Why the Indian Army handles stress better than all other armies

[Zarvan]

WISDOM & VALOUR - THE GENERAL'S VIEWS
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

A commentary on Indian society and the Indian Army's Regimentation; why this support system for soldiers is still the best

The trigger for this piece is a question from a Facebook friend, to whom I am most thankful. The question alluded to reasons why Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is so rampant in the US and indeed other Armies operating in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq and in the same light what is the experience of the Indian Army with PTSD in our operational areas. This is as good a question as any and why it never struck me to write on this earlier beats me. Perhaps I am just presumptuous and I take our Army for granted just as so many others among my countrymen do. A saving grace is that in 2011 while in command of 15 Corps in Kashmir I instituted a study to examine stress levels in my Corps which undoubtedly has the highest level of operational engagements anywhere in the Army. 7000 officers and men were given an instrument by my outstanding medical staff, whose contributions remain a little unsung in the world of machismo and a bit of 'ramboism'. The reason for this was the run of suicides we were hit with. The study did help the Army’s outstanding doctors to arrive at various reasons for suicides but that is not the subject of this essay although I do not wish to underplay the findings. The study helped me as an individual to arrive at my own reasons for the levels of stress or lack of it in operational areas all over the Army's vast deployment.

Let me describe three scenarios from my own operational experience. The first is from Op Pawan, the IPKF's long drawn deployment in India’s first out of area operation (OOAP). The second is from the LoC where I take the case of a unit deployed in a mode to ensure the sanctity of the LoC (which essentially means, no change to its current status, which in turn means that not an inch of the territory in our control should change ownership) and prevent any infiltration of terrorists from Azad Kashmir. And, the third is of an RR unit deployed in depth but close to a forested area with population centres nearby in Kashmir. These are classic examples of the way Infantry and some other Arms function in operational areas.



After the blood and gore of the intense phase of operations in the Jaffna Peninsula in Oct-Jan 1987 the IPKF settled to more routine counter insurgency (CI) operations. There was really nothing routine about them because the LTTE's well-trained cadres fought almost like regulars and less like militants. Units were deployed in company groups at operating bases (COBs) with an area of responsibility. The LTTE could muster as many as 100-200 men at a given point and if ambushed could actually conduct counter ambush drills to break the ambush, quite unlike militants. Their own ambushes were well sited, in large numbers and almost always accompanied by IEDs. Patrols which went out could not let down their guard even within hundred meters from the gate of their posts. Units which remained inside posts without dominating their periphery suffered because the approaches were mined by daring young tigers that crept up as close as ten meters from posts. Trees were booby trapped as were bushes. On the coastline near the town of Mullaitivu an attempt to occupy posts with 20 men or so met with response from 50 or more militants, leading to the Army suffering heavy casualties. Leave parties left and arrived once in three weeks when the road was opened and there was no certainty about reaching destinations without an engagement. As a company commander, if I went on an operation with two platoons I always remained worried about the state of security at my COB where only 20 men were left. Equally when I was at the COB I was always ready to rush for reinforcement of any other company or my own men out on operations. So what can be expected in such an environment except a severe state of tension especially since failure meant loss of quite a few lives. The Indian Army takes casualties with much concern and a high loss of lives without commensurate infliction of higher losses on the adversary is hugely frowned upon, leading to even accusations of inaction and cowardice on part of officers. An entry such as this in your CR means the end of career.



The LoC deployment is in posts and picquets and in some places can be as low as eight men. In the Uri sector is a high altitude area of height 14000 feet and more where snow levels top 35 feet and the area of approximately a company plus (functionally 120 men) is cut off for six months. Extremely difficult evacuation of sick soldiers or casualties by helicopter is possible only with severe risk. The evacuation of small posts to reach the mother post before heavy snow sets in is always fraught with danger and is a unit commander’s nightmare. That leaves routes open which terrorists could sneak through with risk only terrorists can take. Every year a few frozen bodies of dead terrorists are found. In summer, isolated posts can be attacked by Pakistan regulars mixed with terrorists (BAT teams). So can our logistics parties which carry out advance winter stocking for almost six months and move on predictable routes every day, be ambushed en route by shallow raiding Pakistan elements. By day it is essential to carry out snow clearance in winter. In summer there is the challenge of carrying water from sources which keep receding to a far distance (there is no system of bottled water in the Army). Then comes night and four to six man ambushes have to be deployed along the LoC fence from last light to well after first light. To ensure the right density a major part of the sub unit remains deployed along the LoC Fence and the remaining personnel ensure the security of the post.

A brief description of the functioning of RR units on the CT grid is outlined. Every RR unit has its peculiar area of operations. The threat is of standoff fire by terrorists or sneak attacks on posts and not large scale attacks of the LTTE kind. In today’s environment the RR unit’s source of tension is more from bandhs and stone throwing mobs which target their vehicles or patrols. Quick thinking independent decisions are required from junior leaders keeping propriety in mind and degree of response. Small vehicle convoys have been targeted by mobs leaving soldiers in quandary over the need to fire or not to save themselves and Government property. The pressure for results in urban areas and nearby forests is ever present and unit commanders drive their troops to ensure domination and control, gain intelligence and execute innovative operations while seeking contact. I would classify tension here as high but lower than the LoC where threat to life and possibility of adverse contact is far higher.

The tour of duty for Indian soldiers is usually two to three years; that of troops of western armies is six months. Despite terrain constraints the western armies depend far more on helicopter support for logistics and even for bail outs in adverse tactical situations; not so in the Indian Army except for casualty evacuation. The Indian soldier as much as the western one does not fear for his life, but prevailing uncertainty and lack of rest are two major factors for stress. Climatic conditions in high altitude areas can be a major source of tension and if soldiers fear anything it is the effects of climate. Avalanches top the list. In Sri Lanka where operational conditions were far more life threatening I used to look into the eyes of my soldiers and draw solace from that; hardly ever did I find fear writ on their faces. If there was it was due to the possibility of being isolated or detached from the subunit. The necessity of buddy contact was essential. One does not fear for life but of being detached from the subunit or being taken prisoner. What is remarkable is the complete lack of emotions to losses of even close buddies in operations. Our soldiers take the disorder of battle extremely well as well as deprivation of comforts. I always emphasized on the need for ‘sleep/rest management’ of the soldiers because that is an area which is usually neglected by the leadership. Soldiers cannot be expected to function 24x7 but the demands of their responsibility expect exactly that. On the LoC night and day is the same in terms of alert.

There are cases of suicides but hardly ever is this work related. The availability of the mobile phone acts as the biggest threat. In the tense environment of the LoC or RR related operations bad news from home can act as a trigger. In many such instances it is young soldiers unable to bear the additional tension of problems at home; problems as seemingly irrelevant as a newlywed wife unable to get along with the mother in law. Sitting far away on a remote post the immediate world around the soldier may be perceived by him to be within his control but not the world around his home where the problems affect him much more. In his post or on patrol he can still share his immediate concern about safety with his buddy or his superior but sharing home based problems is a greater challenge. Marital problems are one dimension, property problems in rural areas and absence at crucial moments when something legal is involved can be extremely stressful. While leave policy of units is always liberal and the government has sanctioned two free trips home with other trips at concessional rates it is a question of timing. Everyone cannot be away from duty at harvest time or during festivals and that is a problem which the units minimize through whatever they can do to compensate.

The experience of western armies has been the inability of returning soldiers to merge in society; that is a form of PTSD or an effect. Loss of partners while they were away, inability to concentrate on jobs, fits of anger and regret due to unpalatable actions in dealing with aliens and innocents in way off lands, etc; all add to the terrible isolation that individual citizens feel in developed societies. That is the saving grace of Indian society where despite prickly problems of farmer suicides or rural poverty there is family and societal support for those who are away serving the nation. It may all disappear in due course and the mishandling of OROP may very well contribute to the soldier’s dwindling confidence in the support system which Indian society and family system continues to provide.

More than anything else the psychological well-being of soldiers is contingent upon the efficient functioning of the Regimental system of the Indian Army. To a visiting DG of a CAPF I strongly recommended a day be spent with an RR unit. This was in response to his query as to what makes an RR unit tick and achieve so much. He was kind to take my advice, spent a day at Baramula and then rang me up to say that he had got the answer. Bonding of the cap badge and the lanyard has been taken by the Indian Army to such a high level that camaraderie is natural; a soldier’s problems, from womb to tomb (notwithstanding stray cases of neglect of widows reported once in a while) are the unit’s problems. There has been much talk of diluting the Regimental system; the British could not help it and had to compromise with theirs due to downsizing. They taught us what Regimentation means; today the Indian Army can teach them a few lessons in psychological strengthening of soldiers through the Regimental system.

It is not all rosy. Society is changing very rapidly in India. The haloed identity of the soldier is being hugely compromised by the needless rancor over OROP which the government should consider a sensible investment in the social stability of the armed forces. The unfortunate thing in India is that decision makers have very little idea about the profession of arms, perceiving it to be a contractual profession; the soldier's functioning is as yet not contractual but with the complete lack of understanding in a fast changing society all that differentiates the Indian Army from western armies may well collapse. That will be a sad day indeed and a rebirth for Indian military sociology.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain's Blog : Why the Indian Army handles stress better than all other armies
@Horus @nair @MilSpec @GURU DUTT @third eye

 

[ChiefAssasin]

Thank you for this post. It is such a refreshing read. This issue has come across many a times in my mind and has made me wonder as to why westerners have PTSD compared to the rest of the world. may be over dependance on technology and a underestimation of oneself to sort one's problem combined with the urge to hire a psychologist for even the silliest of reasons. The problems that these westerners feel like a worldly burden are handled with ease by us south asians (Atleast 90%+ if not 99%).

 

[Zarvan]

SOS. Army is Seeing More Suicides.


(Nitin Gokhale is a well-known defence and strategic affairs analyst, author and media trainer.)

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has hit the ground running.

Even as he attempts to bring speed and transparency to the arms procurement process, he has rightly identified the welfare of troops as one of his top most priorities. Over the weekend, he told reporters in Goa that in his view "the man behind the machine is more important". He was perhaps responding to recent reports that there have been 449 suicides across the three services since 2011. "This is a man management issue which needs to be resolved in different ways, including counselling, quick redressal mechanism and more tribunals to hear the cases," the Defence Minister reportedly said.

Last week, Parrikar shared these details with parliament: that the Indian Army had reported the highest number - 362 suicides and 10 incidents of fratricide - between 2011 and 2014. In the Air Force, there were 76 suicides and in the Navy 11, in the same period. Taken collectively, these numbers do appear large but they are in keeping with the average number of suicides over the past decade. Except for 2007 and 2008 when suicides in the Army were 142 and 150 respectively, on an average, about 100 jawans have taken their own life every year since 2003.

Given that India has an 11-lakh strong army, these numbers may not be huge but for a force that prides itself on its standards of training and discipline, it is certainly a matter of concern, if not alarm. One can also point out the fact that of late, in the American army, the rate of suicide was one-a-day. That's hardly a consolation.

So is the Indian Army feeling the heat of being in perpetual operations? Are our soldiers' stress levels peaking dangerously?

If you ask the top brass, most tend to brush aside the incidents as aberrations.

But there is indeed a problem, and it is an outcome of a combination of factors: erosion in the status of soldiers in society, prolonged deployment in lengthy and thankless counter-insurgency jobs, a crippling shortage of officers' in combat units and, ironically, easier communication between families and soldiers - which makes it harder to be away from home for long stretches since soldiers now know exactly what they're missing.

There is no denying the fact that come summer, winter or rain, soldiers continue their daily patrols along the Line of Control in Kashmir. Every day and night, at least 1,000 foot patrols spread out in Jammu and Kashmir to try and corner terrorists. The job is risky and can even get monotonous. A bullet can come from anywhere any time. So one has to always be alert. But the chase is mostly futile. Nine out of ten times, the patrols return empty-handed.

After a quarter century of counter-terrorism in Kashmir, the army has got used to the apparent hardship of uninterrupted operations. The fear of the enemy is nominal, claims each man that I have talked to. "We have no tension in this respect (counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency), we had joined the army precisely for this kind of work," is the constant refrain from soldiers.

Operating in a tension-ridden counter-insurgency environment does lead to certain stress among the jawans, but that is only one of the factors.

The main worry are the problems back home - land disputes, tensions within the family; then there's rising aspirations, a lack of good pay and allowances, and also the falling standards of supervision from officers.

Company commanders who lead field units in counter-insurgency situations also believe that tensions at home transmit themselves much quicker today thanks to the ubiquitous mobile phone.

Since almost 80 per cent of India's foot soldiers come from rural and semi-urban areas, most of them have strong links with the land. For the ordinary soldier, the smallest patch of land back home is the most precious property. Very often land gets encroached in his native village, or there is a dispute over even the smallest of property. "There is always a tension. The police don't listen to us. My parents feel helpless, I become tense every time I go back home," I remember a soldier telling me in the Kashmir Valley.

One more common thread among soldiers from Rajasthan to UP, from Tamil Nadu to Haryana, was how little respect they seem to command today in a society which devalues their work. Very often, insensitive civil administrations create tensions.

Senior officers point out that most suicide and fratricide cases take place after soldiers return from a spot of leave. The feeling of frustration can bring in helplessness, which in turn leads to suicides and fratricide; it creates an impression that no one listens to the army. It is the system that sends the man in uniform into a depression.

An acute shortage of officers at the cutting-edge level is a big factor contributing to an increasing gap between soldiers and officers. Against an authorised strength of over 22 officers for a combat battalion, there are at best 8 or 9 officers available to a Commanding Officer these days.

Very often, young officers with less than two years of service are commanding companies! Even in the battalion headquarters, one officer ends up doing the job of three, given the shortage. There is no time to interact with soldiers. In the old days, a game of football or hockey was the best way to get to know each other. Not any longer.

Moreover, soldiers no longer accept a wrong or unjustified command blindly. The old attitudes among some of the COs (Commanding Officers), of lording over ORs (Other Ranks) and expecting them not to protest/revolt must change.

If Manohar Parrikar is serious about the welfare of troops, he needs to start with sensitising the civil administration at the lowest level. Fresh recruits into the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) need to be oriented about the issues soldiers often face in the civil environment. He also needs to direct the Defence Ministry to withdraw litigation initiated against our disabled soldiers related to the subject of their benefits at the earliest, and ensure that officers serving in the Ministry of Defence in general, and Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare in particular, are sensitized towards the needs and requirements of the military community and realize that it is their first obligation to serve soldiers, veterans and their families with due respect and dignity which they deserve.

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Story First Published: December 02, 2014 01:30 IST

SOS. Army is Seeing More Suicides.

 

[third eye]

The breakup of the joint family, property issues & higher expectations from life in general are among the main culprits for stress to a soldier.

The bonding within units is very very strong and so is the affinity to the ' Izzat' of the unit / sub unit. These act as pillars to prop up a soldier.

The only place it does not help is when a phone call comes from home.

By & large the systems within the IA are time tested & have evolved over decades, all in all a good system.

PTSD is ofen seen as a western mans ailment.