Vietnam Defence Forum

[Carlosa]

Vietnam Acquires Two Early Warning Aircraft with ELTA Radar
Vietnam will buy at least two early-warning C-295 AEW&C aircraft to enhance the ability to control the South China Sea airspace

Ami Rojkes Dombe | 30/05/2016

http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/vietnam-acquires-two-early-warning-aircraft-elta-radar

C295 AEW and C295 Transport - militaryaircraft-airbusds.com

According to a report on aseanmildef, Vietnam is purchasing two C-295 type early-warning aircraft (AEW&C). The Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system was developed jointly by ELTA and Airbus in 2006.

In view of China's activity in the South China Sea, Vietnam is probably looking for surveillance and intelligence means that will enable it to better monitor its borders.

According to the report, Vietnam ordered at least two such aircraft.

Vietnam will Buy Early Warning Aircraft C-295 AEW&C
Maki Catama 9:51:00 PM

http://www.aseanmildef.com/2016/05/vietnam-will-buy-early-warning-aircraft.html

HANOI, -- Vietnam will buy at least two early-warning aircraft C-295 AEW&C to enhance the ability to control the South China Sea airspace.

World media simultaneously reported that Vietnam will buy at least 2 aircraft early warning and control air C-295 AEW&C to enhance the ability to control airspace East Sea and provide information reconnaissance, early warning control service of the sky, ready to fight.

This is not without basis when multiple signals recently that Vietnam will likely favor buying the aircraft.

C-295 AEW&C necessary for Vietnam

Military experts said that the C-295 AEW&C is now very necessary for Vietnam.

Accordingly, Vietnam Army was initially formed diverse combat capability with modern weapons such as the Su-30MK2 aircraft, high-speed vessels Molniya rocket, rocket ship Gepard 3.9 Guardians, submarine Kilo 636, missile shore Bastion-P.

However, we still lack a means of linking the modern weapon systems as well as an extended arm to operate, it's early warning aircraft.

The early warning aircraft act in coordination with aircraft, warships help remote target detection, homing missiles, expanding the range of weapons combat. Besides early warning aircraft are also intermediate link, as well as help coordinate the activities of different weapons.

Also according to analysts, this aircraft uses the chassis of the transport aircraft C-295 should help to reduce maintenance costs as well as trained pilots, mechanics.

ELTA radar could be linked to the arms of the Russian system, which Vietnam is owned by Israel have a lot of experience in improving weapons as well as providing radar early warning aircraft to India (the country use Russian aircraft system), C-295 AEW&C is considered the optimal solution for the needs of Vietnam.

Many positive signs

In particular, local and international media also published photographs delegations visiting Vietnam Military C-295 aircraft AEW&C.

This is considered a good signal to accelerate the process of negotiation and transfer between Vietnam and the defense industrial company Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Israel.

In a statement to the media in February month 6/2014, Mr. Antonio Rodríguez Barberan, Director of Airbus DS (subsidiary of Airbus Group European aviation) officially revealed, Ecuador and Vietnam is two of the many new customers have ordered 3 transport aircraft C-295 Airbus DS for each country.

Meanwhile, Russia's Independent newspaper, said that the modernization requires the Air Force in the near future, Vietnam will buy at least two aircraft airborne early warning, in which CASA C-295 is one of the leading candidate.

Because this will be the aircraft is equipped with the electronic system can be compatible with 6 seaplane DHC-6 Twin Otter Navy Air Force Vietnam and create a network of surveillance and early warning area for both air and sea, thereby enhancing the combat readiness capability for our Army.

 

[BoQ77]

My guess
------------
As Vietnam has been exercised on 3 of upgraded DHC-6 long time ago.

The number 3 implies 3 crews ready for 3 bigger platform

 

[frequency]

My guess

amen

 

[Aqsuperman]

In the South China Sea, Vietnam Stands Its Ground

Fortifications such as the one on Vietnamese-controlled Phan Vinh Island in the South China Sea's Spratly chain are one method countries in the disputed waters press their claims. (Vietnam News Agency/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
As China tries to make nice with some of its rivals in the South China Sea, Vietnam is quietly building up its own maritime defenses. Over the past month, a series of satellite images has shown that Hanoi is accelerating its island reclamation and fortification efforts in the Spratly island chain. Combined with its pursuit of defense partnerships with the United States, Russia, France and India, as well as its improving air and naval assets, Vietnam appears determined to thwart China's ambitions to expand its claims over the disputed waters.

Some of Vietnam's neighbors, however, may spoil its plans. The Philippines and Malaysia have given in to Chinese pressure and agreed to manage their territorial feuds with Beijing through bilateral talks rather than international arbitration. Though Vietnam has tried to avoid drawing China's ire by mending ties with it in other ways, Hanoi's continued defiance on maritime issues could incite retaliation from Beijing that leaves Vietnam with little choice, in the end, but to follow its neighbors' lead.

Analysis
Vietnam's practice of fortifying islands and reefs under its control is nothing new. Military installations and garrisons have dotted the features of the Spratly archipelago — including the Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island and Spratly Island itself — for some time. But over the past two years, Vietnam has redoubled its efforts to reclaim and build up these islets and reefs, creating over 50 hectares (120 acres) of new land in the archipelago in spite of U.S. calls for it to stop so as to avoid escalating tensions in the sea.

Vietnam Engineers a Deterrent
Based on satellite imagery, Vietnam's latest projects on Spratly Island include the extension of a 600-meter (2,000-foot) runway to 1,200 meters and the construction of two large hangars, in addition to the two that already existed. Once these projects are finished, the island will be able to accommodate most of the Vietnamese air force's aircraft. According to an assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, they also indicate that Hanoi will probably deploy noncombat aircraft, such as its PZL M28B maritime surveillance planes and CASA C-295 transport planes, to Spratly Island. Meanwhile, dredging work has been spotted at the nearby Ladd Reef that could be designed to provide shelter for Vietnamese vessels inside the lagoon. Unconfirmed reports indicated that Vietnam has positioned rocket artillery in the island chain as well, though Hanoi has denied the claims.

The new features are no match for China's aggressive buildup in the South China Sea, but they are notable for their position. Located on the sea's southwestern rim, Spratly Island stands apart from most of the other islets in the Spratly archipelago, boasting a comparatively large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its own. It also serves as Vietnam's key military outpost in the Spratly island chain, just as the Thitu and Taiping islands do for the Philippines and Taiwan, respectively. But perhaps just as important, Spratly Island rests on the western edge of the nine-dash line that China insists delineates its South China Sea holdings. Under Beijing's definition, Spratly Island — and the vast potential resources that fall within its EEZ — belongs to China. Should Vietnam's claim to the island be verified, it could invalidate the rest of the nine-dash line boundary as well. Hanoi is not taking any chances as China's creeping encroachment has left Vietnam's island defenses vulnerable, and it hopes that bolstering its military posture in the Spratlys will help to ward off any further Chinese advances.

China Treads Carefully
Vietnam's moves come at a time of relative calm in the ongoing South China Sea dispute. To different degrees, the Philippines and Malaysia have acquiesced to China's request to handle territorial spats through its preferred mechanism: diplomatic negotiations and joint arrangements that align with Beijing's interests. Though it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue, several factors can explain why it is happening now. For one, China has gradually gained the tactical upper hand in the region over the past six years as it has modernized its military, developed its islands and acquired new deep-sea drilling technology. That said, China has also experienced significant strategic setbacks, not least of which was a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that negated Beijing's competing claims with the Philippines in the South China Sea. As a result, China seems to have abandoned the outright use of force for a subtler two-track strategy: Using economic and tactical concessions to entice cooperation from some claimants while maintaining pressure against more vocal opponents with limited punitive measures. The former have included offers of joint energy development projects and fishing regulations, while the latter have included diplomatic complaints and interdictions.

Having found themselves with fewer options for countering China's maritime ambitions, many South China Sea claimants — including the Philippines and Malaysia — have adopted a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing. Though these countries have continued to expand their defense ties with other powers, they have relented in their refusal to settle disputes through bilateral talks with China. Vietnam, however, has proved the exception.

China sees Vietnam's land reclamation efforts as a provocation, but it has neither the legal grounds nor the appetite to militarily challenge it. Nevertheless, it has the means to pressure Vietnam or undermine Hanoi's territorial claims, should it so choose. For instance, Beijing could increase its holdings in the Paracel Islands or send coast guard patrols near the Spratlys. It could also begin bidding on or exploring for energy resources around Spratly Island, including in the nearby Vanguard Bank, which Beijing tried to develop in the 1990s. But each of these measures would also risk renewing regional suspicions of China's intentions, undermining its own goal of reaching one-on-one deals with the sea's claimants that ultimately work in its favor.

 

[Viet]

thing is moving at nail speed but some take shape: Vietnam first observatory with a 0.5-meter telescope near Nha Trang. the second one will be in Hanoi. both go live next year. observatories are part of Vietnam $600 million space program.

 

[Viet]

Analysis

Against China, Vietnam Stands Alone
December 22, 2016 | 09:15 GMT

Garment manufacture is among the industries supporting Vietnam's export-oriented economy that depends on Chinese raw materials, such as fabric. That reliance limits Hanoi's options when dealing with its giant northern neighbor. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/Getty Images)

Forecast

• Vietnam will pursue its island reclamation projects and defense partnerships more discreetly to avoid directly challenging China.
• Despite Vietnam's efforts to connect with global markets, its reliance on imports of raw materials and incomplete industrial chains may mean that such integration could damage its export-oriented economy in the long run.
• Rising protectionism in the developed world will hamper Vietnam's attempts to overcome its structural economic flaws, rising debt and inefficient state-owned enterprises.

Analysis
The balance of power in Southeast Asia has been quietly shifting in China's favor, and perhaps no country feels it more than Vietnam. In the span of a few months, Hanoi — once the staunchest advocate for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — became the first participant to shelve the trade pact, well before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw from it. At the same time, Vietnam softened its criticisms of China and took steps to mend ties with Beijing. Rather than positioning itself squarely in China's crosshairs, Hanoi began a more subtle pursuit of its maritime claims and alliances with stronger partners, keeping its options open and its defenses ready.

More so than most of its neighbors, Vietnam can neither fully reject nor embrace the growing power on its northern border. Some, such as the Philippines and Malaysia, have eagerly joined Chinese-led trade blocs and dispute-settling mechanisms. Others, like Japan and Singapore, have firmly backed Washington's regional agenda. Vietnam has historically opted to strike a delicate balance between the two, but as the region adjusts to a new political reality, Hanoi's strategy is becoming increasingly difficult to pull off.

A Lasting Legacy
Despite its short-lived momentum, the TPP's legacy is still alive and well in Vietnam. Shortly after Hanoi decided to suspend its approval of the U.S.-led trade deal, the government announced a raft of new labor laws and business reforms in an apparent bid to demonstrate its continued commitment to the TPP's high regulatory standards. It also took steps to integrate its economy more closely with those of other TPP signatories and regional trade blocs, including the Chinese-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

In fact, Vietnam has embarked on one of the most active quests for free trade in the Pacific Rim. From Hanoi's perspective, deals like the TPP are perfect for attracting foreign investment and buyers for its exports, both of which are crucial to ensuring its success amid heightened regional competition and its gradual reform of the Vietnamese economy. (Currently, inefficient state-run enterprises are responsible for much of the country's economic output.) Though Vietnam was the least developed member of the TPP — and, in many ways, the one that would have proved most vulnerable to its strict requirements — it was also the state that stood the most to gain from it. Despite the deal's impending failure, Hanoi has pursued a fairly liberal trade agenda that has left it with a cushion of other free trade agreements to fall back on, including with the Eurasian Economic Union and European Union. (The former already has taken effect, while the latter is scheduled to be implemented in early 2018.)

But as was true with the TPP, Vietnam's motives for seeking out these trade and investment agreements are not solely economic. Hanoi's deal with the Eurasian Economic Union, for instance, offers only limited access to the bloc's market but lays the groundwork for a stronger military and energy partnership with Russia, its former ally. By comparison, EU members and TPP states receive nearly 60 percent of Vietnam's total exports and include some of its biggest investors, such as Japan, Singapore and the United States. Nevertheless, the two blocs set lofty standards that would require Hanoi to undertake extensive regulatory overhauls and politically sensitive labor union reforms that could directly threaten the operations of its bloated state-owned enterprises. That the Vietnamese government is willing to do so in spite of the risks to its own position in power is a testament to its desire to seek out trade partners other than China and, by extension, limit Beijing's influence over Vietnam.

But putting its plan into practice has been no easy feat. Vietnam's industry is still heavily reliant on Chinese yarn, fabric and electronics, and its recent territorial feuds with Beijing in the South China Sea have raised doubts about whether Hanoi can continue to count on those supplies. Vietnamese imports of Chinese goods increased most rapidly between 2010 and 2015, when tensions between the two countries reached their peak. This, combined with a growing reliance on imports that has reduced the profitability of Vietnam's exports, suggests that Hanoi may have a tough time improving its economic fortunes. The TPP or a free trade agreement with the European Union would expand Vietnam's access to other markets and foreign partners, eventually reducing its dependence on Chinese products. But in the short term, these deals will offer little relief. From Hanoi's perspective, signing the TPP when it essentially has been tabled would needlessly irritate Beijing, which considers the TPP to be part of a U.S.-led strategy to contain China's rise.

Lingering Barriers to Free Trade
Choosing between U.S.- and Chinese-led initiatives in trade and security has not been an option for Vietnam since the Cold War ended. Instead, the country has harnessed its advantageous location and regional clout to make steady gains of its own on both fronts, making room to manage its relationships with meddlesome foreign powers while emerging as one of the biggest manufacturing success stories in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet as much as Hanoi would like to link its economy to the rest of the global market, rising protectionism in the developed world and lingering vulnerabilities in its political economy at home will stand in the way of its ambitions.

Over the past two years, a spurt of economic growth driven by robust exports and investment allowed Vietnam to pull ahead of regional competitors like Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, whose growth slowed during the same period. But with an export-oriented economy that runs on foreign investment, the country's deepening integration with the rest of the world has made it vulnerable to volatility in global markets while squeezing its domestic manufacturers. After years of generous foreign investment, investor pledges have tapered off in recent months, a sign of the challenges to come for Vietnamese exports in the wake of the TPP's demise. Meanwhile, growing protectionism in the United States and European Union — Vietnam's largest export markets — bode ill for its economic prospects, as do the trade disputes brewing between Washington and Beijing. The timing of those developments could not be worse for Hanoi, which is in the midst of a painful effort to restructure its economy that could put pressure on some of Vietnam's most important industries, including agriculture, steel and electronic components.

The country's manufacturing supply chains, moreover, are far from complete. Vietnam must import many of the raw materials it uses to generate its exports. This, coupled with the country's lack of supporting and processing industries, has cut into producers' profit margins and limited their ability to add value. Without a long-term strategy to develop these industries and boost its productivity, Vietnam is vulnerable to external disruptions to its supplies. Hanoi has been forced to make do on a tight income and with meager export revenue. It has also seen its budget deficit grow to nearly 6.5 percent of GDP, aided in part by ballooning expenditures, plummeting oil prices and surging debt-service obligations. All of these issues have been aggravated by Vietnam's persistent macroeconomic problems, including its fragile banking system, an excessive number of non-performing loans, underdeveloped regulations and lagging public enterprise reforms, as well as continued volatility in global commodity prices and financial markets.


A Deeply Rooted Rivalry
The appearance of these new economic problems against a backdrop of mounting political uncertainty — both from the United States' unclear intentions for the Asia-Pacific region and in recent signs that Vietnam's neighbors may be starting to break their collective front against China — may have been the impetus behind the change in Vietnam's diplomatic tactics. But there are limits to how much less contentious its relationship with China can get — and how long Beijing will ignore Hanoi's muted assertiveness.

Vietnam's resistance to Chinese invasion has deep historical roots, and a vein of nationalism still runs strong among its people. Each of these factors will continue to prevent Hanoi from following in Malaysia's footsteps by cozying up to Beijing. Moreover, unlike the Philippines, Vietnam has no U.S. security guarantee to protect it from Chinese aggression, despite its fairly friendly relationship with Washington. Consequently, Hanoi has worked to build up its own defenses and island claims in the South China Sea, all while continuing its drive for closer security cooperation in the region.

To be sure, among all regional challengers to China's maritime expansion, Vietnam is still the most militarily capable. But multilateral organizations like the Association for Southeast Asian Nations will not be much help in deterring Chinese expansionism in the disputed waters. And as other major claimants in the South China Sea begin to pivot to varying degrees toward China, Vietnam will find itself alone in its stand against Beijing. Having given no indication that it intends to lay its maritime disputes with China to rest, Vietnam will continue to discreetly bolster its forces and alliances, even at the risk of drawing Beijing's ire.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/against-china-vietnam-stands-alone

 

[Viet]

a bit of history. a war that nobody wanted. a Vietnam war memorial is opened in the Pentagon. one more to many existing Vietnam war momerials on over America. what began with few hundreds of US troops on the ground, at the end of day the war had seen more than 9,000,000 US soldiers fighting in Vietnam. the war caused not only deaths and destruction to Vietnam, but also inflicted political, economic and military crisis to America. John F. Kenneny was assassinated, also his brother and Martin Luther King, Jr.. Lyndon B. Johnson gave up after a term. Johnson once said "I can't get out, I can't finish it with what I have got. So what the hell do I do?" when his strategy of escalation of war failed. Richard Nixon was forced to resigned after his involvement in the Watergate scandal. Gerald Ford was no illusionist, stopping all supports to South Vietnam, letting the Republic to collapse.

Jumping to the present

Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia on a visit to Vietnam. he is fluent in Vietnamese. No wonder he was trained in Vietnam, learning everything he needs to know to survive in a world of chaos. the late King of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk once scolded him as one eyed lackey of the Vietnamese. I don´t think it is true, considering the deep rooted hatred of Cambodians on everything Vietnamese. Anyway, on his occassion of the visit, Hun Sen found some nice words:

“Tôi rất cảm ơn Việt Nam và biết ơn Việt Nam. Tôi biết ngày mai 
(22-12) là 72 năm ngày thành lập Quân đội nhân dân Việt Nam. Tôi muốn nói rằng quân đội Việt Nam là một đội quân mạnh, đối với tôi, tôi rất tin tưởng. Tôi chúc quân đội Việt Nam tiếp tục trưởng thành...Đất nước Campuchia không có các anh thì lúc này dân tộc Campuchia không biết đi về đâu”.

for someone who is not familiar with Vietnamese language, Hun Sen has great trust to Vietnamese army (whatever the reason) and he thanks Vietnam for saving Cambodia from the abyss (we know what he means).

 

[Silent Knight]

Compensation for the lack of nice photos.

 

[cochine]

In north Vietnam, in nearby with border mountainous area.. .

In south Vietnam where is wet rice planting area closed to the border.

 

[Aqsuperman]

Outfitting and standardizing M-113 weapon system.

 

[Viet]

despite all setbacks I believe we have seen a good year. Merry Christmas!

 

[Viet]

Compensation for the lack of nice photos.

I wish too we have many nice photos to post showing vietnam military power. Personally I am for more posturings as I believe such things have some positive effects. But you know sometimes even that isn't necessary to do so. An US army general was once asked why the US armed forces never stage any military parade in public places like the Russians and Chinese do, with tanks, planes, missiles and everything else? He responds there is not necessary to do it, because everyone knows of US military power.

This week in the most popular weekly German magazine "der Spiegel" appears an interview with a retired Lt. General of Chinese People's Liberation Army. I don't remember if his name. He was asked why Xi Jinping broke the promise not to weaponize the islands in the South China Sea? He answers China does it in response to increasing US military buildup in the South China Sea, especially in the Philippines. And the buildup in the latter continues despite new tones of the Durtete administration. But he comments that is not the US that poses the biggest threat to China but Vietnam. The Vietnamese, he says, are armed to the teeth. China has to respond. Interesting isn't it? Nobody sees it. There isn't announcement. But Vietnam has a military in place that brings death and destruction to an aggressor. The words of a retired PLA general is remarkable because he can freely say without taking care too much of political correctness.

Cheers!

 

[Carlosa]

despite all setbacks I believe we have seen a good year. Merry Christmas!

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to all!

 

[Viet]

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to all!

All the best bro

 

[Carlosa]

All the best bro

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