I wonder why the F-35 is 4th? It's a $400 billion lemon! Beset with insurmountable problems, many countries have/are cancelling their orders. The per unit cost is also escalating in geometric proportion.
The much-vaunted ‘fifth-generation’ capabilities are not only a misnomer; they are, in fact, much inflated if not over-hyped. First of all, today’s F-35 can barely fly, so all of its claimed ‘capabilities’ actually refer to what it might eventually achieve IF its development program is entirely successful which, given its history over the past decade, is far from certain.
US Air Force generals, the Canadian Auditor-General and the Rand Corporation provide shorter, boiled-down definitions of what ‘fifth-gen’ is supposed to mean than what’s included in Lockheed martin’s web site.
From these definitions, it appears that what makes a so-called ‘fifth-gen’ fighter is a combination of:
-- stealth;
-- high maneuverability;
-- advanced avionics;
-- networked data fusion from sensors and avionics; and
-- the ability to assume multiple roles.
That doesn’t really sound like much of a return for a $400 billion investment, and even less so once one realizes that most of these capabilities are already in service today. In fact, once its magic P.R. cloak is stripped away, ‘fifth-gen’ looks a lot less impressive than it sounds.
Here’s a reality check on how these so-called ‘fifth-generation’ capabilities compare to what’s already available today:
Stealth: The F-35’s low radar cross-section and radar-absorbent surface coatings (i.e., paint) make it more difficult to detect by radar, but they do not make it invisible. In any case, detection by radar matters less and less because by switching on its radar a fighter becomes as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room.
So the preferred detection sensors are optical, like Infra-Red Scan and Track (IRST), and in this case the large and very hot exhaust plume of the F-35’s 45,000-lb thrust engine is as visible as a blowtorch in the same dark room!
Furthermore, the F-35 will only be stealthy if it carries nothing under its wings. This means no pylons, so no gun (except for the F-35A, which has an internal gun); no extra fuel tanks; and no large weapons, as the small dimensions of its
two bomb bays allow internal carriage of only two Amraam missiles and two JDAM guided bombs. That is not an impressive weapon load for an aircraft that is intended to penetrate ever-more formidable ‘growing anti-access, area-denial capabilities’ in hostile territory.
A final word on the F-35’s stealth: its design makes it less detectable by radar in its frontal sector, but not from the side, nor from the rear, where the laws of physics dictate it will be easier to detect than face-on.
The JSF operational concept is that this won’t matter, since enemy ground defenses will be taken out at stand-off ranges, before they can detect incoming F-35s.
But taken out with what: the two bombs each F-35 can carry?
High Maneuverability:
Contrary to some existing aircraft, the F-35 has no special maneuverability-enhancing design features such as canard forward surfaces, vectoring nozzles or ‘supercruise’ capabilities that exist on other fighters already in service. Its thrust-to-weight ratio is limited and unlikely to improve since the
F135 engine has limited growth potential.
Advanced Avionics:
Full sensor fusion and networking capability already exist, and was notably demonstrated in combat by French Rafales and Royal Air Force Typhoons during the 2011 operations in Libya. This is a capability that the F-35 will deliver at the turn of the decade, if all goes well, so it is hardly revolutionary.
The pilot’s
Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS) stubbornly refuses to work despite a decade of design and testing. The Pentagon’s Quick-Look Review (QLR), leaked late last year, rated the HMDS a
‘program-level high development risk’ because it is
plagued by faulty displays, night vision and image jitters, and latency issues: in short, it is not fit for purpose.
One of many things the F-35 should but can’t do: its HMDS helmet
is designed to project flight data and night vision imagery onto the pilot’s
helmet visor, but it just doesn’t work, and there’s no head-up display as
back-up. (JSF PO photo)
So dire is the situation, in fact, that Lockheed has asked BAE Systems to adapt its existing Eurofighter helmet display as an interim solution.
This leads to a much bigger problem: since the HMDS was going to provide all the information that the pilot would ever need, no Head-Up Display was fitted to the F-35. So if whatever helmet display is finally selected cannot provide the same functionalities as HMDS, F-35 pilots will end up having inferior, ‘old-generation’ situational awareness, which is somewhat ironical given what the F-35 promised.
Data Fusion:
Again, the idea of fusing data from all on-board sensors is nothing new, as it has been operational for several years on the latest European fighters, Rafale and Typhoon. If, in a decade, the F-35 enters service with a modern data fusion capability, any improvement in terms of data fusion will be a matter of degree, not of nature.
Multirole Capability:
There is no modern combat aircraft that doesn’t claim to be capable of carrying out multiple roles, but even legacy US fighters routinely carry out widely diverse missions: F-15C interceptor and F-15E multirole/strike; F-18E Super Hornet (Air-to-air; strike/attack and electronic attack), and of course the F-16, whose latest versions are far more capable strike aircraft than the lightweight interceptor it was initially designed to be.
So, again, there is nothing revolutionary in the capabilities the F-35 will bring to the party - a decade from now, if all goes well, and at a cost of
over $400 billion.
But there are considerable limitations to the F-35’s own vaunted multirole capabilities.
To remain stealthy, it can carry only internal weapons (two bombs and two air-to-missiles), which severely limits its combat firepower.
So, there it is. The much hyped fifth generation F-35 seems to be a disaster in the making. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the tax payers of the $400 billion spent on producing an aircraft that promises the world but in reality would be a legacy fighter by the time it enters operational service a decade from now.
In November 2011, a Pentagon study team identified the following 13 areas of concern that remained to be addressed in the F-35:
The helmet-mounted display system does not work properly.
The fuel dump subsystem poses a fire hazard.
The Integrated Power Package is unreliable and difficult to service.
The F-35C's arresting hook does not work.
Classified "survivability issues", which have been speculated to be about stealth.
The wing buffet is worse than previously reported.
The airframe is unlikely to last through the required lifespan.
The flight test program has yet to explore the most challenging areas.
The software development is behind schedule.
The aircraft is in danger of going overweight or, for the F-35B, not properly balanced for VTOL operations.
There are
multiple thermal management problems. The air conditioner fails to keep the pilot and controls cool enough, the roll posts on the F-35B overheat, and using the afterburner damages the aircraft.
The automated logistics information system is partially developed.
The lightning protection on the F-35 is uncertified, with areas of concern.
I feel the F-35 should not even be in the list of top 10 FGFA profects!