What’s the India, China Doklam standoff about?

[mirage]

As an i'ndependent' nation, Bhutan is controlled by India diplomatically and economically. But China will break there monopoly just like we do in Nepal. Lot of Bhutanese had got vocal about their fury and unsatisfaction toward India's bully, including their former freign minister.according to the Simla accord in 1890, Doklang area belongs to China. India is such a coward nation doesn't dare to face China directly but sneak through in the name of protecting Bhutan. Pity on Bhutanese.

yea yea yea , the world is watching who is a coward nation busy barking like a road side dog from top to bottom . and few chinese monkeys in the government also said that india occupied the chinese land as doklam is chinese land , and rat shameless pla army could do nothing about it till now , and will bow down ultimately to mighty bhaRAT ULTIMATELY , MC you now wait and see what happens to your big balls of scrotum hernia developed in past 20 years , thanks to sweat shop labor factories and poor people of china , they fed your useless army for long now .

 

[bluesky]

Security experts in Bangladesh and India are already speculating that in the event China takes the Doklam plateau, India would want to use Bangladesh as a transit for military purposes, which would leave Bangladesh in a serious predicament.

BD should strictly refrain from allowing Indian troops or logistics transportation through its land and water. A strong neutrality will open ways for us to get Chinese military hardware assistance to BD, which will provide it the security it needs along the long border with India. An opposite action will just backfire, because China will withhold military assistance to BD and it will become an easy target of Indian hegemony.

However, I wonder what is written in the BD-India comprehensive defense treaty signed during SHW's recent India tour. History will regard it as the BD Demise Treaty if it contains a provision that allows IA troop movement through BD land. Someone should send a complaint to the SC to discuss the treaty in the Parliament. BNP is as usual showing its naivety about the matter.

 

[Banglar Bir]

Indian Diplomacy in Critical Period
‘দুঃসময়ে ভারতীয় কূটনীতি’
07 Aug, 2017

বন্ধু-বান্ধবের অভাব নেই। মিত্রগণ যে যথেষ্ট বলশালী, সে কথাও ঠিক। কিন্তু পড়শির গুরুত্ব তাতে কমে যায় না। পড়শিদের সঙ্গে সহাবস্থান যে হেতু নিয়ত, সে হেতু সম্পর্কও শান্তিপূর্ণ হওয়াই কাম্য। ভারত কি এই সরল সত্যকে যথাযথ উপলব্ধি করতে সক্ষম? ডোকলাম সঙ্কটকে ঘিরে দক্ষিণ এশিয়ার ভূ-রাজনৈতিক ছবিটা যত বদলাচ্ছে, তত বেশি করে উঠে আসছে এই প্রশ্ন।

ভারতকে ঘিরে মাঝারি, ক্ষুদ্র বা অতি ক্ষুদ্র যে সব রাষ্ট্রের অবস্থান, তাদের প্রত্যেককে নিজের শিবিরে টানার চেষ্টা শুরু করেছে চিন। লক্ষ্য অত্যন্ত স্পষ্ট দক্ষিণ এশিয়ায় ভারতকে একা করে দেওয়া। চিন-ভারত বিবাদে বিশ্বের বৃহত্তম শক্তি আমেরিকাকে যে বেজিং পাশে পাবে না, তা শি চিনফিংরা ভালই জানেন। এশিয়া এবং ইউরোপ জুড়ে ছড়িয়ে থাকা যে সব দেশ আমেরিকার সামরিক সহযোগী, তাদেরও যে পাশে পাওয়া যাবে না, বেজিং সে কথাও জানে। ভারতের সঙ্গে এই সব দেশের ক্রমবর্ধমান মৈত্রী, সমন্বয় ও সহযোগিতার ছবিটা আজ গোটা বিশ্বের সামনে স্পষ্ট। কিন্তু কূটনৈতিক যুদ্ধ তথা স্নায়ুর লড়াই যে এর পরেও বাকি থাকে, বেজিং তা দেখাচ্ছে।

ডোকলাম ভুটানের, নাকি চিনের? সঙ্কটের উৎসস্থল মূলত এই প্রশ্নটিই। এই প্রশ্নের সর্বসম্মত উত্তর না খুঁজেই ডোকলামের নেওয়ার চেষ্টা শুরু করেছিল বেজিং। তাই ভারত সেনা পাঠিয়েছে। পড়শি ভুটানের সার্বভৌমত্ব রক্ষার দায়বদ্ধতা ভারতের এই পদক্ষেপের অন্যতম প্রধান কারণ। কিন্তু সেই ভুটানই ধীরে ধীরে চিনের প্রতি নরম এখন। চিনা দূতাবাস নেই ভুটানে। চিনেও নেই ভুটানের কোনও দূত। তা সত্ত্বেও কূটনৈতিক স্তরে থিম্পুর সঙ্গে যোগাযোগ স্থাপন করেছে বেজিং এবং এমন বার্তাই দেওয়া হয়েছে চিনের তরফে যে ভুটান এখন ভারতীয় প্রভাব থেকে নিজেকে কিছুটা হলেও মুক্ত করার চেষ্টায়। ভুটানেই কিন্তু শেষ হচ্ছে না উদ্বেগ। নেপালের সঙ্গেও যোগাযোগ বাড়িয়ে নিয়েছে চিন। ডোকলাম বিতর্কে চিনের অবস্থান কী, তা নেপালের কাছে বিশদে ব্যাখ্যা করা হয়েছে। দফায় দফায় বৈঠক করা হয়েছে, আরও অনেক বৈঠক, অনেক দৌত্যের পথ খুলে ফেলা হয়েছে।

পাকিস্তান দশকের পর দশক ধরেই চিনের ঘনিষ্ঠ মিত্র। বিপুল চিনা বিনিয়োগ এখন বাংলাদেশ এবং শ্রীলঙ্কাকেও বেশ কিছুটা বেজিং-মুখী করে তুলেছে। নয়াদিল্লিকে উদ্বিগ্ন হতেই হচ্ছে অতএব।

ভারতকে বেকায়দায় ফেলতেই হয়তো পড়শিদের প্রতি হঠাৎ যতœবান চিন। হয়তো এই চিনা কৌশল দীর্ঘমেয়াদের নয়। কিন্তু এই কৌশলের মোকাবিলার পথ ভারতকে খুঁজতেই হবে। ধীরে ধীরে প্রায় সব পড়শির উপর থেকে কমতে শুরু করেছে ভারতীয় প্রভাব। এমন ছবি ভারতের জন্য উদ্বেগজনক, এ ভারতীয় কূটনীতির জন্য অত্যন্ত দুঃসময়। সুদিন যে কোনও মূল্যে ফেরাতেই হবে। পদক্ষেপটা এ বার সযতœ এবং সুচিন্তিত হওয়া তাই খুব জরুরি।

সূত্র: আনন্দবাজার
http://www.newsofbd.net/newsdetail/detail/200/327774

 

[Banglar Bir]

Analysts: Full-scale war between India, China likely soon

• Tribune Desk
• Published at 06:46 PM August 07, 2017

A leading state-run Chinese daily has reported that Beijing might use a small-scale military offensive against India to end the Doklam standoff
Noted commentator on international affairs Meghnad Desai in an interview predicted that a war could break out within a month between India and China. Desai’s comment has come at a time when both the nations are exchanging heated arguments in regard to the ongoing standoff in Doklam, lying in the tri-junction region of Bhutan, China and India.

“Even today, nobody is contemplating that the whole Doklam thing could break anytime. We could be in a full-scale war with China within a month. At that stage it will not be controllable. It may come as a surprise, but that is when the defence co-operation of India (with various countries) will bear fruit,” Desai told IANS in an interview.

Also Read- Infographic: India-China standoff in the Himalayas

Meanwhile, a leading state-run Chinese daily has reported that Beijing might use a small-scale military offensive against India to end the Doklam standoff.

Quoting Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told Global Times on August 5 that China is prepared for a small war to assert its position in Doklam.

Hu has come to his conclusion based on the recent statements issued by Chinese officials in China and India.

Hu also said that the objective of this “war” will be to either “expel” Indian troops from Doklam or capture them.
US-China shadow war
UK-based Indian-origin Desai, who is also a Labour Peer in the British House of Lords, observed that if a war is to break out in the two theatres, it will see the United States and India on one side and China on the other. He added that the fate of the ongoing Doklam standoff would largely depend upon events in the South China Sea.

Desai did not consider the Doklam standoff a mere India-China issue but rather equated it to the geo-political tensions across the globe, primarily in the South China Sea. When again asked if a war is really likely to break out, the Padma Bhushan awardee said, “I cannot say what day or date but I think at this time it is very likely that we will be in a state of full-scale war with China very soon. And mind you, on several fronts, not just Doklam. It is just one frontier, they will start from all places, across the northern Himalayas,”

Also Read- What’s the India, China Doklam standoff about?

Regarding the US’ reaction in case there is a war between India and China and whether Washington would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with India, Desai said, “Absolutely”.

“Ultimately, you have to understand that India cannot stand up to China without American help and support. The US cannot stand up to China without Indian help. That is the symmetry in this relationship,” he added.

Diplomatic efforts
In New Delhi, Sushma Swaraj, the minister for external affairs, told Parliament India was concerned about China’s actions affecting the tri-junction boundary point between Bhutan, China and India as well as the India-China border.
She said India would “keep engaging with China to resolve the dispute.”

Also Read- Chinese, Indian troops face off in Bhutan border dispute

“War is not a solution to anything,” Swaraj said. “Patience, control on comments and diplomacy can resolve problems.”

Most previous standoffs, such as one in 2014 just ahead of a rare trip to India for President Xi Jinping, were resolved with both sides withdrawing their forces.

There has been no shooting since a brief border war in 1962.

http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/s...lysts-full-scale-war-india-china-likely-soon/

 

[Banglar Bir]

Is a second Sino-Indian border war imminent?
Feng Zhang, August 11, 2017

The Sino-Indian standoff in the Doklam (Donglang in Chinese) region of the Himalayas where the borders of China, India and Bhutan converge is now nearly two months old. The dispute arose in mid-June when China attempted to build a road in an area it believed to be under its sovereign control, provoking Indian authorities to block the construction by crossing the Sino-Indian border with troops and bulldozers.

As yet there’s little sign of an end to the standoff. On the contrary, talk of war is now heard from both sides, and Chinese voices, both official and unofficial, are particularly strident in accusing India of ‘invading’ Chinese territory.

How likely is it that the current standoff will escalate into a border war? I’ll first assess the probability from the Chinese side.

That China should want to fight a war with India at this moment seems a highly unlikely prospect. Beijing is about to hold the BRICS summit in Fujian province. That gathering is one of the two major ‘home-field’ foreign policy events of this year, the other being the Belt and Road Initiative summit held in May. A war with India would upset proceedings.

Second, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of President Xi Jinping is in the final stage of organising the 19th Party Congress. The once-every-five-years party congress is the most important event in Chinese politics, and President Xi is expected to consolidate his power for a second five-year term. With stability a top priority for Chinese leaders, a war with India would create undesirable complications.

Third, Chinese policymakers can’t fail to notice that China is facing a number of security contingencies along its vast periphery. It’s unclear whether the standoff with India is the most significant. From North Korea to the South China Sea, those scenarios are constantly occupying the minds of Chinese planners.

How important is the standoff with India in China’s overall strategic context? I suggest that, depending on different conceptions of strategic interests and ways to achieve them, the above arguments against war with India can be turned on their head.

First, although the diplomatic success of the BRICS summit is desirable, territorial sovereignty now ranks as one of China’s highest national priorities. The summit will offer a precious chance for President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi to find a diplomatic solution. But if no agreement is reached the probability of a military showdown will increase significantly.

Second, an orderly party congress is desirable to further anoint Xi’s power and authority. But a successful limited war fought on Chinese terms won’t necessarily damage that prospect. On the contrary, such a war would rally Chinese elites and the public around Xi, who would be acclaimed the new strategic mastermind.

Third, Chinese moderates will oppose a war with India on the grounds that the national interests involved are nowhere as vital to generate such a forceful response. However, the hardliners, armed with a different set of strategic assumptions, will argue that such a punitive war promises unique strategic benefits. Aside from bending India to China’s will it would send a ripple effect throughout Asia about the new strategic reality of Chinese power and resolve. Moreover, with a weakened US, isn’t this an opportune moment for some strategic surprise? India and the US may have moved closer in recent years, but they aren’t treaty allies. In a war with China, India would fight alone.

Also Read: Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory

In fact, China has been sending highly unusual signals in recent days. On 2 August, the foreign ministry published a 12-page position paper demonstrating India’s ‘invasion of Chinese territory’. From 3 August, within a 24-hour period, six organisations—the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the Xinhua News Agency, the foreign ministry (a second time), the defence ministry, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, and the People’s Daily—delivered a barrage of warnings to India about the dire consequences of underestimating Chinese resolve.

In a speech marking the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA on 1 August, Xi sternly affirmed:

We will never permit anybody, any organisation, any political party to split off any piece of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form. Nobody should nurse any hope that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harm to our national sovereignty, security and development interests.

If China is mobilising domestic support for a possible showdown, that will make any future compromise hard and costly and, consequently, a punitive war more attractive and acceptable. By now key Chinese elites and the public are convinced that India has ‘invaded’ Chinese territory and that a short, sharp war to expel Indian ‘invaders’ would be just and appropriate.

None of the above is to suggest that war is about to break out next week or next month. Chinese leaders will have to weigh the cost–benefit calculus before making the final call. One hopes that deft diplomacy will prevail—as has been the case since the last border war of 1962. But one shouldn’t rule out the possibility of conflict. Neither China nor India should be complacent about the current situation or underestimate the consequences if war does break out.

AUTHOR
Feng Zhang is a fellow in the Australian National University’s Department of International Relations and adjunct professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in China. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/11/second-sino-indian-border-war-imminent/

Neither India nor China has shown any sign of backing off from a face-off that began nearly three months ago along the Sikkim border when Indian soldiers entered the Doklam plateau to stop the Chinese army from constructing a road.

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indi...aised-report-1736676?pfrom=home-lateststories

Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory
SAM Report, August 10, 2017

Nearly two months have passed since Indian troops illegally crossed the China-India boundary in Sikkim Sector, and there is no sign of withdrawal so far.

According to Xinhua, what the Indian side has done is committed seven “sins” against Chinese sovereignty and international law. These severe mistakes may trigger unpredictable consequences and greatly undermine regional peace and stability.

India’s military trespassing is an infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. On June 18, Indian border troops, carrying weapons and driving bulldozers, illegally crossed the boundary in the Sikkim Sector at the Duo Ka La (Doka La) pass and entered Chinese territory.

For almost two months, India has maintained its military presence in the Doklam area, a place recognized by both India and the international community as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Chinese sovereign territory.

It is fundamentally different in nature from past frictions between the border troops of the two sides at an undefined part of the boundary.

The blatant move contravenes the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, which has clearly delimited this part of the boundary between the Tibet Autonomous Region and India’s Sikkim State.

Every Indian government since independence has confirmed the boundary as it stands under the Convention. It is hard to understand why India abandons its previous position at this time.

Once a boundary is established by a convention, it is under the protection of international law. It is obvious that India’s military invasion, under the pretext of so-called “security concerns,” tramples on the principles of the law as well as international order and cannot be tolerated by any sovereign state.

Since the incident broke out, India has invented various excuses to whitewash its illegal move and smear China’s normal and legitimate activities, but its arguments have no factual or legal grounds and are simply untenable.

India has argued that China’s building of roads would represent a “significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India,” but the fact is, Chinese construction is being conducted within its own territory. It is India that has broken the status quo by trespassing onto Chinese soil.

Even more ridiculous, India has attempted to justify its incursion in the name of “protecting Bhutan,” arguing that Doklam is Bhutanese territory.

The fact is that the Bhutanese authorities have clearly told Chinese officials that Doklam is not Bhutan’s territory and expressed bewilderment at India’s trespassing into Chinese soil.

Matters concerning the China-India-Bhutan boundary tri-junction have nothing to do with this incident. By kidnapping an unrelated third party to stir up troubles in the border area, India seeks to obstruct border negotiations between China and Bhutan.

China has a strong will to solve the problem peacefully, but the prerequisite is that the Indian trespassers must withdraw unconditionally and immediately. China will never negotiate with an invading force when its national territorial integrity remains infringed.

The Indian side keeps playing lip service of seeking diplomatic channels to resolve the issue while refusing to withdraw its troops.

India must be fully aware that as a reckless intruder to its neighbors, it should take responsibility for inflaming border tensions and swallow possible consequences.

http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/10/indian-militarys-seven-sins-trespassing-chinese-territory/

 

[Banglar Bir]

India’s military steps up operational readiness on China border
Reuters
Published at 07:44 PM August 11, 2017

Indian Army personnel keep vigilance at Bumla pass at the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh on October 21, 2012AFP
The crisis began in June when a Chinese construction crew was found to be trying to extend a road in the Doklam region that both China and the mountainous nation of Bhutan claim as theirs
India’s military has increased operational readiness along the eastern Indian border with China, sources said, as neither side shows any sign of backing off from a face-off in a remote Himalayan region near their disputed frontier.

Indian and Chinese troops have been embroiled in the seven-week confrontation on the Doklam plateau, claimed by both China and India’s ally, Bhutan.

The sources, who were briefed on the deployment, said they did not expect the tensions, involving about 300 soldiers on each side standing a few hundred feet apart, to escalate into a conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours, who fought a brief but bloody border war in 1962.

But the military alert level had been raised as a matter of caution, two sources in New Delhi and in the eastern state of Sikkim told on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

The crisis began in June when a Chinese construction crew was found to be trying to extend a road in the Doklam region that both China and the mountainous nation of Bhutan claim as theirs.

India, which has special ties with Bhutan, sent its troops to stop the construction, igniting anger in Beijing which said New Delhi had no business to intervene, and demanded a unilateral troop withdrawal.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, though, has dug in its heels and said that the Chinese road activity in the region near the borders of India, Bhutan and China was a threat to the security of its own northeast region.

“The army has moved to a state that is called ‘no war, no peace’,” one of the sources said. Under the order issued to all troop formations in the eastern command a week ago, soldiers are supposed take up positions that are earmarked for them in the event of a war, the source said.

Each year, Indian troop formations deployed on the border go on such an “operational alert” usually in September and October. But this year the activity has been advanced in the eastern sector, the source in Sikkim, above which lies the area of the current standoff, said.

“Its out of caution. It has been done because of the situation,” the source said. But the source stressed there was no additional force deployment and that the area was well defended.

http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/s...ary-steps-operational-readiness-china-border/

 

[idune]

If China choose to pursue the resolution of conflict using military and control area where river Teesta originates and flowing through, there is silver lining from Bangladesh. Bangladesh could get Teesta water issue solved. That being said we are still far from that point. Regardless, Bangladesh should morally and otherwise support the position that China and Bhutan solve border issue between them bilaterally and india should not have any role in it.

 

[bluesky]

If China choose to pursue the resolution of conflict using military and control area where river Teesta originates and flowing through, there is silver lining from Bangladesh. Bangladesh could get Teesta water issue solved. That being said we are still far from that point. Regardless, Bangladesh should morally and otherwise support the position that China and Bhutan solve border issue between them bilaterally and india should not have any role in it.

Dear @idune, you must read the map of Doklam. I do not find any Teesta there. How do you find it when it is on the other side? Anyway, Teesta is an issue between BD and India. You must talk to your beloved govt west of BD to give us water. Your Mamata Didi there is very mean and selfish, but she may love to hear your plea. Do not expect others to do BD's own homework.

 

[Banglar Bir]

Bhutan asks India to resolve Doklam border standoff amicably with China
SAM Staff, August 12, 2017

Bhutanese Foreign Minister in a meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in Kathmandu today said that they hope the Doklam standoff is resolved peacefully and amicably.

Amid the border tension in Doka La (Doklam), Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met her Bhutanese counterpart Damcho Dorji in Kathmandu on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) Ministerial meeting.

Both sides discussed the border standoff at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction. Speaking to the press after the meeting, the Bhutanese foreign minister said, “We hope the situation in Doklam will be resolved peacefully and amicably”.

This was the first meeting between the two ministers since the Doklam crisis broke out.

This meeting also comes at a time when China has been upping the ante with its media blitzkrieg of opinion pieces and articles in the Chinese mouthpieces as well as regular statements from the Chinese foreign ministry ‘warning’ India of dire consequences if it does not withdraw troops from Doklam.

This is also the first time that there has been an official reaction from the Bhutanese side since the press release that the Bhutan’s foreign ministry put out on June 29 which read, “Bhutan has conveyed to the Chinese side, both on the ground and through the diplomatic channel, that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between our two countries. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.”

The crisis began in mid-June when Indian forces prevented Chinese troops from building a road in Doka La (Doklam), an area which is disputed between Bhutan and China.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...esolve-doklam-border-standoff-amicably-china/

 

[Loafer]

If China choose to pursue the resolution of conflict using military and control area where river Teesta originates and flowing through, there is silver lining from Bangladesh. Bangladesh could get Teesta water issue solved. That being said we are still far from that point. Regardless, Bangladesh should morally and otherwise support the position that China and Bhutan solve border issue between them bilaterally and india should not have any role in it.

Bhutan is a friendly state whose security we handle just like client state Bangladesh.

 

[Banglar Bir]

A war in the Himalayas would expose India’s soft power
M.K. Bhadrakumar, August 12, 2017

The Xinhua news agency and China Daily newspaper, two authoritative platforms of Chinese policies, held out warnings this week over the military standoff with India near the Sikkim border.

China Daily starkly wrote that the “window for a peaceful solution is closing. The countdown to a clash between the two forces has begun….” Xinhua said China’s “restraint has limits and with every day that passes the tether shortens.”

Should these warning be taken seriously? India stubbornly ignored similar warnings 55 years ago in a border war it resoundingly lost and the rest is history.

A war between India and China is improbable since neither side wants it. But below that threshold is a vast space where miscalculations can occur. Indians and Chinese are patriotic people, driven by nationalistic leaderships, and “territorial sovereignty” is a highly emotive issue. What’s alarming is that both governments have successfully rallied domestic opinion.

In China, perhaps, this wasn’t particularly difficult. But in India where a hundred flowers normally bloom, opinion is polarizing at an exceptional rate. It seems all Indians are rising in anger over Facebook posts supporting China’s position. But how could there be a contrarian opinion?

This holds dangers because hubris is a self-devouring monster. The plain truth is that India’s post-Cold War foreign policy calculus will be severely put to test for the first time if a conflict with China ensues. No country has backed India in its seven-week standoff with China. Indians all along fancied that they were leagues ahead of Chinese in “soft power” – yoga, Gandhi, snake charmers, etc. Apparently, that is not so.

It is particularly galling that the United States has not taken any posture favoring India. India’s post-Cold War strategic discourse is heavily laden with the blithe assumption that the US regards India as a “counterweight” to China. Meghnad Desai, a high-flying opinion maker in the English-speaking Delhi circuit, said last week:

“All things that follow now will have a lot to do with what happens in the South China Sea. The US has sent out enough signals. If there is war, it will be a US-China war, with India on the US side, in the South China Sea and in the Himalayas. This trio (India, China and the US) is a very combustible mixture right now.… Ultimately, you have to understand that India cannot stand up to China without American help and support. America cannot stand up to China without Indian help. That is the symmetry in this relationship.”

The sheer naiveté in the above passage sums up India’s misfortune. The Indians refuse to see the geopolitical realities. It doesn’t occur to them that US President Donald Trump will fight wars only if America’s interests are directly threatened. Why should he order the Pentagon to send the marines to the Himalayas or to dispatch a carrier battle group to hunt down Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean?

The one thing emerging out of the meeting in Manila last Friday between US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is that the two top diplomats did not waste time on the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean.

Tillerson told the media that North Korea was the main topic in his discussions and whatever extra “bit of reflection on the relationship” with China that took place was devoted to the four high-level dialogues between the two countries last April at the summit at Mar-a-Lago, Florida. That meeting, he said, is “really advancing our two countries’ understandings of the nature of this relationship … and how we should strive to strengthen this relationship so that it benefits the world in terms of maintaining a secure world absent of conflict.”

Interestingly, the White House released a press release on Saturday thanking China for its cooperation in securing the passage of a resolution in the United Nations Security Council on increased sanctions against North Korea. Trump is expected to make a state visit to China in November and Wang disclosed that preparations have begun.

Indian analysts simply do not get the point that the US-China relationship is in an altogether different league. Simply put, the single most crucial template of India’s strategy against China turns out to be delusional – that the US will confront China on India’s behalf.

Equally, Indian strategists never expected that post-Soviet Russia would bounce back on to the world stage. Through the past quarter-century, successive Indian governments have pursued a policy of benign neglect of relations with Russia, which are today in a state of atrophy. On the other hand, Russia-China relations are today at their highest point in decades.

Sadly, India’s “soft power” took a lethal blow during the past three-year period of the Hindu-nationalist government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This is so not only in liberal Western opinion but also in the Muslim world. The violence against Muslims, the erosion in India’s secularist foundations, the mass upheaval in Kashmir have all received attention internationally. It is also useful to remember that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation represents 54 member countries of the United Nations.

Suffice to say, all these factors will come into play if a war ensues between India and China. India is not a match for China militarily, and in soft power too China may already have an advantage. By cocooning themselves in a fantasyland, Indians are too full of themselves in their refusal to be judged by international opinion – leave alone Chinese and its smaller South Asian neighbors’ opinions.

SOURCE ASIA TIMES
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/12/war-himalayas-expose-indias-soft-power/

 

[Banglar Bir]

2:00 AM, August 06, 2017 / LAST MODIFIED: 12:20 AM, August 06, 2017
Doklam standoff, Bhutan and its quest for greater freedom

Foreign policy independence of the sovereign nation of Bhutan (pictured) remains a far cry as the tiny kingdom finds itself not only landlocked between the two nuclear-armed Asian giants India and China but also at the centre of the latest standoff in Doklam.

Nahela Nowshin
The ongoing border standoff in Doklam between India and China could escalate further. China has already issued some strongly worded statements, including warning India not to test Beijing.

The standoff began in mid-June this year when China attempted constructing a motorable road in the disputed Doklam region—at the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan—considered by India as Bhutanese territory, and viewed by China as its own. India sent its troops to the region in a bid to halt China's construction of the road, and there has been a military standoff between the PLA and the Indian Army ever since.

India claims that China's road construction is an effort to get close to Doka La—which lies on the western edge of the Doklam plateau and is the last Indian military post on its border with Bhutan and China. This poses huge security concerns for India because if China successfully builds the road, it will shorten China's route to India's sensitive "Chicken's Neck", aka Siliguri Corridor, that connects seven northeastern states with the rest of the country. Siliguri Corridor is also vital for India's military formations in the northeast and so, the corridor, if isolated, would lead to supplies and reinforcements to the military being cut off.

"As the turf war between India and China unfolds, all eyes seem to be (as expected) on the future course of relations of the world's two most populous countries. But what has evaded almost everyone's attention is Bhutan.

China has put its foot down and demanded that Indian troops be immediately withdrawn to end the military standoff. China, through its official state news agency Xinhua, has unequivocally stated that “Doklam is Chinese territory and there is no doubt or dispute about it.” China is adamant about its stance on Doklam—make no mistake about it. China's Defence Ministry has warned India to not “push its luck” and “harbour any illusions.” China has said that its “restraint has a bottom line” and is ratcheting up rhetoric and ramping up pressure on India to remove its troops from the Doklam region, saying that India—under the pretext of security concerns or protection of Bhutan—has no legal basis to station troops in another's territory.

A great deal of words have already been exchanged between high-level officials of the two Asian giants, but there doesn't seem to be any solution, at least in the very short term, to the border impasse. Neither India nor China is going to back down anytime soon—neither one of them wants to throw up its hands and look weak. Backing down this early would only embolden the other to encroach on its territory or sphere of influence.

But things are much, much more complicated than that.

Amidst the ongoing crisis between the two countries who are no strangers to border disputes, China has repeatedly invoked the 1890 China-Britain treaty which, the Chinese Foreign Ministry recently said, clearly defines China-India boundary in the Sikkim part of the border. And India has been citing a non-public 2012 agreement according to which the tri-junction boundary points would be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries (including Bhutan); so any unilateral move to determine these points would therefore be a violation of this understanding.

Beijing sees a clear demarcation of borders according to the 1890 treaty—claiming 89 sq km in the Doklam plateau south of where India sees the China-Bhutan border—but Delhi thinks Beijing is mistaken. According to India, China is misinterpreting their previous agreements which take into account unresolved boundary issues at the tri-junction and India has affirmed the 1890 treaty on “the basis of alignment” of the India-China border in Sikkim based only on watershed, and not the treaty's other aspects.

As the turf war between India and China unfolds, all eyes seem to be (as expected) on the future course of relations of the world's two most populous countries. But what has evaded almost everyone's attention is Bhutan. Has anyone asked what Bhutan—the tiny kingdom hidden in the folds of the eastern Himalayas—has to say?

Bhutan in its official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying “the construction of the road [by China] inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between our two countries. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.” This is a reference to the 1988 and 1998 agreements stating that Bhutan and China “agree to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959.”

While China has asked India to back off and said that it is a matter strictly between China and Bhutan, it has not issued a statement on Bhutan's discontent with China.

Bhutan, since issuing a demarche to Beijing, has kept mum. It does not want to rile up tensions with China with whom it has several border disputes and has had 24 rounds of border negotiations. But Bhutan's official statement isn't to say that it does not wish to resolve border disputes with China. In fact, it has been said that the prevailing sentiment in Bhutan is quite the opposite. Bhutan wants to settle the Doklam boundary issue with China once and for all, without giving in to India's interests, so that it can exist peacefully alongside its neighbours. China too has shown an inclination towards establishing diplomatic ties with Bhutan (currently there are none).

But given Bhutan's historical relationship with India—which was in charge of guiding Bhutan's foreign policy as per the 1949 Friendship Treaty up until 2007 when the treaty was updated freeing Bhutan from seeking India's guidance on foreign policy and getting permission for arms imports—Bhutan cannot easily shake off India's sway over the kingdom's policy interests, particularly when China is in the mix. Not to mention Bhutan settling border disputes with China, which could mean Bhutan ceding Doklam plateau to China, is highly undesirable for India.

The Doklam standoff (and Bhutan in turn) has turned into yet another flashpoint of power play between the two giants. As the world keeps a close watch amidst fears of the latest conflict between India and China boiling over into an all-out war, it is easy to forget that what is also at stake here is the sovereignty of an independent nation—Bhutan—caught in the crossfire. Bhutan, like any free country, wants to wield control over its own affairs free of the influence of either Delhi or Beijing. But that is, for Bhutan, merely a fantasy, at least for the time being. For Bhutan, which is physically sandwiched between India and China, charting out its own path would necessarily mean keeping Indian interests at bay and prioritising its own.

Caught between two bigger powers flexing their muscles, the time will come sooner or later when Bhutan will have to take some calculated risks: establish ties and solve border disputes with China and face he wrath of its longtime ally India, or let border issues with China linger, increasing the likelihood of China overstepping its boundary, and let India do all the heavy lifting (to keep China in check) when push comes to shove.

http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/doklam-standoff-bhutan-and-its-quest-greater-freedom-1444063

 

[Banglar Bir]

Danger of India-China border war grows
K. Ratnayake, August 12, 2017

Chinese army in recent drill
The standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on the Doklam Plateau, a remote ridge in the Himalayan foothills, is continuing, amid growing warnings and threats of an impending military clash.

Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley told the country’s parliament Wednesday that its military is ready to meet any challenge and has already demonstrated with its victories over Pakistan in wars in 1965 and 1971 that it has learned the “lessons” of 1962. This was a reference to the month-long 1962 Sino-Indian border in which Beijing gave New Delhi a bloody nose, then ordered its troops to withdraw.

In an even more significant and troubling sign of the escalation of tensions, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MOD) has urgently requested additional funds of Rs. 200 billion ($3.1 billion) from the finance ministry to speed up the procurement of munitions, armaments and other war materiel. This follows on last month’s announcement that the MOD had given Vice Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Sarath Chand special powers to speed up emergency purchases of the ammunition and spare parts needed to wage war.

New Delhi has repeatedly suggested that the Doklam border crisis could be defused by both sides withdrawing their troops from the disputed ridge.

But China is adamant that it is up to India to take the first step, by recalling its forces unilaterally.

Beijing has repeatedly termed India’s actions unprecedentedly provocative. Unlike previous border disputes, the Indian Army is confronting Chinese troops on territory to which New Delhi itself has no claim, but is rather the subject of a dispute between China and the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan.

Moreover, Beijing disputes India’s claim that it interceded at the request of Bhutan to stop Chinese construction workers from expanding a road on the disputed plateau. Beijing contends that New Delhi acted unilaterally, then leaned on Bhutan, which India has long treated like a protectorate, to join it in protesting the alleged Chinese incursion on its territory. To date, Bhutan’s government has issued only one statement on the almost two-month-old Doklam standoff, and did so close to two weeks after the alleged Chinese incursion began.

Meanwhile, Beijing has repeatedly served notice that its patience is wearing thin and that it will not allow the standoff to continue indefinitely.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/12/danger-india-china-border-war-grows/

 

[Banglar Bir]

THE BHUTAN STANDOFF
More opportunity than threat
by James O’Neill | Published: 00:05, Aug 11,2017

IN JUNE of this year a new dispute between India and China arose when Indian troops moved into an area where the borders of Bhutan, Tibet and China meet and confronted Chinese workers building a road. The area concerned is known variously as the Doklam (Indian) or Donglang (Chinese) plateau. There has been a tense standoff between the two sides ever since.

The Sydney Morning Herald rather melodramatically headlined an opinion piece by its international editor Peter Hartcher ‘The clash that could lead to nuclear war’. Hartcher’s article, perhaps rather predictably, finds the Chinese to be responsible for the tension, relying heavily on an ‘expert’ named Rory Medcalf from the Australian National University’s National Security College who declared that it ‘is the most serious confrontation since the 1962 war.’

In his eagerness to find fault with the Chinese, Hartcher manages to completely ignore the historical context, the problems created by India’s reaction to Chinese road building in what China says is its territory, why India is particularly sensitive on border issues; and why the Indian reaction may have been inappropriate.

The Chinese Argument. Hartcher quotes only what he is pleased to call the ‘bellicose’ Global Times, an official newspaper of the Chinese government and widely used to disseminate the official Chinese viewpoint. Australian media of course are never bellicose. Hartcher refers to the Global Times ‘huffing’ sundry warnings and threats against India, and warning of ‘dire consequences’ if the Indian troops do not immediately withdraw.

There is no mention of the fact that the Chinese rely heavily upon and frequently quote the terms of the 1890 China-Great Britain Convention that settled the respective boundaries of India and China. Article 1 of that Convention specifically dealt with the China-India boundary, and that did not include the Doklam/Donglang territory that is the subject of the present dispute as being part of India.
Furthermore, the Chinese say, and it is not disputed by India, that both countries at various times post Indian independence and post the formation of the People’s Republic of China in the late 1940s, reaffirmed the nature and the force of the 1890 convention.

Thirdly, the Chinese argue that the road building was three kilometres north of the line drawn by Article 1 and therefore within Chinese territory.

Fourthly, discussions between Bhutan and China on border issues (and there are more than 400km dividing the two countries) have been going on since the 1980s and there was no reason for India to become involved.

Fifthly, the Chinese argue that India’s action, intervening in a territorial dispute not involving its own territory, is a breach of international law and accordingly the Indian troops should withdraw forthwith.
India’s position. India does not dispute the validity of Article 1 of the 1890 convention. Instead, India argues that the actual territorial line is different in fact than the description given in the convention.
Even if India is correct on that point, it does not assist their argument. If the actual border is as they say, the disputed territory is part of Bhutan, rather than China.

What has happened therefore is that India has intervened in a territorial dispute between China and Bhutan in which it has no legal standing. This is an action fraught with considerable risks, not only to India but in its wider ramifications, as will be returned to below.

India says that Bhutan asked for its help. Hartcher says that the Bhutan Foreign Ministry did indeed ask for help, although there are conflicting reports on that point. According to a more detailed analysis of the point than appears in Hartcher’s piece is in the Indian newspaper the Telegraph the government of Bhutan has made no official statement confirming that it sought India’s assistance.

When an Indian government spokesman was asked a direct question on the point he answered with a rather confusing cricket metaphor. Both the Indian and Bhutan governments issued official statements. The Bhutan statement did not mention India and the Indian statement made no mention that the assistance given was at Bhutan’s request.

As several commentators have pointed out, but Hartcher fails to mention, is that either way the Indian action creates a dangerous precedent. What if, for example, Pakistan was to ask for Chinese help in the divided and disputed territory of Kashmir, where India and Pakistan have been in frequent and often violent dispute since partition in 1948?

Hartcher seems unable or unwilling to acknowledge that at least part of the problem is the unwillingness of Indian Prime Minister Modi to approach key foreign policy issues in a calm manner. Instead he has shown in a number of issues that his hatred of Pakistan and his distrust of China have led to a number of missteps.

Given the studied silence by Bhutan as to whether they welcomed the Indian military incursion or not, this latest action by Modi must be seen as another misstep. Given that Bhutan has been negotiating with China for several decades, it seems a safer assumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that India’s precipitate military intervention was not at all welcome.

India is being encouraged by such nations as the United States and Australia to resist the growing Chinese presence in what the Indians see as ‘their’ region of South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean. When Modi looks around him he sees for example, Chinese initiated developments of enormous scale that are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

These initiatives include for example, the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that is particularly sensitive to India as its route traverses the Pakistan controlled portion of Kashmir. There is also the China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic Passage and the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India Economic Corridor among many other major initiatives. India has neither the economic not financial ability to compete with these projects, which are transformational in their scope and potential.

Instead, India has been beguiled by the US-India so-called strategic partnership, which has minimal benefit for India. Instead, as Gupta that is because it is basically confined to checking Chinese power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

There are however some positive signs. Despite the rhetorical posturing by both sides and the overblown hyperbole of much mainstream media comment, neither side has come to physical blows and neither are they likely to. China’s military might is far superior for one thing, and India has no wish to repeat the 1962 humiliation of their brief war.

More importantly, neither side wants a war that will risk undoing the enormous potential that both sides have. The fact that both India and Pakistan became full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at the same time as this dispute was brewing is evidence of where their priorities lie.
Notwithstanding Modi’s reluctance to fully embrace the BRI (which is also the case with Australia), economic self-interest will dictate a softening of that stance sooner rather than later.

New Eastern Outlook, August 9. James O’Neill, an Australian-based barrister at law, writes exclusively for the online magazine New Eastern Outlook.
http://www.newagebd.net/article/21686/more-opportunity-than-threat

 

[idune]

Bhutan’s neutral stance embarrasses India

August 12, 2017

Despite India’s continuous pressure on Bhutan to openly take India’s side, Thimpu’s passive resistance has embarrassed New Delhi.

Indian media reported Thursday that anonymous sources in the Bhutanese government told the media to refer to the Bhutanese foreign ministry’s June 29 statement for its position on the Doklam issue. The statement said the construction of the road in Doklam was a direct violation of agreements.

A few days ago, a Chinese diplomat told a visiting Indian media delegation that Bhutan had conveyed to China through diplomatic channels that the area of the standoff is not its territory.

Due to the fact that Indian troops crossed into Chinese territory on the ground to “protect Bhutan,” Thimpu’s stance is catastrophic for India.

India has stationed troops in Bhutan and controls the country’s defense and foreign affairs.

Senior Bhutanese officials have never openly said the area of standoff is Bhutan’s territory and never acknowledged they requested India’s intervention in China’s road construction. New Delhi took the liberty to speak on Bhutan’s behalf.

On Friday, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met her Bhutanese counterpart Damcho Dorji. Dorji said “we hope the situation in Doklam will be resolved peacefully and amicably.”

Bhutan obviously wants to remain neutral in the standoff. It does not appear like a country that had been “invaded” by China and desperately wants India’s protection.

India is bullying Bhutan and its fabricated excuses are groundless in front of international laws.

India’s overall strength is far from that of a major power, but its hegemonic ambitions are world-class. It forcefully annexed Sikkim in the past and continues to violate Bhutan’s sovereign rights and to interfere in Nepal’s foreign policies. Because India has always been courted by the West, many of its practices were tolerated by the US and its allies.

India’s regional hegemonism has expanded to harm China’s national interests, forcing Beijing to take action. China has advocated that all countries are equal despite their size. It’s necessary for China to spread this initiative to South Asia, which will surely be welcomed by countries under India’s pressure. China is also capable of influencing how India is perceived by these countries. It’s time for India’s hegemony in South Asia to come to an end.

China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We can also condemn India’s violation of South Asian nations’ sovereign rights through UN platforms. The Doklam standoff is just the start. The world needs to see what India has done in South Asia.

http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/12/bhutans-neutral-stance-embarrasses-india/