Aug 30, 2016
A US-Vietnam Alliance: Prospects And Challenges
Anders Corr, Contributor
I cover international politics, security and political risk.
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.
China’s increasing militarization and persistent maritime claims against Vietnam threaten not only that country, but the international rule-based system of international law developed over the last century. The League of Nations, founded in 1919, and the United Nations, founded in 1945, were meant to be rule-based systems to decrease the risk of military conflict. Yet China
refuses to follow international law, and seems to have forgotten the wretched history of wars that preceded these great peace-making institutions.
US State Secretary John Kerry (L) shakes hands with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh (R) during a ASEAN-United States meeting on the sideline of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) annual ministerial meeting and the Regional Security Forum in Vientiane on July 25, 2016.Vietnam has warned that the inability of Southeast Asian nations to forge a unified front against Beijing’s militarisation of the South China Sea is a ‘test’ of the regional bloc in the face of its greatest security challenge. HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/Getty Images
Indeed, China is determined to follow the chimera of its own territorial growth, at the expense of its neighbors. Perhaps China’s hand is forced by a public opinion starved of informational oxygen due to press restrictions. But as China controls the press, so should it control the overly nationalistic sentiment of its population. Regardless of where one stands on this rather pedantic debate about causes of the conflict, China’s territorial aggression is crystal clear.
To contain it requires increased bilateral and multilateral economic and defense cooperation between Asian-Pacific partners. A broad multilateral alliance is optimal to deter China from military conflict in Asia. But even bilateral alliances will help, including between the U.S. and Vietnam.
Due to current U.S. military and economic superiority over China, the U.S. is the linchpin bilateral alliance partner for claimant states in Asia that plan to defend their maritime or territorial rights, whether through military deterrence or economic sanctions. A strong U.S.-Vietnam alliance would strengthen immediate deterrence, leverage economic trade to influence China, decisively remove Vietnam from China and Russia’s camp, and progress Asia towards a stronger future multilateral alliance in which the U.S. is a leading participant and democratization of China is one of the goals.
An incipient U.S.-Vietnamese alliance should include greater economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation, and can be achieved by: overcoming political and value-based differences between the two countries; strengthening the U.S. defense commitment to Asia generally and Vietnam specifically; increasing economic integration between the U.S. and Vietnam; decreasing Vietnam’s economic and defense dependence on China and Russia; and decreasing U.S. economic dependence on China.
Alternative allies exist for Vietnam, in particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Russia. But a strong bilateral alliance between the U.S. and Vietnam is an essential complement to its traditional participation with these two rather weak political entities.
Consensual multilateral alliances such as ASEAN cannot be relied upon to effectively stop China’s territorial and maritime growth. For example, China’s loan of just
$600 million to Cambodia on July 15, three days after the Permanent Court of Arbitration award to the Philippines, probably stopped issuance of a stronger message on the South China Sea by ASEAN foreign ministers at their July 24 meeting. ASEAN will be irrelevant on China issues until it dispenses with Cambodia’s veto power.
Transforming ASEAN, if it happens at all, will take a long time. Meanwhile, Vietnam needs a stronger partner to resist China.
That partner will never be Russia, which depends on China’s economy for exports of oil, gas, and defense technology. The old diplomatic relationship between China and Russia, in which China simply followed Russia’s diplomatic lead in places like the United Nations, is no more. Now Russia is more likely to follow China’s lead. So Vietnam cannot rely on Russian troops or even Russian military technology, such as the six kilo-class submarines it recently purchased. What if, in a time of war, China told Russia to stop providing submarine technical expertise and delivering spare parts to Vietnam? When push comes to shove, Russia will follow the lead of China.
The U.S. is a great alternative ally for Vietnam, but it will take work and time. U.S. credibility in Asia and Europe is eroding and needs revival. The Philippines seems to have lost Scarborough Shoal, within its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), even though it has a defense treaty with the U.S. and defense cooperation with Japan.
Ukraine lost Crimea to Russia despite the
Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which the U.S., U.K., and Russia gave security assurances to Ukraine in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear weapons. The U.S. has not demonstrated, of late, a willingness to go to war to defend allied territory, even where a formal written agreement exists. That reticence actually invites aggression. The U.S. should frankly acknowledge these failures in order to correct its strategy in future, and broadcast a new tougher stance against Russian and Chinese territorial expansionism. This will be important to strengthening U.S. alliances.
Vietnam will also be wary of an alliance with the U.S. because the U.S. prioritizes alliances with countries that are democratic, wealthy, engage in large amounts of trade with the U.S., and have no outstanding territorial conflicts. The more democratic, wealthy, and economically connected, the greater the likelihood that the U.S. will defend an ally. The Philippines and Ukraine, both of which are trying to increase the cohesion and depth of their defense alliances with the U.S. and other western democracies, are both more democratic than Vietnam. Neither country had a major ongoing territorial dispute when they signed security agreements with the U.S. Given the unfortunate track record the U.S. has in defending these two countries, Vietnam’s leadership will be understandably leery of putting too much trust in any U.S. security guarantees.
From the U.S. perspective, Vietnam’s relatively low absolute trade with the U.S., low scores on democracy and freedom of speech, small GDP, and recent history of territorial conflict with China and Cambodia, including Vietnam’s current maritime dispute with China in the South China Sea, make Vietnam a risky ally. The U.S. will avoid committing to a potentially entangling alliance that could yield low returns, anger its trading partner China, and potentially even draw the U.S. into war with China.
Despite all these obstacles, moving towards an alliance is the best option for both the U.S. and Vietnam. if China captures Vietnam’s maritime resources, China will be economically strengthened and militarily emboldened to capture more. If China increases its influence in Vietnamese politics, Vietnam could be used against the U.S. economically, diplomatically, and even militarily. Chinese client states such as North Korea and Cambodia create huge problems for the U.S. and allies in Asia.
If the U.S. fails to draw closer to Vietnam through this window of opportunity, Vietnam could irreconcilably join a pro-China orbit. As much as the domino theory has been discredited, there is a domino theory redux here. If Vietnam falls to Chinese influence, that will strengthen China and increase the chance that other countries will fall as well.
While the U.S. may not be the most certain of allies for a relatively poor and undemocratic country, it is better than nothing. Vietnam’s ability to defend its EEZ would be strengthened by closer economic integration and a defense alliance with the U.S. Deeply strengthened cooperation between the U.S., Vietnam, and other claimant countries, will be crucial over the next decade for Vietnam’s ability to defend its independence and international market access. Vietnamese hedging between China and the U.S. will not work.
Challenges to U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation abound. Vietnam and the U.S. lack trust given their history of war and different political values on issues such as democracy and freedom of speech. However, Vietnam is working hard to overcome this historical legacy. They recently allowed, for the first time, an Australian military commemoration of the war on Vietnamese soil.
Australian war veterans wear their medals at the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Service in Sydney on August 18, 2016. Vietnam will allow an Australian war commemoration to go ahead on the site of the Battle of Long Tan on Thursday’s 50th anniversary, reversing an earlier ban, a minister said. PETER PARKS/AFP/Getty Images
China uses international business ties to influence both Vietnamese and U.S. politics, including through both the
Democratic and
Republican parties. With that influence, China discourages U.S. involvement in Asian politics, especially in the South China Sea. The economic elements of growing the U.S.-Vietnam alliance, for example economic sanctions on China and increased economic integration between Vietnam and the U.S., are therefore critical so that the project is not undermined.
These challenges can be overcome through five measures:
1) political decisions to reorient business ties away from China, and towards each other, for example through the Trans-Pacific Partnership;
2) increased development aid;
3) increased military-to-military agreements, training, aid, and cooperation;
4) increased intelligence sharing;
5) increased diplomacy, including of the Track-2 and citizen variety; and
6) the issuance of official apologies where appropriate and politically possible, including by the U.S. to Vietnam, and through a reconciliation between Vietnam and Vietnamese-Americans.
Vietnamese-Americans could be a powerful interest group in the U.S. promoting Vietnam’s independence from China. It would be in Vietnam and America’s interest to more effectively leverage them to counterbalance Chinese influence in U.S. politics. This might encourage the U.S. to stand up against China, which it needs to do in order to maintain its own political integrity and adherence to founding ideals.
I believe that Vietnam would prefer to remain neutral in the emerging conflict between its top trade partners, China and the U.S. But neutrality entails the risk of having Vietnam’s EEZ and maritime shipping lanes captured by China, its economy subjugated by a new Chinese mercantilism, and its independent foreign policy, over the next decade, subsumed by China. Alliance with the U.S. admittedly entails risk — including from diplomatic tension with China, military conflict, and economic costs due to potential sanctions against China.
This is the insoluble dilemma that Vietnam faces. There is no easy or perfect solution to countering China’s territorial expansion at the expense of Vietnam. But, a U.S.-Vietnamese defense alliance would strengthen both countries and thereby make military or economic conflict with China less likely. We should take the opportunity while we still have the chance.
