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comment: Unravelling Taliban Shahzad Chaudhry
Al Qaeda will continue to bolster the TTP and other such affiliates to create a bigger quagmire for the Pakistani state, and that is why Pakistans struggle shall not only have to be consistent but persistent as well
As I write this column, Thursday June 4, a private TV channel is kicking off a four-day moot on the Pakistani Taliban their origin, objectives and likely solutions to the armed insurgency that has been precipitated by the now famous Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, of which Baitullah Mehsud remains the most notable leader. It should be an interesting investigation since the participants are all major political, religious and intellectual Pashtuns from the NWFP.
When the insurgency in Swat fomented itself as an organised and a deliberate manoeuvre, away from the usually disparate and scattered militant activity essentially around FATA, it became common to give four separate identifications to the composite militant body: Al Qaeda remnants, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and criminal elements of the region who tried to gain relevance and cover by aligning with one or the other.
As events have progressed, particularly after the Nizam-e Adl Regulation with the subsequent endeavour of the Swat Taliban to expand their presence into areas outside the valley, they have forced a rethink on the real nature of the Talibans intent and origin, as indeed their support base.
Sufi Mohammeds effort to seek qazi courts was according to the aspirations of the local people of Swat, and that became his central demand. As the state acquiesced, his effort mutated into a call for imposition of sharia law, of a brand that soon caught the attention of every citizen, and of a type that did not agree with the wider religious sentiment of society. The TNSM brand may still have been palatable to the larger national sense, but behind his cloak emerged the Fazlullah-led Swat Taliban, who had an entirely different agenda. An operation, currently in its fourth week, to dislodge these Taliban from the area is underway.
Two questions beg answers: who was trying to crook whom, or was it really a matter of being taken in by Sufi Mohammeds rather innocuous effort to provide easy and quick justice to the people?
Let us first place Sufi Mohammed into perspective. A once local councillor, he sought greater influence within Swat to propel himself into the big league of politics. Were only Sufi Mohammeds qazi courts agenda followed, he would have quite easily seen pre-eminence, assuming the erstwhile Walis role. However, his son-in-law Fazlullah had other plans, and the Sufi over-estimated his capacity to discipline him. It is then that the real underlying plan began to unravel.
Onto the next element of this rather surprising amenability of the state to the NAR; it seems the real target was to trap the TTP. The state, conscious of the conglomeration of various well-known militant groups into the TTP, began what seems to be a deliberate move to break a faction away. Fazlullah and his Taliban must have seemed an easier kill, given that his father-in-law was seemingly still manageable and could be brought under necessary lien at a price.
This is where Fazlullah entered with his own game plan. Well guided and mentored by Baitullah Mehsud, he used the states apparent ruse to his own advantage; whence the local administration of Malakand stood in voluntary abdication, the TTP moved in from under the cloak of Sufi Mohammed, dictated the run of events, and developed the rigidity of their cause serving their end-state to practically displace the state. Their rapid movement into Buner and Shangla were particularly strategic in nature since these two extremities bounded the Tarbela Dam and the Karakorum Highway respectively.
That the western world saw in such expansion designs on Islamabad was their own description of the situation the concern, however, was genuine enough. Through Buner in particular, the heartland of Pakistans politico-military infrastructure was exposed and in easy reach. The pushback of the expansion became imperative and almost an existential necessity, just as the futility of the NAR-based effort at appeasement now seemed ill advised.
What is the TTPs agenda? That is a difficult one to discern. From the expansionist design, one thing seems clear it certainly is not sharia law, though that can be a convenient ruse. To examine their latent design, we may first view the identifiable objectives of both Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban, the original version of the brand, have a clear, understandable objective to their struggle. Straddling both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, they exist among their 43 million kin, and have taken up the fight to evict the foreign forces occupying their land this is how they see it; this also makes their struggle against a non-representative government in Kabul seem just, even as one vehemently differs with their philosophy and imposed way of life.
Each to his way at least that is how Pakistan needs to treat this dilemma. Pakistans only concern would be to see those Taliban this side of the border across on their side, vacating our lands and leaving Pakistan to handle its own situation. Without a doubt, the presence of the Afghan Taliban has triggered militancy in Pakistans tribal areas, brought forth on a wave of sympathy, as indeed finding ready support to their mission. The jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s is no mean contribution as well. The Afghan Talibans mission, however, continues to still focus on Kabul and Afghanistan. The consequences of this struggle are likely to be omnipresent and long lasting, even if Al Qaeda or cross-border support were not factors at all.
Al Qaeda was a tenant of the Afghan Taliban and, given the tribal tradition, became their responsibility. Without a base after the US move into Afghanistan and forced to flee, they have found temporary residence in the difficult terrain of the Pak-Afghan borderlands. It would be natural for them to seek an assured base, and if that can be with the more amenable Afghan Taliban, the better.
In the interim, as they remain hunted, they have chosen to do a few things: demonise the state of Pakistan and encourage the formation of the TTP with both money and weapons, unleashing the so created entity against Pakistan, thereby achieving two clear advantages embroiling the state of Pakistan and its military in its own war while obviating one possible front of their own engagement, and through forming the TTP enhancing its virtual and physical perimeter of security, gaining both time and space for its own response, when needed.
How long this stratagem will work is anybodys guess, but as the noose tightens around them, expect greater desperation and some inexplicable responses. They will continue to bolster the TTP and other such affiliates to create a bigger quagmire for the Pakistani state, and that is why Pakistans struggle shall not only have to be consistent but persistent as well.
If the above is how it seems to be, then the Pakistani Taliban are nothing but a group for hire to do others dirty work on recompense the usual mutterings of extra-regional support may not be entirely out of place. They may have some ideological and socio-cultural sympathy with the cause of their Afghan brethren, but they are clearly without an objective in their fight with the Pakistani state. Now at different levels of their organisation, different motivational variations may be at play, including religion, and that is where the relevance of the ideological war lies, but they are essentially about power and money, with the former too used to the ultimate end of the latter. Is this too difficult a war to fight then?
One thing is easily surmised: with the very vast majority of the 170 million Pakistanis aligned against any effort to impose a particular brand of sharia law, any illusion to occupy government as in Afghanistan in 1996 is out of question. The expanse of the land, the size of the population, the poles-apart religious leanings, and a very strong military all make it impossible for Pakistan to fall under the Taliban ever; except in one case only: when the state, citizenry, and its institutions cower under fear and terror. One hopes that will never happen.
The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be contacted at shahzad.a.chaudhry@gmail.com
Al Qaeda will continue to bolster the TTP and other such affiliates to create a bigger quagmire for the Pakistani state, and that is why Pakistans struggle shall not only have to be consistent but persistent as well
As I write this column, Thursday June 4, a private TV channel is kicking off a four-day moot on the Pakistani Taliban their origin, objectives and likely solutions to the armed insurgency that has been precipitated by the now famous Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, of which Baitullah Mehsud remains the most notable leader. It should be an interesting investigation since the participants are all major political, religious and intellectual Pashtuns from the NWFP.
When the insurgency in Swat fomented itself as an organised and a deliberate manoeuvre, away from the usually disparate and scattered militant activity essentially around FATA, it became common to give four separate identifications to the composite militant body: Al Qaeda remnants, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and criminal elements of the region who tried to gain relevance and cover by aligning with one or the other.
As events have progressed, particularly after the Nizam-e Adl Regulation with the subsequent endeavour of the Swat Taliban to expand their presence into areas outside the valley, they have forced a rethink on the real nature of the Talibans intent and origin, as indeed their support base.
Sufi Mohammeds effort to seek qazi courts was according to the aspirations of the local people of Swat, and that became his central demand. As the state acquiesced, his effort mutated into a call for imposition of sharia law, of a brand that soon caught the attention of every citizen, and of a type that did not agree with the wider religious sentiment of society. The TNSM brand may still have been palatable to the larger national sense, but behind his cloak emerged the Fazlullah-led Swat Taliban, who had an entirely different agenda. An operation, currently in its fourth week, to dislodge these Taliban from the area is underway.
Two questions beg answers: who was trying to crook whom, or was it really a matter of being taken in by Sufi Mohammeds rather innocuous effort to provide easy and quick justice to the people?
Let us first place Sufi Mohammed into perspective. A once local councillor, he sought greater influence within Swat to propel himself into the big league of politics. Were only Sufi Mohammeds qazi courts agenda followed, he would have quite easily seen pre-eminence, assuming the erstwhile Walis role. However, his son-in-law Fazlullah had other plans, and the Sufi over-estimated his capacity to discipline him. It is then that the real underlying plan began to unravel.
Onto the next element of this rather surprising amenability of the state to the NAR; it seems the real target was to trap the TTP. The state, conscious of the conglomeration of various well-known militant groups into the TTP, began what seems to be a deliberate move to break a faction away. Fazlullah and his Taliban must have seemed an easier kill, given that his father-in-law was seemingly still manageable and could be brought under necessary lien at a price.
This is where Fazlullah entered with his own game plan. Well guided and mentored by Baitullah Mehsud, he used the states apparent ruse to his own advantage; whence the local administration of Malakand stood in voluntary abdication, the TTP moved in from under the cloak of Sufi Mohammed, dictated the run of events, and developed the rigidity of their cause serving their end-state to practically displace the state. Their rapid movement into Buner and Shangla were particularly strategic in nature since these two extremities bounded the Tarbela Dam and the Karakorum Highway respectively.
That the western world saw in such expansion designs on Islamabad was their own description of the situation the concern, however, was genuine enough. Through Buner in particular, the heartland of Pakistans politico-military infrastructure was exposed and in easy reach. The pushback of the expansion became imperative and almost an existential necessity, just as the futility of the NAR-based effort at appeasement now seemed ill advised.
What is the TTPs agenda? That is a difficult one to discern. From the expansionist design, one thing seems clear it certainly is not sharia law, though that can be a convenient ruse. To examine their latent design, we may first view the identifiable objectives of both Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban, the original version of the brand, have a clear, understandable objective to their struggle. Straddling both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, they exist among their 43 million kin, and have taken up the fight to evict the foreign forces occupying their land this is how they see it; this also makes their struggle against a non-representative government in Kabul seem just, even as one vehemently differs with their philosophy and imposed way of life.
Each to his way at least that is how Pakistan needs to treat this dilemma. Pakistans only concern would be to see those Taliban this side of the border across on their side, vacating our lands and leaving Pakistan to handle its own situation. Without a doubt, the presence of the Afghan Taliban has triggered militancy in Pakistans tribal areas, brought forth on a wave of sympathy, as indeed finding ready support to their mission. The jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s is no mean contribution as well. The Afghan Talibans mission, however, continues to still focus on Kabul and Afghanistan. The consequences of this struggle are likely to be omnipresent and long lasting, even if Al Qaeda or cross-border support were not factors at all.
Al Qaeda was a tenant of the Afghan Taliban and, given the tribal tradition, became their responsibility. Without a base after the US move into Afghanistan and forced to flee, they have found temporary residence in the difficult terrain of the Pak-Afghan borderlands. It would be natural for them to seek an assured base, and if that can be with the more amenable Afghan Taliban, the better.
In the interim, as they remain hunted, they have chosen to do a few things: demonise the state of Pakistan and encourage the formation of the TTP with both money and weapons, unleashing the so created entity against Pakistan, thereby achieving two clear advantages embroiling the state of Pakistan and its military in its own war while obviating one possible front of their own engagement, and through forming the TTP enhancing its virtual and physical perimeter of security, gaining both time and space for its own response, when needed.
How long this stratagem will work is anybodys guess, but as the noose tightens around them, expect greater desperation and some inexplicable responses. They will continue to bolster the TTP and other such affiliates to create a bigger quagmire for the Pakistani state, and that is why Pakistans struggle shall not only have to be consistent but persistent as well.
If the above is how it seems to be, then the Pakistani Taliban are nothing but a group for hire to do others dirty work on recompense the usual mutterings of extra-regional support may not be entirely out of place. They may have some ideological and socio-cultural sympathy with the cause of their Afghan brethren, but they are clearly without an objective in their fight with the Pakistani state. Now at different levels of their organisation, different motivational variations may be at play, including religion, and that is where the relevance of the ideological war lies, but they are essentially about power and money, with the former too used to the ultimate end of the latter. Is this too difficult a war to fight then?
One thing is easily surmised: with the very vast majority of the 170 million Pakistanis aligned against any effort to impose a particular brand of sharia law, any illusion to occupy government as in Afghanistan in 1996 is out of question. The expanse of the land, the size of the population, the poles-apart religious leanings, and a very strong military all make it impossible for Pakistan to fall under the Taliban ever; except in one case only: when the state, citizenry, and its institutions cower under fear and terror. One hopes that will never happen.
The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be contacted at shahzad.a.chaudhry@gmail.com
