An interesting interaction with
@Goritoes in another thread motivated me to talk about this. Firstly, polite warning, this will be a long post so you may want to take your time to digest it.
For some reason a few people on this forum and elsewhere to be honest seem to think more is better, and whilst there is an argument to be had to "being risk averse" the current model of scalability and high mobility adopted by Pakistan Army works just fine and is battle testes - so why re-invent the wheel so to speak?
In this post I will aim to put forward my argument for "less is more", a bibliopgraphy of sources to compile this post will be posted in the footnotes should anyone be bored to engage in further reading.
Lets start by addressing the elephant in the room: The Tacticool "Operator" vs the professional Pakistani front line solider. Now for some reason when people think of what a "professional solider" looks
like thier expectation is instantly:
Whereas the reality is much more minalmistic:
Even with this trimmed down heavily scalable approach the average load a Pakistani solider carries is as follows:
- Body armour: Weight 11kg (e) with plates
- SMG 4.3 kg [loaded weight]
- Loaded magazine @0.85kg x 2 = 1.7kg
- Helmet weight 1.25kg
That is an estimated
18.25kg of kit. Based on the above model and given that the average Pakistani male is
66Kg in weight, the average solider carries
27% of their bodyweight in equipment
AT ALL TIMES.
This brings us to the interesting question of "a soliders load". Soliders have always struggled with the weight of carrying their weapons and equipment. Roman Legionnaires on the march carried
80-pound loads on long spiked stakes slung across their shoulders. Byzantine infantrymen found themselves with similar loads. Their ration carts and pack horses trailed behind them but did little to relieve their individual loads. During the American Revolution, from Boston to Saratoga. British soldiers fought their loads in addition to the American colonists.
In the Normandy invasion of 1944, when
American infantrymen with 80-pound rucksacks dropped from their landing craft into the rough surf off Omaha Beach, many of them never made it to the beach. Many soldiers fell into deep holes while wading in, and their already heavy equipment absorbed so much more weight in water that they could not get up. Others managed to crawl as far as the shoreline where they collapsed. There, overcome with exhaustion, many of them drowned.
In his book Titled "The Soldier's Load and The Mobility of A Nation"
Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall argued
No logistical system is sound unless its first principle is enlightened conservation of the power of the individual fighter.[1]
In his paper in 1987 then Captain and Lt. Gen. William C. Mayville stated
"Soldiers who march into battle carrying heavy loads do not usually perform well in combat. Their loads drain them of their strength, reduce their mobility, and slow their minds."[2]
In an interesting study carried out by the British Army using "Hybrid Formation Training" exercises during Operation HERRICK[Afghanistan], showed that
soliders overburdned with kit not only fatigued quicker, but their accuracy greater deminished based on the amount of equipment they carried:
View attachment 908432
Source[3]
In his book Urgent Fury - The Battle for Grenada Mark Adkin in interview with an anonymous yet decorated solider who recounts:
We attacked to secure the airhead. We were like slow moving turtles. My ruck weighed 120 pounds … There were all those guys sitting on the side of the road with IV tubes in them. There's no way the guys could [have gone on]. [4]
Professional soldiers and military historians over the past 30 years have addressed this issue at great length. In The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation, S.L.A. Marshall cites three fallacious beliefs that lead to overloading.
The first of these fallacies is that large amounts of ammunition on a soldier's back gives him greater confidence in battle. Marshall contends that combat has never supported this myth, that soldiers will fight to the last round when necessary.
The second fallacy is that shortages in ammunition cause "tactical disarrangements" and that such shortages are therefore to be avoided. But Marshall cites the defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge in which soldiers willingly shared their limited supplies to survive eight days of encirclement.
The third fallacy holds that a soldier must be equipped for every possible contingency. Marshall blames staff officers for promoting this notion and argues that such thinking smothers and exhausts soldiers before they ever reach the battlefield. Certainly, the soldiers "sitting on the side of the road" in Grenada would have agreed.
In his book The Mobility of One Man - Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall gave an example of the European Theater duringWWII, druing which he wrote
"the basic individual ammunition load for the paratrooper was eighty rounds for his carbine or MI, and two hand grenades. When the paratrooper jumped into Normandy on June 6, 1944, he also carried these things: 1 rifle and carrier part, 1 English mine, 6 packages of K-ration, 1 impregnated jump suit, 1 complete uniform, 1 steel helmet and liner, 1 knitted cap, 1 change of underwear, 2 changes of sox, 1 entrenching tool, 1 gas mask, 1 first-aid pack, 1 spoon, 2 gas pro tective covers, 1 field bag with suspenders, 1 packet of sulfa tablets, 1 escape kit, and a set of toilet articles.
Despite all that weight, the most salient characteristic in operations by these forces was without doubt the high mobility of all ranks. That was because most of them used common sense. They jumped heavy but they moved light. Once on the ground, most of them ditched every piece of equipment they considered unnecessary. They did this without order, and often before they had engaged any of the enemy or joined up with any of their comrades. It was a reflex to a course of training which had stressed that the main thing was to keep going"[5]
Among other studies on the subject, in 1962 the United States Army Combat Development Agency collected and analyzed statistics from World War II and Korea relating to the soldier's fighting load.
The study concluded that the soldier's load had a direct effect on his performance in combat, that his mobility was "degraded to an unacceptable degree by his prescribed load." [6]
The agency further concluded that infantrymen, who represented 80 percent of all battle casualties in those wars, should be given special equipment and clothing to meet their unique combat requirements.
The study recommended that the maximum fighting load be restricted to 40 pounds or
18Kg and that "officers at all echelons receive a thorough education and indoctrination in the problem of overloading the infantry combat soldier."
The introduction of helicopters and transport vehicles for example, are major logistical steps towards reducing the solider's load. But other tecnnological developments such as NVGs, encrypted radios, Laser Designators and the sort put back the weight these logistical systems remove.
Another major issue becomes CASEVAC, in the British Army review Number 173 - Autumn 2018, one outcome from HFT(Hybrid Formation Training) exercises was to study how to improve CASEVAC in their sections (buddy rescue) some of which were carrying in excess of 80kg of load.
The result was a change in formation of sections to deliberately "off load" on section with the capacity to "stretcher carry" one or more casualty on foot for 2km:
[Notice the magical 18kg re-appearing in the graph below]
View attachment 908435
Similarly the US. Army Infantry School now recommends a maximum load of 30 to 40 percent of a soldier's body weight.
Training light should involve risk, just as fighting light involves risk. The solution to lighter loads is risk analysis, in which a commander makes an accurate tactical assessment and calculates what is really needed for each mission.A soldier's minimum essential load includes his uniform, assigned weapon, and load carrying equipment.. These items are usually identified in a unit's standing operating procedures (SOP).
Admittedly, risk analysis will not bring the proper balance of load and agility to certain types of infantrymen simply because of the equipment that goes with their jobs.
The solution to this particular problem requires imaginative thinking on the part of commanders. It requires that portions of these soldiers' loads be distributed to other members of the unit—water, meals, and sleeping equipment, for example. These adjustments themselves are risk assessments, but failing to make them threatens the survivability of the men who must carry these heavy items.
Strong legs and a good back are a soldier's most precious resources. They are the key to his success and survival on the battlefield. But putting a heavy load on those legs and that back robs him of his mobility and agility. It steals his strength and denies him the ability to think quickly.
Thank you for reading.
@Signalian @PanzerKiel
[1] The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation - S.L.A Marshall - Reprinted 1980
[2] A Soldier's Load (1987) - Captain William C. Mayville, Vol. 77, No. 1, Infantry, Jan-Feb 1987
[3]
https://www.army.mod.uk/umbraco/Surface/Download/Get/11615
[4] Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury - The Battle for Grenada - The Truth Behind the Largest U.S. Military Operation since Vietnam Hardcover – 19 Oct. 1989
[5] The Mobility of One Man - S.L.A Marshall - Reprinted 1980
[6]The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments - J.A. Stockfish
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR435.pdf
For the record, I am 6 ft 1 (185 cm) and 92 kg. And dont know if you can see the shirt, I was with the Airborne when I wear that, and so I was listed as a light infantry.
. Also sorry I forgot to wish you, but Happy New Year to you and yours.
