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VIEW: A review of Pakistan Assistance Strategy Paper

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VIEW: A review of Pakistan Assistance Strategy Paper —Jamal Hussain

If a few hundred Blackwater workers, or an increase of about a hundred US Marines in Islamabad, have the ability to defang us of our nuclear assets despite the presence of over half a million combat-tested military, we deserve to be disarmed and should voluntarily give up our crown jewels

The 19-page ‘Pakistan
Assistance Strategy Paper’ released by the US Administration on December 14, 2009, can be accessed online. It is an interesting document and, similar to the much-maligned Kerry-Lugar Act (KLA), it is well intentioned, but unlike the KLA, much better worded. The paper has correctly identified the core issues that need addressing and the difficulties involved in any assistance programme by the US, given the amount of anti-US sentiments still prevalent among the general public. The policy outlined appears sound, but as the cliché goes, the devil lies in the detail, or in this case in the implementation process.
Any organisation trying to help stabilise and improve Pakistan’s economy through infrastructure uplift and improvement in the quality of education has to contend with the epidemic of corruption. The strategy paper is cognizant of this danger and has attempted to reduce its impact through better monitoring by the donor agencies. To the opposition and the clergy, this will be viewed as another golden opportunity to embarrass the government by raising the spectre of loss of face and sovereignty. In the prevailing anti-US feeling, these sentiments will be lapped up by the media and further confuse the already confused public.
Any increase in the presence of US citizens in Pakistan even for genuinely valid reasons will be portrayed in the media as a further effort to destabilise the state. The bogey of Blackwater personnel undoing the country and neutralising our nuclear deterrence through subversion will be raised. If a few hundred Blackwater workers, or an increase of about a hundred US Marines in Islamabad, have the ability to defang us of our nuclear assets despite the presence of over half a million combat-tested military, we deserve to be disarmed and should voluntarily give up our crown jewels. The real threat to our ‘strategic assets’ does not emanate from these directions. A responsible and mature behaviour by us will put the world at ease and it will eventually learn to live with our nuclear status. However, if we act irrationally, the very survival of Pakistan as a nation state will be in jeopardy.
Appointing locals for monitoring of the assistance programmes is the correct approach, but that too is not without complications. To be able to pick the right persons for the task will always be challenging for the US administrations, as many Chalabis (remember Iraq), suitably camouflaged, will be found here too. Besides, even if the right people are found and given the responsibility without bringing the politicians on board, the government agencies will not make life easy for the appointees. They, too, have to be brought on board. The political masters cannot be kept out of the loop without compromising the success of the entire project. The matter can be resolved, but needs very careful handling.
The additional supply and upgrading of armed helicopters for the Pakistan Army is a very valid recommendation. These machines are ideal platforms in this fourth generation warfare where the adversary has little defence against the rotary-wing attackers. Besides the armed helicopters for the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Armed Forces would love to have low yield smart bombs.
The current laser-guided MK84s (2,000 pounds) pack too much punch and have a very large destruction footprint. When we need to take out just a room, it will flatten the entire compound, adding to the collateral damage. The supply of 500-pound MK82 LGB is an improvement, but there are even smaller, low-yield weapons that are extremely accurate and have very small footprints. Hellfire missiles are ideal for such form of warfare. With a warhead of just 9.0 kg, they can take out just a room where the target may be residing rather than demolish the entire structure. Also, a platform like the A-10 Warthog will allow the PAF to carry out its targeting operations at a much greater pace and at a fraction of the cost that it incurs while using the state of the art F-16s or other modern combat jets. The enhancement of PAF’s ability to conduct night operations will further augment its effectiveness and the service can maintain 24/7 pressure on the insurgents.
For once, the US administration has realised that Pakistan has to be on board if the Americans have any hope of exiting with any degree of honour from Afghanistan at some point in the not-too-distant future. This has put India on the back foot now and some of their current utterances are indicative of their dilemma. A top Indian official recently announced that they may have to rethink their Afghan policy and may have to scale down their participation in helping the Karzai government in the development of infrastructure in the war ravaged country. Pakistan had always maintained that the Indian involvement under the pretext of economic uplift had much more sinister designs against Pakistan and will view the scaling down of the Indian activities in its western neighbourhood as a healthy development.
The US administration and their superior military commanders now appear to have a much better understanding of our position. This has come about because: first, Pakistan has finally recognised the threat trying to appease the non-state actors poses; and second, there has been a rapid learning curve by the US military commanders and administrators about the nuances of dealing with Pakistan. Hillary Clinton’s style of handling the irate Pakistani media and youth was refreshing. Without sounding condescending, she held her ground and acknowledged our concerns even if they appeared to be based on irrational assumptions. It was a far cry from many of the earlier US cowboy messengers with their ‘you are with us or against us’ and ‘we will bomb you into the stone age’ (or words to that effect) style of diplomacy.

The writer is a retired Air Commodore, former director Centre for Aerospace Power Studies PAF Base Faisal, Karachi, and former Commandant Joint Services Staff College. He can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk
 
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