Wikipedia
about that sea battle in 1974
Balance of forces
Four warships of the Republic of Vietnam participated in the battle: three frigates, Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-5),[1] Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16),[2] and Trần Khánh Dư (HQ-4), [3], and one corvette, Nhật Tảo (HQ-10).[4] In addition, a platoon of South Vietnamese naval commandos, an underwater demolition team, and a regular ARVN platoon were stationed on the islands.
The People’s Republic of China had four warships for most parts of the battle, (PLAN corvettes # 271, #274, # 389 and # 396). This force was then reinforced by two more Kronstad-Class submarine chasers (# 281 and # 282) after the end of the battle. In addition, two PLA marine battalions and an unknown number of irregular militia landed on the islands.
In comparison, the total displacements and weapons of the Republic of Vietnam’s four warships were remarkably more than those of the People’s Republic of China. There were four ships of each side engaging in the battle. The supporting and reinforcement forces of China’s PLAN did not take part in this battle for real.
In the early morning of January 19, 1974, Vietnamese troops from HQ-5 landed on Duncan Island (Quang Hòa in Vietnamese) and came under fire from Chinese troops, after HQ-5 opened fire first on the Chinese troops stationed on the island while advancing toward the shores of the island. Three Vietnamese soldiers were killed and two others were injured. Outnumbered, the Vietnamese ground forces withdrew by landing craft, but their small fleet itself did not: instead, they drew up close to the Chinese ships in a tense standoff.
At 10:24 a.m., two Vietnamese ships, HQ-16 and HQ-10 opened fire against Chinese ships. Then, HQ-4, HQ-5 did the same thing. The ensuing sea battle lasted for about 40 minutes, with numerous vessels on both sides sustaining damage. The small Chinese ships maneuvered into the blind spots of the main cannons on the larger Vietnamese warships and succeeded in damaging all four Vietnamese ships, particularly the HQ-10. The Nhật Tảo (HQ-10) could not retreat because her last working engine was disabled in the battle: the ship's crew was ordered to evacuate, but her captain, Major [navy Lt. Commander] Ngụy Văn Thà, remained under fire and went down with his ship. HQ-16, severely shot by a friendly ship, the HQ-5, was forced to retreat westwards. Meanwhile, HQ-4 and HQ-5, were forced to retreat.
The next day, Chinese jet fighters and ground-attack aircraft from Hainan bombed the three islands, and were followed up with an amphibious landing force. The South Vietnamese Marine garrison was captured, and the naval force retreated to Đà Nẵng.
While the battle was going on, the Vietnamese fleet detected two Chinese reinforcing warships rushing to the area; China later acknowledged that these were the Hainan-Class submarine chasers #281 and #282. Despite reports that at least one Vietnamese craft had been struck by a missile, China insisted that no missile-bearing ships were involved in the battle. In addition, the South Vietnamese fleet also received warnings from the United States that their naval radar had detected additional Chinese guided missile frigates and MiG jet fighters on their way from nearby Hainan. South Vietnam requested assistance from the US Seventh Fleet, but the request was rejected.
The South Vietnamese claim of her own casualties was agreed to by the Chinese. According to the claim, warship HQ-10 was sunk, HQ-16 was heavily damaged, HQ-5 and HQ-4 were both lightly damaged. Fifty-three (53) Vietnamese soldiers, including Captain Ngụy Văn Thà, of HQ-10 were killed, 16 others were injured. On January 20, 1974, the Dutch tanker, Kopionella, rescued 23 survivors of HQ-10. On January 29, 1974, Vietnamese fishermen found a group of 15 Vietnamese soldiers near Mũi Yến (Qui Nhơn), who had participated in the combat on Quang Hòa island, and escaped on lifeboats.[5]
Aftermath
As a result of the battle, the People’s Republic of China established control over all of the Paracel Islands, which it calls the Xisha Islands. South Vietnam protested bitterly to the United Nations, but was unable to achieve neither any action nor even public consideration: China, with veto power on the UN Security Council, blocked all efforts to bring up the matter. By January 25, the President of the Security Council, Gonzalo Facio Segreda, publicly advised South Vietnam to give up, because they simply “could not muster the votes.” (NYT, 1/26/74.)