Chanakya's_Chant
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Some observations while I was going through the controversial Indo-US Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and it's implications for India -
>> The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The ACSA is governed by legal guidelines and is used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.
>> In South Asia, Washington has a similar arrangement with Sri Lanka. In March 2007, both countries signed ACSA (valid for 10 years) to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support and re-fuelling of services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises.
>> Stripped down to its basics, the LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each others' fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve non-offensive military equipment ONLY. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. The LSA would be particularly beneficial at the time of disaster relief operations like the one India undertook in the wake of the Asian Tsunami in 2004.
>> The important aspect here is 'interoperability' meaning the Indian and US forces can work together in times of emergency without wasting any time in familiarizing themselves with each other's forces. India and the US are no strangers to the arrangement outlined under the LSA. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Indian government had provided refueling facility to American fighter jets at Mumbai's Sahar international airport (In fact it was forced to do so for availing a loan from the IMF in which the Americans had majority of the voting rights) However, this move had come under criticism from opposition parties and the government had to withdraw the facility subsequently.
>> The past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative. Financially too the LSA makes good sense for India. According to some official estimates, with LSA in place, India would be able to save around US$20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil like the Red Flag War Games.
>> If India signs the Logistic Support Agreement(LSA), India’s maritime industry and shipyards can benefit through USA’s pivot and enhance India’s access to US Naval logistics and co-operation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HADR). The LSA is a mutual naval support agreement, with no strings attached and has been reviewed in the South Block to suit India’s foreign policy.
>> The Indian Navy already has a fuel exchange agreement with the US Navy tankers, and works with USA’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The LSA only extends such co-operation and permits use of Indian shipyards for repairs and refits of US ships, on strictly commercial basis.
>> The LSA agreement includes directions for exercises, training, and for UN Peacekeeping operations, which are standard operating procedures (SOPs) in Malabar exercises and for co-operation in UN operations. The Indian Navy pays an annual fee to the US Navy to fly a USN Deep Sea Rescue Vessel (DSRV) in case of a submarine accident, and has an informal Fuel Exchange Agreement (FEA). Indian warships can take on fuel at sea from US tankers with reciprocal facilities. The Indian Navy buys spares from the US Foreign Military Sales(FMS) with an escrow account to maintain the 17,000 LPD INS Jalsahwa (Ex USS Trenton). The IAF also uses FMS.
>> With LSA USA will be able to offer latest technologies, and set up maintenance and repair organizations (MROs), which India lacks to support civil airlines too, and save FFE.
Comment >>
Opposition to the LSA comes mainly from the Left parties who do not want India to be party to the 'wrong designs' of the US military in the region and in the process, compromise India's strategic sovereignty. The LSA they argue, would oblige India to comply with Washington's agenda. However, the concerns of the Left parties seem unfounded as the past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative.
The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities. Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement. Thus, from both the strategic and economic aspects, the LSA works largely in India's favour.
>> The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The ACSA is governed by legal guidelines and is used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.
>> In South Asia, Washington has a similar arrangement with Sri Lanka. In March 2007, both countries signed ACSA (valid for 10 years) to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support and re-fuelling of services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises.
>> Stripped down to its basics, the LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each others' fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve non-offensive military equipment ONLY. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. The LSA would be particularly beneficial at the time of disaster relief operations like the one India undertook in the wake of the Asian Tsunami in 2004.
>> The important aspect here is 'interoperability' meaning the Indian and US forces can work together in times of emergency without wasting any time in familiarizing themselves with each other's forces. India and the US are no strangers to the arrangement outlined under the LSA. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Indian government had provided refueling facility to American fighter jets at Mumbai's Sahar international airport (In fact it was forced to do so for availing a loan from the IMF in which the Americans had majority of the voting rights) However, this move had come under criticism from opposition parties and the government had to withdraw the facility subsequently.
>> The past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative. Financially too the LSA makes good sense for India. According to some official estimates, with LSA in place, India would be able to save around US$20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil like the Red Flag War Games.
>> If India signs the Logistic Support Agreement(LSA), India’s maritime industry and shipyards can benefit through USA’s pivot and enhance India’s access to US Naval logistics and co-operation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HADR). The LSA is a mutual naval support agreement, with no strings attached and has been reviewed in the South Block to suit India’s foreign policy.
>> The Indian Navy already has a fuel exchange agreement with the US Navy tankers, and works with USA’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The LSA only extends such co-operation and permits use of Indian shipyards for repairs and refits of US ships, on strictly commercial basis.
>> The LSA agreement includes directions for exercises, training, and for UN Peacekeeping operations, which are standard operating procedures (SOPs) in Malabar exercises and for co-operation in UN operations. The Indian Navy pays an annual fee to the US Navy to fly a USN Deep Sea Rescue Vessel (DSRV) in case of a submarine accident, and has an informal Fuel Exchange Agreement (FEA). Indian warships can take on fuel at sea from US tankers with reciprocal facilities. The Indian Navy buys spares from the US Foreign Military Sales(FMS) with an escrow account to maintain the 17,000 LPD INS Jalsahwa (Ex USS Trenton). The IAF also uses FMS.
>> With LSA USA will be able to offer latest technologies, and set up maintenance and repair organizations (MROs), which India lacks to support civil airlines too, and save FFE.
Comment >>
Opposition to the LSA comes mainly from the Left parties who do not want India to be party to the 'wrong designs' of the US military in the region and in the process, compromise India's strategic sovereignty. The LSA they argue, would oblige India to comply with Washington's agenda. However, the concerns of the Left parties seem unfounded as the past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative.
The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities. Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement. Thus, from both the strategic and economic aspects, the LSA works largely in India's favour.
