do not need to see them. The points of intercepts are indicative enough. The interceptors' short flight time places much technical demands on the ID system overall, from ground controller radar's ability to discriminate the small rockets, to the interceptor's quickness in maneuvers to try to make collision. There will gaps and misses. The photo does not mean all intercepts happened the moment the photo was taken. The starlight trails in the sky mean the photo was taken over time.

If any individual interceptor failed, what was the failure mode? Lack of radar guidance? Failed flight control? The attacker was too low in altitude? The interceptor's propulsion failed? The interceptor's IR guidance failed? We will never know because each attempt is destructive even if the interceptor failed because it will be destroyed when it ran out of fuel and fell to the ground. Nevertheless, the successful intercepts are what made the system overall combat proven and -- DESIRABLE. Make no mistake about this. Behind the scene, many countries quietly queried Israel about purchasing the system or better yet, getting the engineering program. The base technology for all the discrete components already exists. The hard part is the engineering to put them all into a functional package and Israel succeeded.

The Iron Dome system is not a failure.

I don't know how anyone can say the Iron Dome is a dud, if Israel did not have the Iron dome, it's frontier town/cities would be unlivable by now.

That being said, it is not an economical system because as you say in the picture above, many more interceptors need to be fired than aggressors not to mention the sophistication of the build is much more expensive than unguided rockets with a fuel tank, stabilizers and a warhead. It is fair to note that Israel's success mostly came from the USA though, as they fund the system for them.
 
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...if Israel did not have the Iron dome, it's frontier town/cities would be unlivable by now.

That being said, it is not an economical system because as you say in the picture above, many more interceptors need to be fired than aggressors...
First priorty: human lives.
Second priority: human structures.

When you attack civilians, you have a choice of targeting intention of either human lives or human structures. Back in WW II, the US dropped leaflets over Japan warning civilians of impending bombing attacks. The intention was demoralize civilians by showing them the devastation of their structures.

For the defenders, the priority list above do not change. Structures can be rebuilt, but no one have ever returned from the afterlife. Once I moved my civilians into protected/armored environment, I can continue to protect the human structures or I can abandon them. Back in WW II, the UK defenders continued to fight despite civilians being underground. So even though it may not be economical from a 'bean-counter' perspective, the strategic goals must still be defended if the means are available, and those goals includes the survival of as much structures as possible. It will be costlier in the long term if civilian structures are not defended.

Now...The NATURE of the attacker is also important. If it is manned aircrafts, it would benefit greatly if I have an aggressive defensive posture, perhaps even to pursue the attacking fighters. Any aircraft loss to the enemy is one less asset to him and to me.

But if the attack method is missiles, assuming a non-nuclear war for now, here is one possible defensive scenario and am going to use simple numbers but it would not be difficult for you to extrapolate.

Assume multiple volleys of 10 missiles per.

First volley.

Intercepted:
- Hospital
- Army HQ
- Fuel depot

Landed:
- Parking lot
- Farm field
- Highway
- Building
- Building
- Warehouse
- Canal

If you do not perform any post mission recon, you are going to assess that my defense failed. However, I know that my defense worked perfectly. The three intercepted missiles were supposed to be for critical targets. The other 7 missiles landed on non-critical structures. But you do not know that.

On the second 10 missiles volley, I will have 17 interceptors vs 10 missiles. But this time, my system determined that no intercepts are necessary, so I did nothing. Your 10 missiles landed on 10 non-critical locations. You will further support your assessment that my defense failed.

On the third 10 missiles volley, I will have 27 interceptors vs 10 missiles. Am sure you get the picture from here.

The fact that you assessed that my defense failed worked to my advantage. With each 10-missile volley you (falsely) reinforced your assessment and that WILL lead you other tactics and strategic goals that unknown to you trends towards your defeat. Not guarantee, but trending enough that I can use tactics to eventually defeat you.

This is why ID is deemed a success by very interested militaries (like Taiwan) around the world.
 
DoD is not going to buy it, highly ineffective against faster moving projectiles.
 
...highly ineffective against faster moving projectiles.
You can believe that, if you like. If you think Iron Dome AS IS cannot be modified to work against higher speed ballistic warheads, or that the base technology cannot be equally modified, you are going to be unpleasantly surprised.
 
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