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Innocent of plotting this coup is what I meant.
The supreme military council was going to have a meeting a couple days after the coup attempt, many believe this was the reason because it was expected that many gülen people from military would have been kicked out after this so they were in hurry to do their move before this happens.

Theres a lot the western media doesnt cover but many things make sense to us who hear and see a lot more than you.

Besides those media outlets that have been closed are linked to gülen network, even the most anti goverment newspapers havent been touched yet.
One of the news papers that has been closed was founded in 2007, just a year later they published ''secret documents'' revealing a coup plot against goverment which resulted in arrest of general that were an obstacle in gülen peoples way.

How is it possible that a just one year old news paper can publish highly secret military documents? I mean nobody is stupid enough to believe in this circus.

Taraf has published a series of highly-controversial stories that revealed the involvement of the Turkish military in daily political affairs. The revealed documents, such as coup plans that involved the bombing of historical mosques in Turkey ("Sledgehammer" coup plan) and bombing of a museum (Operation Cage Action Plan), significantly damaged the social image of the Turkish military. The sources that leaked such critical insider information to Taraf are still unknown.[5]

The response of the Turkish military to Taraf included canceling the newspaper's accreditation from press releases at its headquarters.[6][7] A political journal, Nokta, had similarly published leaked military information (Sarıkız, Ayışığı, Yakamoz and Eldiven) and was closed down in 2007 due to pressure.[8]

Some prominent names of Taraf, such as reporter Mehmet Baransu, columnist Emre (Emrullah) Uslu, and former columnist Önder Aytaç are known for their affiliation with the Gülen movement, although it has been denied that they act as quasi-officials representatives of the movement.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taraf
 
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Theres a lot the western media doesnt cover but many things make sense to us who hear and see a lot more than you.
Stuff like this?

Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition
Turkey's Islamist Danger

by Rachel Sharon-Krespin
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009, pp. 55-66

As Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) begins its seventh year in leadership, Turkey is no longer the secular and democratic country that it was when the party took over. The AKP has conquered the bureaucracy and changed Turkey's fundamental identity. Prior to the AKP's rise, Ankara oriented itself toward the United States and Europe. Today, despite the rhetoric of European Union accession, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has turned Turkey away from Europe and toward Russia and Iran and reoriented Turkish policy in the Middle East away from sympathy toward Israel and much more toward friendship with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria. Anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic sentiments have increased. Behind Turkey's transformation has been not only the impressive AKP political machine but also a shadowy Islamist sect led by the mysterious hocaefendi (master lord) Fethullah Gülen; the sect often bills itself as a proponent of tolerance and dialogue but works toward purposes quite the opposite. Today, Gülen and his backers (Fethullahcılar, Fethullahists) not only seek to influence government but also to become the government.



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In 1998, Fethullah Gülen left Turkey for the United States, reportedly to receive medical treatment for diabetes. Since his voluntary exile, Gülen has resided on a large, rural estate in eastern Pennsylvania, together with about 100 followers, who guard him and tend to his needs. It is from his U.S. base that Gülen has built his fame and his transnational empire.

Today, Turkey has over 85,000 active mosques, one for every 350 citizens—compared to one hospital for every 60,000 citizens—the highest number per capita in the world and, with 90,000 imams, more imams than doctors or teachers. It has thousands of madrasa-like Imam-Hatip schools and about four thousand more official state-run Qur'an courses, not counting the unofficial Qur'an schools, which may expand the total number tenfold. Spending by the governmental Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı) has grown five fold, from 553 trillion Turkish lira in 2002 (approximately US$325 million) to 2.7 quadrillion lira during the first four-and-a-half years of the AKP government; it has a larger budget than eight other ministries combined.[1] The Friday prayer attendance rate in Turkey's mosques exceeds that of Iran's, and religion classes teaching Sunni Islam are compulsory in public schools despite rulings against the practice by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Turkish high court (Danıştay).[2] Both Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Diyanet head Ali Bardakoğlu criticized the rulings for failing to consult Islamic scholars.


Gülen now helps set the political agenda in Turkey using his followers in the AKP as well as the movement's vast media empire, financial institutions and banks, business organizations, an international network of thousands of schools, universities, student residences (ışıkevis), and many associations and foundations. He is a financial heavyweight, controlling an unregulated and opaque budget estimated at $25 billion.[3] It is not clear whether the Fethullahist cemaat (community) supports the AKP or is the ruling force behind AKP. Either way, however, the effect is the same.


Gülen's Background

Born in Erzurum, Turkey, in 1942, Fethullah Gülen is an imam who considers himself a prophet.[4]An enigmatic figure, many in the West applaud him as a reformist and advocate for tolerance,[5] a catalyst of "moderate Islam" for Turkey and beyond. He is praised in the West, especially in the United States, as an intellectual, scholar, and educator[6] even though his formal education is limited to five years of elementary school. After receiving an imam-preacher certificate, he served as an imam, first in Erdirne and later in Izmir. In 1971, the Turkish security service arrested him for clandestine religious activities, such as running illegal summer camps to indoctrinate youths, and was, from that time on, occasionally harassed by the staunchly secular military.[7] In 1981, he formally retired from his post as a local preacher.

To build an image as a proponent of interfaith dialogue, Gülen met Pope John Paul II, other Christian clergy, and Jewish rabbis[8] and emphasizes the commonalities unifying Abrahamic religions. He presents himself and his movement as the modern-day version of tolerant, liberal Anatolian Sufism and has used the literature of great Sufi thinkers such as Jalal ad-Din Rumi and Yunus Emre, pretending to share their moderate teachings.[9] Quotes from their teachings adorn Fethullah's Gülen's propaganda material. The movement, its proxy organizations, and universities—including Georgetown, to which it donates money—hold conferences in the United States and Europe to discuss Gülen. In October 2007, the British House of Lords feted Gülen with a conference in his honor.

Gülen was a student and follower of Sheikh Sa'id-i Kurdi (1878-1960), also known as Sa'id-i Nursi, the founder of the Islamist Nur (light) movement.[10] After Turkey's war of independence, Kurdi demanded, in an address to the new parliament, that the new republic be based on Islamic principles. He turned against Atatürk and his reforms and against the new modern, secular, Western republic.

In 1998, Gülen departed for the United States, reportedly to receive medical treatment for diabetes. However, his absence also enabled Gülen to escape questioning on his indictment in 2000 for allegedly promoting insurrection in Turkey in a series of secretly-recorded sermons. Since his voluntary exile, Gülen has resided on a large, rural estate in eastern Pennsylvania, together with about 100 followers, who guard him and tend to his needs. These servants are educated men who wear suits and ties and do not look like traditional Islamists in cloaks and turbans. They follow theirhocaefendi's orders and even refrain from marrying until age fifty per his instructions. When they do marry, their spouses are expected to dress in the Islamic manner, as dictated by Gülen himself.[11] It is from his U.S. base that Gülen has built his fame and his transnational empire.


Gülen's Education Network

The core of Gülen's network is his educational institutions. His school network is impressive. Nurettin Veren, Gülen's right-hand man for thirty-five years, estimated that some 75 percent of Turkey's two million preparatory school students are enrolled in Gülen institutions.[12] He controls thousands of top-tier secondary schools, colleges, and student dormitories throughout Turkey, as well as private universities, the largest being Fatih University in Istanbul. Outside Turkey, his movement runs hundreds of secondary schools and dozens of universities in 110 countries worldwide. Gülen's aim is not altruistic: His followers target youth in the eighth through twelfth grades, mentor and indoctrinate them in the ışıkevi, educate them in the Fethullah schools, and prepare them for future careers in legal, political, and educational professions in order to create the ruling classes of the future Islamist, Turkish state. Taking their orders from Fethullah Gülen, wealthy followers continue to open schools and ışıkevi in what Sabah columnist Emre Aköz called "the education jihad."[13]

The overt network of schools is only one part of a larger strategy. In a 2006 interview, Veren said, "These schools are like shop windows. Recruitment and Islamization activities are carried out through night classes ... Children whom we educated in Turkey are now in the highest positions. There are governors, judges, military officers. There are ministers in the government. They consult Gülen before doing anything."[14]

The AKP's controversial education policies, coupled with the Islamist indoctrination in Fethullahist schools, have accelerated the Islamization of Turkish society. During AKP's first term in government, the Erdoğan government has changed textbooks, emphasized religion courses, and transferred thousands of certified imams from their positions in the Directorate of Religious Affairs to positions as teachers and administrators in Turkey's public schools.[15] Abdullah Gül, Turkey's first Islamist president and a Gülen sympathizer, appointed a Gülen-affiliated professor, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, to head Turkey's Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK). He has also used his presidential prerogative to appoint Gülen sympathizers to university presidencies.

Beyond Turkey, the Fethullahist schools also serve as fertile recruiting grounds. In his Institut d'Etudes Politiques doctoral thesis on Gülen schools in Central Asia, Bayram Balcı, a French scholar of Turkish origin, wrote, "Fethullah's aim is the Islamization of Turkish nationality and the Turcification of Islam in foreign countries. Dozens of Fethullah's ‘Turkish schools' abroad—most of which are for boys—are used to covertly ‘convert,' not so much ‘in school,' but through direct proselytism ‘outside school.'" Balcı explained, "He wants to revive the link between state, religion, and society."[16] The schools of Gülen's Nur movement in Central Asia have worked to reestablish Islam in a region largely secularized by decades of Soviet control. Balcı explained, "The aim of thecemaat is to educate and influence future national elites, who will speak English and Turkish and who will one day prove their good intentions towards Fethullahists and towards Turkey." Several countries in the region have taken steps against Gülen's educational institutions because of such suspicions. Uzbekistan has banned the schools for encouraging Islamic law,[17] and the Russian government, weary of the movement's activities in majority Muslim regions of the federation, has banned not only the Gülen schools but all activities of the entire Nur sect in the country.[18]

Neither Uzbekistan nor Russia are known for their pluralism, but suspicion about Gülen indoctrination has spread even to more permissive societies such as that of the Netherlands. In 2008, members of the Netherland's Christian Democrat, Labor, and Conservative parties agreed to cut several million euros in government funding for organizations affiliated with "the Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen" and to thoroughly investigate the activities of the Gülen group after Erik Jan Zürcher, director of the Amsterdam-based International Institute for Social History, and five former Gülen followers who had worked in Gülen's ışıkevi told Dutch television that the Gülen community was moving step-by-step to topple the secular order.[19] While the organizations in question denied any ties to the Gülen movement, Zürcher said that taqiya, religiously-sanctioned dissimulation, was typical in the movement's interactions with the West. An unnamed former Gülen follower who also once worked in Gülen schools and ışıkevi reported that Fethullahists called the Dutch "filthy, blasphemous infidels" and that they said "the best Dutchman is one who has converted to Islam. All the Dutch must be made Muslims."[20] Indeed, of the thousands of Fethullahist schools in more than one hundred countries that allegedly teach moderation, none are located in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Iran that exist under domineering strains of official Islam, and most appear instead geared to radicalize students in secular Muslim and non-Muslim societies.

Eviscerating Checks and Balances
Fethullahists have also made inroads into Turkey's 200,000-strong police force. Their infiltration has had a compounding effect, as Fethullahist officials have purged officials more loyal to the republic than the hocaefendi. According to Veren, "There are imam security directors; imams wearing police uniforms. Many police commissioners get their orders from imams."[21] Adil Serdar Saçan, former director of the organized crimes unit within the Istanbul Directorate of Security, confirmed these statements in reports he prepared on the Fethullahist organization within the security apparatus. In a 2006 interview, he said,

Fethullahists began organizing inside the security apparatus in the 1970s. In police academies, students were being taken to ışıkevi by class commissioners. One of those commissioners is now the director of intelligence at the Turkish Directorate of Security. During my time at the [police] academy, those in the directorate who did not have ties to the [Gülen] organization were all pensioned off or fired in 2002 when the AKP came to power. … I was at the top of my class when I graduated from the police academy, and throughout the twenty-four years of my career, I maintained and was honored for my stellar record. After 2002, the AKP blocked my promotions. They promoted only those officers whose files were tainted with allegations that they were engaged in reactionary Islamist activities. … Belonging to a certain cemaat has become a prerequisite for advancement in the force. At present, over 80 percent of the officers at supervisory level in the general security organization are members of the [Gülen] cemaat.[22]

Such statements, however, may have consequences.[23] In October 2008, Turkish police arrested Saçan on suspicion of involvement in the so-called Ergenekon plot to overthrow the Turkish state.[24] Most Turkish analysts believe that the Ergenekon conspiracy, short of any evidence of unconstitutional activities, is more a mechanism by which the Turkish government can harass critics.[25]

Writer and journalist Merdan Yanardağ provided statistics to illuminate the Islamist penetration of the Ankara Directorate of Security. He explained,

Prior to Ramadan, personnel at the Directorate of Security in Ankara were asked whether they would be fasting during Ramadan, in order to establish the number of meals that would be needed during that period. Of the 4,200 employees, only seventeen indicated that they would not be fasting. Considering that some of the seventeen might have been sick or taking medications, the numbers speak for themselves. [26]

Wiretapping scandals in spring 2008 also highlighted Gülenist penetration of the security service's most important units. After the Turkish Security Directorate obtained a blanket court permit in April 2007 to monitor and record all the communications in Turkey including mobile and land-line telephones, SMS text messaging, e-mail, fax, and Internet communications,[27] Turks have grown uneasy about having telephone conversations fearing intrusion into their privacy. Recent leaks to pro-AKP media of recordings of military personnel meetings, lectures, top secret military documents, strategic antiterrorism plans, private medical files of commanders, and contents of personal conversations between state prosecutors have shocked the nation as has the appearance on the Internet video site YouTube of some of those recordings.

The alleged network of Fethullah followers in the security system has an impact on domestic affairs as they use restricted technology or privileged information to further their political agenda. In February 2008, for example, several websites posted the voice recording of a secret speech delivered by Brig. Gen. Münir Erten announcing the timing of an upcoming Turkish military operation into Iraqi Kurdistan, details of a private discussion with the chief of the General Staff, and private information concerning Gen. Ergin Saygun's health.[28] The following month, several websites including YouTube posted a secretly recorded conversation between prosecutor Salim Demirci and a colleague regarding Erdoğan and Efkan Ala, then governor of Diyarbakir and subsequently a counselor of Erdoğan's office. Erdoğan responded by ordering a criminal investigation against Demirci.[29] In June 2008, the Islamist Vakit published Saygun's entire medical file, disclosing information about his diabetes as well as the treatments and medications he had received in the Gülhane military hospital.[30] Others whose tapped conversations appeared on Islamist websites and in Gülen's newspaper network included Erdoğan Teziç, the former head of Turkey's Higher Education Council, and prominent members of the center-left opposition Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Many Turkish journalists believe that Fethullahist-dominated police tap their communications, and according to reports, the head of the wiretapping unit, who was appointed by Erdoğan in August 2005, is a Fethullah follower.[31] Islamist newspapers including Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, and the pro-AKP Taraf published leaks from private conversations held inside government offices and military headquarters. The Islamist, pro-AKP media has reported alleged confidential evidence relating to the police investigation of the so-called Ergenekon plot that posits a secularist cabal of military officers, journalists, and professors sought to overthrow the AKP government.[32] The net effect of such leaks is to tar the reputations of or intimidate AKP's political opponents and the Turkish military.

Islamization within police ranks also contributes to police brutality against anti-AKP demonstrators. On May 1, 2008, the police used gas bombs, pepper gas, water cannons, and clubs against workers who wanted to celebrate May Day peacefully in Istanbul's Taksim Square, the traditional site of demonstrations in Turkey's largest city; scores were injured.[33] Labor unions and opposition parties condemned the police brutality and accused Erdoğan of using police to silence opposition voices.[34]Police also suppressed labor protests in Tuzla (Istanbul) shipyards.[35] Similarly, police have harassed individual citizens after they criticized Erdoğan's policies. Erdoğan's own security guards abducted a 46-year-old man from Antalya for speaking out in public against his social security policies, taking the man to a deserted location where the guards beat and threatened him. The victim alleged that his attackers said they could easily plant guns or drugs on him and kill him.[36]

While Turkey's military is guarantor of the constitution, Veren alleged that Fethullahists had also entrenched themselves within the military, police, and other professions:

The Fethullahist military officers were once our students, who we financially supported, educated, and assisted. When these grateful children graduated and reached influential positions, they put themselves and their positions at the service of Fethullah Gülen … [Gülen] directs and instructs, and, through them, maintains power within the state … When Gülen's students graduate from the police or military academies—as do the new doctors and lawyers—they present their first salaries to Fethullah Gülen as a gesture of their gratitude. Newly graduated officers even bring him the swords that they receive during the graduation ceremony.[37]

According to Veren, Gülen has argued that the military expels no more than one in forty Islamist officers; the rest remain in undercover cells. While such allegations may seem the stuff of conspiracy theory, recent leaks to pro-AKP media suggest a number of Islamist sources within the military ranks, creating speculation that followers of Gülen now populate the senior infrastructure of the Turkish General Staff. Such speculation gained additional credence after the August 2008 Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, YAŞ), which, for the first time, declined to expel suspected Islamists from military ranks.

The AKP government has also aided the Gülen movement with its reorientation of the judiciary. Over the first five years of his rule, Erdoğan replaced thousands of judges and prosecutors with AKP appointees. Now that the president is Islamist, it is unlikely that he would veto the appointment of Islamists to the bench, as did his predecessor Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Indeed, it now appears that the government intends to appoint thousands more to judicial positions.[38] The AKP has also enacted a law that would require applicants for judgeships to first interview with AKP bureaucrats in order better to gauge and adjudicate applicants' adherence to Islam. The results of the AKP's targeting of the judicial system are already apparent as anti-secular, pro-AKP officials have been at the forefront of some controversial trials, such as the case against Van University president Yücel Aşkın,[39] the Şemdinli investigation in which the prosecutor tried to implicate Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt before he became chief of the General Staff, and, most recently, the Ergenekon probe.

Indeed, it is such overtly political and vindictive prosecutions that have led some former Gülen sympathizers, such as University of Utah political scientist Hakan Yavuz, to a change of heart. In one interview, Yavuz told odatv.com that four important legal cases had changed his thinking: the case against Aşkın; the Semdinli case; the Atabeyler operation, uncovered in 2005, involving an organized crime group with alleged plans to assassinate Prime Minister Erdoğan;[40] and the Ergenekon probe. Yavuz explained, "The cemaat has attempted to steer all four cases. Look at the slanderous reports in archives of the cemaat's newspapers, how they defamed Yucel Aşkın. And now it's Ergenekon. Keeping [prominent] personalities in jail for over a year without indictment is inexplicable." Yavuz also suggested Gülen's cemaat spoke differently to its members than to outsiders and that it was pursuing a political agenda that conflicted with the founding philosophy of the modern Turkish republic. He accused Fethullahists of "co-optation" and said that they were recruiting people and paying them money—without any formal receipts or records—to write and speak favorably about the movement while criticizing the secular Turkish state.[41]


The Fifth Estate

If the police, military, and courts might normally protect rule-of-law from within official Turkish government structures, there might still be an external check to abuse of power in the Turkish media. The Turkish media has traditionally been relentless in its reporting of abuses of power and corruption. Soon after assuming office, however, Erdoğan proved intolerant of the concept of a free press. The AKP government has systematically sought to create a media monopoly to speak with one voice and on behalf of the government. Erdoğan lashes out at media organs that he does not control. In his first term, Erdoğan brought more than a hundred lawsuits against sixty-three journalists in sixteen publications, against many writers, as well as the leaders and members of parliament of all opposition parties. The number of lawsuits may be far greater. In 2008, Erdoğan declined to answer a parliamentary inquiry by a Democratic Left Party deputy demanding information on how many lawsuits Erdoğan had initiated against journalists—claiming that such information was in the realm of his private life."[42] Most of Erdoğan's lawsuits against journalists involve criticism that any other democracy would consider legitimate. In 2005, for example, he sued Cumhuriyet cartoonist Musa Kart for depicting him as a cat entangled in a ball of string. Last year, he sued the LeMan weekly humor magazine for ridiculing him in its January 30, 2008 cover.[43]

Erdoğan lost some of his lawsuits, and courts threw out others, but the effect has nonetheless been chilling. Journalists know that not only does the prime minister seek to make them financially liable for any criticism, but that the AKP might even seek to assume control of their publications. During AKP's 6-year rule, the government has seized control of several media outlets and subsequently sold them to pro-AKP holdings affiliated with the Gülen community. In April 2007, for example, the governmental Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) seized Sabah-ATV, Turkey's second largest media group in a predawn raid. The TMSF, staffed by Erdoğan appointees, then sold the group to Çalık Holding, the CEO of which is Erdoğan's son-in-law. Çalık financed the purchase with public funds taken as loans from two state-owned banks and by partnering with a newly-founded, Qatar-based media company that bought 25 percent of Sabahshares. It was Abdullah Gül who introduced Ahmet Çalık to Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa during his January 2008 visit in Syria; Çalık also accompanied Gül in February and Erdoğan in April when they visited Qatar. Media reports indicated that other consortiums that had initially shown interest in purchasing Sabah-ATV with their own money pulled out of the tender shortly before the bid after Erdoğan contacted them, leaving Çalik the sole bidder.[44] Sabah has since become a strong advocate of the AKP government. In September 2008, Erdoğan demanded all party members and aides boycott newspapers owned by the Doğan Media Group after it reported on laundering of money to Islamist charities.[45]

Excluding the Islamist television and radio stations, newspapers such as Zaman, Sabah, Yeni Şafak,Türkiye, Star, Bugün, Vakit, and Taraf all have AKP and/or Gülen-affiliated ownership. By circulation, such papers represent at least 40 percent of all newspaper sales in Turkey.[46]


What Are Gülen's Intentions?

Conglomerates have long had a dominant position in Turkish society. Secular businessmen such as Aydın Doğan and Mehmet Emin Karamehmet have interests not only in industry but also in media, the banking sector, and even education. Never before, though, has a single individual started a movement that seeks to transform Turkish society so fundamentally. Gülen now wields a vocal partisan media; a vast network of loyal bureaucrats; partisan universities and academia; partisan prosecutors and judges; partisan security and intelligence agencies; partisan capitalists, business associations, NGOs, and labor unions; and partisan teachers, doctors, and hospitals. What makes Gülen so dangerous? Gülen's own teaching and sermons provide the best answers.

In 1999, Turkish television aired footage of Gülen delivering sermons to a crowd of followers in which he revealed his aspirations for an Islamist Turkey ruled by Shari‘a (Islamic law) as well as the methods that should be used to attain that goal. In the sermons, he said:

You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers … until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. If they do something prematurely, the world will crush our heads, and Muslims will suffer everywhere, like in the tragedies in Algeria, like in 1982 [in] Syria … like in the yearly disasters and tragedies in Egypt. The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey … Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all—in confidence … trusting your loyalty and secrecy. I know that when you leave here—[just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here.

He continued,

When everything was closed and all doors were locked, our houses of isik [light] assumed a mission greater than that of older times. In the past, some of the duties of these houses were carried out by madrasas [Islamic schools], some by schools, some by tekkes [Islamist lodges] … These isik homes had to be the schools, had to be madrasas, [had to be] tekkes all at the same time. The permission did not come from the state, or the state's laws, or the people who govern us. The permission was given by God … who wanted His name learned and talked about, studied, and discussed in those houses, as it used to be in the mosques.[47]

In another sermon, Gülen said,

Now it is a painful spring that we live in. A nation is being born again. A nation of millions [is] being born—one that will live for long centuries, God willing … It is being born with its own culture, its own civilization. If giving birth to one person is so painful, the birth of millions cannot be pain-free. Naturally we will suffer pain. It won't be easy for a nation that has accepted atheism, has accepted materialism, a nation accustomed to running away from itself, to come back riding on its horse. It will not be easy, but it is worth all our suffering and the sacrifices.[48]

And, in yet another sermon, he declared,

The philosophy of our service is that we open a house somewhere and, with the patience of a spider, we lay our web to wait for people to get caught in the web; and we teach those who do. We don't lay the web to eat or consume them but to show them the way to their resurrection, to blow life into their dead bodies and souls, to give them a life.[49]

Many Gülen supporters and members of the Islamist media affiliated with the cemaat suggested the sermons were somehow forged[50] but the denials are unconvincing given the video footage and reports by Gülen movement defectors.


U.S. Government Support for Gülen?

Many Turkish analysts believe that, prior to Erdoğan's election, Gülen and his supporters in the U.S. government helped obtain an invitation to the White House for him at a time when Erdoğan was banned from politics in Turkey due to his Islamist activities—an event viewed as a U.S. endorsement ahead of the 2002 Turkish elections. That the U.S. government and, specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency support the Gülen movement is conventional wisdom among Turkey's secular elite even though no hard evidence exists to support such allegations.

When Turkish secularists are asked to defend the view that Gülen enjoys U.S. support, they often point to his almost 20-year residence in eastern Pennsylvania. After the Supreme Court of Appeals in Turkey (Yargıtay) confirmed on June 24, 2008, a lower court's ruling to acquit Gülen on charges that he organized an illegal terrorist organization to overthrow the secular government in Turkey, Gülen won another legal battle, this time in the United States. A federal court reversed U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service decisions that would have denied Gülen's application for permanent residency in the United States on the basis that Gülen did not fit the criteria as someone with "extraordinary ability in the field of education." The Department of Homeland Security characterized Gülen as neither an expert in the field of education nor an educator but rather as "the leader of a large and influential religious and political movement with immense commercial holdings."[51]

While the court ruling that allowed Gülen to remain in the United States may provide fodder for Turkish analysts who suggest U.S. support for Gülen, the process is actually more revealing. Indeed, the U.S. government noted that much of the acclaim Gülen touts is sponsored or financed by his own movement. Gülen attached twenty-nine letters of reference to his June 18, 2008 motion, mostly from theologians or Turkish political figures close to or affiliated with his organization. John Esposito, founding director of the Saudi-financed Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, who, after receiving donations from the Gülen movement sponsored a conference in his honor, also supplied a reference. Two former CIA officials, George Fidas and Graham Fuller, and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz also supplied references.

The letters may have worked. On July 16, 2008, U.S. district judge Stewart Dalzell issued a memorandum and order granting Gülen's motion for partial summary judgment and ordering the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service to approve his petition for alien worker status as an alien of extraordinary ability by August 1, 2008. The court found that the immigration examiner improperly concluded that the field of education was the only statutory category in which Gülen's accomplishments could fit and that Gülen's accomplishments in such fields as theology, political science, and Islamic studies should also be considered. The court further determined that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service Administrative Appeals Office erred in concluding that Gülen's work was not "scholarly" by applying an unduly narrow definition of the term. Finally, with regard to the statutory requirement that the applicant show that his or her entry into the United States would substantially benefit the United States, the court found that Gülen had met the requirement.[52]

Regardless of the legal rationale behind his current stay, the U.S. decision to grant Gülen residency will enable his movement to continue to imply Washington's endorsement as the AKP and its Fethullahist supporters seek to push Turkey further away from the secularism upon which it was built.


Conclusions

Gülen enjoys the support of many friends, ideological fellow-travelers, and co-opted journalists and academics. Too often, concern over Gülen's activities is dismissed in the Turkish, U.S., and European media as mere paranoia. When Turkey's chief prosecutor indicted the AKP for attempting to undermine the secular constitution, the pro-Islamist media in Turkey along with Western diplomats and journalists dismissed the case as an "undemocratic judicial coup."[53] Yet at the same time, many of the same outlets and officials have hailed the Ergenekon indictment, assuming a dichotomy between Islamism and democracy on one hand, and secularism and fascism on the other.[54] The repeated branding in Islamist outlets of Turkey's Islamists as "reformist democrats" and of modern, secular Turks as "fundamentalists" has to be one of the most offensive but sadly effective lies in modern politics.

Indeed, Turkey has never seen a single incident of attacks on pious Muslims for fasting during Ramadan, whereas in recent years there have been many incidents of attacks on less-observant Turks for drinking alcohol or not fasting.[55] While women who cover their heads in the Islamic manner can move freely in any area of the country, uncovered women are increasingly unwelcome in certain regions and are often attacked.[56]

Contrary to the impression prevalent in the West—that the conflict is between religious Muslims and "anti-religion, secular Kemalists"—the fact remains that the majority of Turks, secular included, are traditional and observant Muslims many of whom define themselves primarily as "Muslims first."[57]While the Turkish constitution recognizes all Turkish citizens as "Turks," the dominant sentiment in the country has always been that in order to be considered a Turk, one must be Muslim. The complete absence of any non-Muslim governor, ambassador, or military or police officer attests to the prevalence of Islam's dominance in the Turkish establishment. Therefore, it appears Gülen is not fighting for more individual freedoms but to free Islam from the confines of the mosque and the private domain of individuals and to bring it to the public arena, to govern every aspect of life in the country.[58] AKP leaders, including Gül and Erdoğan, have repeatedly expressed their opposition to the "imprisonment of Islam in the mosque," demanding that it be present everywhere as a lifestyle. Most Turks vividly remember statements by AKP leaders not long ago rejecting the definition of secularism as "separation of mosque and state." Gül has slammed "secularism" on many occasions, including during a November 27, 1995 interview with The Guardian. What Turkey's Islamists really want is to remove the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. So long as U.S. and Western officials fail to recognize that Gülen's rhetoric of tolerance is only skin-deep, they may be setting the stage for a dialogue, albeit not of religious tolerance, but rather to find an answer to the question, "Who lost Turkey?"

Rachel Sharon-Krespin is the director of the Turkish Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington D.C.
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My point is Gulen and his followers may behave as described above, yet still be innocent of the July 15 coup attempt. In America we don't lock up guys for threatening tendencies but for actually committing crimes, or at least provable conspiracy to commit crimes.
 
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Stuff like this?

My point is Gulen and his followers may behave as described above, yet still be innocent of the July 15 coup attempt. In America we don't lock up guys for threatening tendencies but for actually committing crimes, or at least provable conspiracy to commit crimes.


image.jpeg
 
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Stuff like this?
Yes
My point is Gulen and his followers may behave as described above, yet still be innocent of the July 15 coup attempt. In America we don't lock up guys for threatening tendencies but for actually committing crimes, or at least provable conspiracy to commit crimes.
What im saying to you is, its pretty clear it was gülens people, them infiltrating the state and Army is known since decades in Turkey, everybody knows this.
AKP and gülen went on full war in 2013 for whatever reason and since then we see more and more stuff happening between them, AKP is cleaning the state from their people since 2013, the only way to stop this is to topple the goverment which was only possible throught a coup.

Let me ask you who else if not gülenists did this coup?
Dont tell me kemalists because the kemalist generals who have been jailed by gülens judges have taken their guns and went to bases to repel the putschists that night.
Erdogan himself said that the former chief of general staff Ilker Basbug who has been jailed too by gülens judges said to him ''today they are doing a coup against us, tomorrow they will do the same to you'' this happened in 2008.

Lets say Erdogan did it to blame it on Gülen then why didnt the biggest goverment critical medias get shut down but only those linked to Gülen? Why did Erdogan invite the opposition to his office? Why did the biggest opposition party made a democracy rally in the midlle of Istanbul while AKP attended it?

And about locking people up, the definitive senteces havent been spoken yet, those where not enough evidence was found have been set free already and more will follow once the situation settles down, AKP worked with gülen network for a decade, they know better whos working with them, right now there is state of emergency in Turkey and people are on the streets since 2 weeks now.

Many cadets who didnt attend military academies throught gülens network have told their stories in national media about physical and psychological tortures to get them to give up their carrer in military so the gülen people can take their place, they have been doing this for decades to breed their own chain of command inside the army.

Our former mod of PDF Turkish section Neptune was forced out of Naval academy with the same methods, he said his former superiors have been jailed last week, so we have an insider among us here, you guys on the other hand can only eat whats being served to you by your biased media but i dont blame you, its a very complicated issue even for us.

I dont like Erdogan but after 15 years i dont believe he will bring sharia to Turkey while that sect leader, religious nutjob working underground, tries to become Khomeini of Turks, guess which side im supporting on this one.

All this aside there is one fact, Turkish nation has been united by this event like nothing else since a long time ago, this when it was most polirized, this is what matters, what foreigners think they know about Turkey is just secondary.
 
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Let me ask you who else if not gülenists did this coup?
I don't know. If it were me, I'd start by investigating who gave the orders to the pilots who attacked parliament and work backwards from there. Did they really do such a thing without written orders?

Lets say Erdogan did it to blame it on Gülen then why didnt the biggest goverment critical medias get shut down but only those linked to Gülen? Why did Erdogan invite the opposition to his office? Why did the biggest opposition party made a democracy rally in the midlle of Istanbul while AKP attended it?
Hasn't Erdogan proved he survives at the top - even after losing an important election - by dividing those who oppose him, rather than tackling them all at once?

Many cadets who didnt attend military academies throught gülens network have told their stories in national media about physical and psychological tortures to get them to give up their carrer in military so the gülen people can take their place,
Such accounts would be much more believable if last week there weren't so many pictures of soldiers beaten and abused by their fellow Turks. Stories made under duress mean little - you'll have to rely on those from before July 15, I guess.

I dont like Erdogan but after 15 years i dont believe he will bring sharia to Turkey while that sect leader, religious nutjob working underground, tries to become Khomeini of Turks, guess which side im supporting on this one.
Here's a response to the article I posted - for a bit of balance and your contemplation:

A response to Rachel Sharon-Krespin’s ‘Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition: Turkey’s Islamist Danger’
Greg Barton,PhD

My heart sank as I read the recent article by Rachel Sharon-Krespin, "Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition: Turkey's Islamist Danger" (Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp. 55-66).

If she is right, then we might as well abandon all reasonable hope of seeing progressive civil society organizations emerging in the Muslim world anytime soon. Judging from this piece by Sharon-Krespin and earlier works by her colleagues Michael Rubin and Daniel Pipes at the Middle East Quarterly, these commentators appear to have been uncritically swayed by the views and dark fears of secular ultra-nationalists when it comes to their assessment of Turkish affairs.

Rubin and Pipes are smart guys, and I agree with much of what they write in other contexts. Nevertheless, I take a generally more optimistic position on contemporary Islamic movements than they do and am not at all persuaded that we are witnessing a "clash of civilizations." I think that it is a mistake on every level to live in such fear of Islam that we see danger in every corner, even where it does not exist, and fail to see the good that plainly does exist. Even so, I see myself as a realist -- I am no fan of Islamist politics and activism in any form -- although I would argue that some forms are preferable to others -- and would be the first to be concerned if I thought that what Sharon-Krespin was arguing was indeed true.

I loathe the violence and hatred of the militant Islamist groups that have arisen out of the Muslim Brotherhood and regard jihadi terrorism as a real and continuing threat. I am not, however, convinced that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is in fact Islamist (I would see it being better understood as being post-Islamist) in the manner of Necmettin Erbakan and the Milli Görüş movement that preceded it. But I would not claim to be an expert on Turkish politics and have not studied matters carefully enough to form a proper assessment of the AK Party.

When it comes to the Gülen movement, however, I feel a good deal more confident in my reading of the movement's true character and intentions. And, frankly, I am simply not persuaded by the Sharon-Krespin line. She certainly writes sufficiently well that were I completely unfamiliar with the issues I might be inclined to believe her. The 58 footnotes accompanying her article give it an air of substance and credibility. But on closer examination the article appears to be little more than a pastiche of partisan and prejudiced assertions and the references don't offer the academic support that their sheer volume initially suggests.

I have done a moderate amount of research on the Gülen movement over the past five years, in the context of spending 20 years studying similar Islamic movements in Asia, and feel, to my own satisfaction, that I have obtained a fairly good understanding of the movement. Like virtually everything of consequence in Turkish society, Fethullah Gülen and the movement associated with him attracts diverse responses from a nation still recovering from a turbulent history marked by deep polarization. The ultranationalist right, including elements of the military, views civil-sphere movements in general, and religion-based movements in particular, with deep suspicion. Moreover, the somewhat fractured and polarized nature of Turkish society, though considerably moderated now, manifests itself in reports in the newspapers and other organs of the various camps habitually identifying vast conspiracies and hidden agenda linked to rival camps. It is not surprising then that Gülen continues to be viewed with suspicion by some within the Turkish establishment. But basing a scholarly article, even in part, on sensationalist stories run in staunchly secular newspapers like Cumhuriyet and ultranationalist tabloids like Milliyet and Hürriyet is misleading.

For what it is worth, the following are my brief responses to some of the key assertions made by Sharon-Krespin, in the order in which they appear in her article:

The Gülen movement has been comparatively well studied over the past decade and has become increasingly self-reflexive. I have found the movement to be remarkably open and have not found research access at all difficult, nor have I ever felt pressured to take a particular line in what I write or say about it. If the movement really was hiding dark secrets and conspiratorial ambitions then I think that I would have discovered at least a little about them by now. Just as importantly, there is nothing I have seen that would lead me to describe it as being an Islamist movement. It is clearly, in certain respects, a socially conservative and pietistic movement, but it nevertheless stands diametrically opposed to Islamism. The fact that Gülen was openly critical of Erbakan as prime minister, disagreeing with the (relatively soft) Islamist policies of the Virtue Party (FP) and the Milli Görüş (National Vision) movement associated with Erbakan is but one of many pieces of evidence pointing to his aversion to Islamist ideas.

Translating hocaefendi as "master lord," as is done in this article, is a bit misleading -- teachers are regularly referred to as "hoca" in Turkish Islamic circles and "effendi" is used freely in conversation in much the same way as the word "sir" is in America. Certainly, Gülen is regarded with great respect and affection within the movement, but this is in keeping with the pattern of pious Muslim society in Turkey and across the Muslim world, and parallels common Christian and Jewish practice.

In my observation, the Gülen movement's commitment to dialogue and tolerance is profound and genuine. In fact, I know of no other large Islamic movement anywhere that is so consistently and convincingly committed to dialogue. After years of interaction with them, I can't believe that this is all merely part of some vast charade or a stalking-horse for political ambition. I would suspect that the vast majority of Gülen movement members are personally supportive of the AK Party (after all, Turkish citizens have to vote for one party or another and the AK Party is no doubt felt by many to be the best choice available) -- but this is very different from saying that the movement, despite its frequent denials, is in fact party-political. I simply don't see any compelling evidence that the movement wants "to become the government."

The figures quoted of Turkey having 85,000 active mosques -- one for every 350 citizens seems plausible, if a little on the high side, but it needs to be understood that Gülen himself has for 30 years encouraged his followers to use their charitable giving to build schools rather than mosques on the grounds that Turkey already has plenty of mosques but lacks as sufficient number of good schools.

Moreover, conflating the position of Gülen and the Gülen movement with the policies and (alleged) intentions of the AK Party government, as this article does repeatedly, is neither fair nor reasonable. The dynamics here are altogether more complex than that, and speak as much to the relative robustness of democracy in Turkey today as they do to its weakness.

Importantly, more than ever, what is happening in Turkey gives us hope for the potential of Islam to support liberal democracy. It is not sufficient to merely assert, as Sharon-Krespin does, that "it is not clear whether the Fethullahist cemaat [community] supports the AKP or is the ruling force behind the behind the AKP. Either way, however, the effect is the same."

Similarly, it is all too easy to simply assert of Gülen that "he is a financial heavyweight, controlling an unregulated and opaque budget estimated at $25 billion." The claim is followed by a footnoted reference to an academic paper that not only gives no evidence for the fantastic figure of $25 billion quoted but rather makes a nuanced and convincing argument about how that pattern of philanthropic giving within the Gülen movement conforms to the general patterns on social and religious philanthropy in the West, as well as confirming with traditional Turkish Islamic conventions.

It is deeply misleading and offensive to claim that "Fethullah Gülen is an imam who considers himself a prophet." This is a very strong assertion but the evidence given in support of it does not go beyond hearsay and is certainly entirely out of keeping with the vast corpus of material published by and about Gülen.

Were it to be true it would involve both a vast conspiracy of silence and profound doctrinal deviation on the part of the millions involved with the movement. This is frankly not plausible.

It is also misleading to say that Gülen's "formal education is limited to five years of elementary school." It is true that his early classroom education was cut short when his family moved to the village of Alvarli in the impoverished province of Erzurum. Conditions in Turkey's mountainous far east in the 1940s was difficult. But it is noteworthy that Gülen went on to complete the official imam hatip exams and graduate from secondary school. Gülen certainly benefited from his studies with well-established Islamic scholars, but he is also a voracious reader and autodidact. A prolific author accomplished at writing for both ordinary laypeople and for scholars his Quranic scholarship and studies of Said Nursi are highly regarded by academic experts.

By any measure he is not just one Turkey's most significant contemporary intellectuals but also one of the world's leading modern Islamic intellectuals. It is, of course, reasonable to disagree with him, but it is foolish to dismiss him as a lightweight.

Sharon-Krespin makes brief reference to Nursi. She is correct in associating Gülen with Nursi's legacy, but the way in which she discusses Nursi's views suggests either deep prejudice or deep ignorance.

It is not clear where Sharon-Krespin gets the ideas that Gülen's followers "even refrain from marrying until age fifty per his instructions." Her account suggests a dour and joyless community earnestly following their leader's instructions without thinking for themselves. As a scholar of religion, I fully acknowledge that such groups do exist (including within the world of Protestant Christianity with which I am associated), but in my observation the Gülen movement is not such a group. In my dealings with members of the movement, I am struck by their consistent good humor and occasionally even mischievous sense of fun. These are people who love life and enjoy each others' company. Yes, they do tend to dress in a more conservative fashion -- although not exclusively so -- which is hardly surprising given the social origins of the movement and, like the vast majority of observant Muslims around the world, they do not drink alcohol. But to spend time in their company is to be reminded that one needs neither alcohol nor secular cool to enjoy laughter and good humor. Social conservatism is not necessarily a sign of fundamentalism.

The Gülen movement's contributions to education are indeed impressive but seem more than a little exaggerated here. And presenting them as being part of an "education jihad" based on indoctrination is more than a little unfair as it grossly misrepresents the consistently secular content of what is taught in the classrooms and the overall ethos of the schools. Different scholars will, naturally enough, have different positions on this. My own position, having observed the movement over the past five years is that it represents precisely the sort of non-Islamist, progressive, civil society movement that Muslim world needs at this point in history if it is to engage with democratic, secular, modernity. In my reading, the educational programs can be understood as broadly paralleling earlier examples of Christian and Jewish educational philanthropy in the West.

Perhaps this makes me a non-credible observer as one of the many "friends, ideological fellow-travellers, and co-opted journalists and academics." If that is the case, it would appear that I am in good company.

[*] Professor Greg Barton is a Herb Feith research professor for the study of Indonesia and acting director at the Centre for Islam and the Modern World.

Related Article:

Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition”: A Biased, Selective, Misleading, Misrepresentative and Miscalculated Article

Read Original Article:

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-166511-a-response-to-rachel-sharon-krespins-fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition-turkeys-islamist-danger-i-by-greg-barton.html


Turkish nation has been united by this event like nothing else since a long time ago, this when it was most polirized, this is what matters, what foreigners think they know about Turkey is just secondary.
Is that really something to be proud of? That Turks are in "groupthink" mode and have let themselves become vulnerable to the capriciousness of their leaders, rather than evidence and reasoned arguments from loyal dissent that helps develop good governance?
 
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Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan wants the armed forces and national intelligence agency brought under the control of the presidency, a parliamentary official said on Thursday, part of a major overhaul of the military after a failed coup.

Erdogan's comments came after a five-hour meeting of Turkey's Supreme Military Council (YAS) - chaired by Prime Minister Binali Yildirim and including the top brass - and the dishonorable discharge of nearly 1,700 military personnel over their alleged role in the abortive putsch on July 15-16.

After the meeting, Erdogan approved the council's decisions to keep armed forces chief Hulusi Akar and the army, navy and air force commanders in their posts, making few changes to the top brass, Erdogan's spokesman Ibrahim Kalin told reporters.

Erdogan, who narrowly escaped capture and possible death on the night of the coup, told Reuters in an interview last week that the military, NATO'S second biggest, needed "fresh blood". The dishonorable discharges included around 40 percent of Turkey's admirals and generals.

Turkey accuses U.S.-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen of masterminding the coup and has suspended or placed under investigation tens of thousands of his suspected followers, including soldiers, judges and academics.

In the aftermath of the coup, media outlets, schools and universities have also been closed down.

"The president said that ... he would discuss with opposition parties bringing the General Staff and the MIT (intelligence agency) under the control of the presidency," the parliamentary official said.

Such a change would require a constitutional amendment, so Erdogan's Islamist-rooted AK Party would require the support of opposition parties in parliament, Turkish media said.

Both the General Staff and MIT currently report to the prime minister's office. Putting them under the president's overall direction would be in line with Erdogan's push for a new constitution centered on a strong executive presidency.

Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag repeated Ankara's request to the United States to swiftly extradite Gulen, once a powerful ally of Erdogan. He cited intelligence reports suggesting that the 75-year-old preacher might flee his residence in rural Pennsylvania.

Gulen has condemned the coup and denies any involvement.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said more than 300 personnel in his ministry had links to Gulen and that it had dismissed 88 employees.

Separately, Turkey's biggest petrochemicals company Petkim said its chief executive had resigned and the state-run news agency Anadolu said he had been detained in connection with the failed coup.

Anadolu also said Ankara prosecutors requested the seizure of the assets of 3,049 judges and prosecutors detained as part of the investigation into the coup attempt.

WESTERN CONCERNS

Western governments and human rights groups have condemned the coup, in which at least 246 people were killed and more than 2,000 injured. But they have also expressed disquiet over the scale and depth of the purges, fearing that Erdogan may be using them to get rid of opponents and tighten his grip on power.

The government said on Wednesday it had ordered the closure of three news agencies, 16 television channels, 45 newspapers, 15 magazines and 29 publishers. This announcement followed the shutting down of other media outlets and detention of journalists with suspected Gulenist ties.

In Washington, State Department spokesman John Kirby said the United States was "deeply concerned" about the latest reports of Turkish closure of news media outlets and was seeking clarification from the government about the action.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel became the latest Western leader on Thursday to urge restraint, while underlining Turkey's need to take action against the rebels.

"In a constitutional state - and this is what worries me and what I am following closely - the principle of proportionality must be ensured by all," she told a news conference in Berlin.

Cavusoglu told broadcaster CNN Turk that some prosecutors with links to Gulen had fled to Germany and he urged Berlin to extradite them. He also said he saw "positive change" in the attitude of the United States towards Ankara's request to extradite Gulen to Turkey.

Even before the failed coup, Turkey was struggling with major security challenges including attacks by Kurdish militants and Islamic State, a grim reality underscored by tourism data on Thursday showing a 40 percent fall in foreign visitors in June.

Turmoil in Turkey's armed forces raises questions about its ability to contain the Islamic State militant threat in neighboring Syria and the renewed Kurdish insurgency in its southeast, military analysts say.

The AK Party, founded by Erdogan and in power since 2002, has long had testy relations with the military, which for decades saw itself as the ultimate guardian of Turkey's secular order and legacy of the nation's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The military has ousted four governments in the past 60 years.

However, Erdogan says the armed forces have been infiltrated in recent years by Gulen's supporters. "The army has to stop being the army of the Fethullah Gulen terrorist organization," Justice Minister Bozdag said.



EXERTING CONTROL

In a symbolic sign of how civilian authorities are now firmly in charge, Thursday's military council meeting was held at the prime minister's office rather than General Staff headquarters.

Yildirim accompanied senior military officers to pay respects at Ataturk's mausoleum in Ankara ahead of the meeting.

"We will surely eliminate all terror organizations that target our state, our nation and the indivisible unity of our country," Yildirim said in televised remarks at the mausoleum.

Changes since the coup include bringing the gendarmerie, which is responsible for security in rural areas, and the coast guard firmly under interior ministry control rather than under General Staff control.

CNN Turk has reported that more than 15,000 people, including around 10,000 soldiers, have been detained so far over the coup, citing the interior minister. Of those, more than 8,000 were formally arrested pending trial, it said.

EXTRADITION URGENT

This month's events have exacerbated strains in Turkey's relations with the United States. Washington has responded cautiously to the request to extradite Gulen, saying it must provide clear evidence of his involvement in the coup plot.

Bozdag said Turkey was receiving intelligence that Gulen might flee, possibly to Australia, Mexico, Canada, South Africa or Egypt. Egypt said it had not received an asylum request.

Gulen built up his reputation as a Sunni Muslim preacher with intense sermons. His movement, known as Hizmet, or "Service" in Turkish, set up hundreds of schools and businesses in Turkey and later abroad. His philosophy stresses the need to embrace scientific progress, shun radicalism and build bridges to the West and other religious faiths.

The United States and European Union, which Turkey aspires to join, have both urged Ankara to exercise restraint in its crackdown on suspected Gulen supporters and to ensure those arrested have a fair trial.

Amnesty International has said detainees may have suffered human rights violations, including beatings and rape - an accusation roundly rejected by Ankara.

The EU has also bridled at talk in Turkey - from Erdogan down - of restoring the death penalty, a move Brussels said would scupper Ankara's decades-old bid to join the bloc.

Tourism, a pillar of the economy, has been badly hit by a series of deadly bombings in Turkey, including one at Istanbul's airport in June that killed 45 people, and by tensions with Russia. Data showing a 40 percent drop year-on-year in June in the number of foreign visitors to Turkey is further bad news for the government. The decline was the biggest in 22 years.
 
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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN10912T
Turkey shakes up armed forces, U.S. says purges harming cooperation

Turkey has begun overhauling its armed forces following a failed coup, but its NATO ally the United States complained that the purges of generals and officers were hindering cooperation in the fight against Islamic State.

The military announced late on Thursday the promotion of 99 colonels to the rank of general or admiral, part of a shake-up that left General Staff chief Hulusi Akar and the army, navy and air force commanders in their posts.

The announcement came shortly after the dishonorable discharge of nearly 1,700 military personnel over their alleged roles in the abortive July 15-16 putsch, in which at least 246 people were killed and more than 2,000 injured. About 40 percent of all generals and admirals have been dismissed since the coup.

President Tayyip Erdogan, who ordered the restructuring, accuses U.S.-based Muslim preacher and scholar Fethullah Gulen of orchestrating the coup and wants Washington to extradite him.

Turkish authorities have launched a series of mass purges of suspected Gulen supporters, suspending, detaining or putting under investigation tens of thousands of police, judges, teachers, diplomats, journalists and others since the coup.

The number of public sector workers removed from their posts since the coup attempt now stands at more than 66,000, including some 43,000 people in education, the state-run Anadolu news agency reported on Friday.

Gulen denies any involvement in the coup and in an interview published on Friday said Erdogan had been "poisoned" by power.

Erdogan says Gulen, an ally-turned-arch-foe, harnessed his extensive network of schools, charities and businesses, built up in Turkey and abroad over decades, to create a secretive "parallel state" that aimed to take over the country.

The president's critics say Erdogan, who narrowly escaped capture and possible death on the night of the coup, is using the mass purges to crack down indiscriminately on dissent and to tighten his grip on the nation of nearly 80 million.

Erdogan wants to bring the General Staff and the national intelligence agency directly under the president's control, officials say, though he needs the support of opposition parties for such a change that would require a constitutional amendment.

Both the armed forces and the intelligence agency now report to the prime minister. Putting them under the president's overall direction would be in line with Erdogan's push for a new constitution centered on a strong executive presidency.



AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERNS

The United States and the European Union, which Turkey wants to join, have expressed alarm over the scale of the purges.

With long land borders with Syria and Iraq, Turkey is a central part of the U.S.-led military operation against Islamic State. As home to millions of Syrian refugees, it is also the European Union's partner in a deal reached last year to halt the biggest flow of migrants into Europe since World War Two.

The U.S. director of national intelligence, James Clapper, said on Thursday the purges within the Turkish military were having an impact on bilateral cooperation, adding: "Many of our interlocutors have been purged or arrested."

"There's no question this is going to set back and make more difficult cooperation with the Turks," Clapper said.

Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu shrugged off the concerns, telling reporters on Friday that Turkey's armed forces, "cleansed" of their Gulenist elements, would prove more "trustworthy ... and effective" allies against Islamic State.

Turkey hosts U.S. troops and warplanes at Incirlik Air Base, from which the United States flies sorties against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria. Those air operations were temporarily halted following the coup attempt.

The U.S. State Department also said it was "deeply concerned" about the closure of news media outlets in Turkey. The authorities say such closures target only Gulenists, though some journalists detained are known for left-wing secular views and do not share the Gulenists' religious outlook.

Cavusoglu said those detained in the media were not "real journalists". He also said that the coup might have succeeded if the authorities had not already purged the police and judiciary of large numbers of Gulenists in recent years.



"POWER POISONING"

The latest purges have now spread from state institutions, academia and the media to the world of private business.

On Friday police detained the chairman of furniture-to-cables conglomerate Boydak Holding and two company executives as part of the investigation into the "Gulenist Terror Group", state-run Anadolu Agency reported.

Chairman Mustafa Boydak and two group executives, Sukru and Halit Boydak, were held in raids on their homes, it said. Detention warrants were issued for six Boydak family members in total on allegations of financing the Gulen group.

Prosecutors in the Aegean coastal city of Izmir issued orders to detain 200 police on Friday as part of the investigation targeting Gulenists, the Dogan news agency said.

Gulen, who has lived in self-imposed exile in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania since 1999, again maintained his innocence during an interview with Italy's Corriere della Sera newspaper, saying he had himself suffered from previous coups in Turkey.

Asked why his once-warm ties with Erdogan and Turkey's ruling Islamist-rooted AK Party had turned sour, Gulen said: "It appears that after staying in power for too long, (they) are suffering from power poisoning."

Gulen, whose Hizmet (Service) movement stresses the need to embrace scientific progress and inter-faith dialogue, said he still strongly backed Ankara's bid to join the EU, saying this would buttress democracy and human rights in Turkey.



(Additional reporting by Orhan Coskun in Ankara and Steve Scherer in Rome; Writing by Gareth Jones; Editing by Nick Tattersall)
 
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Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan wants the armed forces and national intelligence agency brought under the control of the presidency, a parliamentary official said on Thursday, part of a major overhaul of the military after a failed coup.

Erdogan’s comments came after a five-hour meeting of Turkey’s Supreme Military Council (YAS) – chaired by Prime Minister Binali Yildirim and including the top brass – and the dishonorable discharge of nearly 1,700 military personnel over their alleged role in the abortive putsch on July 15-16.

Erdogan, who narrowly escaped capture and possible death on the night of the coup, told Reuters in an interview last week that the military, NATO’s second biggest, needed “fresh blood”. The dishonorable discharges included around 40 percent of Turkey’s admirals and generals.

Turkey accuses U.S.-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen of masterminding the coup and has suspended or placed under investigation tens of thousands of his suspected followers, including soldiers, judges and academics.

In the aftermath of the coup, media outlets, schools and universities have also been closed down.

“The president said that … he would discuss with opposition parties bringing the General Staff and the MIT (intelligence agency) under the control of the presidency,” the parliamentary official said.

Such a change would require a constitutional amendment, so Erdogan’s Islamist-rooted AK Party would require the support of opposition parties in parliament, Turkish media said.

Both the General Staff and MIT currently report to the prime minister’s office. Putting them under the president’s overall direction would be in line with Erdogan’s push for a new constitution centered on a strong executive presidency.

Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag said the YAS decisions – which Erdogan must first approve – would be announced on Thursday evening and would come into force immediately.

Bozdag also repeated Ankara’s request to the United States to swiftly extradite Gulen, once a powerful ally of Erdogan. He cited intelligence reports suggesting that the 75-year-old preacher might flee his residence in rural Pennsylvania.

Gulen has condemned the coup and denies any involvement.

Source: PAKISTANTODAY
 
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Last Updated On 29 July,2016 10:36 am
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There is no gravestone on his tomb but just a pile of soil. Next to his
ISTANBUL (AFP) - It’s a barren plot on the outskirts of Istanbul, its stony ground baking under the merciless summer sun. A single sign gives a macabre clue as to the intended use of the arid patch.

"Traitors’ graveyard," say the white capital letters on the black sign, planted on two stakes into the ground.

The cemetery was created to bury Turkish rebel soldiers whose failed July 15 putsch claimed a total of 270 lives but did not manage to unseat the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The location has been chosen with the apparent intention to offer the minimum glory in burial -- just near a construction site where a project to build a shelter for street animals is under way.

The Turkish authorities say 24 plotters were killed in the coup. Only one soldier has been buried in the graveyard so far.

Captain Mehmet Karabekir reportedly killed a local headman during the power grab attempt and his body was rejected by his family and relatives.

There is no gravestone on his tomb but just a pile of soil. Next to his, three more empty graves have been dug.

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‘Can’t rest in peace’

"The dead body was carried in an ambulance, with no sirens. He was laid to rest by a handful of people and then it was over," one witness told AFP.

Civilians are banned from visiting the cemetery and media are accompanied by a security official for taking any video or pictures.

Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbas, in remarks carried by Turkish media, said the idea to create a "traitors’ graveyard" had been floated during a municipal meeting.

"Those who betray this nation cannot rest in peace even in their tombs," he said.

Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate, Diyanet, said after the putsch there would not be any funeral services or prayers for the rebel soldiers involved in the coup.

"Funeral prayers are made for the deceased by his Muslim brothers for redemption. But those people, by resorting to that action, trampled on the law not only of individuals but an entire nation.

"They did not deserve redemption or prayers of their Muslim brothers."

But Diyanet excluded soldiers or security personnel who were forced or threatened to take part in the July 15 action aimed at bringing down the government.

"This is a disrespect to the homeland, nation and the flag. This is a betrayal," a middle-aged taxi driver, Yasar, said about the graveyard.

"They deserved the label (traitor)," he said.

‘Hasty decision’

Not everyone agrees it is a good idea.

Campaigners and some theologists say a proper burial is a human right, whatever the deceased has done.

"This is a decision made hastily at the heat of the moment," said Necip Taylan, former lawmaker from the ruling AKP party and retired professor from faculty of theology at Marmara University.

"We know the society is hurt by what happened," he told AFP.

"But there have always been traitors. It is nothing new, you can bury in a separate spot... I don’t think it is a good idea to create such a cemetery."

Turkey’s once powerful military, the second largest army in NATO, has staged three coups since 1960, forced a prime minister out of power in 1997, and threatened to intervene in the 2007 presidential elections.

The cemetery also sparked storms on the social media, with one Twitter handle @ParcaInsan asking: "Kenan Evren and his team will also be buried to the Traitors’ Graveyard?"

General Evren, who died in disgrace last year after being sentenced to life in prison, led the 1980 coup after ousting the government of the time.
http://dunyanews.tv/en/World/346914-Traitors-graveyard-Where-Istanbul-plotters-laid-

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