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Turkey must be thinking of the Bomb

Would you support turkish nuclear weapons program

  • Yes

    Votes: 27 84.4%
  • No

    Votes: 5 15.6%

  • Total voters
    32

rajvoSa

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Actors not invested in the Western liberal order are enjoying a period of resurgence. While analysts chase meaning in US President Donald Trump’s many erratic policies, there are some threads of consistency, including his affection for strongmen and his scepticism about the existing economic and security orders. Whether this is by design or incompetence is debatable, but it has incentivised a range of once off-limits security policies particularly of interest to those with a dictatorial bent.

The contrast between the international political climate of 2015 and the present is hard to understate.

The policy with the most profound long-term implications is Trump’s embrace of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who has effectively been rewarded for his family’s nuclear ambitions. Until recently, nuclear aspirants were more likely to end up on the gallows (Saddam Hussein) or bayoneted in ditches (Muammar Gaddafi). Yet in 2018, Kim has used his nuclear capability to obtain a degree of legitimacy in exchange for few concessions or concrete commitments.

This reintroduction of nuclear weapons as a legitimate security currency emboldens potential proliferators, presenting a challenge to one of the key norms of international politics. Turkey is one of many actors who will be watching carefully. There are strong incentives for a nuclear pathway given Turkey’s vulnerabilities and strategic position.

Turkey has historically eschewed a nuclear program because it already housed nuclear weapons: the US has stationed missiles there since 1959. As part of NATO agreements, an estimated 50 B61 bombs still remain on Turkish soil at Incirlik Air Base, in the country’s south, as a deterrence measure.

But Trump’s disdain for NATO threatens this arrangement. In fact, a 2015 Carnegie paper assessing Turkey’s nuclear posture argued that the most probable scenario under which Turkey would seek nuclear weapons would be a collapse of its relationships with NATO and the US.

A variety of actors have an interest in Turkey losing its proxy nuclear deterrent. Russia has embraced Ankara as a defence partner, selling it the S-400 missile shield which hedges against total NATO dependence. Both Iran and Syria would welcome the removal of nuclear weapons from Incirlik, as it would reduce the US security presence in the region.

There are signs that Turkey has contingency plans for the removal of weapons too, demonstrated by their pursuit of nuclear latency: the material and technical capabilities to produce weapons within a short time frame should the need should arise.

A first piece of evidence is Turkey’s consistent pursuit of nuclear energy, which would enable the establishment of a fuel cycle to manufacture weapons. Ankara first began pursuing nuclear power in the 1970s, but these efforts were disbanded after Pakistan’s controversial nuclear test in 1998. Turkey then held concerns that any nuclear activity might be problematic for their attempts to join the EU following widespread criticism of Islamabad.

This reticence has changed in the current international environment. Work recently commenced on the Akkuyu nuclear station on the Mediterranean Coast. The station interests strategic analysts for a variety of reasons: it has a quick build time – five years compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency – recommended 10–15 years; and it will be the first nuclear station ever built under a BOO (Buy Own Operate) model. The contractor is the Russian company Rosatom, and operations, ownership of processes, and inspection regimes are legislatively unclear under the BOO model.

The second piece of evidence is the increasing speed of Turkey’s indigenous ballistic missile program and associated defence products. The first fully indigenous missile, the KAAN, developed by state company ROKETAN, was demonstrated in April 2017. Its development coincided with an increase of 39% in domestic defence development from 2016–17.

Others have highlighted Ankara’s thinly veiled aspirations to proliferate, but assert Turkey lacks material capabilities and that claims should be viewed in a domestic context. For example, former parliamentarian Aykan Erdemir has argued that “Erdogan has a strong desire to make Turkey into a nuclear power, but not the capacity,” and that the “pro–government media often exaggerate the strength of the military to increase morale in Turkey”.*

Mark Hibbs’s excellent article is also highly sceptical about this sort of evidence and the evolution of a Turkish nuclear program. Hibbs cited a deficit of necessary technology as well as the safeguards put in place by the IAEA, which has found no evidence of clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities during its reporting processes.

But while Hibbs’s points are strongly made, his analysis predated Trump’s election. The contrast between the international political climate of 2015 and the present is hard to understate.

In 2018, NATO looks fractured and the Western normative order is potentially in decline. Russia is revitalised and assertive. In the nuclear domain, Iran appears to have engaged with the P5+1 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action only to be punished, while serial offender Kim has been rewarded for his determined push towards proliferation.

In this context, the proliferation threshold has been lowered and the oft-discussed nuclear “domino effect” becomes more likely. The most widely discussed possibility is a single Middle Eastern state proliferating, and others quickly following, the most likely candidates being Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Turkey.

The internal characteristics of the Turkish state are also more conducive to proliferation. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can effectively rule by decree under new powers granted after the 2017 referendum and his 2018 re-election. Importantly, the 2016 coup attempt allowed him to purge the military and defence establishment of dissenting actors who could push back against dramatic strategic changes.

When combined, the new highly centralised authoritarian system, future access to a nuclear fuel cycle, large investment in delivery mechanisms, and an international system where proliferation is rewarded make Turkey’s emergence as a nuclear state much more likely than in the past. Given international security is largely a game of deterrents, it is hard to picture a strategic environment where Turkey is not considering or planning the ability to proliferate in the near future if required.

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/turkey-must-be-thinking-bomb

one much more detailed analysis
Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons?

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898
 
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No matter what Turks say, we all know that without the bomb, Turkey is not a major military power. Not now, not ever. When your opponent has a weapon so powerful that can evaporate your major cities within seconds—no matter how fancy conventional tech you have, you will always be at a strategic loss.

Turkish leadership should have all this in mind.
 
. . .
Yes Turkey does need nukes. Especially in the region we are in. We are surrounded by enemies but these weapons also send a message to everybody not to mess with us.
 
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it is always difficult for any country in this world to acquire the bomb other then israel but once the county gets it its safety and security increases manifold. that country can only be attacked through fourth and fifth gen war and not by conventional war. the recent example of US and NK is the classical example after the abbotabad incident US made up their mind to attack pak but it was pak nuclear capability that made them to change their mind.
 
.
Actors not invested in the Western liberal order are enjoying a period of resurgence. While analysts chase meaning in US President Donald Trump’s many erratic policies, there are some threads of consistency, including his affection for strongmen and his scepticism about the existing economic and security orders. Whether this is by design or incompetence is debatable, but it has incentivised a range of once off-limits security policies particularly of interest to those with a dictatorial bent.

The contrast between the international political climate of 2015 and the present is hard to understate.

The policy with the most profound long-term implications is Trump’s embrace of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who has effectively been rewarded for his family’s nuclear ambitions. Until recently, nuclear aspirants were more likely to end up on the gallows (Saddam Hussein) or bayoneted in ditches (Muammar Gaddafi). Yet in 2018, Kim has used his nuclear capability to obtain a degree of legitimacy in exchange for few concessions or concrete commitments.

This reintroduction of nuclear weapons as a legitimate security currency emboldens potential proliferators, presenting a challenge to one of the key norms of international politics. Turkey is one of many actors who will be watching carefully. There are strong incentives for a nuclear pathway given Turkey’s vulnerabilities and strategic position.

Turkey has historically eschewed a nuclear program because it already housed nuclear weapons: the US has stationed missiles there since 1959. As part of NATO agreements, an estimated 50 B61 bombs still remain on Turkish soil at Incirlik Air Base, in the country’s south, as a deterrence measure.

But Trump’s disdain for NATO threatens this arrangement. In fact, a 2015 Carnegie paper assessing Turkey’s nuclear posture argued that the most probable scenario under which Turkey would seek nuclear weapons would be a collapse of its relationships with NATO and the US.

A variety of actors have an interest in Turkey losing its proxy nuclear deterrent. Russia has embraced Ankara as a defence partner, selling it the S-400 missile shield which hedges against total NATO dependence. Both Iran and Syria would welcome the removal of nuclear weapons from Incirlik, as it would reduce the US security presence in the region.

There are signs that Turkey has contingency plans for the removal of weapons too, demonstrated by their pursuit of nuclear latency: the material and technical capabilities to produce weapons within a short time frame should the need should arise.

A first piece of evidence is Turkey’s consistent pursuit of nuclear energy, which would enable the establishment of a fuel cycle to manufacture weapons. Ankara first began pursuing nuclear power in the 1970s, but these efforts were disbanded after Pakistan’s controversial nuclear test in 1998. Turkey then held concerns that any nuclear activity might be problematic for their attempts to join the EU following widespread criticism of Islamabad.

This reticence has changed in the current international environment. Work recently commenced on the Akkuyu nuclear station on the Mediterranean Coast. The station interests strategic analysts for a variety of reasons: it has a quick build time – five years compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency – recommended 10–15 years; and it will be the first nuclear station ever built under a BOO (Buy Own Operate) model. The contractor is the Russian company Rosatom, and operations, ownership of processes, and inspection regimes are legislatively unclear under the BOO model.

The second piece of evidence is the increasing speed of Turkey’s indigenous ballistic missile program and associated defence products. The first fully indigenous missile, the KAAN, developed by state company ROKETAN, was demonstrated in April 2017. Its development coincided with an increase of 39% in domestic defence development from 2016–17.

Others have highlighted Ankara’s thinly veiled aspirations to proliferate, but assert Turkey lacks material capabilities and that claims should be viewed in a domestic context. For example, former parliamentarian Aykan Erdemir has argued that “Erdogan has a strong desire to make Turkey into a nuclear power, but not the capacity,” and that the “pro–government media often exaggerate the strength of the military to increase morale in Turkey”.*

Mark Hibbs’s excellent article is also highly sceptical about this sort of evidence and the evolution of a Turkish nuclear program. Hibbs cited a deficit of necessary technology as well as the safeguards put in place by the IAEA, which has found no evidence of clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities during its reporting processes.

But while Hibbs’s points are strongly made, his analysis predated Trump’s election. The contrast between the international political climate of 2015 and the present is hard to understate.

In 2018, NATO looks fractured and the Western normative order is potentially in decline. Russia is revitalised and assertive. In the nuclear domain, Iran appears to have engaged with the P5+1 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action only to be punished, while serial offender Kim has been rewarded for his determined push towards proliferation.

In this context, the proliferation threshold has been lowered and the oft-discussed nuclear “domino effect” becomes more likely. The most widely discussed possibility is a single Middle Eastern state proliferating, and others quickly following, the most likely candidates being Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Turkey.

The internal characteristics of the Turkish state are also more conducive to proliferation. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can effectively rule by decree under new powers granted after the 2017 referendum and his 2018 re-election. Importantly, the 2016 coup attempt allowed him to purge the military and defence establishment of dissenting actors who could push back against dramatic strategic changes.

When combined, the new highly centralised authoritarian system, future access to a nuclear fuel cycle, large investment in delivery mechanisms, and an international system where proliferation is rewarded make Turkey’s emergence as a nuclear state much more likely than in the past. Given international security is largely a game of deterrents, it is hard to picture a strategic environment where Turkey is not considering or planning the ability to proliferate in the near future if required.

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/turkey-must-be-thinking-bomb

one much more detailed analysis
Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons?

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898

The propaganda to try to turn Turkey into Iran begins. Also interesting that this is written by someone left wing, given the way they omit Obama's nuclear deal with Iran.

Edit: yep, it's the same institute that runs the left wing propaganda house here in Australia called The Conversation.
 
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Must have the Bomb to get peace of mind and respect.
Peace of mind can be achieved by the bomb but not international respect.
The best example of this is North Korea.
 
.
No matter what Turks say, we all know that without the bomb, Turkey is not a major military power. Not now, not ever. When your opponent has a weapon so powerful that can evaporate your major cities within seconds—no matter how fancy conventional tech you have, you will always be at a strategic loss.

Turkish leadership should have all this in mind.

We should build a ozon layer destroying bomb that would kill everything on the planet

Or additionally station 20x one tone solid metal near venus and then let it fly to earth we need unconditional thinking

Or releasing 500 tons of 100 different genetic modified deadly viruses
Yeah let's wipe out whole earth
 
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That boat sailed long time ago. Turkey will be on receiving end of some really horrible proxy war as soon as it decide to tread this path. Pakistan has suffered a lot both in terms of finance and human loses to get where it is now with regards to its nuke capability.

Best option would be to work with Pakistan for some sort of nuke umbrella.
 
.
The propaganda to try to turn Turkey into Iran begins. Also interesting that this is written by someone left wing, given the way they omit Obama's nuclear deal with Iran.

Edit: yep, it's the same institute that runs the left wing propaganda house here in Australia called The Conversation.

ok. But National Interest is consevative outlet. Nevermind the articles, I just used em as a means, to start a discusion about the subject. To give a bit of background. Lets put them aside. What are yout thoughts bro about the subject, woud you support Turkeys nuclear ambition, does Turkey need a bomb in yout opinion ?

That boat sailed long time ago. Turkey will be on receiving end of some really horrible proxy war as soon as it decide to tread this path. Pakistan has suffered a lot both in terms of finance and human loses to get where it is now with regards to its nuke capability.

Best option would be to work with Pakistan for some sort of nuke umbrella.

Turkey already has similiar deal with NATO (US).
Pakistan may be only come to play as a secret parner in a secret turkish nuclear program. ( cause lets face it, if turkey has indeed such plans, they will not go public with it. maybe in the end some strange eathquake like detection under some of the turkish mountain would be the way to hint it to the world) At least that would nbe my guess.
 
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In a IDEAL world NO ONE should have it.
In a INSANE world EVERYONE should have it.

Now its your call on which world you want to live and leave behind for your children.

Not everyone. I disqualify myself in advance of such opportunity. If I had it, I woud nuke Portugal twice in last 5 years. ( over tw0o World/Euro Cup qualifying play-off losses ) lol.
 
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The reason Turkey needs a long range ballistic platform and a capable nuclear warhead to go with it is the same reason she can't have it. We only need this kind of deterrent against the US and Russia. Neither will sit on their hands as soon as we even try and develop a system like this. Proxy wars / conventional wars with 3rd party actors, you name it - it will happen.

The warhead part isn't even that hard, you need decent fuel and that can be accomplished with the new nuclear reactors.

The hard part is the ballistic missile, it needs many different kinds of tech as well as launch sites to test out early models. Turkey lacks most of these technologies and it would take a very long time to develop a proper ballistic BUS system (which would be the only deterrent against the US).

Major world powers won't wait until we develop a nuclear warhead, they'll intervene as soon as we decide to go for a 5000km+ ballistic platform.

So realistically, until Turkey is a VERY strong international actor that no one close to her dare not touch - we can't start this program. We need a huge military deterrence force, strong enough to stop Greece + Armenia + Syria + possibly Iran even think of an attack even if together (that alone is very hard to obtain).

Then we need to be a major world class country and western style democracy so no one can impose sanctions or military interventions with a straight face - like Spain for example.

And to be honest, when you're at that level you don't REALLY need nuclear deterrence anymore.

Like the Pakistani bro said a few posts up - we missed that boat, in this climate it's suicide to develop a ballistic nuclear weapon if you need it. And if you're in the position to be able to develop one, chances are you don't need it.
 
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