Does Nuclear Deterrence Work?
What of the argument that nuclear deterrence makes war between India and Pakistan less likely? Why would not the allegedly proven ability of nuclear balance, which is supposed to have kept peace in the world, be effective also in the subcontinent? I believe that this question can be answered from four different perspectives.
First, even if it were the case that the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan reduces the probability of war between the two, there would be a trade-off here between a lower chance of conventional war against some chance of a nuclear holocaust. No sensib le decision-making can concentrate only on the probability of war without taking note of the size of the penalties of war should it occur. Indeed, any significant probability of the scenario captured by Arundhati Roy's description of "the end of imaginat ion" can hardly fail to outweigh the greater probability, if any, of the comparatively milder penalties of conventional war.
Second, there is nothing to indicate that the likelihood of conventional war is, in fact, reduced by the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan. Indeed, hot on the heels of the nuclear blasts, the two countries did undergo a major military confrontation in the Kargil district in Kashmir. The Kargil conflict, which occurred within a year of the nuclear blasts of India and Pakistan, was in fact the first military conflict between the two in nearly 30 years. Many Indian commentators have argued that the conf rontation, which was provoked by separatist guerillas coming across the Line of Control from Pakistan (in their view, joined by Army regulars), was helped by Pakistan's understanding that India would not be able to use its massive superiority in conventional forces to launch a bigger war in retaliation, precisely because it would fear a nuclear holocaust. Whether or not this analysis is right, there is clearly substance in the general reasoning that the enemy's fear of nuclear annihilation can be an argument in favour of military adventurism without expectation of a fuller retaliation from the enemy. Be that as it may, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and no matter what the explanation, nuclearisation evidently has not prevented non-nuclear conflicts between India and Pakistan.
Third, the danger of accidental nuclear war is much greater in the subcontinent than it was in the Cold War itself. This is not only because the checks and controls are much looser, but also because the distances involved are so small between India and P akistan - that there is little time for any conversation when a crisis might occur and a first strike were feared. Also, the much-discussed hold of fundamentalist jehadists within the Pakistan military and the absence of democratic control add to the fear of a sudden flashpoint.
Fourth, there is a need also to assess whether the peace that the world enjoyed with nuclear deterrence during the global Cold War was, in fact, predictable and causally robust. The argument for the balance of terror has been clear enough for a long time , and was most eloquently put by Winston Churchill in his last speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955. His ringing words on this ("safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation") has a mesmerizing effect, but Churchill himself did make exceptions to his rule, when he said that the logic of deterrence "does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dug-out".
INDIA AND THE BOMB<sup>1</sup>
What of the argument that nuclear deterrence makes war between India and Pakistan less likely? Why would not the allegedly proven ability of nuclear balance, which is supposed to have kept peace in the world, be effective also in the subcontinent? I believe that this question can be answered from four different perspectives.
First, even if it were the case that the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan reduces the probability of war between the two, there would be a trade-off here between a lower chance of conventional war against some chance of a nuclear holocaust. No sensib le decision-making can concentrate only on the probability of war without taking note of the size of the penalties of war should it occur. Indeed, any significant probability of the scenario captured by Arundhati Roy's description of "the end of imaginat ion" can hardly fail to outweigh the greater probability, if any, of the comparatively milder penalties of conventional war.
Second, there is nothing to indicate that the likelihood of conventional war is, in fact, reduced by the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan. Indeed, hot on the heels of the nuclear blasts, the two countries did undergo a major military confrontation in the Kargil district in Kashmir. The Kargil conflict, which occurred within a year of the nuclear blasts of India and Pakistan, was in fact the first military conflict between the two in nearly 30 years. Many Indian commentators have argued that the conf rontation, which was provoked by separatist guerillas coming across the Line of Control from Pakistan (in their view, joined by Army regulars), was helped by Pakistan's understanding that India would not be able to use its massive superiority in conventional forces to launch a bigger war in retaliation, precisely because it would fear a nuclear holocaust. Whether or not this analysis is right, there is clearly substance in the general reasoning that the enemy's fear of nuclear annihilation can be an argument in favour of military adventurism without expectation of a fuller retaliation from the enemy. Be that as it may, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and no matter what the explanation, nuclearisation evidently has not prevented non-nuclear conflicts between India and Pakistan.
Third, the danger of accidental nuclear war is much greater in the subcontinent than it was in the Cold War itself. This is not only because the checks and controls are much looser, but also because the distances involved are so small between India and P akistan - that there is little time for any conversation when a crisis might occur and a first strike were feared. Also, the much-discussed hold of fundamentalist jehadists within the Pakistan military and the absence of democratic control add to the fear of a sudden flashpoint.
Fourth, there is a need also to assess whether the peace that the world enjoyed with nuclear deterrence during the global Cold War was, in fact, predictable and causally robust. The argument for the balance of terror has been clear enough for a long time , and was most eloquently put by Winston Churchill in his last speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955. His ringing words on this ("safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation") has a mesmerizing effect, but Churchill himself did make exceptions to his rule, when he said that the logic of deterrence "does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dug-out".
INDIA AND THE BOMB<sup>1</sup>
