Why air power was not used in 1962

[Hindustani78]

Updated: November 18, 2016 01:19 IST
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-...used-in-1962/article9357917.ece?homepage=true

Tactical restraint: “The Chief of the Air Staff had arrived at the conclusion that the positions were so interlocked that air strikes would endanger the safety of India’s own troops.” Indian soldiers seen in a bunker in a forward post in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area in November 1962. Photo: The Hindu Archives
The war was more a victory of India’s policy of non-alignment than a humiliating defeat at the hands of China.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) recently celebrated its 84th anniversary with the usual fanfare. In a film made for the occasion, the IAF’s achievements in all the wars and rescue missions since World War II were highlighted. Its remarkable performance in the wars against Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and, above all, the decisive victory of 1971, was well emphasised. Regarding 1962, the narrator regretted that the IAF was not used in the Sino-Indian conflict — an intervention many military historians and retired officers claim could have altered the final outcome to a great extent. It was only the helicopter and transport crew of the IAF that were deployed to service forward pickets in the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh.

What was the reluctance of India’s political and military leadership to use its offensive air power assets to stop the advance of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in NEFA and Ladakh? Let us first examine the strength of the air force of both the countries in 1962.

With nearly 22 combat squadrons and over 500 aircraft, the IAF’s mainstays in mid-1962 comprised the Hunter Mk-56 fighter-bomber aircraft, Gnat interceptor aircraft, French-built ground-attack aircraft such as Mystere and Toofani, Canberra bomber-reconnaissance jets, and the Vampire ground-attack jet. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was equipped with the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19 and medium-range IL-28 bombers.

Better safe than sorry

With no sound operational assessment of the PLAAF by the IAF, the government relied on inputs from the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB cautioned the government that the use of offensive air power could result in the PLAAF attacking Indian cities like Calcutta and also deny India the ‘moral high ground’ in case of a protracted conflict. No cognisance was taken of the fact that PLAAF aircraft could reach targets in India only if they operated from airfields in Tibet with the high altitudes imposing severe restrictions on their weapon-carrying capacity. On the other hand, IAF fighters would have had the advantage of operating with full weapon loads from airfields in the plains of Assam and Punjab.

General B.M. Kaul, the commander of IV Corps in NEFA, alleged in his memoirs that the IAF was not used in close support of the Army. This was disputed by IB chief B.N. Mullik, who said that Kaul had not asked for air support. The question of air support had anyway been considered at the headquarters and the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) arrived at the conclusion that the positions were so interlocked that air strikes would have endangered the safety of India’s own troops.

CAS Air Marshal Aspy Engineer accepted the IB assessment at face value. Apart from IB chief, there were others who played a role in ensuring that the IAF was kept out of the conflict. H.C. Dewan, the officer in charge of air operations in 1962, would later say: “It was I who advised not to use fighters and bombers against the Chinese. As the Army got more and more bogged down in NEFA, it became quite difficult to hold [Jawaharlal] Nehru back; he wanted to launch the fighters. Had he done so, it would have had disastrous consequences.”

Neville Maxwell, correspondent of The Times (London) in 1962, in his book India’s China War says: “The government had decided that tactical air support with bombers on ground attack must be ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitation of IAF, it is doubtful whether its intervention in a tactical role could have had much effect.” Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam in his recent book India’s Wars has written: “With joint Army-Air Force structures in place at the corps level, and forward air controllers with the brigades, it is clear that the IAF brass was timid and diffident about forcefully articulating to both the Army and the political leadership that in an asymmetric situation on the ground, offensive air power could play a stabilising role, if not a decisive one.”

However, India did seriously contemplate using American-supplemented air power in the later stages, when it appeared as if the Chinese could not be stopped from overrunning Tezpur and possibly reaching Guwahati and even Calcutta. But before it could materialise, the PLA declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21 and withdrew completely from NEFA and partially from Ladakh. JFK’s Forgotten Crises by Bruce Riedel notes: “JFK [U.S. President John F. Kennedy] gave Nehru the support he needed to signal [Chinese leader] Mao [Zedong] not to go too far… Later the Indian Prime Minister was to publicly acknowledge that one of the factors that halted the war ‘was the speed of the American response’.”

India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a ‘humiliating defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment which, with massive military and economic aid from both the American and (then) Soviet blocs, had India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a blessing in disguise.

Praveen Davar, a former Army officer, is Member, National Commission for Minorities. The views expressed are personal.

 

[Hindustani78]

Sino-Soviet agreements were made in 1953 and 1956 regarding Soviet military assistance in the development of a broad array of weapons and munitions such as tanks, aircraft, guns, ammunition, and ship board systems.

From 1960 to 1976, the Chinese ordnance industry began to domestically develop an ind ependent base for production of the army’s weapons and equipment. Research institutes, such as the Tank Research Institute, the Tank Engine Research Institute, the Gun Research Institute, the Metallic Material Research Institute, and others were established in the 1960. The army itself set up research organizations such as the Artillery Force Science and Technology Institute and the Armament Research Institute which helped improve the a domestic defense-industrial base.

Despite China ’s improved ability to independently develop and produce weapons, the quality of such products was lacking. Many of the weapons produced and delivered to the PLA was unproven, resulting in inadequate budgets and persistent technical fla ws. The Commission of Industry for National Defence (CIND) implemented measures for improved quality control in August 1961. During the next several years, new weapons, ranging from tanks, new missiles, and artillery pieces were made.

 

[Hareeb]

No cognisance was taken of the fact that PLAAF aircraft could reach targets in India only if they operated from airfields in Tibet with the high altitudes imposing severe restrictions on their weapon-carrying capacity. On the other hand, IAF fighters would have had the advantage of operating with full weapon loads from airfields in the plains of Assam and Punjab.

Why didnt they use IAF? The whole story is summed up in these above two sentences. IAF had no aircraft which could have reached Chinese border. End of story.

 

[Hindustani78]

China also has a nearly 2,000 light tanks. Again, these tanks are copies of old Soviet models: the Type 62 is a scaled down version of the Type 59, while the Type 63 is based on the Soviet amphibious PT-76. Both entered production in China in the early 1960s.

Why didnt they use IAF? The whole story is summed up in these above two sentences. IAF had no aircraft which could have reached Chinese border. End of story.

Chinese were having Anti Aircraft guns which they placed on higher atitudes. And over all they were having ballistic missiles

Soviet Union offered crucial help to jump start the ballistic missile program. Two R-1 (SS-1) rockets built by Korolev's design bureau were provided to China in 1956. More advanced R-2 (SS-2) missiles reached the country in December 1957. The missiles were followed by extensive engineering documentation and equipment and a large number of Soviet specialists arriving to organize production of the R-2 in China.

The range of the R-2 was limited to 600 km (370 miles)

they demonstrated by a successful launch of the first R-2 from a newly established missile test site in September 1960

China's first two missile programs were the 1059 and 1060. The 1059 was a Chinese manufactured R-2 serving from 1961 to 1967, while the 1060 was a brief attempt to reverse engineer the R-11FM cancelled in 1961.

 

[Hareeb]

[/QUOTE]
Tanks are better for plain surfaces like Pakistan India border, and not for mountanious surfaces.

So inshort, you have admitted IAF was feared of Chinese military. LOL.

The war was more a victory of India’s policy of non-alignment than a humiliating defeat at the hands of China.

Dil k behlane ko yeh khayal acha ha ghalib.

 

[Hindustani78]

Tanks are better for plain surfaces like Pakistan India border, and not for mountanious surfaces.

So inshort, you have admitted IAF was feared of Chinese military. LOL.

Chinese were using the nuclear black mail . And were having enough anti aircraft guns and ballistic missiles and were armed with automatic weapons.

Indian Army beefed up its defences. As a result IAF was asked to undertake tremendous surge in air maintenance – nearly thrice the normal amount. The air maintenance flying in Sep 1962 was 1179 hours. It increased to 3263 hours in Nov 1962. However, the inflow at the receiving end of air maintenance was not as spectacular. The dropping zones (DZ) were sub optimum; there was shortage of dropping equipment; there were too few porters to retrieve the dropped load and take it to Army posts; the identification between different items of dropped air load was ineffective or absent. All this resulted in around 80 percent of the drop being irretrievable.1 This despite the valiant effort of IAF transport crew and helicopter crew which continued to provide much needed support. This has been well recorded and appreciated.


Chinese Airfields. Chinese air force could operate from airfields in Tibet, Sinkiang and Yunan province, from all of which air attacks on India could be mounted.

IL-28 bomber could have operated from these bases striking cities like Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Guwahati, Shillong and Kohima.

Dil k behlane ko yeh khayal acha ha ghalib.

Hum ko haqeeqat ko accept karna aata hain. Republic of India was fighting with well armed PLA troops

hazāroñ ḳhvāhisheñ aisī ki har ḳhvāhish pe dam nikle- bahut nikle mire armān lekin phir bhī kam nikle

 

[Hareeb]

Chinese were using the nuclear black mail . And were having enough anti aircraft guns and ballistic missiles and were armed with automatic weapons.

Indian Army beefed up its defences. As a result IAF was asked to undertake tremendous surge in air maintenance – nearly thrice the normal amount. The air maintenance flying in Sep 1962 was 1179 hours. It increased to 3263 hours in Nov 1962. However, the inflow at the receiving end of air maintenance was not as spectacular. The dropping zones (DZ) were sub optimum; there was shortage of dropping equipment; there were too few porters to retrieve the dropped load and take it to Army posts; the identification between different items of dropped air load was ineffective or absent. All this resulted in around 80 percent of the drop being irretrievable.1 This despite the valiant effort of IAF transport crew and helicopter crew which continued to provide much needed support. This has been well recorded and appreciated.


Chinese Airfields. Chinese air force could operate from airfields in Tibet, Sinkiang and Yunan province, from all of which air attacks on India could be mounted.

IL-28 bomber could have operated from these bases striking cities like Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Guwahati, Shillong and Kohima.

Hum ko haqeeqat ko accept karte hain. Republic of India was fighting with well armed PLA troops

hazāroñ ḳhvāhisheñ aisī ki har ḳhvāhish pe dam nikle- bahut nikle mire armān lekin phir bhī kam nikle

So all the activities happened inside Indian terrority, then how does IAF chief can say its a victory over China. LOL. As the article mentions your forces didnt pass the border, or attacked Chinese with air arm. You guys were afraid of Chinese power. If Chinese wanted to, they could have captured Indian Terrority easily. But they spared you as a kid.

Chinese were using the nuclear black mail . And were having enough anti aircraft guns and ballistic missiles and were armed with automatic weapons.

Pakistan has all of these weapons, but still your forces want a war, and escalate situation on LoC on regular basis.
Zindagi pyari ni ha kia bhai?

hazāroñ ḳhvāhisheñ aisī ki har ḳhvāhish pe dam nikle- bahut nikle mire armān lekin phir bhī kam nikle

This fits on Indian dream of conquering Pakistan. LOL.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Chinese were using the nuclear black mail . And were having enough anti aircraft guns and ballistic missiles and were armed with automatic weapons.

China didn't have nuclear weapons in 1962.

 

[ranadd]

Pakistan has all of these weapons, but still your forces want a war, and escalate situation on LoC on regular basis.
Zindagi pyari ni ha kia bhai?
.

1962 Indian Armed forces was under armed. In the worst way. They were not prepared.

Pakistan was always in focus. Never left. Indian government understands Pakistan Army will never strike full on. 1000 cuts and all. So, no point.

 

[Hindustani78]

So all the activities happened inside Indian terrority, then how does IAF chief can say its a victory over China. LOL. As the article mentions your forces didnt pass the border, or attacked Chinese with air arm. You guys were afraid of Chinese power. If Chinese wanted to, they could have captured Indian Terrority easily. But they spared you as a kid.

Chinese were suicide during that period as even they were fighting on other fronts. Korean front, vietnam front , to dominate Cambodia and Laos.

Pakistan has all of these weapons, but still your forces want a war, and escalate situation on LoC on regular basis.
Zindagi pyari ni ha kia bhai?

We are talking about 1962 but the fact doesnt change that even in 1965 , Chinese armed you.

This fits on Indian dream of conquering Pakistan. LOL.

We just want to liberate ours territories which are being occupied.

China didn't have nuclear weapons in 1962.

China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons.

The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nur on October 16, 1964.


Memorandum from Lt. General John K. Gerhart, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans & Programs, U.S. Air Force, to Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White, "Long-Range Threat of Communist China," 8 February 1961, Secret

Source: Library of Congress, Thomas White Papers, box 44, Air Staff Actions.

This document suggests the foreboding with which senior Air Force officers viewed the possibility of a nuclear-armed China. It also illustrates Air Force intelligence's predisposition to make exaggerated forecasts of adversary capabilities. A recent CIA estimate, National Intelligence Estimate 13-60, issued in December 1960, had predicted that Beijing could test a nuclear device during 1963, but Air Force estimators suggested that a test could be much earlier: it "may occur in late 1961." To neutralize a Chinese nuclear capability, Air Force planners went far in advocating nuclear weapons dispersal to U.S. allies and other potential cooperators in the region, including India. Not long after Beijing actually tested a device in October 1964, the possibility of U.S. nuclear support for South Asian countries attracted interest in the Pentagon and in some quarters of the State Department, but it was out of step with the Johnson administration's developing interest in nuclear nonproliferation.

CIA prepared an NIE on Chinese nuclear weapons during 1961, it remains to be declassified. This estimate shows the considerable progress that the Agency had made in using sophisticated collection methods--satellite photography and U-2 flights by Chinese Nationalist pilots--in expanding its database on Chinese nuclear developments. Nevertheless, much remained elusive to U.s. intelligence; for example, CIA had yet to learn that the installation at Lanzhou was in fact a gaseous diffusion plant that would soon be ready for operations.

China's first two missile programs were the 1059 and 1060. The 1059 was a Chinese manufactured R-2 serving from 1961 to 1967, while the 1060 was a brief attempt to reverse engineer the R-11FM cancelled in 1961.

By 1961 India had become aware of China's nuclear program, the first formal demand for the development of nuclear weapons was made in Parliament, by the Jana Singh party, in December 1962. Bhabha, well aware that a Chinese nuclear test was not far off (his estimate was then 12 to 18 months)

 

[Hareeb]

1962 Indian Armed forces was under armed. In the worst way. They were not prepared.

Pakistan was always in focus. Never left. Indian government understands Pakistan Army will never strike full on. 1000 cuts and all. So, no point.

But in '65, you lost almost 2000 miles of Indian terrority before the war ended.

Chinese were suicide during that period as even they were fighting on other fronts. Korean front, vietnam front , to dominate Cambodia and Laos.

If the enemy is busy on diff fronts, isnt it easy to push her inside her terrority? You forces failed to do so. The fact is your forces were incompetent, and any adventure by IA could had caused a lose in terrority.

We are talking about 1962 but the fact doesnt change that even in 1965 , Chinese armed you.

I think we won because we had better fighter crafts and better trained pilots, and in addition IAF lost some of her birds on grounds in Pathankot.

We just want to liberate ours territories which are being occupied.

Occupied by whom? History tells us your forces occupied Junagadh and Bantva Manavadar, in addition to Hydreabad Daccan (lets put Kashmir aside for sometime). Your forces are occupied ones. And in north, Aksai Chin was occupied.

 

[ranadd]

But in '65, you lost almost 2000 miles of Indian terrority before the war ended.

There was no permanent territorial changes.For god sake, read Tashkent declaration.

And during the war India said they had 1500 Sq miles of Pakistan. Pakistani government said they had 250 sq miles of India. Independent observers said India held 710 Sq miles and Pakistan held 210 sq miles.

Do you guys say whatever you want?

 

[Hareeb]

Independent observers

And this Independent observer is an Indian. What a coincidence.

https://www.quora.com/Jammu-and-Kas...to-Lahore-why-didnt-it-take-back-Azad-Kashmir

 

[Hindustani78]

But in '65, you lost almost 2000 miles of Indian terrority before the war ended.

At the end of a bruising 22-day war, India held 1920 square kilometres of Pakistani territory while Pakistan only held 550 square kilometres of Indian land. The Haji Pir pass was also captured by Indian soldiers after an epic battle. And yet India returned back at the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.

If the enemy is busy on diff fronts, isnt it easy to push her inside her terrority? You forces failed to do so. The fact is your forces were incompetent, and any adventure by IA could had caused a lose in terrority.

Enemy was very suicidal during that period. Ballistic missiles with Nukes .

That was cold war era but still the leadership of Republic of India has showed thier maturity.

Quam ki barbadi hindustaniyon ko kabhi manzoor nahi thi.

I think we won because we had better fighter crafts and better trained pilots, and in addition IAF lost some of her birds on grounds in Pathankot.

We were not expecting any war during that time and who provided satellite outputs to Pakistan forces even explain many things. ?

Occupied by whom? History tells us your forces occupied Junagadh and Bantva Manavadar, in addition to Hydreabad Daccan (lets put Kashmir aside for sometime). Your forces are occupied ones. And in north, Aksai Chin was occupied.

Well your history is too different from us Hindustanis.

Partition itself explain about the big game which was played on Indians, Arabs, Turks and Africans.

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

Idiotic media report? Victory of India on non-alignment? I like Nehru for his vision, especially him building an democratic transition of India and other scientific things. He did botched up on some foreign policy. But credit should be provided where due.

This war is a defeat for India and sugar coating with other words is like the author is deluding himself.