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VIEW: Poor civvies in the power conundrum Imtiaz Alam
As the country is moving towards becoming a conglomerate of various institutional fiefdoms, the establishment will be the greatest beneficiary, as it has always been, and parliament will lose whatever sovereignty it has mustered, judiciary will lose its independence and media its freedom
As a powerful army stays in the background, the civilian power players are engaged in a bitter power struggle to annex greater space at the cost of the other. In the post-Musharraf era, if parliament has partially asserted its sovereign role vis-à-vis the president and civilian executive, the judiciary and the media are now on the front foot to redefine the power equation at the cost of the elected government and parliament. The question is: who is sovereign or supreme or is it going to be a conglomerate of institutional fiefs that will zealously guard their territories and contend for more space at the expense of others?
The military regimes in Pakistan monopolised all powers. The judiciary (with very few honourable exceptions) and a section of politicians and the media succumbed to the pressures of military juntas on the expedient grounds of necessity. The occasions of power struggle arose only after the process for civilianisation was initiated by one military ruler or the other. On the other hand, as democracy opened up the venues of free play, a vicious power struggle dominated the political landscape during the civilian rule. Not only that the political players fought amongst themselves to gain more political ground, but also played into the hands of civilian and khaki establishments who, in turn, fought back to regain their lost ground to the civilian rulers.
The army has expanded its corporate interests and consolidated its control over most crucial spheres of states functions. During the civilian rule, the army played a decisive role depending upon the strengths and weaknesses of a civil government. With a presidency equipped with that draconian Article 58-2(b), introduced by General Zia and revived by General Musharraf, parliament was left at the mercy of the president who invariably became an instrument in the hands of the powerful army to subdue an elected government or pack up the Assemblies at will. Consequently, parliament lost its sovereign character and became a hostage to the whims of an autocratic presidency or a quasi-military rule.
Quite interesting was the power-play after the bitter struggle between the judiciary and the bar, on the one hand, and President Musharraf, on the other. Pressed by the political forces at large, especially the PPP and the PML-N, and civil society led by the bars, COAS-President Musharraf had to partially concede some powers, taking off his uniform, hold free elections and withdraw the cases against the PPP leaders, among others, by diluting his draconian National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance, now sanctified in the NRO case. In fact, the infamous NRO paved the way for a compromise that in the end unleashed the potential of democratic forces that forced him to quit as president, subsequently.
It may be noted that the judiciary lost the second round to Musharraf when it failed to restrain him from contesting presidential election. Musharrafs dictatorial step of imposing emergency was reinforced by other brother judges led by Justice Dogar who took another oath under yet another PCO. Musharraf was substantially weakened and had to doff his uniform and hold fair elections under a political deal with Ms Benazir Bhutto. With lawyers and civil society on the streets and losing his hold over reigns of power, President Musharraf lost out to PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari who, by aligning with the PML-N, neutralising the army, the Americans and the judiciary under Justice Dogar, forced him to resign with the full backing of parliament.
Through his reconciliation policy, Mr Zardari helped his party capture the offices of prime minister, Speaker of the National Assembly and Senates chairman and took a great leap in consolidating his hold over the civilian power structure by replacing General Musharraf as president. After Z A Bhutto, the presidency went out of the hands of a dominating establishment leaving it without an effective instrument to manipulate an elected government. Sensing a potential threat from a judiciary, if led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, President Zardari delayed his restoration with the help of PCO-II judiciary under Justice Dogar. A confident President Zardari took the initiative to set a new direction for security issues, especially to take on the menace of terrorism, and foreign affairs, including the partnership with the US and normalisation with India and Afghanistan by ignoring the well-entrenched security establishment.
The differences between the president and the army came into the open when the latter frustrated his half-baked move to make the ISI responsible to the ministry of interior, no-first use of nuclear weapons offer to India and the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Reaching out to the international community, while bypassing the establishment, especially the US, Afghanistan and India, irked the most overdeveloped security structure which, it seems, resorted to its well tested tactics to tame an elected government. Exploiting a bad perception about Mr Zardari, a campaign was built by a powerful section of the media, segments of bars and civil society and political opposition against the president, which reached its climax after the judgement of the Supreme Court in the NRO case.
The first serious threat posed to the new government was on the issue of the restoration of the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP). Sensing the consolidation of immense power in the hands of the president-co-chairperson of the PPP, the bars, the media, civil society and the political opposition led by Mian Nawaz Sharif joined forces to put Mr Zardari on the back foot and the prime minster was left with no option but to restore Chief Justice Chaudhry. Compensating the delay in his restoration as chief justice, President Zardari allowed complete freedom to Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Riding the high tide of popularity and after consolidating his hold over the judiciary under him, the chief justice took a populist road of judicial activism. With his restoration, the judiciary picked the necessary courage to redefine its role as yet another powerful player in the power matrix. Undoubtedly, a free media and an independent judiciary are essential components of good governance and are a necessary check on the executive in defence of citizens rights. But, here it seems, the tough time being given by the media and the judiciary to the elected government and an elected president indirectly played into the hands of the security establishment. This decisive advantage of this round of power struggle among civilian institutions went to the security establishment who successfully snatched the real power from the elected leadership to define national security and foreign policy.
In the meanwhile, thanks to President Zardaris promise and the great maturity shown by the politicians, especially Mr Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister Gilani and Senator Raza Rabbani, parliament asserted its sovereign authority by unanimously passing the 18th Amendment. The new amendment not only fully restored the executive powers of the prime minister by drastically slashing the powers of the president, but also expanded its role of overseeing various functions of the executive and appointment of judges while substantially devolving the powers of the federation to the provinces. This has not eased the ongoing power struggle between the judiciary and the media, on one side, and a democratic government and parliament, on the other. It is interesting to note that the political opposition and all the parliamentary forces are inclined to join hands to defend parliaments sovereign domain of lawmaking, especially on the 18th Amendment, but not in other cases that only affect the PPP leadership.
The next round now being played out in the courts and elsewhere is going to lead to either a complete showdown between the executive and the judiciary, on the one hand, and parliament and the judiciary, on the other; or a compromise between the three institutions of the state. Either parliament asserts its sovereign authority, which it should if it comes to keeping the 18th Amendment on the book, or allows the judiciary to become super-authority on what it thinks of the constitution, on the pretext of basic structure of the constitution, regardless of what parliament thinks. Even if the judiciary retreats in front of an assertive and united parliament, it can still put the government in a most vulnerable position by becoming a super-government. Although the army seems to be neutral at the moment, the infighting among the civilian institutions will ultimately bring the army once again in the position of an arbiter. As the country is moving towards becoming a conglomerate of various institutional fiefdoms, the establishment will be the greatest beneficiary, as it has always been, and parliament will lose whatever sovereignty it has mustered, judiciary will lose its independence and media its freedom. So, stay within your limits poor civvies.
Imtiaz Alam is Editor South Asian Journal. He can be reached at imtiazalampak@yahoo.com
As the country is moving towards becoming a conglomerate of various institutional fiefdoms, the establishment will be the greatest beneficiary, as it has always been, and parliament will lose whatever sovereignty it has mustered, judiciary will lose its independence and media its freedom
As a powerful army stays in the background, the civilian power players are engaged in a bitter power struggle to annex greater space at the cost of the other. In the post-Musharraf era, if parliament has partially asserted its sovereign role vis-à-vis the president and civilian executive, the judiciary and the media are now on the front foot to redefine the power equation at the cost of the elected government and parliament. The question is: who is sovereign or supreme or is it going to be a conglomerate of institutional fiefs that will zealously guard their territories and contend for more space at the expense of others?
The military regimes in Pakistan monopolised all powers. The judiciary (with very few honourable exceptions) and a section of politicians and the media succumbed to the pressures of military juntas on the expedient grounds of necessity. The occasions of power struggle arose only after the process for civilianisation was initiated by one military ruler or the other. On the other hand, as democracy opened up the venues of free play, a vicious power struggle dominated the political landscape during the civilian rule. Not only that the political players fought amongst themselves to gain more political ground, but also played into the hands of civilian and khaki establishments who, in turn, fought back to regain their lost ground to the civilian rulers.
The army has expanded its corporate interests and consolidated its control over most crucial spheres of states functions. During the civilian rule, the army played a decisive role depending upon the strengths and weaknesses of a civil government. With a presidency equipped with that draconian Article 58-2(b), introduced by General Zia and revived by General Musharraf, parliament was left at the mercy of the president who invariably became an instrument in the hands of the powerful army to subdue an elected government or pack up the Assemblies at will. Consequently, parliament lost its sovereign character and became a hostage to the whims of an autocratic presidency or a quasi-military rule.
Quite interesting was the power-play after the bitter struggle between the judiciary and the bar, on the one hand, and President Musharraf, on the other. Pressed by the political forces at large, especially the PPP and the PML-N, and civil society led by the bars, COAS-President Musharraf had to partially concede some powers, taking off his uniform, hold free elections and withdraw the cases against the PPP leaders, among others, by diluting his draconian National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance, now sanctified in the NRO case. In fact, the infamous NRO paved the way for a compromise that in the end unleashed the potential of democratic forces that forced him to quit as president, subsequently.
It may be noted that the judiciary lost the second round to Musharraf when it failed to restrain him from contesting presidential election. Musharrafs dictatorial step of imposing emergency was reinforced by other brother judges led by Justice Dogar who took another oath under yet another PCO. Musharraf was substantially weakened and had to doff his uniform and hold fair elections under a political deal with Ms Benazir Bhutto. With lawyers and civil society on the streets and losing his hold over reigns of power, President Musharraf lost out to PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari who, by aligning with the PML-N, neutralising the army, the Americans and the judiciary under Justice Dogar, forced him to resign with the full backing of parliament.
Through his reconciliation policy, Mr Zardari helped his party capture the offices of prime minister, Speaker of the National Assembly and Senates chairman and took a great leap in consolidating his hold over the civilian power structure by replacing General Musharraf as president. After Z A Bhutto, the presidency went out of the hands of a dominating establishment leaving it without an effective instrument to manipulate an elected government. Sensing a potential threat from a judiciary, if led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, President Zardari delayed his restoration with the help of PCO-II judiciary under Justice Dogar. A confident President Zardari took the initiative to set a new direction for security issues, especially to take on the menace of terrorism, and foreign affairs, including the partnership with the US and normalisation with India and Afghanistan by ignoring the well-entrenched security establishment.
The differences between the president and the army came into the open when the latter frustrated his half-baked move to make the ISI responsible to the ministry of interior, no-first use of nuclear weapons offer to India and the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Reaching out to the international community, while bypassing the establishment, especially the US, Afghanistan and India, irked the most overdeveloped security structure which, it seems, resorted to its well tested tactics to tame an elected government. Exploiting a bad perception about Mr Zardari, a campaign was built by a powerful section of the media, segments of bars and civil society and political opposition against the president, which reached its climax after the judgement of the Supreme Court in the NRO case.
The first serious threat posed to the new government was on the issue of the restoration of the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP). Sensing the consolidation of immense power in the hands of the president-co-chairperson of the PPP, the bars, the media, civil society and the political opposition led by Mian Nawaz Sharif joined forces to put Mr Zardari on the back foot and the prime minster was left with no option but to restore Chief Justice Chaudhry. Compensating the delay in his restoration as chief justice, President Zardari allowed complete freedom to Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Riding the high tide of popularity and after consolidating his hold over the judiciary under him, the chief justice took a populist road of judicial activism. With his restoration, the judiciary picked the necessary courage to redefine its role as yet another powerful player in the power matrix. Undoubtedly, a free media and an independent judiciary are essential components of good governance and are a necessary check on the executive in defence of citizens rights. But, here it seems, the tough time being given by the media and the judiciary to the elected government and an elected president indirectly played into the hands of the security establishment. This decisive advantage of this round of power struggle among civilian institutions went to the security establishment who successfully snatched the real power from the elected leadership to define national security and foreign policy.
In the meanwhile, thanks to President Zardaris promise and the great maturity shown by the politicians, especially Mr Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister Gilani and Senator Raza Rabbani, parliament asserted its sovereign authority by unanimously passing the 18th Amendment. The new amendment not only fully restored the executive powers of the prime minister by drastically slashing the powers of the president, but also expanded its role of overseeing various functions of the executive and appointment of judges while substantially devolving the powers of the federation to the provinces. This has not eased the ongoing power struggle between the judiciary and the media, on one side, and a democratic government and parliament, on the other. It is interesting to note that the political opposition and all the parliamentary forces are inclined to join hands to defend parliaments sovereign domain of lawmaking, especially on the 18th Amendment, but not in other cases that only affect the PPP leadership.
The next round now being played out in the courts and elsewhere is going to lead to either a complete showdown between the executive and the judiciary, on the one hand, and parliament and the judiciary, on the other; or a compromise between the three institutions of the state. Either parliament asserts its sovereign authority, which it should if it comes to keeping the 18th Amendment on the book, or allows the judiciary to become super-authority on what it thinks of the constitution, on the pretext of basic structure of the constitution, regardless of what parliament thinks. Even if the judiciary retreats in front of an assertive and united parliament, it can still put the government in a most vulnerable position by becoming a super-government. Although the army seems to be neutral at the moment, the infighting among the civilian institutions will ultimately bring the army once again in the position of an arbiter. As the country is moving towards becoming a conglomerate of various institutional fiefdoms, the establishment will be the greatest beneficiary, as it has always been, and parliament will lose whatever sovereignty it has mustered, judiciary will lose its independence and media its freedom. So, stay within your limits poor civvies.
Imtiaz Alam is Editor South Asian Journal. He can be reached at imtiazalampak@yahoo.com
