Kiss_of_the_Dragon
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Why air power was not used in 1962
- Thread starter Hindustani78
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SingaporeGuy
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India uses airpower in 1962? Only more losses
Hindustani78
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Wang, head of the Institute of South and Central Asia, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, wrote in the piece titled “Expert: no winner in armed conflicts”.
Wang said Indians should not misjudge “India’s strength and China’s bottom line, otherwise it will shoot itself in the foot”.
He referred to the brief conflict between Chinese and Indian forces near Nathu La in the Sikkim sector in 1967.
“With the conflict at Nathula and Daggi in September and October 1967 respectively reaching a peak, when the Indian side assigned its No 112 mountain infantry brigade and No 17 artillery brigade to attack Chinese troops stationed at Nathula mountain pass on the China-Sikkim border. In self-defense, Chinese troops launched two destructive counterattacks against the Indian side,” Wang wrote.
However, it is widely accepted that Indian troops gave the Chinese a bloody nose in the clashes of 1967, killing some 300 to 400 Chinese soldiers while losing about 80 soldiers.
Wang also referenced the 1962 border conflict that ended in defeat for India, and said Indian border troops had continued to “provoke” the Chinese military after the war. He contended that China had not wanted to fight in the 1962 war, which he described as the “counterattack in self-defence”.
He wrote that “after the 1962 Counterattack in Self-Defence on China-India, Indian troops made many provocations to Chinese border troops in Yatung (a frontier county situated in the mouth of the Chumbi valley near the China-India border) and Nathula (a mountain pass in the Himalayas which connects the Indian state of Sikkim with China’s Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous Region) in 1965-1967”.
Wang said Indians should not misjudge “India’s strength and China’s bottom line, otherwise it will shoot itself in the foot”.
He referred to the brief conflict between Chinese and Indian forces near Nathu La in the Sikkim sector in 1967.
“With the conflict at Nathula and Daggi in September and October 1967 respectively reaching a peak, when the Indian side assigned its No 112 mountain infantry brigade and No 17 artillery brigade to attack Chinese troops stationed at Nathula mountain pass on the China-Sikkim border. In self-defense, Chinese troops launched two destructive counterattacks against the Indian side,” Wang wrote.
However, it is widely accepted that Indian troops gave the Chinese a bloody nose in the clashes of 1967, killing some 300 to 400 Chinese soldiers while losing about 80 soldiers.
Wang also referenced the 1962 border conflict that ended in defeat for India, and said Indian border troops had continued to “provoke” the Chinese military after the war. He contended that China had not wanted to fight in the 1962 war, which he described as the “counterattack in self-defence”.
He wrote that “after the 1962 Counterattack in Self-Defence on China-India, Indian troops made many provocations to Chinese border troops in Yatung (a frontier county situated in the mouth of the Chumbi valley near the China-India border) and Nathula (a mountain pass in the Himalayas which connects the Indian state of Sikkim with China’s Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous Region) in 1965-1967”.
ohmrlobalobayeh
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Rifleman Jaswant Singh of 4 Garhwal Rifles held off a massive Chinese attack in the battle of Nauranang before being killed in November 1962.
india Updated: Jul 03, 2017 11:25 IST
Arvind Moudgil and Anupam Trivedi
Pauri Garhwal /Dehradun
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india...kra-for-him/story-vgNa4ZP6i2mePof1OrCE2H.html
=
PLA soldiers =
More Bharatiya bullshit propaganda- nothing more
Last edited:
Hindustani78
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NEW DELHI , September 09, 2017 23:52 IST
Updated: September 09, 2017 23:57 IST
http://www.thehindu.com/news/intern...ow-to-india/article19652999.ece?homepage=true
Mushroom cloud from China’s first test of an atomic bomb on October 16, 1964.
K. R. Narayanan, as China Division head, warned that the test, coming after 1962 war, would further weaken India’s position on border claims
Beijing believed that it had delivered a “head-on blow” and sent shock waves through India after its first-ever nuclear test conducted on October 16, 1964 — two years after the border war fought by the two countries.
A cable sent from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to Beijing at the end of October 1964 said the “success” of its nuclear test had led Prime Minister Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to get various countries to “censure” China, but they refused to go along with him.
India, the cable said, was engaged in an internal debate on how to respond to China’s nuclear test.
“The current issue for India is not whether it should produce nuclear weapons but whether it can do so,” the communication said, concluding that Delhi would actively strive to do this to enhance its international status. The cable is available at the Wilson Centre’s Digital Archive.
Countering U.S. presence
The Chinese also believed that the United States was engaged in exerting its influence on a weak India after the 1962 war.
“But now the United States wants to control India and manage its relationship with Pakistan at the same time, thus it is unwilling to help India manufacture atomic bombs.”
The Embassy also believed that China’s newly acquired nuclear status would also enhance the chances of regaining its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council from Taiwan, clearly linking the two. “As we [China] now had a bigger chance of regaining our place in the United Nations, India is hoping to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with Soviet support,” the cable added.
In the Indian assessment, the Chinese nuclear explosion would “alter the political balance in Asia and disturb profoundly the status quo in the world”.
As Director of the China Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, K.R. Narayanan, who went on to become President of India, linked the Chinese nuclear test with India’s options relating to the border dispute.
“But even in the immediate future India cannot ignore the bomb…as one of the factors affecting the power balance between China and India and the rest of Asia. Peking’s bomb is not a tactical weapon, but a strategic instrument,” Mr. Narayanan’s secret memo, circulated after internal discussions in the Ministry, said.
“If the recovery of Aksai Chin and the settlement of the border question through resort to arms was inconceivable hitherto it would be more so in the future,” Mr. Narayanan believed, adding that India would also have fewer military and diplomatic options after the Chinese nuclear test.
Arguing that China had now secured the breakthrough to “big power” status, the memo felt the real question for India was a long-term one —how India and China would be in 25-50 years if they followed different policies with regard to the use of nuclear energy.
Mr. Narayanan felt the Chinese had attacked in 1962 because they wanted to damage India’s influence in the Asian-African world and “expedite the process of polarisation” in India’s domestic politics. “The ideological bitterness which the Chinese evinced against Jawaharlal Nehru sprang from a realisation that it was his policies of non-alignment and socialism which stood as a border against the Communist dream of a violent revolution in India.”
Build the bomb
In Mr. Narayanan’s view, diplomacy could only embroider on the fact of power but not act as a substitute for it. “Therefore, whatever policy we may choose to follow, it seems that without a nuclear bomb of our own, India cannot answer the challenge posed by China.”
He argued that India acquiring the bomb might make Chinese leaders sit up and reconcile with Delhi just like the U.S. and other nuclear powers were coming to grips with the reality of China. According to the memo, China’s ultimate aim was to drive the U.S. out of Asia and “establish herself” as a nuclear power equal to the U.S. and the USSR. A second nuclear test conducted by the Chinese in May 1965 drew great praise from over 100 Pakistani officials gathered for a reception hosted by the Chinese embassy in Karachi.
************
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
April 1965 – September 23, 1965
Updated: September 09, 2017 23:57 IST
http://www.thehindu.com/news/intern...ow-to-india/article19652999.ece?homepage=true
Mushroom cloud from China’s first test of an atomic bomb on October 16, 1964.
K. R. Narayanan, as China Division head, warned that the test, coming after 1962 war, would further weaken India’s position on border claims
Beijing believed that it had delivered a “head-on blow” and sent shock waves through India after its first-ever nuclear test conducted on October 16, 1964 — two years after the border war fought by the two countries.
A cable sent from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to Beijing at the end of October 1964 said the “success” of its nuclear test had led Prime Minister Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to get various countries to “censure” China, but they refused to go along with him.
India, the cable said, was engaged in an internal debate on how to respond to China’s nuclear test.
“The current issue for India is not whether it should produce nuclear weapons but whether it can do so,” the communication said, concluding that Delhi would actively strive to do this to enhance its international status. The cable is available at the Wilson Centre’s Digital Archive.
Countering U.S. presence
The Chinese also believed that the United States was engaged in exerting its influence on a weak India after the 1962 war.
“But now the United States wants to control India and manage its relationship with Pakistan at the same time, thus it is unwilling to help India manufacture atomic bombs.”
The Embassy also believed that China’s newly acquired nuclear status would also enhance the chances of regaining its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council from Taiwan, clearly linking the two. “As we [China] now had a bigger chance of regaining our place in the United Nations, India is hoping to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with Soviet support,” the cable added.
In the Indian assessment, the Chinese nuclear explosion would “alter the political balance in Asia and disturb profoundly the status quo in the world”.
As Director of the China Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, K.R. Narayanan, who went on to become President of India, linked the Chinese nuclear test with India’s options relating to the border dispute.
“But even in the immediate future India cannot ignore the bomb…as one of the factors affecting the power balance between China and India and the rest of Asia. Peking’s bomb is not a tactical weapon, but a strategic instrument,” Mr. Narayanan’s secret memo, circulated after internal discussions in the Ministry, said.
“If the recovery of Aksai Chin and the settlement of the border question through resort to arms was inconceivable hitherto it would be more so in the future,” Mr. Narayanan believed, adding that India would also have fewer military and diplomatic options after the Chinese nuclear test.
Arguing that China had now secured the breakthrough to “big power” status, the memo felt the real question for India was a long-term one —how India and China would be in 25-50 years if they followed different policies with regard to the use of nuclear energy.
Mr. Narayanan felt the Chinese had attacked in 1962 because they wanted to damage India’s influence in the Asian-African world and “expedite the process of polarisation” in India’s domestic politics. “The ideological bitterness which the Chinese evinced against Jawaharlal Nehru sprang from a realisation that it was his policies of non-alignment and socialism which stood as a border against the Communist dream of a violent revolution in India.”
Build the bomb
In Mr. Narayanan’s view, diplomacy could only embroider on the fact of power but not act as a substitute for it. “Therefore, whatever policy we may choose to follow, it seems that without a nuclear bomb of our own, India cannot answer the challenge posed by China.”
He argued that India acquiring the bomb might make Chinese leaders sit up and reconcile with Delhi just like the U.S. and other nuclear powers were coming to grips with the reality of China. According to the memo, China’s ultimate aim was to drive the U.S. out of Asia and “establish herself” as a nuclear power equal to the U.S. and the USSR. A second nuclear test conducted by the Chinese in May 1965 drew great praise from over 100 Pakistani officials gathered for a reception hosted by the Chinese embassy in Karachi.
************
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
April 1965 – September 23, 1965
Hindustani78
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//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/61141699.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
IANS|
Updated: Oct 19, 2017, 01.00 PM IST
China began planning the war as early as 1959 and proposes that it was merely a small move in the larger strategic game that China was playing to become a world player. Following is an exclusive extract from "China's India War")
It was entirely unexpected that the Chinese would attack. The Indians had observed a massive build-up across the border and there had been several encounters between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA in the days before the main attack, including bombardment of Dhola and Khenzemane on October 19, 1962. But the ferocity and the sheer coordination of the Chinese attacks on October 20, 1962, and the days that followed stunned the Indian security establishment as well as international observers.At day-break on that day, artillery guns and mortars began intense bombardments across the Thagla Ridge.
According to Brigadier John Dalvi: At exactly 5 on the morning of 20th October 1962, the Chinese Opposite Bridge III fired two Verey lights. This signal was followed by a cannonade of over 150 guns and heavy mortars, exposed on the forward slopes of Thagla... this was a moment of truth. Thagla Ridge was no longer, at that moment, a piece of ground. It was the crucible to test, weigh and purify India's foreign defence policies.
Dalvi called it "The Day of Reckoning — 20th October 1962". The all-out assault on Indian positions north of Tawang was on.
On the western front in Aksai Chin, the fighting was spread out over a swathe of land from north to south, covering a distance of approximately 600 kilometres. But the thrust of the Chinese towards the south was confined to a relatively narrow area, which measured approximately 20 kilometres from west to east. Most of the attacks by the PLA seemed to be confined to dislodging Indian troops from the outposts that had been established as a result of the government's Forward Policy rather than for capturing territory. According to Indian military analysts, "In the Western sector, [the] Chinese had a limited aim. They were already in occupation of most of the Aksai Chin plateau through which they had constructed the Western Highway connecting Tibet and Xinjiang. In this war, their aim was to remove the Indian posts which they perceived were across their 1960 Claim Line."
They had no intention to move forward deep into Indian territory, as they did in NEFA (The North-East Frontier Agency).
The Aksai Chin plateau was and still is virtually unpopulated; this had made it possible for the Chinese to build their highway there in the mid-1950s without the Indians finding out about it until a year after it had been completed. The name Aksai Chin means "the desert of white stones", and the altitude varies between 4,300 and 6,900 metres above sea level.
During the weeks of fighting in this western sector of the theatre of the 1962 War, it became obvious that the Chinese knew exactly where the Indians were, how many there were at each position, and what kind of weaponry they had. As was the case in the NEFA in the east, pre-war intelligence gathering had been carried out in the Aksai Chin area by small teams of surveyors who could move freely and, presumably, undetected on the barren plateau.
A contentious issue on the eastern front was the location of the Indian outpost at Dhola in the River Namka Chu gorge, where the borders of India, Bhutan, and Tibet intersect northwest of Tawang. The post was created on February 24, 1962, and according to the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, the site "was established north of the McMahon Line as shown on maps prior to the October/November 1962 edition.It is believed that the old edition was given to the Chinese by our External Affairs Ministry to indicate the McMahon Line. It is also learnt that we tried to clarify the error in our maps, but the Chinese did not accept our contention." The Chinese, in any case, would not have paid much attention to Indian maps. Their objective was entirely different: To teach India a lesson.
This remark in the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report is any way a far cry from the claim by Neville Maxwell and others that the establishment of the Dhola outpost triggered the 1962 War and that India was the aggressor.
Chinese troops had crossed the Namka Chu on September 8, surrounded an Indian outpost in the gorge, and destroyed two bridges on the river. The nearby Dhola Post was reinforced and firing from both sides continued in the area throughout September. Three Indian soldiers were wounded when the Chinese threw hand grenades at their position, but otherwise, there were no casualties.
IANS|
Updated: Oct 19, 2017, 01.00 PM IST
China began planning the war as early as 1959 and proposes that it was merely a small move in the larger strategic game that China was playing to become a world player. Following is an exclusive extract from "China's India War")
It was entirely unexpected that the Chinese would attack. The Indians had observed a massive build-up across the border and there had been several encounters between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA in the days before the main attack, including bombardment of Dhola and Khenzemane on October 19, 1962. But the ferocity and the sheer coordination of the Chinese attacks on October 20, 1962, and the days that followed stunned the Indian security establishment as well as international observers.At day-break on that day, artillery guns and mortars began intense bombardments across the Thagla Ridge.
According to Brigadier John Dalvi: At exactly 5 on the morning of 20th October 1962, the Chinese Opposite Bridge III fired two Verey lights. This signal was followed by a cannonade of over 150 guns and heavy mortars, exposed on the forward slopes of Thagla... this was a moment of truth. Thagla Ridge was no longer, at that moment, a piece of ground. It was the crucible to test, weigh and purify India's foreign defence policies.
Dalvi called it "The Day of Reckoning — 20th October 1962". The all-out assault on Indian positions north of Tawang was on.
On the western front in Aksai Chin, the fighting was spread out over a swathe of land from north to south, covering a distance of approximately 600 kilometres. But the thrust of the Chinese towards the south was confined to a relatively narrow area, which measured approximately 20 kilometres from west to east. Most of the attacks by the PLA seemed to be confined to dislodging Indian troops from the outposts that had been established as a result of the government's Forward Policy rather than for capturing territory. According to Indian military analysts, "In the Western sector, [the] Chinese had a limited aim. They were already in occupation of most of the Aksai Chin plateau through which they had constructed the Western Highway connecting Tibet and Xinjiang. In this war, their aim was to remove the Indian posts which they perceived were across their 1960 Claim Line."
They had no intention to move forward deep into Indian territory, as they did in NEFA (The North-East Frontier Agency).
The Aksai Chin plateau was and still is virtually unpopulated; this had made it possible for the Chinese to build their highway there in the mid-1950s without the Indians finding out about it until a year after it had been completed. The name Aksai Chin means "the desert of white stones", and the altitude varies between 4,300 and 6,900 metres above sea level.
During the weeks of fighting in this western sector of the theatre of the 1962 War, it became obvious that the Chinese knew exactly where the Indians were, how many there were at each position, and what kind of weaponry they had. As was the case in the NEFA in the east, pre-war intelligence gathering had been carried out in the Aksai Chin area by small teams of surveyors who could move freely and, presumably, undetected on the barren plateau.
A contentious issue on the eastern front was the location of the Indian outpost at Dhola in the River Namka Chu gorge, where the borders of India, Bhutan, and Tibet intersect northwest of Tawang. The post was created on February 24, 1962, and according to the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, the site "was established north of the McMahon Line as shown on maps prior to the October/November 1962 edition.It is believed that the old edition was given to the Chinese by our External Affairs Ministry to indicate the McMahon Line. It is also learnt that we tried to clarify the error in our maps, but the Chinese did not accept our contention." The Chinese, in any case, would not have paid much attention to Indian maps. Their objective was entirely different: To teach India a lesson.
This remark in the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report is any way a far cry from the claim by Neville Maxwell and others that the establishment of the Dhola outpost triggered the 1962 War and that India was the aggressor.
Chinese troops had crossed the Namka Chu on September 8, surrounded an Indian outpost in the gorge, and destroyed two bridges on the river. The nearby Dhola Post was reinforced and firing from both sides continued in the area throughout September. Three Indian soldiers were wounded when the Chinese threw hand grenades at their position, but otherwise, there were no casualties.
Mr.Cringeworth
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the things losers say.
Hindustani78
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Television footage from November 22, 1963 shows President John F. Kennedy and first lady Jacqueline Kennedy in the presidential limousine moments before he was assassinated
http://www.thehindu.com/news/intern...ased-online/article19930465.ece?homepage=true
Washington, October 27, 2017 07:55 IST
Updated: October 27, 2017 08:05 IST
The U.S government on Thursday released several thousand secret files on the assassination of former president John F. Kennedy, but withheld others on national security grounds.
A statement released by the National Archives said on orders from President Donald Trump it had released 2,891 records related to the November 22, 1963 assassination of JFK in Dallas, Texas.
Kennedy scholars have said the documents released are unlikely to contain any bombshell revelations or put to rest the rampant conspiracy theories about the assassination.
Mr. Trump said in a memorandum that he had agreed to hold back for further review some records relating to the killing.
“Executive departments and agencies have proposed to me that certain information should continue to be redacted because of national security, law enforcement, and foreign affairs concerns,” Mr. Trump said.
“I have no choice -- today -- but to accept those redactions rather than allow potentially irreversible harm to our nation’s security,” he said.
Administration officials who requested anonymity said the majority of those requests had come from the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
