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ISLAMABAD, Pakistan When American and Pakistani agents captured Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Talibans operational commander, in the chaotic port city of Karachi last January, both countries hailed the arrest as a breakthrough in their often difficult partnership in fighting terrorism.
But the arrest of Mr. Baradar, the second-ranking Taliban leader after Mullah Muhammad Omar, came with a beguiling twist: both American and Pakistani officials claimed that Mr. Baradars capture had been a lucky break. It was only days later, the officials said, that they finally figured out who they had.
Now, seven months later, Pakistani officials are telling a very different story. They say they set out to capture Mr. Baradar, and used the C.I.A. to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Mr. Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan, the Talibans longtime backer.
In the weeks after Mr. Baradars capture, Pakistani security officials detained as many as 23 Taliban leaders, many of whom had been enjoying the protection of the Pakistani government for years. The talks came to an end.
The events surrounding Mr. Baradars arrest have been the subject of debate inside military and intelligence circles for months. Some details are still murky and others vigorously denied by some American intelligence officials in Washington. But the account offered in Islamabad highlights Pakistans policy in Afghanistan: retaining decisive influence over the Taliban, thwarting archenemy India, and putting Pakistan in a position to shape Afghanistans postwar political order.
We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us, said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.
Read the rest on New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23taliban.html?ref=global-home
But the arrest of Mr. Baradar, the second-ranking Taliban leader after Mullah Muhammad Omar, came with a beguiling twist: both American and Pakistani officials claimed that Mr. Baradars capture had been a lucky break. It was only days later, the officials said, that they finally figured out who they had.
Now, seven months later, Pakistani officials are telling a very different story. They say they set out to capture Mr. Baradar, and used the C.I.A. to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Mr. Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan, the Talibans longtime backer.
In the weeks after Mr. Baradars capture, Pakistani security officials detained as many as 23 Taliban leaders, many of whom had been enjoying the protection of the Pakistani government for years. The talks came to an end.
The events surrounding Mr. Baradars arrest have been the subject of debate inside military and intelligence circles for months. Some details are still murky and others vigorously denied by some American intelligence officials in Washington. But the account offered in Islamabad highlights Pakistans policy in Afghanistan: retaining decisive influence over the Taliban, thwarting archenemy India, and putting Pakistan in a position to shape Afghanistans postwar political order.
We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us, said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.
Read the rest on New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23taliban.html?ref=global-home
.In any case; I see no strategic implications from this.The work that needs to be done is being done.
