Will China Have 7 Aircraft Carriers by 2025?

[haidian]

Will China Have 7 Aircraft Carriers by 2025?
The PLA Navy’s upcoming Type 075 assault ships may deploy fighter jets to better contend pacific naval superiority.

By Abraham Ait
June 30, 2018

The 2012 commissioning of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and the subsequent expansion of the country’s carrier fleet, with three new warships currently in various stages of testing or construction, has been cause for great apprehension among its potential adversaries in Asia and the West. Borrowing heavily from the highly ambitious Soviet Kuznetsov and Ulyanovsk carrier programs initiated in the late 1980s, both of which were cut short by the country’s collapse, China is on schedule to have four carriers by 2025.

Not only is the PLAN’s fleet numerous, but its vessels are growing in both sophistication and size. While the carrier Liaoning, a better armed and modernized sister to the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, leaves much to be desired in its sophistication, state of the art technologies developed for future carriers will make them considerably more capable. These include electromagnetic launch systems (EMALS), facilitating the deployment of heavier and better armed fighters; carrier-based early warning aircraft, the development of which was completed in 2017; and dedicated carrier-based electronic attack jets, currently in the prototype stage. These assets, all fielded by the latest U.S. supercarrier USS Gerald Ford, are set to allow the PLAN’s future carriers to better contend with advanced rival warships fielded by Japan, the United States, and other potential adversaries in the Pacific. Combined with the rapid growth in the country’s destroyer fleet and the commissioning of a lethal new destroyer class, the Type 055, China’s ability to project power at sea and contest dominance of the contested and strategically vital South and East China Seas appears to be growing apace.

While the four ship strong PLAN carrier fleet planned for 2025 is already a daunting prospect for the United States and its Asian allies, there is a considerable chance that a lower profile defense program currently underway could see this number rise to seven. Alongside the development of three carrier warships, the Type 001, Type 002 and Type 003, Chinese shipbuilders have also begun the construction of three amphibious assault ships — 40,000 ton warships approximately the same size as the French carrier Charles De Gaulle. The warships are highly similar to the U.S. Navy’s America and Wasp class amphibious assault ships, almost identical in size and appearance. The example set by the American warships could well give some indications as to the PLA’s intentions for the Type 075 class’ future.

The U.S. Navy currently fields 20 aircraft carriers, 11 of which are 100,000 ton supercarriers and nine of which are amphibious assault ships – which the United States does not consider carriers, but which deploy fixed wing combat aircraft. While lacking the runways and arresting gear necessary to launch conventional carrier-based aircraft such as the F-18E or F-35C, specialized short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) capable aircraft, the Harrier Jump Jet and more recently the F-35B, have been developed to deploy from the decks of these assault ships, allowing them to effectively function as aircraft carriers — and highly capable ones at that. China’s Type 075 assault ships, all of which are expected to be in service by 2025, could well also deploy specialized aircraft by that time to allow them to function as carriers, thus bringing the size of the PLAN’s carrier fleet up to seven. Indeed, given the limited uses of a dedicated helicopter carrier with such a large deck, it is highly likely that the Type 075 class was designed with an aircraft carrier role in mind.

While the United States is currently the only producer of an STOVL aircraft, the F-35B, it is not the only country to have developed such technologies. The Soviet Union was in fact a pioneer of these technologies during the Cold War, and the country’s Cold War-era carrier fleet relied exclusively on vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft incorporating similar design concepts to STOVL. As part of the USSR’s ambitious carrier expansion plans of the late 1980s, the country had developed a highly sophisticated VTOL aircraft, the Yak-141, which would have been able to deploy from assault ships similar to the Wasp Class and Type 075. The program was ultimately cancelled following the USSR’s disintegration, but had reached a late development stage with four working prototypes.

Much as China did with a number of cancelled Soviet weapons programs in the 1990s, the country could well purchase the Yak-141’s technologies from Russia to very quickly develop its own VTOL or STOVL fighter. Combined with the state of the art military aviation technologies the PLA has recently developed, from stealth systems and AESA radars to some of the world’s foremost jet engines and air-to-air missiles, a Chinese derivative of the Yak-141 deployed from its three assault ships, which can carry up to 30 aircraft each, will be a formidable asset to the PLAN in the South and East China Seas. With a number of reports indicating that Russia is itself considering restarting the Yak-141 program, in light of its plans to construct four amphibious assault ships of its own, the PLAN could embark on a joint program to develop these aircraft or else purchase the fighters directly from Russia. The input of advanced Chinese technologies however would likely make for a more capable aircraft, and would be preferable for the PLAN.

With the U.S. Navy today increasingly stretched between several major fronts, and set to potentially escalate its involvement in the Middle East in light of growing tensions with Iran, matching a Chinese fleet of seven carrier warships, which could materialize in just seven years, will be a highly strenuous task. The PLAN will continue to retain a critical advantage in that it can focus its assets to the Asia-Pacific region, whereas the United States’ own carrier fleet, though many times larger, faces global commitments that restrict its ability to meet fast growing challenges to its primacy at sea in Asia.

With the Chinese defense budget growing by over 7 percent per year, almost in line with the country’s economic growth, the PLAN has room to induct more carriers, both assault ships and conventional larger vessels, after 2025. The U.S. Navy’s own carrier fleet, meanwhile, is unlikely to grow to much more than 20 warships, and matching the rapid growth in China’s capabilities in the Asia-Pacific will mean sacrificing commitments elsewhere. 2025 could well thus mark a considerable turning point in the Pacific balance of power, providing the U.S. Navy with the first real challenge to the dominance of its carrier strike groups in Asia since the sinking of the Imperial Japanese supercarrier Shinano in 1944.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/will-china-have-7-aircraft-carriers-by-2025/

 

[haidian]

China's military power already on par with US in East Asia
The dragon is catching up fast with the eagle
James Stavridis
November 22, 2017 11:06 JST

In his recent study of U.S.-China relations, Harvard professor Graham Allison provocatively asks whether the two superpowers of the 21st century are destined for war. After studying similar situations over the past 2,500 years -- when a rising power challenges an existing power -- the answer is that, more often than not, war is likely. The U.S. and China certainly have a basket of troublesome issues over which they disagree -- trade imbalances, collisions in cyberspace, Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, North Korea and uneasy Sino-Japanese relations.

The good news is that in this turbulent period, the international system has more effective tools to deal with conflict between states than ever before. Communications are instantaneous, there are international organizations and forums in which problems can be aired, economies are highly intertwined, and there is a plethora of mechanisms (academic conferences, business engagements, social networks) for informal dialog. But the possibility of a military confrontation between a rising China -- more nationalistic and muscular under President Xi Jinping -- and the U.S., led by an unpredictable and inexperienced president, cannot be ignored.

What does the balance of military power tell us about a potential war? What are the differences in the combat capability of the two nations? What would a conflict look like?


First, it is important to understand the differing defense aspirations of the two nations. The U.S. has a truly global set of security commitments enshrined in treaties and less formal arrangements. These include formal pacts with 28 NATO nations, Japan, South Korea, Australia and many others; as well as highly developed military relationships with Israel, Jordan, Singapore, Sweden, Finland and Afghanistan to name but a few.

China, on the other hand, has few formal alliances and does not -- at least at the moment -- aspire to operate a truly global security network. While Xi is beginning to talk about a more global military presence (and has opened China's first overseas military base on the highly strategic Horn of Africa), this difference in ambition will persist into the next decade and probably beyond. At present, China seeks the ability to control East Asia, dominate the South China Sea, operate at will in the East China Sea, overpower any Asian competitor (notably Japan), and compete with the U.S. in the region.

Even though the U.S. defense budget of around $600 billion dwarfs China's estimated spending of perhaps $200 billion (exact figures are hard to obtain, although Beijing certainly has the second largest military budget in the world), the military balance is approximately equal in East Asia. China's $200 billion focused on regional security roughly equals the U.S. spending and presence in the Pacific. Importantly, Chinese military spending and operations are increasing, while the U.S.'s are largely static.

Narrowing advantage

A second key point of comparison is the capability of naval and air forces. There is virtually no scenario in which large numbers of U.S. ground troops would fight Chinese ground troops (numbering 1.6 million, the largest army in the world), with the possible exception of a repeat of the Chinese and U.S. intervention on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s on opposite sides -- and that is hard to imagine. Therefore, the balance between the two countries in naval and air forces -- where the chances of conflict are far higher -- is vital to understand.

Here the U.S. enjoys a narrow but dwindling technology advantage. U.S. advanced jet fighters (both carrier and land-based) are still about a generation ahead of their Chinese counterparts. Pilot proficiency is also higher, and the ability to operate from massive aircraft carriers (which can travel nearly 1,000 miles daily, are hard to target precisely, and carry 80 combat aircraft) is an advantage. On the other hand, Chinese hypersonic missiles, satellite targeting, and quiet diesel submarines can threaten U.S. warships within 800 or so miles of the Chinese coast. As China's technology and defense spending increase over the coming years, this narrow U.S. advantage in maritime and air forces will reduce further.

Thirdly, the balance of strategic nuclear forces is worth examining; and here the U.S. enjoys its largest advantage over China. The U.S. operates a continuous, highly capable force of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines at sea, which China cannot. The U.S. has a powerful long range, land-based air force with the ability to deliver nuclear weapons; this is a lacuna in the Chinese inventory. Both nations have intercontinental ballistic missiles in land silos, although China has far fewer. While the U.S. has the advantage here, there is a very low likelihood of using strategic nuclear weapons, making this less significant than the two other factors.

Finally, there is the balance in the newest venue of potential conflict: cyberspace. Here the two nations have a roughly equal level of capability in offensive cyber tools. The Chinese have shown the ability to blend commercial, military and political objectives seamlessly in cyberspace, and are more advanced than the U.S. in developing a dedicated cyber force. Their PLA Cyber Unit 61398 is well-known for its military operations -- which led the U.S. to indict five officers in 2014 for their attacks on private U.S. companies.

Overall, the U.S. and China in the military sphere are rather like an eagle and a dragon -- formidable in nature, different in ambition and bringing powerful but distinct tools to battle. The balance between them is difficult to define precisely, but within the East Asia region is on rough parity. Above all, we need to apply all the tools of diplomacy to ensure the two superpowers do not end up in a fight that would be to neither's advantage.

James Stavridis, a retired four-star U.S. Navy admiral, was the 16th supreme allied commander at NATO and spent over half of his career in the Pacific Fleet. He is dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-military-power-already-on-par-with-US-in-East-Asia

 

[randomradio]

Even though the U.S. defense budget of around $600 billion dwarfs China's estimated spending of perhaps $200 billion (exact figures are hard to obtain, although Beijing certainly has the second largest military budget in the world), the military balance is approximately equal in East Asia. China's $200 billion focused on regional security roughly equals the U.S. spending and presence in the Pacific. Importantly, Chinese military spending and operations are increasing, while the U.S.'s are largely static.

The US and Chinese budgets are roughly on par. I bet the Chinese spend more in East Asia than the US, but it's the Japanese and Australians who even the scales.

 

[Tshering22]

The US and Chinese budgets are roughly on par. I bet the Chinese spend more in East Asia than the US, but it's the Japanese and Australians who even the scales.

Australia is a defensive force. It has a modern military but is very small. Japanese have excellent technology but not the financial muscle at present to engage in any serious offensive conflict. At the most, they can act as pincer launch pads for US military in the event of a hypothetical war. Don't expect RAAF and JASDF fighter jets to be zooming in and out of Chinese territory unloading missiles and bombs.

Not happening.

Which is why The Quad is very impractical.

 

[randomradio]

Australia is a defensive force. It has a modern military but is very small. Japanese have excellent technology but not the financial muscle at present to engage in any serious offensive conflict. At the most, they can act as pincer launch pads for US military in the event of a hypothetical war. Don't expect RAAF and JASDF fighter jets to be zooming in and out of Chinese territory unloading missiles and bombs.

Not happening.

Which is why The Quad is very impractical.

You need alliances for presence. For example, the USN may dedicated 50 P-8s for surveillance in East Asia. The Chinese may end up with 70 aircraft. But the Australians and Japanese can add to the difference of 20 with their own assets. The Chinese have to deal with the US, Japan and Australia as a single group.

Japan's defence budget is 1% of the GDP. If the Chinese expenditure starts straining US resources, then the Japanese can easily increase their budget. But during wartime, it's obvious the US has to do all the heavy-lifting.

The Quad is not a military alliance, it's just a group with shared interests. The real alliance is between the US, Japan and Australia. Don't bring the Quad into the discussion, it will only end up with a flame war here.

 

[Tshering22]

You need alliances for presence. For example, the USN may dedicated 50 P-8s for surveillance in East Asia. The Chinese may end up with 70 aircraft. But the Australians and Japanese can add to the difference of 20 with their own assets. The Chinese have to deal with the US, Japan and Australia as a single group.

Nice example, but Chinese being at home turf, with more resources than Japan and Australia combined, can deploy a lot, lot more. I know you were showing that as an example but when push comes to shove, both Australia and Japan would move away. Working in non-combatant roles as a part of 20+ member fighting force is very different from fighting a major global power head on.

Quad is going towards a military alliance man. Japan and Australia are total military allies of US. We are the only ones who are a bit distant.

 

[randomradio]

Nice example, but Chinese being at home turf, with more resources than Japan and Australia combined, can deploy a lot, lot more. I know you were showing that as an example but when push comes to shove, both Australia and Japan would move away. Working in non-combatant roles as a part of 20+ member fighting force is very different from fighting a major global power head on.

Neither country can challenge China. But they can support the US in challenging China.

My point being the Chinese can outspend the US in East Asia and the US will need Japan and Australia to pool in their resources to balance China's spending.

Quad is going towards a military alliance man. Japan and Australia are total military allies of US. We are the only ones who are a bit distant.

That would make it a Tri instead of a Quad then.

 

[haidian]

The US and Chinese budgets are roughly on par. I bet the Chinese spend more in East Asia than the US, but it's the Japanese and Australians who even the scales.

Australia is negligilble and Japan has trouble dealing with Russia and North Korea, those two are more aggressive against Japan than China.

The most abysmal position in this region is where Japan lies, it has long standing territorial disputes with China ,Russia, North Korea and South Korea, Japan and Russia technically are still at war today, if US withdraws it leave Japan high and dry in this region.

 

[haidian]

By 2022, China’s Navy will outnumber the US and in the 2030s will achieve qualitative parity
May 18, 2017

China’s Navy will have a larger number of ships and submarines than the US Navy in 2030.

China’s navy will be approaching 500 ships by 2030 and the US Navy will have between 300 and 350 depending upon which budgets get adopted.

China’s navy will be a Blue-Water Naval Power by 2030: China is rapidly transforming itself from a continental power with a focus on its near seas to a great maritime power with a two-ocean focus. The PLAN is looking beyond the san hai – the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and East China Sea – and out toward the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

By 2020 China will have the second-largest modern amphibious capability in the world (after the United States), and potentially will be able to embark between 5,000–6,000 marines for operations anywhere in the world.

By 2020, the PLAN will surpass Britain, Russia, Japan, and India to become the second largest navy in the world. Some estimates suggest that it will homeport 265–273 major surface vessels and could surpass the U.S. Navy in number as early as 2022.

By 2030, many forecasts suggest that China will be quantitatively on par with the United States, while others suggest Beijing may even have a significantly larger naval order of battle than the United States.

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/...he-2030s-will-achieve-qualitative-parity.html

 

[PeaceGen]

Will China Have 7 Aircraft Carriers by 2025?
The PLA Navy’s upcoming Type 075 assault ships may deploy fighter jets to better contend pacific naval superiority.

By Abraham Ait
June 30, 2018

The 2012 commissioning of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and the subsequent expansion of the country’s carrier fleet, with three new warships currently in various stages of testing or construction, has been cause for great apprehension among its potential adversaries in Asia and the West. Borrowing heavily from the highly ambitious Soviet Kuznetsov and Ulyanovsk carrier programs initiated in the late 1980s, both of which were cut short by the country’s collapse, China is on schedule to have four carriers by 2025.

Not only is the PLAN’s fleet numerous, but its vessels are growing in both sophistication and size. While the carrier Liaoning, a better armed and modernized sister to the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, leaves much to be desired in its sophistication, state of the art technologies developed for future carriers will make them considerably more capable. These include electromagnetic launch systems (EMALS), facilitating the deployment of heavier and better armed fighters; carrier-based early warning aircraft, the development of which was completed in 2017; and dedicated carrier-based electronic attack jets, currently in the prototype stage. These assets, all fielded by the latest U.S. supercarrier USS Gerald Ford, are set to allow the PLAN’s future carriers to better contend with advanced rival warships fielded by Japan, the United States, and other potential adversaries in the Pacific. Combined with the rapid growth in the country’s destroyer fleet and the commissioning of a lethal new destroyer class, the Type 055, China’s ability to project power at sea and contest dominance of the contested and strategically vital South and East China Seas appears to be growing apace.

While the four ship strong PLAN carrier fleet planned for 2025 is already a daunting prospect for the United States and its Asian allies, there is a considerable chance that a lower profile defense program currently underway could see this number rise to seven. Alongside the development of three carrier warships, the Type 001, Type 002 and Type 003, Chinese shipbuilders have also begun the construction of three amphibious assault ships — 40,000 ton warships approximately the same size as the French carrier Charles De Gaulle. The warships are highly similar to the U.S. Navy’s America and Wasp class amphibious assault ships, almost identical in size and appearance. The example set by the American warships could well give some indications as to the PLA’s intentions for the Type 075 class’ future.

The U.S. Navy currently fields 20 aircraft carriers, 11 of which are 100,000 ton supercarriers and nine of which are amphibious assault ships – which the United States does not consider carriers, but which deploy fixed wing combat aircraft. While lacking the runways and arresting gear necessary to launch conventional carrier-based aircraft such as the F-18E or F-35C, specialized short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) capable aircraft, the Harrier Jump Jet and more recently the F-35B, have been developed to deploy from the decks of these assault ships, allowing them to effectively function as aircraft carriers — and highly capable ones at that. China’s Type 075 assault ships, all of which are expected to be in service by 2025, could well also deploy specialized aircraft by that time to allow them to function as carriers, thus bringing the size of the PLAN’s carrier fleet up to seven. Indeed, given the limited uses of a dedicated helicopter carrier with such a large deck, it is highly likely that the Type 075 class was designed with an aircraft carrier role in mind.

While the United States is currently the only producer of an STOVL aircraft, the F-35B, it is not the only country to have developed such technologies. The Soviet Union was in fact a pioneer of these technologies during the Cold War, and the country’s Cold War-era carrier fleet relied exclusively on vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft incorporating similar design concepts to STOVL. As part of the USSR’s ambitious carrier expansion plans of the late 1980s, the country had developed a highly sophisticated VTOL aircraft, the Yak-141, which would have been able to deploy from assault ships similar to the Wasp Class and Type 075. The program was ultimately cancelled following the USSR’s disintegration, but had reached a late development stage with four working prototypes.

Much as China did with a number of cancelled Soviet weapons programs in the 1990s, the country could well purchase the Yak-141’s technologies from Russia to very quickly develop its own VTOL or STOVL fighter. Combined with the state of the art military aviation technologies the PLA has recently developed, from stealth systems and AESA radars to some of the world’s foremost jet engines and air-to-air missiles, a Chinese derivative of the Yak-141 deployed from its three assault ships, which can carry up to 30 aircraft each, will be a formidable asset to the PLAN in the South and East China Seas. With a number of reports indicating that Russia is itself considering restarting the Yak-141 program, in light of its plans to construct four amphibious assault ships of its own, the PLAN could embark on a joint program to develop these aircraft or else purchase the fighters directly from Russia. The input of advanced Chinese technologies however would likely make for a more capable aircraft, and would be preferable for the PLAN.

With the U.S. Navy today increasingly stretched between several major fronts, and set to potentially escalate its involvement in the Middle East in light of growing tensions with Iran, matching a Chinese fleet of seven carrier warships, which could materialize in just seven years, will be a highly strenuous task. The PLAN will continue to retain a critical advantage in that it can focus its assets to the Asia-Pacific region, whereas the United States’ own carrier fleet, though many times larger, faces global commitments that restrict its ability to meet fast growing challenges to its primacy at sea in Asia.

With the Chinese defense budget growing by over 7 percent per year, almost in line with the country’s economic growth, the PLAN has room to induct more carriers, both assault ships and conventional larger vessels, after 2025. The U.S. Navy’s own carrier fleet, meanwhile, is unlikely to grow to much more than 20 warships, and matching the rapid growth in China’s capabilities in the Asia-Pacific will mean sacrificing commitments elsewhere. 2025 could well thus mark a considerable turning point in the Pacific balance of power, providing the U.S. Navy with the first real challenge to the dominance of its carrier strike groups in Asia since the sinking of the Imperial Japanese supercarrier Shinano in 1944.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/will-china-have-7-aircraft-carriers-by-2025/

great. not.
another huge waste of money into an arms-race that is going to get nobody anywhere they aren't already today.

NATO and the US have been clear about their interest to keep the South China Sea as international waters rather than China-controlled territory,
and we're not in the habit of letting our arms advantages be eroded significantly.

that means, to put it simply : whatever the Chinese build, the US and NATO are going to build decisive assets against those new Chinese capabilities.

 

[haidian]

great. not.
another huge waste of money into an arms-race that is going to get nobody anywhere they aren't already today.

NATO and the US have been clear about their interest to keep the South China Sea as international waters rather than China-controlled territory,
and we're not in the habit of letting our arms advantages be eroded significantly.

that means, to put it simply : whatever the Chinese build, the US and NATO are going to build decisive assets against those new Chinese capabilities.

It all boilds down who's going to have more economic strength and manufacturing capacity in the future.

 

[PeaceGen]

It all boilds down who's going to have more economic strength and manufacturing capacity in the future.

it's pointless for China to try to play catch-up in terms of military manufacturing capacity, for reasons i explained earlier.

 

[Götterdämmerung]

A NATO-troll posing as peacefan ... one couldn't be more oxymoronic. LOL

 

[Jlaw]

NATO troll is worried. But China's objective is to drive US out of East Asia. NATO troll is safe. You can sleep now.