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Why Pakistan needs to revisit its Afghan policy & how?
Global Village Space
Jan Achakzai |
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are continuously on a downward trajectory and this by extension is affecting Pakistan’s relations with the US. The US has a huge interest in Afghanistan so our Afghan policy has a direct impact on Pak-US bilateral relations.
In addition, security issues are so humungous and so complex that these negative triangular relations have created huge challenges for Pakistan.
At the moment, there seems to be no major bilateral exchanges between Pakistan and Afghanistan except some limited interactions with UNHCR on Afghan refugees issues or some communications on border management, the kind of ones that took place after the recent terrorist attacks in Lahore and Sehwan Sharif.
No engagement of the civilians and military brass with the Kabul government suggests as if Islamabad is waiting for Kabul to come forth or for Washington to push Kabul to reach out to Islamabad.
Unfortunately, the unwise narrative of the Kabul government by putting all blame on Pakistan has foreclosed all doors for cooperation. We are not discussing here who is responsible for the current undesirable situation or what but to seek a way forward.
Read more: How terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan are posing threat to Pakistan’s viability?
Where are we? How to improvise the variables of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
But first things first: the premise here is how to arrest the downward spiral in relations with the US and by extension with the Kabul government and create a leverage to advance national interests.
At the moment, there seem to be no major bilateral exchanges between Pakistan and Afghanistan except some interactions with UNHCR on Afghan refugees issue.
Some specific actions by Pakistan, as seen in the recent past, against some Taliban leaders as reported in the media involving arrest of some individuals are not enough to improve talking points of the US or Pakistan. While more arrests if followed will create traction in Washington; the cycle of arrest and immediate release will not convince the US and thus will not help Pakistan gain political mileage.
The US has made huge investments in Afghanistan. It should be kept in view that our narrative and actions should be consistent.
If Pakistan fears of any eventual tactical alliance of the Haqqani’s with the anti-Pakistan TTP, (which cannot be ruled out, given that all groups we targeted since 9/11 were then penetrated by Indian agencies) then we should put this openly on the table with the US and talk through all contingencies candidly.
The United States have huge ways of monitoring: communications intercept, eve droppings on camps and locations as they have made huge ingress in the country. There is no chance for the revival of the Quadrilateral forum unless either there is a movement on bilateral, observable changes, transitional steps or possible shift. Continuation on the existing route is not in any body’s interest. Isolation is real: keeping the status quo is unacceptable as bilateral relations gets worse between the three countries. Since Kabul government takes a cue from the US, it makes very pragmatic sense for Pakistan to address the US concerns in the first place.
It is the time we revisit our Afghan policy and assess underlying principles and its pragmatic underpinnings.
What are our Broad objectives?
Our broad objectives in the mid-term should be:
1) Unravel Afghan-Indian coalition,
2) Facilitate Chinese leverage on Kabul,
3) Avoid escalation of hostilities between the Kabul Government and the Taliban,
4) Portray Pakistan as responsible mature power in Afghanistan,
5) Increase equities with the US and China that Pakistan is an honest broker in Afghanistan,
6) Achieve the last goal by a push for peace negotiations,
7) Prevent Afghan fragile state’s melt-down so the sovereign voids along Pak-Afghan borders is averted in the long run, and
8) Convince the Afghans why CPEC is a game changer for Kabul too.
We need to ponder on some issues here and come out with adjustments:
How to manage the Haqqanis?
Pakistan needs to assess how we can preserve our ties with the Haqqanis and the Taliban (If we are still convinced that it is needed and that its cost-benefit analysis supports our policy of treating the Haqqanis as “insurance” policy-as commonly believed).
read full story: Why Pakistan needs to revisit its Afghan policy & how?
Global Village Space
Jan Achakzai |
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are continuously on a downward trajectory and this by extension is affecting Pakistan’s relations with the US. The US has a huge interest in Afghanistan so our Afghan policy has a direct impact on Pak-US bilateral relations.
In addition, security issues are so humungous and so complex that these negative triangular relations have created huge challenges for Pakistan.
At the moment, there seems to be no major bilateral exchanges between Pakistan and Afghanistan except some limited interactions with UNHCR on Afghan refugees issues or some communications on border management, the kind of ones that took place after the recent terrorist attacks in Lahore and Sehwan Sharif.
No engagement of the civilians and military brass with the Kabul government suggests as if Islamabad is waiting for Kabul to come forth or for Washington to push Kabul to reach out to Islamabad.
Unfortunately, the unwise narrative of the Kabul government by putting all blame on Pakistan has foreclosed all doors for cooperation. We are not discussing here who is responsible for the current undesirable situation or what but to seek a way forward.
Read more: How terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan are posing threat to Pakistan’s viability?
Where are we? How to improvise the variables of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
But first things first: the premise here is how to arrest the downward spiral in relations with the US and by extension with the Kabul government and create a leverage to advance national interests.
At the moment, there seem to be no major bilateral exchanges between Pakistan and Afghanistan except some interactions with UNHCR on Afghan refugees issue.
Some specific actions by Pakistan, as seen in the recent past, against some Taliban leaders as reported in the media involving arrest of some individuals are not enough to improve talking points of the US or Pakistan. While more arrests if followed will create traction in Washington; the cycle of arrest and immediate release will not convince the US and thus will not help Pakistan gain political mileage.
The US has made huge investments in Afghanistan. It should be kept in view that our narrative and actions should be consistent.
If Pakistan fears of any eventual tactical alliance of the Haqqani’s with the anti-Pakistan TTP, (which cannot be ruled out, given that all groups we targeted since 9/11 were then penetrated by Indian agencies) then we should put this openly on the table with the US and talk through all contingencies candidly.
The United States have huge ways of monitoring: communications intercept, eve droppings on camps and locations as they have made huge ingress in the country. There is no chance for the revival of the Quadrilateral forum unless either there is a movement on bilateral, observable changes, transitional steps or possible shift. Continuation on the existing route is not in any body’s interest. Isolation is real: keeping the status quo is unacceptable as bilateral relations gets worse between the three countries. Since Kabul government takes a cue from the US, it makes very pragmatic sense for Pakistan to address the US concerns in the first place.
It is the time we revisit our Afghan policy and assess underlying principles and its pragmatic underpinnings.
What are our Broad objectives?
Our broad objectives in the mid-term should be:
1) Unravel Afghan-Indian coalition,
2) Facilitate Chinese leverage on Kabul,
3) Avoid escalation of hostilities between the Kabul Government and the Taliban,
4) Portray Pakistan as responsible mature power in Afghanistan,
5) Increase equities with the US and China that Pakistan is an honest broker in Afghanistan,
6) Achieve the last goal by a push for peace negotiations,
7) Prevent Afghan fragile state’s melt-down so the sovereign voids along Pak-Afghan borders is averted in the long run, and
8) Convince the Afghans why CPEC is a game changer for Kabul too.
We need to ponder on some issues here and come out with adjustments:
How to manage the Haqqanis?
Pakistan needs to assess how we can preserve our ties with the Haqqanis and the Taliban (If we are still convinced that it is needed and that its cost-benefit analysis supports our policy of treating the Haqqanis as “insurance” policy-as commonly believed).
read full story: Why Pakistan needs to revisit its Afghan policy & how?
