What Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar won’t say

[Bang Galore]

What Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar won’t say

Why couldn’t Dr Singh visit Pakistan? Why did UPA policy not deliver when he, Khurshid were in charge?


Written by M J Akbar | Published:November 20, 2015

Mani Shankar Aiyar


Science might have jogged along a bit since the doctors of medicine in ancient Greece, but their metaphors are still in application. Hippocrates was right when, nearly 2,500 years ago, he recognised the “humour” or bile that gives rise to choleric rage as a medical condition.

The malevolence that infuses the language of Congress notables like Mani Shankar Aiyar and Salman Khurshid when they refer to Prime Minister Narendra Modi does not, however, emerge merely from personal frustrations. There is also some elitist snobbery. A “chap” who should have ended his career serving scones in their boarding schools has had the temerity to become prime minister of India. But this is less relevant than the question raised by Aiyar when he urged a Pakistani television audience to “remove” Modi so that talks could resume between India and Pakistan.

If the debate were informed by reason rather than prejudice, the relevant question would be different: Why couldn’t Manmohan Singh visit Pakistan as prime minister?

Manmohan Singh was prime minister for 10 years. You have to be 10 times blessed by destiny to achieve such longevity in office. Manmohan Singh was sincere enough. There was also a very understandable emotional aspect. Manmohan Singh was very keen to visit Gah, the Pakistani village where he was born and lived before fleeing as a refugee when sibling neighbours were separated at birth by the cruel knife of Partition.

Why did Manmohan Singh fail to achieve peace?

For 10 long years, he continued a dialogue at many levels. Perhaps the most important tier of this multi-dimensional engagement took place in what is known as the secretive back-channel. What happened there? We do not know. What we do know is that nothing important was achieved on any channel, which was why the relationship remained dangerously stagnant below the semantics of good manners and the cordial exchange of signals that signified nothing. Is this what we want — the restoration of sterility under the veil of pretence?

It is important to stress that Manmohan Singh made the compromises he considered necessary for taking the relationship forward, which, in the view of many analysts, were injurious to our national interest. At the height of his personal influence, after re-election in 2009, Manmohan Singh accepted in a joint statement issued at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, an implicit Indian role in the Balochistan uprising that has troubled Pakistan for decades. This reversal of India’s position was not only totally unwarranted, but astonished even Manmohan Singh’s national security advisor, M.K. Narayanan, who had to be farmed out to a palace in Calcutta soon after Sharm el-Sheikh. Pakistan did not bend before any Indian demand on action against architects of terrorism against us, the chief of whom is, of course, Hafiz Saeed, then head of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It was Manmohan Singh who gave way. Even this did not persuade Pakistan to lift the security protection and legal lenience that it has provided to Saeed and his fellow terrorists, or indeed do anything else to create conditions for a visit by Manmohan Singh. Why has this fact disappeared from discussion?

It seems now that Sharm el-Sheikh was not an aberration but conscious Congress policy. Khurshid’s virtual silence on Saeed during a recent set-piece visit to Karachi to deliver a formal address indicates as much. Khurshid has served as foreign minister under Manmohan Singh. He has the blessings of the leaders of his party, Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi. He cannot be dismissed as a maverick on the wrong kind of steroids. Khurshid praised the Pakistan army for confronting tribal forces on its western frontiers, but did not have much to say about ISI support for the architects of the Mumbai outrage, or their successors who might be planning a repetition. This is precisely the line that Pakistani hardliners want Indian politicians to take. We should not be surprised if the government of Nawaz Sharif and Raheel Sharif conclude that they have diminished, if not dented, India’s unity on terrorism.

The Congress is now extending, in the company of bombastic rabble-rousers like Azam Khan, the Pakistani narrative to terrorism across the world. Islamabad’s standard response, when questioned about the sources of terrorism that find sanctuary on its soil, is to divert the argument to “causes” of terrorism. This is what Azam Khan and Aiyar repeat.

There is a misguided notion behind this voice of appeasement. There are too many senior people in the Congress and other parties who believe that this is what Indian Muslims want to hear, that such rhetoric will cement their support. Certainly the likes of Azam Khan have no other reason for playing their verbal games. This is not only wrong but does Indian Muslims severe injustice. The fringe of extremists apart, Indian Muslims believe in the values of their soil and the principles of our Constitution. They want the same things from practical electoral politics as anyone else; fundamentally, a better life. To believe that they will sympathise with a foreigner’s murderous war is to echo a lie.

No one in his senses prefers conflict to peace. Every prime minister of India has sought a settlement with Pakistan, and every prime minister will continue to do so. But whose fault was it that Manmohan Singh failed? Aiyar was in the cabinet; Khurshid was foreign minister; both said everything Pakistan wanted to hear, and continue to do so. Why did the three fail despite being in power for 10 years? Was a decade too short even to open a door for Manmohan Singh’s visit?

What right do Aiyar and Khurshid have to talk about talks when all their talking for 10 years did not take the two countries an inch forward? Or is simulation and pretence all that they and the Congress have as substitute for policy?

Islamabad felt no need to reach terms with a government it could take for a ride. That is the answer to the question that the Congress wants to bury.

What Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar won’t say | The Indian Express

 

[dadeechi]

What Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar won’t say

Why couldn’t Dr Singh visit Pakistan? Why did UPA policy not deliver when he, Khurshid were in charge?


Written by M J Akbar | Published:November 20, 2015

Mani Shankar Aiyar


Science might have jogged along a bit since the doctors of medicine in ancient Greece, but their metaphors are still in application. Hippocrates was right when, nearly 2,500 years ago, he recognised the “humour” or bile that gives rise to choleric rage as a medical condition.

The malevolence that infuses the language of Congress notables like Mani Shankar Aiyar and Salman Khurshid when they refer to Prime Minister Narendra Modi does not, however, emerge merely from personal frustrations. There is also some elitist snobbery. A “chap” who should have ended his career serving scones in their boarding schools has had the temerity to become prime minister of India. But this is less relevant than the question raised by Aiyar when he urged a Pakistani television audience to “remove” Modi so that talks could resume between India and Pakistan.

If the debate were informed by reason rather than prejudice, the relevant question would be different: Why couldn’t Manmohan Singh visit Pakistan as prime minister?

Manmohan Singh was prime minister for 10 years. You have to be 10 times blessed by destiny to achieve such longevity in office. Manmohan Singh was sincere enough. There was also a very understandable emotional aspect. Manmohan Singh was very keen to visit Gah, the Pakistani village where he was born and lived before fleeing as a refugee when sibling neighbours were separated at birth by the cruel knife of Partition.

Why did Manmohan Singh fail to achieve peace?

For 10 long years, he continued a dialogue at many levels. Perhaps the most important tier of this multi-dimensional engagement took place in what is known as the secretive back-channel. What happened there? We do not know. What we do know is that nothing important was achieved on any channel, which was why the relationship remained dangerously stagnant below the semantics of good manners and the cordial exchange of signals that signified nothing. Is this what we want — the restoration of sterility under the veil of pretence?

It is important to stress that Manmohan Singh made the compromises he considered necessary for taking the relationship forward, which, in the view of many analysts, were injurious to our national interest. At the height of his personal influence, after re-election in 2009, Manmohan Singh accepted in a joint statement issued at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, an implicit Indian role in the Balochistan uprising that has troubled Pakistan for decades. This reversal of India’s position was not only totally unwarranted, but astonished even Manmohan Singh’s national security advisor, M.K. Narayanan, who had to be farmed out to a palace in Calcutta soon after Sharm el-Sheikh. Pakistan did not bend before any Indian demand on action against architects of terrorism against us, the chief of whom is, of course, Hafiz Saeed, then head of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It was Manmohan Singh who gave way. Even this did not persuade Pakistan to lift the security protection and legal lenience that it has provided to Saeed and his fellow terrorists, or indeed do anything else to create conditions for a visit by Manmohan Singh. Why has this fact disappeared from discussion?

It seems now that Sharm el-Sheikh was not an aberration but conscious Congress policy. Khurshid’s virtual silence on Saeed during a recent set-piece visit to Karachi to deliver a formal address indicates as much. Khurshid has served as foreign minister under Manmohan Singh. He has the blessings of the leaders of his party, Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi. He cannot be dismissed as a maverick on the wrong kind of steroids. Khurshid praised the Pakistan army for confronting tribal forces on its western frontiers, but did not have much to say about ISI support for the architects of the Mumbai outrage, or their successors who might be planning a repetition. This is precisely the line that Pakistani hardliners want Indian politicians to take. We should not be surprised if the government of Nawaz Sharif and Raheel Sharif conclude that they have diminished, if not dented, India’s unity on terrorism.

The Congress is now extending, in the company of bombastic rabble-rousers like Azam Khan, the Pakistani narrative to terrorism across the world. Islamabad’s standard response, when questioned about the sources of terrorism that find sanctuary on its soil, is to divert the argument to “causes” of terrorism. This is what Azam Khan and Aiyar repeat.

There is a misguided notion behind this voice of appeasement. There are too many senior people in the Congress and other parties who believe that this is what Indian Muslims want to hear, that such rhetoric will cement their support. Certainly the likes of Azam Khan have no other reason for playing their verbal games. This is not only wrong but does Indian Muslims severe injustice. The fringe of extremists apart, Indian Muslims believe in the values of their soil and the principles of our Constitution. They want the same things from practical electoral politics as anyone else; fundamentally, a better life. To believe that they will sympathise with a foreigner’s murderous war is to echo a lie.

No one in his senses prefers conflict to peace. Every prime minister of India has sought a settlement with Pakistan, and every prime minister will continue to do so. But whose fault was it that Manmohan Singh failed? Aiyar was in the cabinet; Khurshid was foreign minister; both said everything Pakistan wanted to hear, and continue to do so. Why did the three fail despite being in power for 10 years? Was a decade too short even to open a door for Manmohan Singh’s visit?

What right do Aiyar and Khurshid have to talk about talks when all their talking for 10 years did not take the two countries an inch forward? Or is simulation and pretence all that they and the Congress have as substitute for policy?

Islamabad felt no need to reach terms with a government it could take for a ride. That is the answer to the question that the Congress wants to bury.

What Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar won’t say | The Indian Express

Modi as PM is the best opportunity for both India and Pakistan to settle any and all disputes. No one in India would question the intentions and integrity of Modi even if he agrees for a deal which seems to be more favorable to Pakistan. The same could be said about Raheel Sharif too from Pakistan's perspective.

 

[Bang Galore]

Modi as PM is the best opportunity for both India and Pakistan to settle any and all disputes. No one in India would question the intentions and integrity of Modi even if he agrees for a deal which seems to be more favorable to Pakistan. The same could be said about Raheel Sharif too from Pakistan's perspective.

There is never going to be a deal favouring Pakistan. Not even MMS conceded that. The best that will be on offer is some cosmetics put on what is essentially the status quo. Lipstick on a pig, if you will.

 

[MilSpec]

Modi as PM is the best opportunity for both India and Pakistan to settle any and all disputes. No one in India would question the intentions and integrity of Modi even if he agrees for a deal which seems to be more favorable to Pakistan. The same could be said about Raheel Sharif too from Pakistan's perspective.

India's Pakistan Policy is deeply rooted in principles of diminishing returns.
that said I am thoroughly disappointed in this government's UPA'isqe policy.

 

[Bang Galore]

India's Pakistan Policy is deeply rooted in principles of diminishing returns.
that said I am thoroughly disappointed in this government's UPA'isqe policy.

Don't disagree but what would like to see done differently?

 

[dadeechi]

There is never going to be a deal favouring Pakistan. Not even MMS conceded that. The best that will be on offer is some cosmetics put on what is essentially the status quo. Lipstick on a pig, if you will.

Yes. Hence, I said seemingly favorable. A deal is possible only when both parties could see the gain and be able to sell it back to their respective citizens. A one sided deal made under duress would lead to disastrous results like in the case of Treaty of Versailles.

 

[MilSpec]

Don't disagree but what would like to see done differently?

What result has last 40 years of engagement produced? what has really worked? I dont think a SWOT is that difficult.
This policy of appeasement has gotten India nothing, all this blah blah of look east, where did that disppear, what happened to BIMSTEC, SASEC...
Dis engage, stop interactions, go your own way- there is not 1, not a single reason to engage with Pakistan in the current scenario. It is a complete waste of diplomatic capital.

Yes. Hence, I said seemingly favorable. A deal is possible only when both parties could see the gain and be able to sell it back to their respective citizens. A one sided deal made under duress would lead to disastrous results like in the case of Treaty of Versailles.

What happens when you have two divergent graphs? what happens to those two graphs in two years, what happens in 20? What happens to those two graphs in 40? With divergent entities you cannot have convergent areas - it is as simple as that. Stop punching below your weight.

 

[dadeechi]

Yes. Hence, I said seemingly favorable. A deal is possible only when both parties could see the gain and be able to sell it back to their respective citizens. A one sided deal made under duress would lead to disastrous results like in the case of Treaty of Versailles.

What happens when you have two divergent graphs? what happens to those two graphs in two years, what happens in 20? What happens to those two graphs in 40? With divergent entities you cannot have convergent areas - it is as simple as that. Stop punching below your weight.

Did Bhutto outwit Indira Gandhi?

To Understand the political climate prevalent in the subcontinent in June-July 1972, when the Simla Conference was held, it is necessary to recall the events that preceded it - events that altered some basic perceptions that the Pakistan leadership had held dear. The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state had starkly shown the inadequacy of religion as the sole basis of nationality. It also repudiated the two-nation theory and struck a deadly blow to Pakistan's claim, implicit as well as explicit, that it spoke on behalf of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Bhutto was acutely conscious of this fundamental change of context and he stated this frankly in his preliminary conversation with Indira Gandhi. He referred critically to his own views on these subjects, which he had articulated in extremely bellicose language earlier. He even lamented the tripartite division of the Muslim community in the subcontinent and hoped that, in the new circumstances, the community would become a strong force for peace and stability in the region.Furthermore, Bhutto said he was convinced by the events of 1971 that Pakistan could not acquire Kashmir via military intervention. In March 1972, a month before the meeting of emissaries in Murree, he told Indian journalists that a settlement of the Kashmir issue would emerge on the basis of a "line of peace" and that the right of self-determination, in his view, was not to be exported from outside. "Kashmir troubles me a lot," Bhutto said. He did not want its dark shadow looming over Indo-Pak. relations. He wanted his countrymen to get over the trauma of the emergence of its eastern wing as a separate independent state as quickly as possible and concentrate on making the now smaller Pakistan a prosperous country. He told Indira Gandhi in his meeting with her on July 1: "I have been saying in Pakistan: how can we fight for rights of Kashmiris? I have prepared public opinion for days ahead. But we cannot do it under compulsion." Bhutto was personally inclined to accept the status quo as a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem. However, he had several constraints in this regard which he spelt out as follows:
(a) His political enemies at home, especially the army bosses, would denounce him for surrendering what many in Pakistan considered their vital national interest. This would endanger the democratic set-up which had emerged after fourteen years of army rule. In this context, Bhutto repeatedly talked about his fear of what he called the Lahore lobby, though he never clearly explained what it was.
(b) He was anxious to obtain the support of all political elements in Pakistan in favour of any agreement that might emerge at Simla. He made this point at the beginning of the conference, while apologising for bringing with him an unusually large delegation, consisting of about 84 members, who represented the entire political spectrum of Pakistan. He wanted all members of the delegation to support and be committed to the outcome of the conference. He said there should be no dissenters in his delegation when he left Simla. He was probably thinking of his own negative role vis-a-vis Ayub Khan after the Tashkent Declaration in 1966.
Bhutto was very keen on the support of Aziz Ahmed, who led the Pakistan negotiating team. Ahmed was Pakistan's senior-most civil servant and carried great weight in the ranks of its bureaucracy. He also had the reputation of being a hardliner. Ahmed's support would secure Bhutto the support of Pakistan's officialdom, which constituted a very powerful segment of the country's political elite.
Aziz Ahmed was against enlarging the agenda to include Kashmir. But he yielded ground when the Indian side explained it was not insisting on an immediate and formal acceptance of the status quo, which they believed could be looked upon as the imposition of harsh terms by the victor in war. P. N. Haksar, who had assumed the leadership of the Indian team when D. P. Dhar suddenly took ill, felt that such a move might nurture a revanchist ideology in Pakistan. He reminded his colleagues of the consequence of the Treaty of Versailles and persuaded them against doing anything which could be the basis of another war. The Indian side therefore put their proposal in a low key and in an indirect manner by proposing that the name of the line dividing India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir be changed from the "cease-fire line" to the "line of control". Aziz Ahmed objected to this. He pointed out quite rightly, that the proposed change in terminology would mean a change in the status of the line. He put forth this view vehemently and said he was not prepared to accept the change in nomenclature.
* * *
In the afternoon meeting on July 2, which was to consider the third and last Indian draft agreement, Aziz Ahmed said: "This is our last meeting... Pakistan cannot accept that the ceasefire line has ceased to exist. That is the main reason why we are not accepting the Indian draft." For the Indian side this was a retreat from the statement made by Bhutto in his previous day's meeting with Indira Gandhi in the presence of officials. In that meeting, after Aziz Ahmed's remark that "We have agreed to everything except Kashmir", Bhutto intervened and said: "I have, in a way, agreed to Kashmir being resolved by peaceful means... As regards the Kashmir dispute, an agreement will emerge in the foreseeable future. It will evolve into a settlement. Let there be a line of peace; let people come and go; let us not fight over it."
The transformation of the ceasefire line into the line of control was the core of the Indian solution to the Kashmir problem. The de facto line of control was meant to be graduated to the level of a de jure border. Since no agreement was reached on this point, negotiations were called off and the curtain came down on five days of hectic negotiations which had begun with great hopes throughout the subcontinent. This was the afternoon of July 2. The Pakistan delegation was scheduled to leave Simla the next morning.
Soon, word spread that the conference had failed. Media men rushed off to announce the failure. In the midst of this enveloping gloom Bhutto asked to see Mrs. Gandhi and a meeting was fixed for 6 p.m. at the Retreat, where she was staying. When Bhutto came to see Mrs. Gandhi, he met P.N. Haksar and myself briefly and said: "You officials give up too easily". Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto then met for an hour while Haksar and I waited in the adjoining room. Emerging from his tete-a-tete with Mrs. Gandhi, Bhutto looked pleased and said, "we have settled the matter and decided to give you some work to do before dinner." After we saw Bhutto off, Mrs. Gandhi briefed us on what had transpired.
Mrs. Gandhi elaborated the merits of the Indian proposal in the following terms: It was the only feasible solution. An important feature of the proposal was that neither country was gaining or losing territory on account of war. It did not involve transfers of population from one side to the other. Kashmiris as an ethnic community were left undivided on the Indian side. The line of control was therefore largely an ethnic and linguistic frontier. In fact in 1947, at the time of partition, it was also an ideological frontier, being the limit of the political influence of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and his National Conference party. True, there were some anomalies in this otherwise neatly etched picture, but these, Mrs. Gandhi pointed out, could be removed by mutual consent.
Bhutto resounded with feeling and apparent sincerity. After long reflection he had come to the conclusion that the Indian proposal was the only feasible one. But he could not agree to incorporating it in the agreement for the reasons he had stated earlier. He would, however, work towards its implementation in practice and over time. Mrs. Gandhi herself was worried that a formal withdrawal of the Indian claim on Pak-occupied Kashmir could create political trouble for her. She agreed that the solution should not be recorded in the agreement for the reasons advanced by Bhutto, but it should be implemented gradually, as he had suggested.
It was also agreed that the understanding would not be a written one. The insertion of secret clauses in the agreement was considered inconsistent with the desire to build a structure of durable peace. It was decided, however, that the agreement would be worded in a manner that would not create difficulties of implementation for Pakistan. This resulted in some last-minute negotiations which were carried on during the return banquet of the president of Pakistan on the eve of his departure for his country. Thus, some clauses included in the draft agreement had to be deleted to accommodate Bhutto.
The most important part of the agreement, sub-clause 4(ii), says: In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line. The phrase "without prejudice" to the recognised position of either side was a concession to Bhutto to save him from domestic critics. The second and third sentences were assumed to prevent the abuse of this concession and to lay the foundation for a future settlement of the Kashmir issue.
* * *
Bhutto also knew that the Government of India had opened a dialogue with Sheikh Abdullah. He realised that India was in effect meeting the demand of separatist Kashmiris for representation at India-Pak negotiations on Kashmir via simultaneous but separate talks with Sheikh Abdullah. From his own sources and from reports in the Indian press he was aware of the probability of the Sheikh joining Indian mainstream politics. He knew that the ban on the Sheikh's entry into Kashmir was about to be removed. And when it was removed, three weeks after the Simla conference, the Sheikh told his audience in Srinagar that the tragic events of Bangladesh had proved how correct Kashmiris were in rejecting union with thecoratic Pakistan. The Sheikh's withdrawal of his demand for a plebiscite was expected to help Bhutto face the criticism of people at home.
* * *
Bhutto agreed not only to change the ceasefire line into line of control, for which he had earlier proposed the term "line of peace", he also agreed that the line would be gradually endowed with the characteristics of an international border (his words). The transition was to take place in the following manner. After the resumption of traffic between India and Pakistan across the international border had gained momentum, the movement of traffic would be allowed at specified points across the line of control. At these points of entry, immigration control and customs clearance offices would be established. Furthermore, Pakistan- occupied Kashmir would be incorporated into Pakistan. To begin with, Bhutto's party would set up its branches there, and later the area would be taken over by the administration. India would make proforma protests in a low key (This is what actually happened in 1974, when Bhutto made Azad Kashmir constitutionally a province of Pakistan without much protest from India). It was thought that with the gradual use of the line of control as the de facto frontier, public opinion on both sides would become reconciled to its permanence. In the meanwhile, the opening of trade and commerce and cooperation between India and Pakistan would result in easing tensions between the two countries. When Mrs. Gandhi, after recounting their points of agreement, finally asked Bhutto: "Is this the understanding on which we will proceed? He replied, "Absolutely, aap mujh par bharosa keejiye (you can rely on me).
One of Bhutto's aides, who was also very close to the Americans, fully briefed James P. Sterba (the New York Times correspondent) on the understanding that this leader had reached with Mrs. Gandhi. In his news analysis, which appeared within hours of the signing, Sterba, after referring to the inflexible positions of the two governments on the Kashmir problem, wrote: "these positions have been drummed into the minds of the peoples of each side to the point where any compromise would be viewed largely as a "sell out" in both countries. And for years, such a sell out would have probably toppled the rulers who agreed to it". Sterba added:
President Butto, Pakistan's first civilian leader in fourteen years, came to Simla ready to compromise. According to sources close to him, he was willing to forsake the Indian held two- thirds of Kashmir that contains four-fifths of the population and the prized valley called the 'Vale', and agree that a ceasefire line to be negotiated would gradually become the border between the two countries. The key word is 'gradually' (emphasis added)... President Bhutto wants a softening of the ceasefire line with trade and travel across it and a secret agreement with Mrs. Gandhi that a formally recognised border would emerge after a few years, during which he would condition his people to it without riots and an overthrow of his Government.
This was the understanding between the leaders of the two countries and this was the Simla Solution of the Kashmir problem. The agreement that was signed at Simla in the first hour of July 3, 1972 was the launching pad for an implementation of the Simla Solution. Some Pakistanis maintain that recent events in Kashmir have overtaken the agreement, while Indians insist that the dispute should be resolved through bilateral negotiations, as stipulated under it. This debate misses the crucial point that the Simla Agreement provided not only a mechanism for the solution of the Kashmir problem but also envisaged the solution itself.
The Simla Solution seemed the only way in which the political leadership of the two countries could resolve their conflicting claims over Kashmir. It is still the only way that remains open to them. To be sure, the aspirations of Valley Muslims need to be satisfied. The Indira-Abdullah Accord, which was an answer to this question, has come unstuck due partly to New Delhi's hamhandedness and largely due to the growth of Muslim fundamentalism in the Valley, as also because of the massive intervention of Pakistan, in flagrant violation of the Simla commitments. Had the Simla understanding been converted into the final solution of the problem, the Kashmir issue would have simply become an internal problem for India, namely one of altering the existing centre-state relations in a manner that would satisfy the Kashmiri demand for greater autonomy.
* * *
It was in the context of an utter disregard for the Simla commitments by Pakistan that I decided to make public the substance of the Simla understanding. I did this through a two- part article which was published in the Times of India in April 1995. Pakistani response to this came in an avalanche of statements and comments from the government, political leaders, columnists, and editorial writers questioning the veracity of what I had said. About the only person in authority who did not react was Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto.
The expressions of disbelief in the existence of a verbal understanding between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were often accompanied by high praise of what Humayun Gauhar called Bhutto's diplomatic artistry. Writing on this subject in the Political and Business Weekly of May 15, 1995, Gauhar wrote:
If it took a private talk between Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi in which he made certain commitments to her but which he was clever enough not to have written down in the Simla Agreement or on a separate piece of paper, then it was diplomatic artistry of the highest order. He would have known wn better than anyone else that such a private secret agreement, which is only verbal, was worthless. Face it Mr. Dhar, even if we accept what you say, Mr. Bhutto fooled your Prime Minister.
Gauhar explains the nature of Bhutto's artistry in Bhutto's own words. Three months before the Simla Conference Bhutto told Oriana Falaci, the Italian journalist: "Well, in politics you sometimes have to have light and flexible fingers... have you ever seen a bird sitting on its eggs in the nest? Well, a politician must have fairly light, fairly flexible fingers, to insinuate them under the bird and take away the eggs. One by one . Without the bird realising it."
Commenting on Pakistani rejoinders to my article, Alistair Lamb, the well-known author of several books on the Kashmir question (in which he has vigorously supported Pakistan's point of view), says: "Pakistani refutations of P. N. Dhar's claims (that Z. A. Bhutto did privately agree with the Indian Prime Minister that this was exactly the way in which the Kashmir problem would be settled, with the line of control being allowed to evolve gradually into an international border) have not to date been particularly impressive or convincing though circumstances have removed over the years any significance they may ever have possessed... Its essential veracity has been implied by Akram Zaki, former Pakistan Secretary General, Foreign Affairs". In India too my article was widely noted by the media and the predominant view was not very different from that of Humayun Gauhar, namely that India had lost on the negotiating table what its armed forces had gained in the battlefield.
Extracted from: Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian Democracy,
P. N. Dhar, Oxford University Press, Rs.545.

The Hindu : Did Bhutto outwit Indira Gandhi?

 

[Indika]

Just like musharaff is non-entity in pakistan so is manishankar & khurshid. why give so much importance to these ppl?

 

[Spectre]

What result has last 40 years of engagement produced? what has really worked? I dont think a SWOT is that difficult.
This policy of appeasement has gotten India nothing, all this blah blah of look east, where did that disppear, what happened to BIMSTEC, SASEC...
Dis engage, stop interactions, go your own way- there is not 1, not a single reason to engage with Pakistan in the current scenario. It is a complete waste of diplomatic capital.


What happens when you have two divergent graphs? what happens to those two graphs in two years, what happens in 20? What happens to those two graphs in 40? With divergent entities you cannot have convergent areas - it is as simple as that. Stop punching below your weight.

Disengagement is a flawed strategy when

1. Other side wants attention and would start wars for "engagement"
2. Other side has the nuclear umbrella - under the shade of which all kinds of mischief's are planned and executed.

Empty engagement without any expectations to keep alive the perception of momentum is not a bad strategy if you consider the alternative where in absence of engagement who knows what the attention starved nuclear armed neighbor would get up-to.

By all means diplomatic speak don't cost a thing - and as the CIA says Trust but Verify. We don't need to expend any political and diplomatic capital in vacuum of non-progressive peace but we do when another incursions happen.

Where UPA and last NDA Govt went wrong is that they trusted Pakistan - expected dividends and results. I expect future govts to take heed not repeat that same mistake.

 

[MilSpec]

Just like musharaff is non-entity in pakistan so is manishankar & khurshid. why give so much importance to these ppl?

Because - For perplexing reasons congress still continues to exist as a political entity in India and beleive it or not these Gandhi family butlers actually get cabinet posts that shape the foreign and domestic policy in India. It has happened for a good part of last 65 years, and will continue to be so...

Disengagement is a flawed strategy when

1. Other side wants attention and would start wars for "engagement"
2. Other side has the nuclear umbrella - under the shade of which all kinds of mischief's are planned and executed.

Empty engagement without any expectations to keep alive the perception of momentum is not a bad strategy if you consider the alternative where in absence of engagement who knows what the attention starved nuclear armed neighbor would get up-to.

By all means diplomatic speak don't cost a thing - and as the CIA says Trust but Verify. We don't need to expend any political and diplomatic capital in vacuum of non-progressive peace but we do when another incursions happen.

As I said this punching below has become a syndrome.
"1. Other side wants attention and would start wars for "engagement" - So are we incompetent imbeciles? If anyone wants war then be it - you are standing of shoulders of Giants... the second largest standing force on this planet. If anyone has the balls to take us on, I say bring it.

"2. Other side has the nuclear umbrella - under the shade of which all kinds of mischief's are planned and executed."

And we have Plastic Umbrella? If they can play mischief, so can we at a much larger scale. But we continue to remain docile- That's who we are, that who we will remain.

Where UPA and last NDA Govt went wrong is that they trusted Pakistan - expected dividends and results. I expect future govts to take heed not repeat that same mistake.

UPA and NDA? are we forgetting last 65 years of history here?

 

[Spectre]

As I said this punching below has become a syndrome.
"1. Other side wants attention and would start wars for "engagement" - So are we incompetent imbeciles? If anyone wants war then be it - you are standing of shoulders of Giants... the second largest standing force on this planet.

"2. Other side has the nuclear umbrella - under the shade of which all kinds of mischief's are planned and executed."

And we have Plastic Umbrella? If they can play mischief, so can we at a much larger scale. But we continue to remain docile- That's who we are, that who we will remain.


UPA and NDA? are we forgetting last 65 years of history here?

All a matter of objectives and perspectives - from where we stand war is harmful to our long term prospects. We will fight when compelled and necessary but until then containment is the best strategy.
Yes, we have taken body blows terrible ones at that, sometimes we hit back using force other times diplomatically. The thing is we cannot let out enemy control our reaction - if and when we retaliate it will be at the ground of our choosing, time we are comfortable and force we deem appropriate.

Pakistan wants - war - that is the best case scenario for Pakistan not so for us, so it would be great if we don't oblige the enemy.

The other point about docility - I don't give a damn if we are considered docile (we aren't) if it gets us to our objectives of development. My friend we need to be smart here not give in to our basic and baser instincts.

Regards

 

[Indika]

All a matter of objectives and perspectives - from where we stand war is harmful to our long term prospects. We will fight when compelled and necessary but until then containment is the best strategy.
Yes, we have taken body blows terrible ones at that, sometimes we hit back using force other times diplomatically. The thing is we cannot let out enemy control our reaction - if and when we retaliate it will be at the ground of our choosing, time we are comfortable and force we deem appropriate.

Pakistan wants - war - that is the best case scenario not so for us, so it would be great if we don't oblige the enemy.

The other point about docility - I don't give a damn if we are considered docile (we aren't) if it gets us to our objectives of development. My friend we need to be smart here not give in to our basic instincts.

Regards

Completely agree with the points. No point in fighting a war with pakistan , the reason being we have nothing to gain.
More the silent we remain greater their frustration and agitation. We need to bide our time and wait for our right chance. Like in fights we should not rush towards the enemy in a mad frenzy. Lay the trap and wait for them to tumble in.

Absolutely right ,what they think of us makes no difference. But what we achieve for ourself is what matters to us. Lets wait for economic growth.

 

[MilSpec]

All a matter of objectives and perspectives - from where we stand war is harmful to our long term prospects. We will fight when compelled and necessary but until then containment is the best strategy.

How? What have you gained by policy of contained, what have you contained, Nuclear proliferation, MTCR proliferation, a mega threat on your eastern flank from a country that you could have demolished in 71-78? terrorism? What exactly is this containment? and which metrics determine that this has been the "best strategy" when the results produced indicate the opposite. Compare that to offensive actions that put the opposition on the backfoot, straight tangible measurable result. show me one from this "containment"

Yes, we have taken body blows terrible ones at that, sometimes we hit back using force other times diplomatically. The thing is we cannot let out enemy control our reaction if and when we retaliate it will be at the ground of our choosing, time we are comfortable and force we deem appropriate.

And who will determine this "time of choosing" - Manishankar Aiyers of the world? And what choosing of your time, what have you choosen, your civilians are being killed dime a dozen and you send dossiers - Try selling this policy to victims of state sponsored terrorism in India- see how many takers you get.
And what reaction are you referring to, what has been Indian reaction to x numbers of attacks ? My blood boils when I hear this sophisticated rhetoric where behind all of it we are more concerned of sensex taking a dip than lives of our own country men.
lets admit what the reality is- we are a nation of cowards- who in turn elect cowards> who in-turn sell this cowardice as successful diplomacy... the one with some balls join the forces to be frustrated with this cowardice day in and day out.

Your talks with pakistan did not affect outcome of there outlook - actions by Indian Armed Forces did! stack it up against all of the diplomatic exchanges and figure out what produced results.

let me tag @Joe Shearer see if i can get an opinion from him on the topic,

 

[Indika]

a mega threat on your eastern flank from a country that you could have demolished in 71-78?

Those are missed opportunities which even indira gandhi could not take advantage of. Dont expect current leaders to do some thing like that now.

your civilians are being killed dime a dozen and you send dossiers - Try selling this policy to victims of state sponsored terrorism in India- see how many takers you get.

Attacks have decreased since mumbai 26/11. Just need to wait for pakistan to self destruct. See whats happened to afghanistan. For countries it will take decades to change fortunes just like for india post 1990's.