Abid123
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 1, 2021
- Messages
- 2,829
- Reaction score
- -8
- Country
- Location
When Pakistan and Israel Almost Went to War; Tensions Between the Nuclear Armed Islamic Republic and Jewish State - Part One
While Pakistan had been a strategically critical ally of the Western bloc during the Cold War, bordering China, Soviet aligned India and the Soviet Union itself and serving as a key conduit for Western arms and aid to anti Soviet Islamist Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan, relations between Islamabad and the West saw a serious decline following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The United States’ adoption of a new foreign policy which was at times perceived to be 'anti Muslim,’ targeting a number of Muslim states with military force, was strongly criticised by the Pakistani government, and violations of Pakistani airspace during American attacks on Afghan targets in the 1990s further soured relations. The Pakistani nuclear program however was perhaps the main point of contention between the Western Bloc and Islamabad, and while Israel, India and even Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty had been met with relatively little opposition in their attempts to develop nuclear arms, in Iran’s case with active U.S. support, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear arms was considered an unacceptable development by the Western powers. The result was the imposition of stringent economic sanctions on the South Asian state and an arms embargo by the United States.
Alongside the Western bloc, Israel was also stringently opposed to the Pakistani nuclear development. While both Islamabad and Tel Aviv had been major Western military partners during the Cold War, each supplied with advanced U.S. arms to combat their Soviet aligned neighbours, relations between the two were poor. Israel’s longstanding conflict with a number of Middle Eastern Muslim states, and its reliance on its own nuclear arsenal to maintain an asymmetric advantage over these states, led to concerns that Pakistan’s bomb would be a 'Muslim bomb,’ and could well proliferate to Israeli adversaries such as Iran or Sudan - two other self proclaimed Islamic Republics with close ties to Islamabad.
In response to the perceived threat posed by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, the Israeli military considered launching preventative military strikes on Pakistani nuclear facilities. A plan for the Israeli Air Force to strike Pakistani Nuclear Facilities in Kahuta was authorised by the Israeli High Command, and the military reportedly built a full mock up of the facilities in the Negev Desert based on satellite images which were used by Israeli pilots to practice mock attacks. While Israel had initially sought to launch a strike jointly with India, this request was flatly refused by Delhi - leaving Tel Aviv to handle the results of any political fallout alone. Failing to gain direct Indian support, Israeli sought to at the very least gain landing and refuelling rights to launch the attack on Pakistan from facilities in India. This too was refused by Delhi, seriously complicating the Israeli operation. Without even token Indian support, Israeli would be held solely responsible for the attack.
Israel had previously carried out a highly successful preventative strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 under Operation Opera to prevent Saddam Hussein’s government from developing a nuclear weapon, and the operation against Pakistani facilities was set to follow a similar plan. Israel and Pakistan’s air forces mirrored one another’s capabilities, with the two having been the first and second respective clients for the U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon light fighter - fielded by both states in large numbers. Israel did however retain an advantage in that it had acquired more advanced heavy air superiority fighters, the F-4E and F-15C, which were capable of carrying heavier payloads, operating at longer ranges and flying at higher altitudes. This was a capability Pakistan lacked. The long range of the Israeli fighters would have proved a significant asset in a strike on Pakistan and minimised the need for aerial refuelling. Israel’s larger aerial tanker fleet was also an essential asset, which were particularly critical in allowing shorter range lighter fighters such as the F-16 to reach Pakistani targets.
Continued in Part Two
Source: https://militarywatchmagazine.com/a...ed-islamic-republic-and-jewish-state-part-one
When Pakistan and Israel Almost Went to War; Tensions Between the Nuclear Armed Islamic Republic and Jewish State - Part Two
Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI discovered the Israeli plan to strike the country’s nuclear facilities, and the military begun to both strengthen the defences of Pakistani nuclear facilities and prepare for retaliatory strikes in response. Pakistan’s armed forces at the time lacked the advanced strike capabilities it fields today, and were forced to rely on their F-16 light fighters to carry out attacks on Israeli targets. The Air Force’s 14th squadron of F-16C fighters was reportedly assembled and the pilots were asked to volunteer for what would almost certainly be a suicide mission to carry out retaliation strikes on Israeli targets. The majority of pilots agreed to participate, and F-16 fighters were prepared for an attack on Israel. While the exact targets are unknown, it is likely that the strikes were to target the country’s nuclear facilities to inflict maximum retaliatory damage.
With the element of surprise having been critical to the success of Operation Opera against Iraq, and later to Operation Outside the Box against a Syrian reactor in 2007, the fact that Pakistan’s ISI was able to discover the Israeli strike seriously undermined its chances of success. Pakistan’s ability to launch retaliatory strikes on Israel, as well as its readiness to challenge Israeli fighters in its own airspace and potentially destroy Israel’s aerial tankers - thus leaving its short range fighters stranded without fuel to return to their airfields, were all significant factors which contributed to deterring the Israeli military from carrying out the attack.
Pakistan would go on to test its first nuclear bomb in 1998, and has since acquired an arsenal of over 100 nuclear warheads for both strategic and tactical uses. Relations between Israel and Pakistan remain poor, with Islamabad having sided with Iran and Syria in their ever escalating conflict with Tel Aviv and the Western bloc. Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman has accused ISI of capturing and assassinating Mossad agents around the world, and Islamabad’s foreign policy realignment away from the Western Bloc and towards China has further worsened relations between the two nuclear powers. In 2016 a false report that Israel had threatened Pakistani forces with nuclear attacks should they provide direct support to the Syrian military in its war against Islamist insurgents was met with a swift response from Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, who tacitly threatened Israel with nuclear retaliation should it ever undertake such action.
While Pakistan is not known to have proliferated nuclear weapons, the country’s strike capabilities have expanded significantly since the 1990s and pose a major threat to Israeli security in the event of future hostilities. While an attack on Pakistani facilities could have been contemplated by Tel Aviv or other state actors in the 1990s, it is today near impossible to take such military action. Pakistani ballistic missile capabilities have expanded considerably, with Islamabad acquiring the Rodong-1 from North Korea ballistic missile and fielding it as the Hatf-5/Ghauri-1 to deliver its nuclear payloads. Other platforms such as the solid fuelled Shaheen 3 have also been tested. Pakistan’s airspace meanwhile is more secure than ever before, and while the Air Force still lacks advanced air superiority fighters to match the F-15, it fields both heavily armed new indigenous fighters, the JF-17, as well as state of the art HQ-16 air defence systems. With Pakistan moving to strengthen its ties with Israel’s foremost Middle Eastern adversaries, namely Iran, whether Islamabad will be drawn further into Middle Eastern conflicts remains to be seen.
Part One is available here
Source: https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/70618
While Pakistan had been a strategically critical ally of the Western bloc during the Cold War, bordering China, Soviet aligned India and the Soviet Union itself and serving as a key conduit for Western arms and aid to anti Soviet Islamist Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan, relations between Islamabad and the West saw a serious decline following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The United States’ adoption of a new foreign policy which was at times perceived to be 'anti Muslim,’ targeting a number of Muslim states with military force, was strongly criticised by the Pakistani government, and violations of Pakistani airspace during American attacks on Afghan targets in the 1990s further soured relations. The Pakistani nuclear program however was perhaps the main point of contention between the Western Bloc and Islamabad, and while Israel, India and even Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty had been met with relatively little opposition in their attempts to develop nuclear arms, in Iran’s case with active U.S. support, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear arms was considered an unacceptable development by the Western powers. The result was the imposition of stringent economic sanctions on the South Asian state and an arms embargo by the United States.
Alongside the Western bloc, Israel was also stringently opposed to the Pakistani nuclear development. While both Islamabad and Tel Aviv had been major Western military partners during the Cold War, each supplied with advanced U.S. arms to combat their Soviet aligned neighbours, relations between the two were poor. Israel’s longstanding conflict with a number of Middle Eastern Muslim states, and its reliance on its own nuclear arsenal to maintain an asymmetric advantage over these states, led to concerns that Pakistan’s bomb would be a 'Muslim bomb,’ and could well proliferate to Israeli adversaries such as Iran or Sudan - two other self proclaimed Islamic Republics with close ties to Islamabad.
In response to the perceived threat posed by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, the Israeli military considered launching preventative military strikes on Pakistani nuclear facilities. A plan for the Israeli Air Force to strike Pakistani Nuclear Facilities in Kahuta was authorised by the Israeli High Command, and the military reportedly built a full mock up of the facilities in the Negev Desert based on satellite images which were used by Israeli pilots to practice mock attacks. While Israel had initially sought to launch a strike jointly with India, this request was flatly refused by Delhi - leaving Tel Aviv to handle the results of any political fallout alone. Failing to gain direct Indian support, Israeli sought to at the very least gain landing and refuelling rights to launch the attack on Pakistan from facilities in India. This too was refused by Delhi, seriously complicating the Israeli operation. Without even token Indian support, Israeli would be held solely responsible for the attack.
Israel had previously carried out a highly successful preventative strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 under Operation Opera to prevent Saddam Hussein’s government from developing a nuclear weapon, and the operation against Pakistani facilities was set to follow a similar plan. Israel and Pakistan’s air forces mirrored one another’s capabilities, with the two having been the first and second respective clients for the U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon light fighter - fielded by both states in large numbers. Israel did however retain an advantage in that it had acquired more advanced heavy air superiority fighters, the F-4E and F-15C, which were capable of carrying heavier payloads, operating at longer ranges and flying at higher altitudes. This was a capability Pakistan lacked. The long range of the Israeli fighters would have proved a significant asset in a strike on Pakistan and minimised the need for aerial refuelling. Israel’s larger aerial tanker fleet was also an essential asset, which were particularly critical in allowing shorter range lighter fighters such as the F-16 to reach Pakistani targets.
Continued in Part Two
Source: https://militarywatchmagazine.com/a...ed-islamic-republic-and-jewish-state-part-one
When Pakistan and Israel Almost Went to War; Tensions Between the Nuclear Armed Islamic Republic and Jewish State - Part Two
Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI discovered the Israeli plan to strike the country’s nuclear facilities, and the military begun to both strengthen the defences of Pakistani nuclear facilities and prepare for retaliatory strikes in response. Pakistan’s armed forces at the time lacked the advanced strike capabilities it fields today, and were forced to rely on their F-16 light fighters to carry out attacks on Israeli targets. The Air Force’s 14th squadron of F-16C fighters was reportedly assembled and the pilots were asked to volunteer for what would almost certainly be a suicide mission to carry out retaliation strikes on Israeli targets. The majority of pilots agreed to participate, and F-16 fighters were prepared for an attack on Israel. While the exact targets are unknown, it is likely that the strikes were to target the country’s nuclear facilities to inflict maximum retaliatory damage.
With the element of surprise having been critical to the success of Operation Opera against Iraq, and later to Operation Outside the Box against a Syrian reactor in 2007, the fact that Pakistan’s ISI was able to discover the Israeli strike seriously undermined its chances of success. Pakistan’s ability to launch retaliatory strikes on Israel, as well as its readiness to challenge Israeli fighters in its own airspace and potentially destroy Israel’s aerial tankers - thus leaving its short range fighters stranded without fuel to return to their airfields, were all significant factors which contributed to deterring the Israeli military from carrying out the attack.
Pakistan would go on to test its first nuclear bomb in 1998, and has since acquired an arsenal of over 100 nuclear warheads for both strategic and tactical uses. Relations between Israel and Pakistan remain poor, with Islamabad having sided with Iran and Syria in their ever escalating conflict with Tel Aviv and the Western bloc. Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman has accused ISI of capturing and assassinating Mossad agents around the world, and Islamabad’s foreign policy realignment away from the Western Bloc and towards China has further worsened relations between the two nuclear powers. In 2016 a false report that Israel had threatened Pakistani forces with nuclear attacks should they provide direct support to the Syrian military in its war against Islamist insurgents was met with a swift response from Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, who tacitly threatened Israel with nuclear retaliation should it ever undertake such action.
While Pakistan is not known to have proliferated nuclear weapons, the country’s strike capabilities have expanded significantly since the 1990s and pose a major threat to Israeli security in the event of future hostilities. While an attack on Pakistani facilities could have been contemplated by Tel Aviv or other state actors in the 1990s, it is today near impossible to take such military action. Pakistani ballistic missile capabilities have expanded considerably, with Islamabad acquiring the Rodong-1 from North Korea ballistic missile and fielding it as the Hatf-5/Ghauri-1 to deliver its nuclear payloads. Other platforms such as the solid fuelled Shaheen 3 have also been tested. Pakistan’s airspace meanwhile is more secure than ever before, and while the Air Force still lacks advanced air superiority fighters to match the F-15, it fields both heavily armed new indigenous fighters, the JF-17, as well as state of the art HQ-16 air defence systems. With Pakistan moving to strengthen its ties with Israel’s foremost Middle Eastern adversaries, namely Iran, whether Islamabad will be drawn further into Middle Eastern conflicts remains to be seen.
Part One is available here
Source: https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/70618
