What does it take to win in asymmetrical modern warfare?

[jaibi]

In the 2000s the focus of command levels shifted down to div level movements with a more cohesive hold of command yet flexibility of control. What you're speaking of is more on the basis of fighting a conventional enemy. The article focuses on asymmetrical warfare. The scenario you're speaking of is what most militaries are already trained for.

It depends. If you are faced with an enemy with massive firepower, you need tactics, and a force that is able to execute those tactics. Flexibility, adaptability, not just at the infantry level, but at the co-ordination level of infantry-armor-artillery-air support becomes necessary to employ superior tactics. Better gadgets will give you an advantage. Simply having a battle hardened infantry will not be beneficial in this scenario.

For you may be but I would confidently poise that we are. We heavily drill ourselves and have matched every technological edge successfully. The latest engagements are proof of that.

What Pakistan faced was the other extreme, and Alhamdulillah we prevailed. But are our officers and generals trained and equipped to fight a war against an enemy that has massive firepower? Do they have mastery of latest science and technology that they can tailor to their needs and understand what they are up against? For me, this is a question mark.

Sometimes you've to go into the direction of KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid

Rebels in various parts of Middle east is the prime example of what you are suggesting, Completely agreed and Well Written piece.

Use of tech doesn’t cast much fear into the minds than use of Highly intelligent Humans (Infantry) and that too in numbers, This leaves the other party desperate and concerned.

For example :

Let’s say, XYZ rebellious group is in a defending position, Has high grounds, Defenses against Gunfights and rockets.

But then you send in Airforce or UCAVs, There is always a warning (sound/sight) of these machines, Gives a room to run away, But, When you send in the men, You are always uncertain, About every second, A bullet at extremely high speed can come any milli second...

So yes, All those US dramabazi isn’t much worth as compared to boots on ground (varies according to nature of Op though).

Sir, you are missed.

True, that's the base but where to put that economy when coming up with tough choices? That's what I was focusing on.

Economy.

Having all these and more has proven to be ineffective at times; I highlighted so in the OP as well. And international relations isn't the topic of discussion here, brother.

What it takes to win asymmetric warfare:

1. Cyber warfare
2. Drones
3. Space program
4. Missile deterrence
5. Proxy warfare
6. Decentralized Navy
7. Autonomous leadership
8. Sharp intelligence
9. Steel manufacturing
10. Mountainous terrain

Pakistan only has 1 thing on that list and that is proxies

Iran has all 10 of these and that is why not even US can touch Iran

Iran is top 10 producer of steel in the world while Pakistan just fired entire steel mill employees

@PanzerKiel , sir, please, I'd bother you once again to critique or put your thoughts for us humble beings.

 

[Nilgiri]

The assymetrics themselves are quite different, I dont find really a very valid correlation tbh.

Firstly swat is established territory of Pakistan. This in itself would dictate a huge deal in tenacity, goal and rooted direction (forget venturing to intrinsic knowledge + intelligence) of one's fighting force (at all levels)....compared to a war projected far away in alien environment and somewhat alien purpose to the grunts, NCOs and field officers. Especially when latter was yet again promised a quick easy in + out war rather than persistence, deterioration + "frayed purpose" COIN conflict...

US didnt go for a more clear cut (given the extent of time of these conflicts and strategies) colonization + political incorporation (like say French did in Algeria) which would have changed that dynamic a large deal for its forces and also local supporters/collaborators/proxies (if you look at the effects it had in France w.r.t wax/wane of "pied-noirs"+proxies and effect of this on strategy and window of options available and basic political energies in govt + mil-establishment)....though it took huge toll on France in the end too inevitably....again because of the sheer cultural chasm existing.

This has its relevant reverse effect too on the opposition combatants too....what their scope and window and scale is...and how that changes with time too.

I find it somewhat artificial to compare such different situations in buttressed A=A, B=B equivalent way.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Very few armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare. The principal reasons that why the regulars are weak in fighting irregular wars are:-

• Strategy The chief difficulty for regulars is to decide upon a strategy that might work. Military operations and tactics are not the keys to success. However, they can prove to be the keys to political failure.
• One Army. Every country has one regular army and can not afford to deprogram it as she may need it to perform in a regular way, even in pursuit of counter insurgency.
• Organizational weaknesses. The conventional armies are organized, equipped, and trained to fight other armies with characteristics similar to theirs.
• Mind Set. Since soldiers have fighting as their most distinctive core competency, and given that they are best prepared to wrestle with other regular soldiers. They have to change mind-set to deal with problem that is largely, though not entirely, political.
• Not Trained For. When a regular force is committed to counter insurgency, it is asked to perform in ways, and for purposes, for which it is relatively ill prepared.
• Traditional Strength. Irregular warfare calls for cultural, political, and non military qualities that are not among the traditional strengths of regular forces,
• Retaliation. The retaliatory capability of regular forces is not utilized to optimum to avoid collateral damage.
• Military Defeat. In the theater of irregular warfare military defeat or humiliation of enemy is not the prime objective. This is not to say that such defeat is unimportant, but is not the only winning factor.
• Variable and Complex. Irregular warfare is highly variable in form and is always complex.
• Choice of Selection of Time and Target. The choice of selection of target and time of engagement lies with the forces undertaking asymmetric actions.
• Irregulars Avoid Strength of Regular Forces. Perpetrators avoid the strengths of their adversaries. They endeavor to employ methods that can be neither anticipated nor countered by regulars effectively.
• Surprise. Asymmetrical attacks and defenses lean toward the counter cultural. It is abhorrent to strategists even to contemplate some of the techniques or weapons of asymmetrical warfare. For these reasons, finally, the perpetrator of asymmetrical warfare will undoubtedly have surprise on its side.
• Media. Role of media is vital to change the affiliations of locals towards any party and making the environment hostile for any force.
• Knowledge of terrain. Irregular forces and non state actors mostly being locals enjoy the advantage of having knowledge of terrain over regular forces.
• Identification of Friend and Foe. As enemy is hidden in masses so it poses a serious challenge to regular forces to identify the threat.
• Psychological Effects. Regular forces are operating away from their homes. At times they operate even against their own brothers and relatives. Moreover if the cause is not clear they operate under tense moral and psychological pressure of being right and wrong.

Some of the recommendations which can be useful for regular forces in defeating irregulars are:-

• Last Resort/ Vital interests. The commitment of forces to combat irregular warfare should be a last resort, only after diplomatic, political, economic and other efforts have failed and the vital interests of a state are on stake.
• Allies and Local Support. Regular forces must attract allies to their side, and subtract them from opponent's side. Create "harmony" and cohesion on own side, foster chaos and paralysis on the other side. Government should have assurance of the Support of the local people and their elected representatives to its regular forces.
• Political and Military Objectives. Political and military objectives must be defined. Unless the military leaders know precisely what they intend to achieve by fighting and how the forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives, the size of forces to be committed can not be formulated.
• Long term commitment. Regular forces should accept that counter insurgency requires a long-term commitment.
• Accomplishment of Objective. Military commanders must find ways to accomplish the objectives in given time frame.
• Root Causes. Government should address root causes of the insurgency and provide alternatives to valid grievances. The regular forces while quelling insurgency must help other government tentacles to address the root cause of insurgency.
• Special Force. It is suggested that some special forces should be constituted and structured along military lines. Such units should not have the military's heavy armament but would be more heavily armed than police. Enlarging regular military police units is one of the options.
• Doctrine of Regular Warfare. Militaries involved in asymmetric or irregular warfare should be prepared to tear up its doctrinal manuals for regular warfare and evolve the doctrine for irregular warfare.
• Cooperation. Military power alone cannot bring decisive victory; therefore, police, civilian security, public information, and intelligence forces should be critical in a state’s Use of persuasive instruments for conducting counter insurgency.
• Intelligence Agencies. All agencies must be capable of dealing with or technologically advanced or equipped and organized to grasp or handle the prevailing asymmetric threats.
• Training. Regular forces need special training to withstand this challenge. Recent military engagements have made it apparent that regular forces lack requisite training to combat terrorism.
• Force Structure. Asymmetric operations would usually require a force that is smaller, flexible and is capable of rapid deployment and redeployment.
• Understanding. Appreciate that the conflict is for the acquiescence or support of the people. Dead insurgents are a bonus; they are not a reliable mark of success.
• Strength of Mind. Asymmetric warfare is war of patience which may take longer time to settle the problems. Military leaders and men got to strengthen their nerves to defeat irregular forces.
• Minimum Credible and Legitimate Use of Force. Shedding blood and killing are activities that no society can tolerate. Overarching objective is to ensure that change is brought through peaceful means. Historical analysis seems to show that one needs roughly 20 members of the security forces for every 1,000 people in the general population.
• Relationship-Forces and Objective. The commanders should understand relationship between objectives and the forces which have been committed, their size, composition, and disposition, must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary. In order to deter successfully, the use military force must be credible.
• Create Deterrence. Deterrence is a way, or a strategy, to attain an objective. One does not value deterrence for itself, but for what it can accomplish.
• Utilization of Force Multipliers. Troops must make effective use of force multipliers like artillery support, air force, combat aviation and modern means for real time battle field information.
• Intelligence Risk Taking. To defeat the asymmetric forces intelligence risk taking is required to be inculcated in the culture of regular forces.
• Weapons and Equipment. Weapons designed for conventional wars are not suitable to be used under asymmetric environments. There is need to correctly evaluate and fix scale of specialized equipment to fight such threat.
• Latest Technology. Structure and equip forces so that they are agile and flexible, provide commanders with multiple options so that they can switch between different thrusts quickly.
• Active Denial System. Use of directed energy as a weapon for counter personnel and crowd control in the asymmetric warfare environments will be useful.
• Improvisation. Forces should be trained to use available material for erection of improvised obstacles, establishing check posts and barriers.
• Logistics. So far the logistic system of regular forces has not been able to successfully meet the requirement of fighting asymmetric warfare. There is a need to change the system of logistics so that all stores required by the soldiers are made available at their doorstep.
• Use of Media. Effective use of media will have definite effects to mold public opinion at home and abroad. Officers and troops should be trained in handling local and international media.
• Local Support. Local inhabitants should be used to overcome language and area familiarization problems. Locals can also be used for logistic support. To win their affiliations forces must undertake projects which are acceptable to them and are for betterment of area.
• Multiple options. Each irregular warfare contingency is different, and no single planning template can be applied to every operation. Surround the opponent with sustained ambiguity, deception, surprise, isolation, and menace. Pursue multiple approaches and attacks, then switch between them and develop new thrusts faster than the opponent can cope.
• Address Vulnerabilities. Forces must examine their potential vulnerabilities and address them.
• Reducing the Fog of War. To overcome the forces of asymmetric friction and to cut through and counter the fog of war the military commander should have iron will and a powerful sense of purpose.
• Situational Awareness. Forces should be able to recognize what is happening and maintain vigilance for threats, change, and opportunity.
• Know your Enemy. In asymmetric warfare it becomes even more imperative to gain insight of the enemy’s mind, intentions, and capabilities.
• Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare can deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, or destroy Communication nodes of insurgents by using electromagnetic, directed energy, and high-powered microwave systems.
• Agility and Flexibility. Structure and endow forces so that they are agile and flexible. Provide commanders with manifold choices so that they can continuously reshape themselves through experimentation and training.
• Coup d’oeil. The Clausewitz’s concept of “coup d’oeil” provides a useful approach for a strategic leader in dealing with an asymmetric threat. When a strategic leader is confronted with asymmetric threat, two qualities are indispensable. First the inner light that leads to truth and second involves possessing courage to flow this faint light where it may lead.
• Legal Considerations. Irregular warfare missions may be governed by unclear or emerging international law. As a matter of policy, forces should comply with the law of armed conflict in all combats.
• Bold Actions. Leaders of regular forces should take decisive and bold actions to knock out the irregular elements.
• Arrangements for psychological operations and media support.
• Elaborate medical arrangements should be made.
• Sufficient transport specially armored personal carriers and light aircrafts including protection equipment like jammers etc.
• Locate, fix and target fraying insurgents and their leadership. Combat aviation and Air force is best suited for this job.
• Extend more initiative to junior leaders like section and platoon commanders.

 

[jaibi]

That's not actually what the field thinks of these two arena. I glossed over this in my article because we're trying to get bite-sized things but in summary, from a purely methodological POV the two were quite similar. What has had the American mil really interested in the conduct of Swat was that Fallujah is supposed to be easier on paper due to the terrain but Swat is mountainous. Moreover, both required a more direct engagement with an enemy that required 'holding' the area. Therefore, these two battles would be a part of history for that reason because the way they were fought was quite different and the outcomes came differently as well.

The assymetrics themselves are quite different, I dont find really a very valid correlation tbh.

On paper, yes; however, the Pakistani government's presence in the area had been minimalized during the time so it wasn't just going back to one's own territory. The logistics were a nightmare. Unfortunately, these areas had been neglected and the valiant effort of the police did its best to keep things at bay but we effectively lost the area for a while. There's one man who was instrumental in this battle Lt Gen Tariq Khan (Rtd) who was instrumental in a lot of these changes that I described and I'll do my best to get the great warrior to agree to an interview for more elaboration.

Firstly swat is established territory of Pakistan. This in itself would dictate a huge deal in tenacity, goal and rooted direction (forget venturing to intrinsic knowledge + intelligence) of one's fighting force (at all levels)

A good point and that's where the objectives of the two ops were similar and there's one thing you're missing. The American war machine is heavily built towards venturing far off and fighting and their budget and orientation shows that; however, Pakistan's forces are built around a defensive nature of conflict. Thus, they balance it our. The same attitude that the actual fighting against 'militants' would be easy because they focus on coercing the local population rather than fighting an actual conventional army was present in both militaries.

....compared to a war projected far away in alien environment and somewhat alien purpose to the grunts, NCOs and field officers. Especially when latter was yet again promised a quick easy in + out war rather than persistence, deterioration + "frayed purpose" COIN conflict...

The US was looking for clearing out opposition and installing a friendly govt and backing it up with security because of the manner in which these conflicts have evolved. The ongoing global war on terror stretched out more than the WWs. The manner in which you impose your will may have changed but the nature stays the same.

US didnt go for a more clear cut (given the extent of time of these conflicts and strategies) colonization + political incorporation (like say French did in Algeria)

You're comparing two very different eras and natures of the conflict. Imposing the lens of the past on the present conflict is not really helpful here because the political environment in which they were fought has changed. Think of as saying that the Persians could have beaten the Macedonians with air superiority or Genghis Khan could have been beaten by a coalition force backed up by an international alliance.

which would have changed that dynamic a large deal for its forces and also local supporters/collaborators/proxies (if you look at the effects it had in France w.r.t wax/wane of "pied-noirs"+proxies and effect of this on strategy and window of options available and basic political energies in govt + mil-establishment)....though it took huge toll on France in the end too inevitably....again because of the sheer cultural chasm existing.

Precisely, they have evolved to challenge air superiority and even drones but one thing that they consistently rely on is good infantry whatever else the change may be because they've no other choice.

This has its relevant reverse effect too on the opposition combatants too....what their scope and window and scale is...and how that changes with time too.

This is why I wrote this in the article as well: "Warfare is a brutal arena, believe me, what you see in the movies or the newspapers does not justify how it actually is. It is something that can only be appreciated if you’ve actually experienced it yourself otherwise it is something very difficult to understand and therefore appreciate. This is why you would often see service members roll their eyes when someone, like an academician or journalist, tries to lecture them about it. The ground realities are a completely different environment to exist."

The whole nature of joint exercises and training abroad done by all forces all over the world is to learn from each other. The military needs to be ready for future threats and learn what it can by the nature and ground realities of those that have gone by. This is why exercise Yarmook is still present to this day.

I find it somewhat artificial to compare such different situations in buttressed A=A, B=B equivalent way.

@Joe Shearer please, sir, if you would give a glance and add your two cents.

 

[Joe Shearer]

That's not actually what the field thinks of these two arena. I glossed over this in my article because we're trying to get bite-sized things but in summary, from a purely methodological POV the two were quite similar. What has had the American mil really interested in the conduct of Swat was that Fallujah is supposed to be easier on paper due to the terrain but Swat is mountainous. Moreover, both required a more direct engagement with an enemy that required 'holding' the area. Therefore, these two battles would be a part of history for that reason because the way they were fought was quite different and the outcomes came differently as well.


On paper, yes; however, the Pakistani government's presence in the area had been minimalized during the time so it wasn't just going back to one's own territory. The logistics were a nightmare. Unfortunately, these areas had been neglected and the valiant effort of the police did its best to keep things at bay but we effectively lost the area for a while. There's one man who was instrumental in this battle Lt Gen Tariq Khan (Rtd) who was instrumental in a lot of these changes that I described and I'll do my best to get the great warrior to agree to an interview for more elaboration.


A good point and that's where the objectives of the two ops were similar and there's one thing you're missing. The American war machine is heavily built towards venturing far off and fighting and their budget and orientation shows that; however, Pakistan's forces are built around a defensive nature of conflict. Thus, they balance it our. The same attitude that the actual fighting against 'militants' would be easy because they focus on coercing the local population rather than fighting an actual conventional army was present in both militaries.


The US was looking for clearing out opposition and installing a friendly govt and backing it up with security because of the manner in which these conflicts have evolved. The ongoing global war on terror stretched out more than the WWs. The manner in which you impose your will may have changed but the nature stays the same.


You're comparing two very different eras and natures of the conflict. Imposing the lens of the past on the present conflict is not really helpful here because the political environment in which they were fought has changed. Think of as saying that the Persians could have beaten the Macedonians with air superiority or Genghis Khan could have been beaten by a coalition force backed up by an international alliance.


Precisely, they have evolved to challenge air superiority and even drones but one thing that they consistently rely on is good infantry whatever else the change may be because they've no other choice.


This is why I wrote this in the article as well: "Warfare is a brutal arena, believe me, what you see in the movies or the newspapers does not justify how it actually is. It is something that can only be appreciated if you’ve actually experienced it yourself otherwise it is something very difficult to understand and therefore appreciate. This is why you would often see service members roll their eyes when someone, like an academician or journalist, tries to lecture them about it. The ground realities are a completely different environment to exist."

The whole nature of joint exercises and training abroad done by all forces all over the world is to learn from each other. The military needs to be ready for future threats and learn what it can by the nature and ground realities of those that have gone by. This is why exercise Yarmook is still present to this day.


@Joe Shearer please, sir, if you would give a glance and add your two cents.

REALLY enjoyed this post, indeed, the exchange as well. I will certainly come back to this, but after some domestic chores are done.

It is so pleasant to read these rather than the 'main, main, tu, tu' elsewhere. Bless you.

PS: I've just glanced through some other posts. This is a treasure trove - MUST return. Soon.

 

[jaibi]

Sir ji, I meant the article PDF combines recent posts into a single one so it got mixed up but thank you!

REALLY enjoyed this post, indeed, the exchange as well. I will certainly come back to this, but after some domestic chores are done.

It is so pleasant to read these rather than the 'main, main, tu, tu' elsewhere. Bless you.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir ji, I meant the article PDF combines recent posts into a single one so it got mixed up but thank you!

Of course the article, but important interventions as well. I'm sorry, before my coffee and my medication, my syntax is sometimes a little underdressed.

 

[Nilgiri]

That's not actually what the field thinks of these two arena. I glossed over this in my article because we're trying to get bite-sized things but in summary, from a purely methodological POV the two were quite similar. What has had the American mil really interested in the conduct of Swat was that Fallujah is supposed to be easier on paper due to the terrain but Swat is mountainous. Moreover, both required a more direct engagement with an enemy that required 'holding' the area. Therefore, these two battles would be a part of history for that reason because the way they were fought was quite different and the outcomes came differently as well.


On paper, yes; however, the Pakistani government's presence in the area had been minimalized during the time so it wasn't just going back to one's own territory. The logistics were a nightmare. Unfortunately, these areas had been neglected and the valiant effort of the police did its best to keep things at bay but we effectively lost the area for a while. There's one man who was instrumental in this battle Lt Gen Tariq Khan (Rtd) who was instrumental in a lot of these changes that I described and I'll do my best to get the great warrior to agree to an interview for more elaboration.


A good point and that's where the objectives of the two ops were similar and there's one thing you're missing. The American war machine is heavily built towards venturing far off and fighting and their budget and orientation shows that; however, Pakistan's forces are built around a defensive nature of conflict. Thus, they balance it our. The same attitude that the actual fighting against 'militants' would be easy because they focus on coercing the local population rather than fighting an actual conventional army was present in both militaries.


The US was looking for clearing out opposition and installing a friendly govt and backing it up with security because of the manner in which these conflicts have evolved. The ongoing global war on terror stretched out more than the WWs. The manner in which you impose your will may have changed but the nature stays the same.


You're comparing two very different eras and natures of the conflict. Imposing the lens of the past on the present conflict is not really helpful here because the political environment in which they were fought has changed. Think of as saying that the Persians could have beaten the Macedonians with air superiority or Genghis Khan could have been beaten by a coalition force backed up by an international alliance.


Precisely, they have evolved to challenge air superiority and even drones but one thing that they consistently rely on is good infantry whatever else the change may be because they've no other choice.


This is why I wrote this in the article as well: "Warfare is a brutal arena, believe me, what you see in the movies or the newspapers does not justify how it actually is. It is something that can only be appreciated if you’ve actually experienced it yourself otherwise it is something very difficult to understand and therefore appreciate. This is why you would often see service members roll their eyes when someone, like an academician or journalist, tries to lecture them about it. The ground realities are a completely different environment to exist."

The whole nature of joint exercises and training abroad done by all forces all over the world is to learn from each other. The military needs to be ready for future threats and learn what it can by the nature and ground realities of those that have gone by. This is why exercise Yarmook is still present to this day.


@Joe Shearer please, sir, if you would give a glance and add your two cents.

There is lot to unpackage here further for me. Let me get to it later. Lot I agree with, some is half/half, other stuff I disagree.

I disagree very much for example that France/Algeria was a different time period and era (as much as say Persians or Mongols) that voids it for comparison here.

Recently I came across that Charles De Gaulle son is still alive (retired Admiral) today for example....it kindled a huge deal of stuff I read long time ago on the Algerian wars. Friend I know here in Canada is also descendent of a pied-noir. It was the pied-noirs that kept France as early-ramped and intensely vice-locked with Algeria as long as it did....as opposed to assymetry warfare where you are a fresh arrival so to speak. Whole situation unfolds differently imo....even at tactical levels.

There is thus lot of stuff we can learn and apply to more recent wars for sure (in my opinion)...and I feel my basic premise stands.

Yes Pakistan might not have been fully a complete sovereign in the area (Swat) relatively speaking, and yes the US military is very power-projection oriented....I factored both in and I still say a lot weighs heavily on local vs foreign chasm..... stuff that is not immediately apparent, like how soldiers break bread in recuperation after a hard days fighting...day after day in deployment....how that wears on them with time...as things get stretched....as they feel unwanted in an area. That is when purpose and morale really play a big part.

I talked to one that served in Iraq at length about this....how stuff wore him down and others...the effects of that....he referenced his dad in Vietnam a lot too. Let me see if I can bring him here one day to talk to you guys here.

I don't think it would be something a Pak soldier would experience much on relatively home turf (and the equivalents worldwide like that).

Then there would be other things a Pak soldier would experience unknown to a more foreign deployment too. It gets complicated the more you look into each conflict....tactically and strategically.

I am in no way saying you are fully wrong or fully right (or what the level of that is), but we must also treat things carefully for cross-comparison. Even in chess, some tactics and strategies only come about in a particular type of game opening and middle game choice....even though the pieces are the same, move the same, work together the same.... and to layman it all looks generally the same...and even results can be the same. But there are significant details that matter past it that make it different etc.

 

[CriticalThought]

In the 2000s the focus of command levels shifted down to div level movements with a more cohesive hold of command yet flexibility of control. What you're speaking of is more on the basis of fighting a conventional enemy. The article focuses on asymmetrical warfare. The scenario you're speaking of is what most militaries are already trained for.

A conventional military facing another conventional military with a massive firepower/technological advantage is also asymmetric warfare. The Pak Army realized this and trained for it by starting Zarb-e-Momin in 1989. And I am saying, I question their efficacy in the modern era of technology.

For you may be but I would confidently poise that we are. We heavily drill ourselves and have matched every technological edge successfully. The latest engagements are proof of that.

We are good at catching up with known developments in enemy capabilities. But what if the enemy brings forward an unknown technological edge that you only feel by its outcome on the battlefield in the form of huge losses? Are our generals mentally strong and technically capable to turn impending defeat into victory by quickly analyzing an unknown capability, reaching valid conclusions about how it may work, and creating and deploying counter-measures? I don't think so. You can tell a lot about a man as soon as he opens his mouth. I see Pakistani top brass and I see people who are set in their ways and unable to fight modern wars with quick thinking on their feet. And due to their own inefficiency, they cannot train the rest of the army either. I tried to hint all of this on this thread:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/towards-knowledge-creation-within-pakistani-armed-forces.646087/

and here:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/succ...ring-pak-armys-readiness.467864/#post-9029599

@PanzerKiel

 

[Yaseen1]

for cyber space warfare we have to develop space program and satellite launching capability as well as anti satellite weapons

What it takes to win asymmetric warfare:

1. Cyber warfare
2. Drones
3. Space program
4. Missile deterrence
5. Proxy warfare
6. Decentralized Navy
7. Autonomous leadership
8. Sharp intelligence
9. Steel manufacturing
10. Mountainous terrain

Pakistan only has 1 thing on that list and that is proxies

Iran has all 10 of these and that is why not even US can touch Iran

Iran is top 10 producer of steel in the world while Pakistan just fired entire steel mill employees

 

[Aspen]

Commenting on this post so I can come back to it later

Really good analysis in here, I'm impressed

We are good at catching up with known developments in enemy capabilities. But what if the enemy brings forward an unknown technological edge that you only feel by its outcome on the battlefield in the form of huge losses? Are our generals mentally strong and technically capable to turn impending defeat into victory by quickly analyzing an unknown capability, reaching valid conclusions about how it may work, and creating and deploying counter-measures? I don't think so. You can tell a lot about a man as soon as he opens his mouth. I see Pakistani top brass and I see people who are set in their ways and unable to fight modern wars with quick thinking on their feet. And due to their own inefficiency, they cannot train the rest of the army either. I tried to hint all of this on this thread:

The concern is not really India bringing a technological edge.

India and Pakistan have never been innovators in any regard to warfare.

The real innovators in war are probably Iran, China, Russia, US. Maybe also Israel and North Korea.

India and Pakistan have always followed what others do. So the odds of something new and unexpected showing up from the Indian side is basically zero as long as they are playing catch up to Russia and China. Pakistan might drop a surprise or two courtesy China tech transfer, but in general Pakistan is not much better than India when it comes to military innovation.

The major concern in my opinion is the extremely slow adoption rate of Pakistan's (and India's) use of cyber warfare, drones, precision missiles, hypersonics, and space. These are not going to surprise anyone, but nevertheless, Pakistan doesn't seem to have even a passing interest whatsoever in exploring these technologies and neither does India except for space.

You know, I google "pakistan cyber" and "pakistan space" every week to see if there is any news about Pakistan's cyber strategy and space program but I keep getting empty results on Google. It's so sad.

 

[CriticalThought]

Commenting on this post so I can come back to it later

Really good analysis in here, I'm impressed



The concern is not really India bringing a technological edge.

India and Pakistan have never been innovators in any regard to warfare.

The real innovators in war are probably Iran, China, Russia, US. Maybe also Israel and North Korea.

India and Pakistan have always followed what others do. So the odds of something new and unexpected showing up from the Indian side is basically zero as long as they are playing catch up to Russia and China. Pakistan might drop a surprise or two courtesy China tech transfer, but in general Pakistan is not much better than India when it comes to military innovation.

The major concern in my opinion is the extremely slow adoption rate of Pakistan's (and India's) use of cyber warfare, drones, precision missiles, hypersonics, and space. These are not going to surprise anyone, but nevertheless, Pakistan doesn't seem to have even a passing interest whatsoever in exploring these technologies and neither does India except for space.

You know, I google "pakistan cyber" and "pakistan space" every week to see if there is any news about Pakistan's cyber strategy and space program but I keep getting empty results on Google. It's so sad.

Never make assumptions about enemy's capabilities. And never assume the enemy will act alone. The threat of unforeseen technological asymmetry is obvious if you see India's deep relationships with Israel, and now Australia and America as well. And I am not even taking into account the army of Indian CEOs sitting on top of the world's largest and most advanced technological firms.

 

[Aspen]

Never make assumptions about enemy's capabilities. And never assume the enemy will act alone. The threat of unforeseen technological asymmetry is obvious if you see India's deep relationships with Israel, and now Australia and America as well. And I am not even taking into account the army of Indian CEOs sitting on top of the world's largest and most advanced technological firms.

I used to think the same way as you but reality is we know how Pakistani people think and Indian thinking is more or less the same follower mentality. There is no concept of innovation in South Asia which is a shame.

My point still stands, India is importing tech from Israel and US. Pakistan is importing from China and Turkey. I would be *very* surprised if India invented anything that US and Israel had not invented first.

Basically my point is that as far as India-Pakistan military situation is concerned, there are not gonna be any surprise innovations given the current state of affairs. Pakistan and India have not even gotten into cyberwar yet and its already 2020. Any thing that Pakistan or India uses will have been invented by someone else first so as long as both sides pay attention to the global innovators like US/China/Iran/Israel/Turkey/Russia, then nothing should come as a surprise to us.

 

[CriticalThought]

I used to think the same way as you but reality is we know how Pakistani people think and Indian thinking is more or less the same follower mentality. There is no concept of innovation in South Asia which is a shame.

My point still stands, India is importing tech from Israel and US. Pakistan is importing from China and Turkey. I would be *very* surprised if India invented anything that US and Israel had not invented first.

Basically my point is that as far as India-Pakistan military situation is concerned, there are not gonna be any surprise innovations given the current state of affairs. Pakistan and India have not even gotten into cyberwar yet and its already 2020. Any thing that Pakistan or India uses will have been invented by someone else first so as long as both sides pay attention to the global innovators like US/China/Iran/Israel/Turkey/Russia, then nothing should come as a surprise to us.

In short, as long as Pakistan is prepared to fight with the likes of US, Russia, China, and Israel, then nothing should come as a surprise to us. Is Pakistan prepared to undertake such an endeavor? I am saying, no we aren't.

 

[Aspen]

In short, as long as Pakistan is prepared to fight with the likes of US, Russia, China, and Israel, then nothing should come as a surprise to us. Is Pakistan prepared to undertake such an endeavor? I am saying, no we aren't.

Well it helps that China is either No.1 or No.2 innovator in the world right now. I hope that eventually some of this will rub off on Pakistan so we can make some innovations without China's help.