http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/na...-policy-on-supply-of-armed-drones/576937.html
For India the new policy allows use of these drones to fulfil ‘counter-terrorism objectives’, allowing attacks on terrorists who are so far dealt by ground-based Indian Army troops.
New Delhi will be a major gainer as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a blueprint to procure more than 5,000 UAVs over the next years. These will include high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAVs, medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAVs and mini UAVs. Some of these intend to be armed to buttress the strike capability.
The Indian armed forces are looking for 100 Predator types of drones–both the armed version and for surveillance. It will increase India’s maritime surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean region. It can also keep a hawk’s eye on the long porous border with Pakistan and relay-live any attempts at incursions in the Bengal Province by the Chinese PLA. These drones can fly for 24 hours without refuelling and operate at 50,000-ft altitude (modern passenger aircraft cruise at 35,000-45,000 ft).
Last year, Washington announced the export of 22 unarmed Predator drones following an Indian Navy request.
Another 1,500 mini UAVs are needed for the Army. Apart from this, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard want 50 ship-borne mini UAVs for monitoring sea lines of communications, search and rescue and anti-piracy roles. These UAVs coupled with the Predator can incrementally add to capacities of maritime patrol aircraft like the P-8I and Anti submarine warfare helicopters at sea.
“Procurement cases for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are being actively pursued,” Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba said at a press conference in New Delhi on December 2 last year.
The Indian Army proposes to equip UAVs down to the battalion level, while the Air Force plans to have fully operational squadrons of surveillance UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).
For US, policy has following objectives
A policy shift has been made by the United States enabling India to acquire armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as drones.
The US on Thursday night (Indian time) okayed the ‘US Policy on the Export of Unmanned Aerial Systems’. A statement of the US State department said:
“The President (Donald Trump) has approved a new policy on the export of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This policy updates and replaces the previous policy announced on February 17, 2015.”
It increases trade opportunities for US companies. It will remove barriers to the global drone market and avoid ceding export opportunities to competitors where such self-imposed restrictions are unwarranted.
It bolsters partner security and counterterrorism capabilities. It will facilitate international partners’ access to US drones in situations where it will enhance those partners’ security and their ability to advance shared security or counterterrorism objectives.
It strengthens bilateral relationships. The US will use these drone sales to strengthen US security relationships when stronger bilateral ties and greater interoperability serve broader US national security and foreign policy interests.
All potential military drone transfers will be subject to Department of State-led assessment under the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy and Department of Defene (DOD)-led assessment regarding technology security, as applicable.
All drone transfers will be reviewed consistent with US international nonproliferation commitments, including under the Missile Technology Control.
There will be End-Use Monitoring and Additional Security Conditions. All military drones may be subject to enhanced end-use monitoring and may also be subject to additional security conditions. Transfers of US-origin armed and MTCR Category I drones shall require periodic consultations with the United States on their use.
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The modern age of drones began in 1995 in Bosnia, with the first deployment of a squadron of Air Force Predator reconnaissance aircraft.
The Predators used in Bosnia were unarmed, but their ability to track terrorists quickly sparked a debate about whether to arm them. In October 2000, the United States began using unarmed Predators to surveil terrorists in Afghanistan with the aim of finding Osama bin Laden. The potential for armed drones to shorten the kill chain and strike bin Laden, if he was seen, inspired then-White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to push for arming Predators. The United States tested the first Predators armed with Hellfire missiles in early 2001. Hellfire missiles were slated for deployment to arm Predators by September 1, 2001, but the missiles were delayed because of technical problems. After the September 11 attacks, the United States rushed Hellfires to theater, and the first armed drone strike occurred in November 2001.14 Their use to kill terrorists from afar started a new pattern of war.
More than 90 state and non-state actors now possess drones, ranging from small, inexpensive commercial drones to sophisticated military drones.
Secrecy surrounding some development programs and arms transfers makes it difficult to produce a completely accurate picture of drone proliferation, but open source data indicates at least 16 countries have armed drones and 20 additional countries are seeking to develop armed drones.
The majority of drones transferred abroad are unarmed and intended primarily for reconnaissance. Between 2010 and 2014, only 2.5 percent of drones transferred abroad (11 of 439) were armed.
The MTCR was established in 1987 to limit the proliferation of unmanned ballistic missile technology and delivery vehicles that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The MTCR sets guidelines and promulgates lists of systems, software, technologies, and services that should be controlled due to military and dual-use purposes as they apply to missile development, production, and operation. The list of controlled items can be separated into two general categories:
- Category I items: Complete unmanned systems or subsystems that have the capability to deliver a 500-kilogram payload over a distance of 300 kilometers. This includes: ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones, and remotely piloted vehicles. Category I also includes the technology for design and production facilities.
- Category II items: These are items that could con- tribute to a delivery system. This includes: inertial navigation and production, flight control systems, avionics equipment, launch support equipment and facilities, test facilities and equipment, software and related computers, and reduced-observables technology, materials, and devices.
Under these guidelines, members agree to an “unconditional strong presumption of denial” of transfer of Category I items, which should occur “only on rare occasions.” This strong presumption of denial applies to Category I transfers to members and non-members, regardless of the purpose of export. Transfers require binding and vigorous government-to-government assurances on end-use. Transfers of Category I production facilities are “absolutely prohibited.” For Category II items, members can make case-by-case decisions to transfer and seek additional end-use assurances if deemed necessary.
the MTCR has failed to keep the world’s most problematic actors – China, Pakistan, Israel and, of course, North Korea and Iran – from advancing their missile programs and proliferating technology. Yet overall, the MTCR has had remarkable success in creating a more challenging and costly environment for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD-capable missiles.
MTCR treats drones like missiles, not aircraft. The MTCR’s 500-kilogram payload and 300-kilometer range limits apply to “complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones).” In 1987 when the MTCR was founded, this classification made sense since most drones were one-way target drones.
The United States has approved transfers of category I drones, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper, to a limited number of NATO and major non-NATO allies, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea, The United States has been particularly reluctant to transfer armed drones, only authorizing transfers to Italy and the United Kingdom.
This hesitation to transfer drones has even extended in some cases to transfers of unarmed, category II systems to close U.S. partners. In 2014, the Obama administration rejected Jordan’s request to acquire unarmed Predator XP drones, which fall below the MTCR’s 500-kilogram, 300-kilometer category I limit.
Satellite images of a Israeli air base in 2016 showed a Chinese-made CH-4 surveillance and strike drone, comparable to a U.S. Reaper.
(The MTCR does not distinguish between armed vs. unarmed drones.) China has sold armed drones to Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan.
Russia reportedly has approved but not yet delivered transfers of armed drones to Germany.
In 2013, motivated by some of these problems, the United States initiated a broad review of its approach to drone exports that culminated in the February 2015 U.S. Export Policy for Military Unmanned Aerial Systems.
In March 2017, the Republican and Democratic chairs of the U.S. Senate India Caucus sent letters to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis expressing support for India’s request regarding the Guardian drone, an unarmed maritime version of the MQ-9 Reaper.
The following month, a bipartisan group of 22 Congressional representatives signed a letter to President Trump asking him to permit sales of MQ-9 Reaper drones to Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. (Both the Guardian and Reaper are Category I MTCR systems, and unarmed Reapers have been approved for transfer to several NATO and major non-NATO allies.) The lawmakers cited concerns that countries would turn to China instead for their drone purchases – concerns that have materialized in reality.
