US & The Awakened Giant

[muse]

Some speculate about the potential for serious problems between US and China - is this likely, what are these relations about?:




US and the awakened giant

Hussain H Zaidi
Monday, April 11, 2011

“What are the major contours of our relationship with China?” the president asked his team of advisors.

“Mr President, our country and China are at once competitors and partners,” the secretary of state explained. “Since the demise of the USSR, we’re the globe’s sole superpower and have shaped international relations in our own fashion in what was once called the New World Order. But now we’ll have to reckon with Beijing, which is a superpower in the making and suspects we’re out to prevent its rise. This makes us rivals. That said, both of us have stakes in preserving the current international economic order and therefore maintaining global peace and security. The economy is the mainstay of China’s power and it’s alive to the fact that economic growth predicates a peaceful, predictable and stable environment. Hence, cooperation is in our mutual interest.”

“What about China’s imperialistic ambitions,” the president enquired.

“None. The Chinese have no ambition to export their ideology or create colonies.”

“Surprising, indeed!” The president remarked.

“Well, it’s simple. The Chinese believe that the non-Chinese world is too savage to be civilised; so political or cultural imperialism makes little sense in their worldview,” the secretary of state replied. “In the realm of economics, like us, Beijing is a beneficiary of economic and trade liberalisation and has no alternative economic model to espouse.”

“Politically, where do we clash?” the president turned to his national security advisor.”

“We’ve quite a few issues to settle,” the advisor began. “Potentially the most explosive is the Taiwan issue. China claims Taiwan to be its province, which has to be united with the mainland. Officially, we’re committed to a one-China policy and recognise Taiwan to be part of China. So far things have been under control. But problems may crop up in case Taiwan formally declares independence and China resorts to the use of force to avert that, prompting us to step in on the side of Taiwan. That may bring us to a direct military conflict with Beijing, which evidently would be catastrophic.”

“From politics we move on to economics,” the president looked at his treasury secretary.

“Well, China is close on our heels as the world’s second-largest economy and trading nation. They have already become the globe’s top exporter of merchandise goods. Our transnational corporations have invested billions of dollars in the enormous Chinese market. On its part, China is in part financing our current account deficit through huge investment in the domestic bond market.”

“That’s nice, isn’t it? Courtesy China, we’re consuming more than we’re producing,” the president noted.

“Yes, on the face of it. But the fact is that our firms are finding it exceedingly difficult to successfully face competition from their Chinese counterparts at home. That’s why our trade deficit with Beijing is on the rise. Importing more from China than exporting to it means we’re losing jobs to them at a time when our economy is in straits and is facing double-digit unemployment,” the treasury secretary explained.

“It means the Chinese first cause our terms of trade to go to our disadvantage and then come to our rescue. Clever! Aren’t they? I’m sure we have responded to the Chinese challenge.”

“Our response, Mr President, has been two-fold: We’ve taken trade defence measures on several Chinese products as well as pressured them on such issues as human right and intellectual property right violation, subsidisation and an undervalued currency. Congress is considering clamping punitive duties on Chinese exports. However, we need to be careful in acting against the Chinese, for several reasons. One, our transnational corporations have invested heavily in China and a good deal of Chinese economic output is produced by the subsidiaries of these firms. Hence, punitive action against China will also penalise these mega-businesses and have a backlash at home. Two, punitive measures against China would harm our own consumers and businesses, which are getting inexpensive goods in Chinese imports in hard times.

“Three, in China, we’ve a credible source of funding for our current account deficit. Imposition of duties may force China to disinvest part of its holdings of our public securities, which would push the greenback down and may cause great inflationary pressures on the economy. Four, our administration is eyeing huge Chinese foreign exchange reserves to bail out the beleaguered domestic financial firms. Beijing hasn’t ruled out the possibility of lending a hand to our administration, but it has made it subject to certain conditions, such as softening of criticism of state of human rights in China, an attenuated American support to Taiwan, and removal of what they call discriminatory trade restrictions on their exports and businesses.

“You’ve nicely put our constraints in dealing with China. But do Chinese policymakers also realise their constraints?”

“Yes, of course. As the secretary of state stated, if China wants to continue its economic and commercial growth momentum, it must adhere to peaceful settlement of disputes. And they know it. Besides, the Chinese are mindful of the repercussions on their own economic performance of the economic slowdown in the West, particularly in our part of the world. Their economic growth is mainly export-led and we account for the bulk of their trade surplus. Our economic slowdown will reduce demand for China’s exports and hamper its growth momentum.”

“Very well. Thanks for the nice briefing.”

The writer is a freelance contributor based in Islamabad. Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail. com

 

[below_freezing]

I'd say this only looks at surface and public things. There are things far deeper that most people can only get a hint of. Meanwhile, the media will continue fooling the public.

 

[Swatwolf]

I'd say this only looks at surface and public things. There are things far deeper that most people can only get a hint of. Meanwhile, the media will continue fooling the public.

You seem to make more sense when you are not being racist or talking about IQ level.

 

[muse]

'Subtle power' reshapes global village
By David Gosset

The administration of United States President Barack Obama has rebranded American foreign policy around the grand concept of "smart power", an expression which envelops great confidence if not self-satisfaction, and which, to a certain extent, presupposes a strategic dominance.

However, if the West wants to maintain a real capacity to influence the world affairs, it should not assume a position of intellectual superiority but try to comprehend what makes the success of the new global forces. While the US public diplomacy apparatus works to persuade the world of its benevolent "smart power", China is quietly reshaping the global village with the effectiveness of its "subtle power".

In the first half of the 21st century, the major redistribution of power and the great game for influence are obviously taking place between Washington and Beijing. At the end of each decade which followed Deng Xiaoping's opening up, the China watcher had to formulate the same observation: the gain of Beijing's relative power in the international system anticipated at the beginning of the period had always been underestimated.

Fundamentally, the analysts have been unable to assess and anticipate accurately the Chinese momentum because they were preoccupied by what they viewed as China's structural inadequacies and did not apprehend Beijing's "subtle power" or its extraordinary adaptability.

Forty years ago, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the destruction of Confucian symbols, but the legacy of the Chinese president Hu Jintao - who was 24 years old when the Cultural Revolution exploded - will be arguably neo-Confucianism: a massive statue of the Chinese thinker has now become one of Tiananmen Square's major attractions. Beijing's leaders are not only in charge of the People's Republic of China but they are responsible for the renaissance of a civilization-state.

Amid unavoidable ups and downs in domestic affairs, Beijing has certainly been able to create the conditions of a rapid development but the evolving geopolitical environment favored China's re-emergence: the collapse of the Soviet Union offered to the Chinese leadership new strategic options in Central Asia, in Northeast Asia but also in Southeast Asia, the post September 11 geopolitical tensions allowed Beijing to advance its interests without too much American attention, the financial crisis exposed Wall Street's excess but underlined Beijing's prudence, and the disorder in the Arab world is not a major cause of concern for the Chinese policy-makers but constitutes a real challenge for the West and its allies.

While China's re-emergence corrects a development imbalance triggered by Europe's industrial revolution in the 18th century - Kenneth Pomeranz's "great divergence" - the re-entry of one-fifth of mankind at the center of history marks also the beginning of a period where different types of modernity have to coexist. Beyond more tangible economic or political multipolarity, one should pay great attention to a global contention of ideas without complacency nor condescension, and realize that China's role in the global intellectual debate will be proportionate with the depth of its ancient civilization.

The unique combination of size, speed and scope that characterizes China's transformation has no equivalent in world history. At the end of March 2011, Justin Lin, the World Bank's vice-president declared at the China Economic Development Forum in Hong Kong that China's economy will be the world's biggest by 2030; in 1978 China's economic output was less than 2% of the world economy. When American investment bank Goldman Sachs made its first forecasts for the BRIC economies in 2003 the experts predicted that China would overtake America in 2041 but they currently mention 2027 as being the year of the highly symbolic shift. Financial services company Standard Chartered announced that the change will happen by 2020.

Thirty-three years after the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening up Beijing has regained a position of centrality in Asia, and China's hard power is certainly already considerable. In a relatively short period of time, China has become the top trade partner of Japan, Australia, South Korea or Kazakhstan but also of Brazil and South Africa - after only 13 years of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Pretoria! In the Fortune Global 500 ranking, not one single Chinese firm was ranked in the top 20 in 2005, three companies headquartered in Beijing were ranked in the top 10 in 2010.

Some figures are more explicit than lengthy prose: in the first month of 2011, China's central bank announced that its foreign reserves, already the world's biggest, soared to US$2.8 trillion. Beijing owns currently US$1.1 trillion of American debt - in Niall Ferguson's words the globalization of finance has turned "China into America's banker, the Communist creditor to the capitalist debtor in a change of epochal significance".

In the 1980s, China's contribution to total world GDP (gross domestic product) growth was 3.6%, in the 1990s 9.6%, and in the first decade of the 21st century 25.5% . With such a momentum the results of a 2010 Pew Research Center survey are not a surprise: 74% of the Chinese people are optimistic about the future against 52% for Americans and 40% for Europeans.

Despite the acceleration of a process that puts China in a position of growing strength, many still insist on Beijing's weak soft power. This is, for example, the view of the venerable American political scientist Joseph Nye. However, such an emphasis might be explained in relation with a perceptive remark made by Italo Calvino in Invisible Cities: "It is not the voice that commands the story: it is the ear."

Or, more precisely, the China story is often rewritten in a fiction which can be reassuring for the Western ears but which does not always reflect the reality. One should not approach China as an intrinsically imperfect entity whose reach will be limited by some essential inadequacies but let us look at it as a developing force on the way to fully realize a truly unique potential.

While the West would like to believe that China's progress is synonymous with Westernization, the Chinese renaissance is in fact the renewal and the reaffirmation of the Chinese identity. In other words, the West would like to recreate China in its image - and, by doing so, helping to solve the so-called China's bad image problem - but China's representation of itself can not correspond to such a fantasy.

Interestingly, the Western discourse on China's so-called lack of soft power could be another case of Western-centrism. Indeed, it can be argued that China is not trying to conform to Western models, to adopt foreign standards or to operate according to exogenous references but is developing a unique modus operandi in a permanent effort to maximize effectiveness.

If the notion of "smart power", an approach strongly advocated by US State Secretary Hillary Clinton, is generally defined as the combination of hard and soft powers, "subtle power", China's way of extending influence, can be described as the art of using three minimalist axioms - non-confrontation, non-interference and readiness for paradigm change - congenial with the Chinese classical strategic thinking.

Expecting China to adopt its behaviors, the West is especially sensitive to what it perceives as Chinese soft power deficit, symmetrically, China can be puzzled - sometimes amused - by what she frames as the US lack of "subtle power".

China can work to increase its "smart power" as much as the US or others can be inspired by the idea of "subtle power" but the US will remain more at ease with the spectacular grand principles of "smart power" and China more in its element with the restrained but penetrating force of "subtle power".

Laozi prepared the Chinese mind to a world of paradoxes 2,500 years ago: "The sage relying on actionless activity [wu wei] carries on wordless teaching'.' He also famously described the most subtle skills necessary to maintain internal political equilibrium, an ideal preparation for the infinite nuances of effective diplomacy: "Ruling an immense country is like cooking a small fish." And, he wisely noticed that "the highest good is like that of water", and explained that "nothing under heaven is softer or more yielding than water" even if "one cannot alter it". In the 21st century, China's "subtle power", softer than Joseph Nye's soft power, will quietly extend its influence and it is in the highest interest of the West not to underestimate the force of the Chinese momentum. In a sense, as it might be smart for China to increase its soft power by articulating a universal narrative, the wise thing to do for the West could be to learn from China's "subtle power" by showing less but achieving more.

 

[Bigoren]

You seem to make more sense when you are not being racist or talking about IQ level.

Let get who start the racist things first.abit off topic.