US-India nuke deal: 1.. 2 ..3..go *ITS DONE*
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No there wasn't any.....just like there isn't a clausule in the current NPT to reward non signatories with nuclear technology inorder to help them accellerate weapon stockpile based on 'good and resposible baheavior'.
Samudra
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So, whats with the complaining ?
just like there isn't a clausule in the current NPT to reward non signatories with nuclear technology inorder to help them accellerate weapon stockpile based on 'good and resposible baheavior'.
Ah, but the help is only in the civillian field. It doesn't in anyway contradict NPT.
Samudra
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The fact is that you don't simply make hundreds of nuclear weapons, put them in a warehouses and forget about them!
I'm told that we have had the theoretical capacity to make about two thousand nuclear weapons for a while now. Did we make so many ? We don't have the exact numbers, but ain't making THAT many.
Fissile material - we have had enough, we can have enough without external support. The external support is irrelevant in the present situation.
We have signed away 14 reactors into the civil area! We're in fact losing that much fissile material ? In the bigger picture it is something that doesn't matter.
You can't have too many. Neither can you have too less. Thats the dynamics of nuclear weapons.
Its relevant, India needs US technology and reactors aswell as support from NSG to buy fuel from international market to excellerate (civil) power production and to divert plutonium from her 8 unsafeguarded military reactors for weapon production.
Samudra
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But we're not making thousands of nukes. We've had enough for a while, we're happy with what we have. If we never went on to produce hundreds of nukes when we've had the capability to we're not going to do so in the future either. India cannot, will not and does not need to increase its arsenal in a dramatic manner.
India cannot produce nuclear weapons above a certain threshold and we've had enough supplies to reach that threshold for quite a while.
India cannot produce nuclear weapons above a certain threshold and we've had enough supplies to reach that threshold for quite a while.
Adux
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Europe and the Indo-US nuclear deal
As the US and India wrap up a historic nuclear cooperation deal, Russia, France, Germany and the UK prepare for a role in a potentially lucrative market, but the rest of Europe and China may make waves.
Image: ABrCommentary by C Raja Mohan for ISN Security Watch (23/07/07)
As the historic Indo-US atomic energy initiative moves from a bilateral to a multilateral setting, a divided Europe will soon have to make up its mind on accepting New Delhi as a nuclear armed power for all practical purposes.
After prolonged negotiations spread over months, last week in Washington, senior US and Indian officials wrapped up the so-called "123 Agreement," which defines the legal framework for civilian nuclear cooperation between the two nations and is named after a section of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954.
The next steps involve the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between India and the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an endorsement of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which sets the rules for global nuclear commerce. Europe is well represented in both these bodies.
As ISN Security Watch reported in May, the historic agreement unveiled by US President George W Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh two years ago on 18 July 2005 involved a series of reciprocal commitments from Washington and New Delhi.
The Bush Administration promised to persuade the US Congress to change its domestic non-proliferation law and the NSG to revise the international rules to facilitate renewed international nuclear cooperation with India.
New Delhi, in turn, had agreed to separate its civilian and military programs and place the former under international safeguards. It had also offered to extend enduring support to the global non-proliferation regime.
Intense criticism from arms controllers from across the Atlantic greeted the Indo-US nuclear deal. They despaired at the US readiness to live with India's nuclear weapons program and recast the global nuclear order built around the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India never signed the NPT, which limits the number of nuclear weapon powers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Despite the backlash from the non-proliferation community in the US and Europe, New Delhi and Washington went ahead with the implementation of the deal. The two sides agreed on a nuclear separation plan for India in March 2006 and the US Congress approved a new law, the Hyde Act, to resume civilian nuclear cooperation in December 2006. The Hyde Act will come into force after the US Congress nods at the bilateral 123 Agreement in conjunction with the NSG approval and the IAEA safeguards agreement.
Since India is not a recognized nuclear weapons power under the NPT but is in possession of nuclear weapons, the IAEA will have to craft a special safeguards arrangement for New Delhi. This safeguards agreement will have to be approved by the IAEA's 35-member board of governors. The current IAEA board includes 12 European nations. The NSG, representing the world's leading industrial nations, has a stronger European representation at 31.
The three nuclear weapon powers of Europe - Russia, France and the UK - have already backed the Indo-US nuclear deal. Even before the Bush Administration's special initiative towards India, Russia and France had begun to make the case for a nuclear accommodation with a rising India.
Since the unveiling of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Moscow and Paris have positioned themselves to make a big entry into the potentially lucrative Indian market for imported nuclear power plants. Germany too appears to have recognized the necessity of deeper a political relationship with India.
Some of the smaller European countries - including Austria, Ireland and Sweden - that have traditionally taken strong positions in favor of arms control and non-proliferation remain squeamish about making a nuclear exception for India.
The smaller European nations might not be able to stop the momentum behind a nuclear agreement sponsored by the US, and endorsed by Russia, France, Germany and the UK. India, however, is acutely conscious of their ability to create complications in the NSG debate by demanding additional non-proliferation commitments from India beyond those it has already undertaken in its negotiations with the US.
India, for example, is not a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear testing. Many European states have demanded that India sign the CTBT. While New Delhi has been abiding by a unilateral moratorium on further tests, it faces strong domestic political opposition to joining the CTBT.
New Delhi is concerned that the European opposition will be leveraged by China to either block the NSG approval or make it conditional and therefore unacceptable to India. Deeply concerned about the warming political and security ties between New Delhi and Washington, Beijing has argued against a country-specific exception to the nuclear rules.
Instead, it demands the negotiation of a set of universal criteria for changing the regime.
Implicit in the Chinese argument is a simple proposition: If a special political favor is on offer to India, it also needs to be extended to Pakistan, Beijing's long-standing ally. That proposition in turn could lead to an indefinite delay in the NSG approval for the Indo-US nuclear deal.
In the next few weeks, India and the US are expected to intensify their outreach to the European nations and explain the high geopolitical stakes involved in a quick and unconditional approval of their nuclear agreement
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17891
As the US and India wrap up a historic nuclear cooperation deal, Russia, France, Germany and the UK prepare for a role in a potentially lucrative market, but the rest of Europe and China may make waves.
Image: ABrCommentary by C Raja Mohan for ISN Security Watch (23/07/07)
As the historic Indo-US atomic energy initiative moves from a bilateral to a multilateral setting, a divided Europe will soon have to make up its mind on accepting New Delhi as a nuclear armed power for all practical purposes.
After prolonged negotiations spread over months, last week in Washington, senior US and Indian officials wrapped up the so-called "123 Agreement," which defines the legal framework for civilian nuclear cooperation between the two nations and is named after a section of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954.
The next steps involve the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between India and the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an endorsement of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which sets the rules for global nuclear commerce. Europe is well represented in both these bodies.
As ISN Security Watch reported in May, the historic agreement unveiled by US President George W Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh two years ago on 18 July 2005 involved a series of reciprocal commitments from Washington and New Delhi.
The Bush Administration promised to persuade the US Congress to change its domestic non-proliferation law and the NSG to revise the international rules to facilitate renewed international nuclear cooperation with India.
New Delhi, in turn, had agreed to separate its civilian and military programs and place the former under international safeguards. It had also offered to extend enduring support to the global non-proliferation regime.
Intense criticism from arms controllers from across the Atlantic greeted the Indo-US nuclear deal. They despaired at the US readiness to live with India's nuclear weapons program and recast the global nuclear order built around the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India never signed the NPT, which limits the number of nuclear weapon powers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Despite the backlash from the non-proliferation community in the US and Europe, New Delhi and Washington went ahead with the implementation of the deal. The two sides agreed on a nuclear separation plan for India in March 2006 and the US Congress approved a new law, the Hyde Act, to resume civilian nuclear cooperation in December 2006. The Hyde Act will come into force after the US Congress nods at the bilateral 123 Agreement in conjunction with the NSG approval and the IAEA safeguards agreement.
Since India is not a recognized nuclear weapons power under the NPT but is in possession of nuclear weapons, the IAEA will have to craft a special safeguards arrangement for New Delhi. This safeguards agreement will have to be approved by the IAEA's 35-member board of governors. The current IAEA board includes 12 European nations. The NSG, representing the world's leading industrial nations, has a stronger European representation at 31.
The three nuclear weapon powers of Europe - Russia, France and the UK - have already backed the Indo-US nuclear deal. Even before the Bush Administration's special initiative towards India, Russia and France had begun to make the case for a nuclear accommodation with a rising India.
Since the unveiling of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Moscow and Paris have positioned themselves to make a big entry into the potentially lucrative Indian market for imported nuclear power plants. Germany too appears to have recognized the necessity of deeper a political relationship with India.
Some of the smaller European countries - including Austria, Ireland and Sweden - that have traditionally taken strong positions in favor of arms control and non-proliferation remain squeamish about making a nuclear exception for India.
The smaller European nations might not be able to stop the momentum behind a nuclear agreement sponsored by the US, and endorsed by Russia, France, Germany and the UK. India, however, is acutely conscious of their ability to create complications in the NSG debate by demanding additional non-proliferation commitments from India beyond those it has already undertaken in its negotiations with the US.
India, for example, is not a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear testing. Many European states have demanded that India sign the CTBT. While New Delhi has been abiding by a unilateral moratorium on further tests, it faces strong domestic political opposition to joining the CTBT.
New Delhi is concerned that the European opposition will be leveraged by China to either block the NSG approval or make it conditional and therefore unacceptable to India. Deeply concerned about the warming political and security ties between New Delhi and Washington, Beijing has argued against a country-specific exception to the nuclear rules.
Instead, it demands the negotiation of a set of universal criteria for changing the regime.
Implicit in the Chinese argument is a simple proposition: If a special political favor is on offer to India, it also needs to be extended to Pakistan, Beijing's long-standing ally. That proposition in turn could lead to an indefinite delay in the NSG approval for the Indo-US nuclear deal.
In the next few weeks, India and the US are expected to intensify their outreach to the European nations and explain the high geopolitical stakes involved in a quick and unconditional approval of their nuclear agreement
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17891
BanglaBhoot
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Group of US lawmakers threatens to block nuke deal with India
Afp, Washington
The Daily Star - July 27, 2007
A bi-partisan group of lawmakers warned Wednesday that Congress could block a landmark US-India nuclear cooperation deal if it sidesteps safeguards to prevent military uses of the technology.
The 23 legislators sent a letter to President George W. Bush saying the so-called "123" operating agreement, which reportedly allows India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, could end up violating US law.
"The agreement for nuclear cooperation is subject to the approval of Congress, and any inconsistencies between the agreement and the relevant US laws will call congressional approval deeply into doubt," said the letter from the 23 members of the House of Representatives.
Edward Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation, sounded his own warning.
"If the 123 agreement has been intentionally negotiated to side-step or bypass the law and the will of Congress, final approval for this deal will be jeopardized," Markey said.
Details of the agreement have been kept under wraps since it was finalized in Washington last week by senior officials of the two countries.
The nuclear deal was agreed upon by Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh two years ago to highlight strategic ties between the world's two biggest democracies.
The Congress approved the deal in principle last year and a bill to that effect was signed into law by Bush, but there was a delay in finalizing the operating agreement, which has to be approved again by Congress.
India has stood fast against accepting any curbs on its reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/07/27/d707274309118.htm
Afp, Washington
The Daily Star - July 27, 2007
A bi-partisan group of lawmakers warned Wednesday that Congress could block a landmark US-India nuclear cooperation deal if it sidesteps safeguards to prevent military uses of the technology.
The 23 legislators sent a letter to President George W. Bush saying the so-called "123" operating agreement, which reportedly allows India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, could end up violating US law.
"The agreement for nuclear cooperation is subject to the approval of Congress, and any inconsistencies between the agreement and the relevant US laws will call congressional approval deeply into doubt," said the letter from the 23 members of the House of Representatives.
Edward Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation, sounded his own warning.
"If the 123 agreement has been intentionally negotiated to side-step or bypass the law and the will of Congress, final approval for this deal will be jeopardized," Markey said.
Details of the agreement have been kept under wraps since it was finalized in Washington last week by senior officials of the two countries.
The nuclear deal was agreed upon by Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh two years ago to highlight strategic ties between the world's two biggest democracies.
The Congress approved the deal in principle last year and a bill to that effect was signed into law by Bush, but there was a delay in finalizing the operating agreement, which has to be approved again by Congress.
India has stood fast against accepting any curbs on its reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/07/27/d707274309118.htm
intruder
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Same things happened when nuclear deal was signed and then ratified by Us congress .... same will happen with 123 agreement ..... just wait and watch this space ...
BanglaBhoot
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Same things happened when nuclear deal was signed and then ratified by Us congress .... same will happen with 123 agreement ..... just wait and watch this space ...
Yep they will squeeze India till it hurts ..... and then some .....
Samudra
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Neo, here are the answers - this time from an Official source.
On apprehension in the West that India will use the civil nuclear cooperation to enhance its strategic programme, he shot back, "If we need additionality to our strategic stockpile, we know how to do it.
We don't need to use this route for it."- NSA Narayanan.
I am satisfied with nuclear deal: Kakodkar
Minimum deterrence is directly related to the capabilities of adversaries. We cannot over do it - lest it go against our doctrine and put us into trouble aka arms race that we can ill afford.
From our Nuclear doctrine :
Do I need to jump in the discussion gentlemen?
I dont have the revised text of the nuclear deal so cannot say what has ultimately been done but it seems like there has been ways to address the concern both ways.
the only clash I see with the FBR programme is here as follow,
1. India followed a highly costlier path for FBR in a 3stage cycle and has been trying and has done the breakthrough which many other nations couldnt through solid fuelled FBR.
2. Just to get a high breeding Ratio (due to less Uranium) India has taken up such a expensive and critical path.
3. If they end up getting the international trade deal they're looking for, opening the door to uranium sales to India, then the need for max BR will be relaxed considerably. Then it would make less financial sense to go with solid fuel FBRs, and the associated reprocessing back end of the fuel cycle, which is far more complex than with MSRs.
I just hope the FBR will stand right as kalam says, as of with the deal I cannot say anything now as the text has not been released online as of yet. We should see the bigger picture and should not let any nation to repeat what has happened with us, Energy independence even if solid fuelled FBR costs more should be what which should be taken into consideration.
I'll talk about pros and cons of this deal once i get a good analysis and read things on the same, elt the real text come through first.
I dont have the revised text of the nuclear deal so cannot say what has ultimately been done but it seems like there has been ways to address the concern both ways.
the only clash I see with the FBR programme is here as follow,
1. India followed a highly costlier path for FBR in a 3stage cycle and has been trying and has done the breakthrough which many other nations couldnt through solid fuelled FBR.
2. Just to get a high breeding Ratio (due to less Uranium) India has taken up such a expensive and critical path.
3. If they end up getting the international trade deal they're looking for, opening the door to uranium sales to India, then the need for max BR will be relaxed considerably. Then it would make less financial sense to go with solid fuel FBRs, and the associated reprocessing back end of the fuel cycle, which is far more complex than with MSRs.
I just hope the FBR will stand right as kalam says, as of with the deal I cannot say anything now as the text has not been released online as of yet. We should see the bigger picture and should not let any nation to repeat what has happened with us, Energy independence even if solid fuelled FBR costs more should be what which should be taken into consideration.
I'll talk about pros and cons of this deal once i get a good analysis and read things on the same, elt the real text come through first.
^^ Not at all but its just that the need of such a critical design for reaching such max BR might not be needed in de-facto basis, FBR's will be here though, I wonder how much funding will be after this deal. Just saw kakodkar speaking if that mans happy, dont worry have some curry. Then there are the menon family and NSA naranayan.
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