waraich66
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Oct 19, 2008
- Messages
- 4,641
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
WILL PAKISTAN BE NEXT?
- It is to be hoped that the Arab future tilts towards democracy
KANTI BAJPAI
The crises in Tunisia and Egypt have surprised the world even as they have shocked the incumbent leaderships. The knock-on effects on South Yemen and Jordan suggest that there is widespread popular disaffection in the Arab world. Is this a pointer to rebellion brewing in the Muslim world beyond the Arab countries? What about Pakistan in particular? Could it be next?
What we are seeing in Tunisia and now in Egypt is large-scale popular rebellion against long-standing authoritarian leaderships. Both are fairly advanced Arab countries in terms of per capita income ($7900 and $5400 respectively in purchasing power parity terms), literacy (78 per cent and 66 per cent), exposure to the media and electronic communications, and political awareness. Both have respectable population growth rates, with Tunisia slightly below the world average and Egypt somewhat above. Both are growing economically at a decent rate at between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent respectively. Unemployment is probably the most disturbing element, with Tunisia at 14 per cent and Egypt at 10 per cent.
There is trouble also in Yemen and Jordan. How do they stack up against Tunisia and Egypt? Yemen has a per capita income of $2400 and Jordan of $5000. Literacy is at 59 per cent and 91 per cent respectively. Population growth rates are 2.97 per cent and three per cent, well above the global average of 1.17 per cent. Economically, they are both growing at five per cent. And unemployment is 35 per cent and 13 per cent. This suggests that Jordan is somewhat closer to Tunisia and Egypt.
Why then, given quite different profiles, at least between Yemen on the one hand and Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan on the other, are both sets of countries in political difficulty? Do the economic and social characteristics of countries not matter?
There is a view that economic and social deprivation leads to rebellion. An alternative view is that economic and social progress, up to a threshold, gives rise to rebellion. The four profiles sketched in here suggest that the latter view is more credible, as three of the four States represent middle-level developing countries that have attained a certain threshold of economic and social progress. Economic and social progress creates political awareness and a level of political mobilization that is necessary for an agitational movement. Economic and social progress is also influential in determining the nature of the movement. If one had to make a vulgar prediction, it is that Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, as relatively rich and modern societies, will handle the present crises somewhat better and move in the direction of a fairly moderate, liberal alternative. Not so Yemen.
Is there anything that the four countries have in common besides being Arab and Muslim and sharing some economic and social features? One striking common feature is their political leadership which has been in the same hands for three decades. Discontent is as much political, therefore, as it is economic and social.
Where is Pakistan in comparison? Its per capita income is $2600 dollars, close to Yemens. Literacy is 54 per cent, again Yemen-like. Population is growing at a more moderate pace, at 1.84 per cent. Economic growth is running at 2.7 per cent, lower than Yemen and barely keeping up with population growth. Unemployment stands at 15 per cent, well below Yemens rate. In sum, Pakistans economic and social profile is more like that of Yemen than of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.
Yet, compared to the four Arab States, Pakistan has certain political characteristics which make massive street protests against the incumbent government unlikely. It has had a history of rather effective street protests in 1969 to oust Ayub Khan, in 1977 to oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and in 2009 to oust Pervez Musharraf. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to happen in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.
For one thing, and perhaps most importantly, Pakistan has not had the same leadership for 30 years. Nobody in Pakistan, not even a dictator, has ruled for more than 11 years. Pervez Musharraf, the last authoritarian leader of that country, did not quite make the 11-year limit, being at the helm from 1999 to 2009.
Secondly, the present government in Pakistan is a popularly elected one. There is discontent in the country, but the Zardari government was elected in a free and fair election and his political capital has not run out he has not hit the 11-year limit. Nor has it been possible to focus public anger against any one leader. President Asif Ali Zardari is not personally liked, but he is not the only focus of dissatisfaction. The prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, runs the day-to-day affairs of the State with a fairly capable group of ministers. Responsibility is more diffuse in Pakistan.
This brings me to a third feature of the Pakistani system, namely, its relative openness. Pakistan today is not authoritarian in the way that Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are. There are political spaces and freedoms available to dissenting groups, most obviously parliament. The effect of this is to let pressure dissipate.
Fourth, Pakistan has a lively and relatively free media. Popular expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction are allowed fairly free rein, particularly in periods of civilian rule. Even during military rule, Pakistans press has had a fair degree of commentative and reporting freedom. Political unhappiness is therefore not bottled up as in the Arab world.
Another key difference is that Islamic forces in Pakistan have not been suppressed in the way that they have been contained in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. It is not clear to what extent Islamic groups have instigated or taken over the protests in those three countries. In Egypt, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is becoming more evident. What is worrisome in the Egyptian movement is that the only organized force within it is the Brotherhood. There is a danger, therefore, that the Islamists will manipulate the post-Mubarak phase to their advantage and marginalize the liberals. In Pakistan, by contrast, the Islamists are pretty much out in the open and have the patronage or acquiescence of political parties and the army. Pakistani Islamists may not need a popular movement against the government of the day. They already set a good deal of the agenda and frequently act as a veto group.
Finally, young people have been a crucial force in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, but Pakistans youth, particularly educated youth, have really not played much of a role in agitational politics since the late 1960s. Some segments of young people have been drawn into Islamic radicalism, others have joined the mainstream political parties. Yet others have emigrated to the West or are politically apathetic. Those who have joined Islamic radicalism and those in the mainstream parties are not terribly interested in agitational street politics: the radicals are attracted to terrorism and sectarian conflict Shia versus Sunni or cultural reformation; and those in the political parties give vent to their views within the political process.
If this is correct, Pakistan is unlikely to be a candidate for the kind of protests we are seeing in the Arab world. Pakistan already has a richer democratic history than these countries. It also has much more instability and political violence. We must hope that the Arab future tilts towards democracy rather than instability and violence.
The author teaches international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
- It is to be hoped that the Arab future tilts towards democracy
KANTI BAJPAI
The crises in Tunisia and Egypt have surprised the world even as they have shocked the incumbent leaderships. The knock-on effects on South Yemen and Jordan suggest that there is widespread popular disaffection in the Arab world. Is this a pointer to rebellion brewing in the Muslim world beyond the Arab countries? What about Pakistan in particular? Could it be next?
What we are seeing in Tunisia and now in Egypt is large-scale popular rebellion against long-standing authoritarian leaderships. Both are fairly advanced Arab countries in terms of per capita income ($7900 and $5400 respectively in purchasing power parity terms), literacy (78 per cent and 66 per cent), exposure to the media and electronic communications, and political awareness. Both have respectable population growth rates, with Tunisia slightly below the world average and Egypt somewhat above. Both are growing economically at a decent rate at between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent respectively. Unemployment is probably the most disturbing element, with Tunisia at 14 per cent and Egypt at 10 per cent.
There is trouble also in Yemen and Jordan. How do they stack up against Tunisia and Egypt? Yemen has a per capita income of $2400 and Jordan of $5000. Literacy is at 59 per cent and 91 per cent respectively. Population growth rates are 2.97 per cent and three per cent, well above the global average of 1.17 per cent. Economically, they are both growing at five per cent. And unemployment is 35 per cent and 13 per cent. This suggests that Jordan is somewhat closer to Tunisia and Egypt.
Why then, given quite different profiles, at least between Yemen on the one hand and Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan on the other, are both sets of countries in political difficulty? Do the economic and social characteristics of countries not matter?
There is a view that economic and social deprivation leads to rebellion. An alternative view is that economic and social progress, up to a threshold, gives rise to rebellion. The four profiles sketched in here suggest that the latter view is more credible, as three of the four States represent middle-level developing countries that have attained a certain threshold of economic and social progress. Economic and social progress creates political awareness and a level of political mobilization that is necessary for an agitational movement. Economic and social progress is also influential in determining the nature of the movement. If one had to make a vulgar prediction, it is that Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, as relatively rich and modern societies, will handle the present crises somewhat better and move in the direction of a fairly moderate, liberal alternative. Not so Yemen.
Is there anything that the four countries have in common besides being Arab and Muslim and sharing some economic and social features? One striking common feature is their political leadership which has been in the same hands for three decades. Discontent is as much political, therefore, as it is economic and social.
Where is Pakistan in comparison? Its per capita income is $2600 dollars, close to Yemens. Literacy is 54 per cent, again Yemen-like. Population is growing at a more moderate pace, at 1.84 per cent. Economic growth is running at 2.7 per cent, lower than Yemen and barely keeping up with population growth. Unemployment stands at 15 per cent, well below Yemens rate. In sum, Pakistans economic and social profile is more like that of Yemen than of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.
Yet, compared to the four Arab States, Pakistan has certain political characteristics which make massive street protests against the incumbent government unlikely. It has had a history of rather effective street protests in 1969 to oust Ayub Khan, in 1977 to oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and in 2009 to oust Pervez Musharraf. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to happen in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.
For one thing, and perhaps most importantly, Pakistan has not had the same leadership for 30 years. Nobody in Pakistan, not even a dictator, has ruled for more than 11 years. Pervez Musharraf, the last authoritarian leader of that country, did not quite make the 11-year limit, being at the helm from 1999 to 2009.
Secondly, the present government in Pakistan is a popularly elected one. There is discontent in the country, but the Zardari government was elected in a free and fair election and his political capital has not run out he has not hit the 11-year limit. Nor has it been possible to focus public anger against any one leader. President Asif Ali Zardari is not personally liked, but he is not the only focus of dissatisfaction. The prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, runs the day-to-day affairs of the State with a fairly capable group of ministers. Responsibility is more diffuse in Pakistan.
This brings me to a third feature of the Pakistani system, namely, its relative openness. Pakistan today is not authoritarian in the way that Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are. There are political spaces and freedoms available to dissenting groups, most obviously parliament. The effect of this is to let pressure dissipate.
Fourth, Pakistan has a lively and relatively free media. Popular expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction are allowed fairly free rein, particularly in periods of civilian rule. Even during military rule, Pakistans press has had a fair degree of commentative and reporting freedom. Political unhappiness is therefore not bottled up as in the Arab world.
Another key difference is that Islamic forces in Pakistan have not been suppressed in the way that they have been contained in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. It is not clear to what extent Islamic groups have instigated or taken over the protests in those three countries. In Egypt, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is becoming more evident. What is worrisome in the Egyptian movement is that the only organized force within it is the Brotherhood. There is a danger, therefore, that the Islamists will manipulate the post-Mubarak phase to their advantage and marginalize the liberals. In Pakistan, by contrast, the Islamists are pretty much out in the open and have the patronage or acquiescence of political parties and the army. Pakistani Islamists may not need a popular movement against the government of the day. They already set a good deal of the agenda and frequently act as a veto group.
Finally, young people have been a crucial force in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, but Pakistans youth, particularly educated youth, have really not played much of a role in agitational politics since the late 1960s. Some segments of young people have been drawn into Islamic radicalism, others have joined the mainstream political parties. Yet others have emigrated to the West or are politically apathetic. Those who have joined Islamic radicalism and those in the mainstream parties are not terribly interested in agitational street politics: the radicals are attracted to terrorism and sectarian conflict Shia versus Sunni or cultural reformation; and those in the political parties give vent to their views within the political process.
If this is correct, Pakistan is unlikely to be a candidate for the kind of protests we are seeing in the Arab world. Pakistan already has a richer democratic history than these countries. It also has much more instability and political violence. We must hope that the Arab future tilts towards democracy rather than instability and violence.
The author teaches international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
