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What will the jihadist takeover of Kashmir lead to?
Salman Rafi, May 28, 2017
Who would the world blame if Kashmir, a disputed territory between Pakistan and India, falls a prey to jihadist radicalization and turn into a battleground between competing religious ideologies, outshining the erstwhile fervor for national independence and emancipation from decades of suppression? This is a question worth asking at this stage!
Given the momentum the movement for independence has recently picked in the Indian held Kashmir, the risk of this momentum being hijacked by religious radicalism has equally increased. Its first manifestation came when the leader of Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Zakir Musa, recently announced that his struggle was for the implementation of Sharia Law in Kashmir and that he wanted to chop off “the heads of Hurriyat leaders.”
In his messages posted on social media, Musa can be seen explicitly opposing the movement for independence on nationalist basis, calling nationalism as anti-Islam ideology and impressing his followers, who’re mostly young university students, to reject this path, and instead gear their energy towards establishment of Sharia.
Being seen as the first major split of its kind in Kashmir, the Jihadist takeover, if successful and absolute, is likely to change the very character of the movement in the coming years. That is to say, whereas the split itself signifies an internal struggle between the old Kashmiri freedom fighters and the young radicalised youth, it also shows that the more the Kashmir dispute drifts, or is allowed to drift, towards exclusive remit of right-wing and violent groups, the more the inherent justness of the Kashmir cause will be obscured, making it difficult even for Pakistan, who is fighting its own war on terror, to extend diplomatic and moral support to these militant groups.
Let’s not miss that Musa has equally criticised Pakistan for not being Islamic enough and praised the Taliban for their struggle to revive Sharia Law in Pakistan.
The scenario thus developing in Kashmir is also leaving Pakistan with minimum options available, options that would not only force upon Pakistan a change in the way it has traditionally viewed the problem and projected it worldwide, but also in terms of revisiting its de facto Kashmir-first-policy.
What does this scenario mean in terms of India’s engagement with Kashmir?
Already, the Modi Sarkar’s highhanded policy of suppression has caused a new era of protests and militant struggle in Kashmir. The question, therefore, for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is no longer — and not merely— of how to resolve the crisis, but equally of how to prevent the apparent emergence of religious radicalism?
There is no gainsaying that the Modi Sarkar’s sole reliance on the use of force is going to provide the all necessary context — and it already has to an extent — for this radicalization to gain deep roots. Given the past history of India’s (mis) handling of the Kashmir issue, there is equally very little chance of India following a different policy track in the current situation.
For Modi Sarkar, this would perhaps mean another opportunity to divert more of its resources to Kashmir, allow the conflict to grow more violent, spread its wings and use that situation to strengthen its political position inside India.
On the regional scale, while such a situation is unlikely to enable India to disrupt the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor, which is passing through the Pakistani part of Kashmir, India can tap into the militarized scenario and use to disassociate itself further from OBOR and other projects such as Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM).
But what is the likelihood of India using the situation to better its relations with Pakistan and jointly confront the rising menace of religious extremism?
Political expediency of the Modi regime has so far kept it preoccupied with forcefully maintaining law and order and bash Pakistan solely for the situation. This, in turn, is part of Modi’s policy to maintain his image as a “strong leader” in the mainland India.
Musa’s turn towards Islamization of the Kashmiri movement is, therefore, directly going to add more and more substance to Modi’s attachment to Hindutva ideology, allow it even more space within Indian electoral politics and thereby render India’s constitutional attachment to secularism as increasingly irrelevant to India’s politics.
This will certainly make the question of resolving the Kashmir conundrum with potential co-operation of Pakistan even more problematic and politically suicidal for the BJP.
So far, the Modi government seems to have chosen to stay in a state of denial as it as yet again ruled out engaging in dialogue with the separatists, including the separatist Hurriyat, or the new radicals. Unable to see the rift piercing apart the internal unity of the movement and the opportunity it is offering to co-opt the Hurriyat, neither is the India government willing to recognize that Kashmir is a problem, nor open enough to see that the string of solution is in its own hands rather than Pakistan.
As Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist and peace activist recently argued, “by formally acknowledging Kashmir as a problem that needs a political solution, using humane methods of crowd control, and releasing political prisoners from Kashmiri jails, India could move sensibly towards a lessening of internal tensions.”
For a durable peace to occur, this realization needs to be compounded by a fundamental policy shift in Pakistan and realization within the people of Kashmir themselves, particularly the nationalists, of the grave dangers of allowing religious radicals to takeover.
If anything, this takeover will do, it will strip the national movement of the right to demand the right to exercise self-determination as a nation and, on the other hand, allow India to lay a heavy hand on the valley, and indulge in aggressive pursuits, falling short of a full-fledged attack, inside Pakistan as was recently warned by US intelligence officials.
Blaming Pakistan simply wouldn’t resolve the problem, as it never has. The solution has to start from within India and it needs to be based upon the principle of constructive engagement rather than an outright denial of the problem, for the problem is gradually worsening and merely blaming Pakistan wouldn’t treat it in any way.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is an independent journalist based in Pakistan. His areas of interest include politics of terrorism, global war on terror, ethno-national conflicts, foreign policies of major powers, application and consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/05/28/will-jihadist-takeover-kashmir-lead/
Salman Rafi, May 28, 2017
Who would the world blame if Kashmir, a disputed territory between Pakistan and India, falls a prey to jihadist radicalization and turn into a battleground between competing religious ideologies, outshining the erstwhile fervor for national independence and emancipation from decades of suppression? This is a question worth asking at this stage!
Given the momentum the movement for independence has recently picked in the Indian held Kashmir, the risk of this momentum being hijacked by religious radicalism has equally increased. Its first manifestation came when the leader of Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Zakir Musa, recently announced that his struggle was for the implementation of Sharia Law in Kashmir and that he wanted to chop off “the heads of Hurriyat leaders.”
In his messages posted on social media, Musa can be seen explicitly opposing the movement for independence on nationalist basis, calling nationalism as anti-Islam ideology and impressing his followers, who’re mostly young university students, to reject this path, and instead gear their energy towards establishment of Sharia.
Being seen as the first major split of its kind in Kashmir, the Jihadist takeover, if successful and absolute, is likely to change the very character of the movement in the coming years. That is to say, whereas the split itself signifies an internal struggle between the old Kashmiri freedom fighters and the young radicalised youth, it also shows that the more the Kashmir dispute drifts, or is allowed to drift, towards exclusive remit of right-wing and violent groups, the more the inherent justness of the Kashmir cause will be obscured, making it difficult even for Pakistan, who is fighting its own war on terror, to extend diplomatic and moral support to these militant groups.
Let’s not miss that Musa has equally criticised Pakistan for not being Islamic enough and praised the Taliban for their struggle to revive Sharia Law in Pakistan.
The scenario thus developing in Kashmir is also leaving Pakistan with minimum options available, options that would not only force upon Pakistan a change in the way it has traditionally viewed the problem and projected it worldwide, but also in terms of revisiting its de facto Kashmir-first-policy.
What does this scenario mean in terms of India’s engagement with Kashmir?
Already, the Modi Sarkar’s highhanded policy of suppression has caused a new era of protests and militant struggle in Kashmir. The question, therefore, for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is no longer — and not merely— of how to resolve the crisis, but equally of how to prevent the apparent emergence of religious radicalism?
There is no gainsaying that the Modi Sarkar’s sole reliance on the use of force is going to provide the all necessary context — and it already has to an extent — for this radicalization to gain deep roots. Given the past history of India’s (mis) handling of the Kashmir issue, there is equally very little chance of India following a different policy track in the current situation.
For Modi Sarkar, this would perhaps mean another opportunity to divert more of its resources to Kashmir, allow the conflict to grow more violent, spread its wings and use that situation to strengthen its political position inside India.
On the regional scale, while such a situation is unlikely to enable India to disrupt the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor, which is passing through the Pakistani part of Kashmir, India can tap into the militarized scenario and use to disassociate itself further from OBOR and other projects such as Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM).
But what is the likelihood of India using the situation to better its relations with Pakistan and jointly confront the rising menace of religious extremism?
Political expediency of the Modi regime has so far kept it preoccupied with forcefully maintaining law and order and bash Pakistan solely for the situation. This, in turn, is part of Modi’s policy to maintain his image as a “strong leader” in the mainland India.
Musa’s turn towards Islamization of the Kashmiri movement is, therefore, directly going to add more and more substance to Modi’s attachment to Hindutva ideology, allow it even more space within Indian electoral politics and thereby render India’s constitutional attachment to secularism as increasingly irrelevant to India’s politics.
This will certainly make the question of resolving the Kashmir conundrum with potential co-operation of Pakistan even more problematic and politically suicidal for the BJP.
So far, the Modi government seems to have chosen to stay in a state of denial as it as yet again ruled out engaging in dialogue with the separatists, including the separatist Hurriyat, or the new radicals. Unable to see the rift piercing apart the internal unity of the movement and the opportunity it is offering to co-opt the Hurriyat, neither is the India government willing to recognize that Kashmir is a problem, nor open enough to see that the string of solution is in its own hands rather than Pakistan.
As Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist and peace activist recently argued, “by formally acknowledging Kashmir as a problem that needs a political solution, using humane methods of crowd control, and releasing political prisoners from Kashmiri jails, India could move sensibly towards a lessening of internal tensions.”
For a durable peace to occur, this realization needs to be compounded by a fundamental policy shift in Pakistan and realization within the people of Kashmir themselves, particularly the nationalists, of the grave dangers of allowing religious radicals to takeover.
If anything, this takeover will do, it will strip the national movement of the right to demand the right to exercise self-determination as a nation and, on the other hand, allow India to lay a heavy hand on the valley, and indulge in aggressive pursuits, falling short of a full-fledged attack, inside Pakistan as was recently warned by US intelligence officials.
Blaming Pakistan simply wouldn’t resolve the problem, as it never has. The solution has to start from within India and it needs to be based upon the principle of constructive engagement rather than an outright denial of the problem, for the problem is gradually worsening and merely blaming Pakistan wouldn’t treat it in any way.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is an independent journalist based in Pakistan. His areas of interest include politics of terrorism, global war on terror, ethno-national conflicts, foreign policies of major powers, application and consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/05/28/will-jihadist-takeover-kashmir-lead/
