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http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/09/11/1967222/chinas-anti-corruption-trillions/
China’s anti-corruption trillions
David Keohane Comment | Share
Some thoughts from Nomura a little while back on where exactly all of this anti-corruption cash being swept up in China on the orders of Xi Jinping might end up.
Potentially, in the coffers of local and central government:
Our anecdotal checks reveal that for cases involving cooperation among various local and central governments, distribution of any recovered funds has largely been based on negotiation among the governments involved.
… a billion here, a billion there
In the Report on the Work of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (8 May 2014), the government disclosed that there were 2,581 corruption cases valued at CNY1mn or above in 2013, resulting in recovery of CNY10.14bn in illegal proceeds. Reuters reported on 30 Mar 2014 that Chinese authorities had seized assets valued at at least CNY90bn related to the Zhou Yongkang case. Oriental Daily reported on 1 Jul 2014 that Xu Caihou had turned in CNY1bn-plus of illegal proceeds and may have another HKD10bn tucked away in Hong Kong. We note that reported corruption cases have occurred in some well-oiled sectors, including the military, coal, energy and utilities. With Beijing expanding investigations into local governments’ past land sales and the financial space, on top of the SOEs, total seized assets will likely rise. Hypothetically, if 3% of China’s GDP since 1995 went to corruption, this would total CNY4tn, assuming the amount was compounded at the modest PBOC 1-year benchmark savings rate and a 25% recovery rate. We note the actual amount could be even higher considering the decade-long bull market in various assets.
So, perhaps the LGFV risk is not so unmanageable after all?
While the distribution of seized illegal gains among central and local governments would be subject to technicalities, we are talking about a lot of money that could help to fix quite a few problems. China’s fiscal income was CNY12.9tn and fiscal deficit was CNY1.1tn in 2013. As of end-June 2013, the balances of China’s local government funding vehicle (LGFV) and local government debt were estimated at CNY7tn and CNY10.9tn, according to the National Audit Office. While family members have been allowed to retain illegal proceeds in cases where the official(s) involved are deceased or out of jurisdication, we expect tougher efforts by Beijing to seize all illegal gains under the new Code of Criminal Procedure effective in 2013, the Ministry of Public Security’s “Fox Hunting 2014” project and the APEC anti-corruption network established in August 2014.
We have no idea if this will come to pass — or, if it does, how big a risk there is that local governments will respond to this incentive in dangerous ways.
But it does paint a very direct picture of the reform battle (maybe) being waged at the top levels in China. As Michael Pettis has said many times before, “what will largely determine the path China follows is the political struggle the Xi administration will have in imposing the needed reforms on an elite that will strongly resist these reforms – mainly of course because these reforms must necessarily come at their expense.”
The above (and yes the obvious caveats about the drivers behind this anti-corruption drive apply — there remains no guarantee this isn’t an exercise in control, in the absence of real reform) would be a pleasingly streamlined example. Just need to find one for those who gained via the system rather than through corruption directly next.
China’s anti-corruption trillions
David Keohane Comment | Share
Some thoughts from Nomura a little while back on where exactly all of this anti-corruption cash being swept up in China on the orders of Xi Jinping might end up.
Potentially, in the coffers of local and central government:
Our anecdotal checks reveal that for cases involving cooperation among various local and central governments, distribution of any recovered funds has largely been based on negotiation among the governments involved.
… a billion here, a billion there
In the Report on the Work of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (8 May 2014), the government disclosed that there were 2,581 corruption cases valued at CNY1mn or above in 2013, resulting in recovery of CNY10.14bn in illegal proceeds. Reuters reported on 30 Mar 2014 that Chinese authorities had seized assets valued at at least CNY90bn related to the Zhou Yongkang case. Oriental Daily reported on 1 Jul 2014 that Xu Caihou had turned in CNY1bn-plus of illegal proceeds and may have another HKD10bn tucked away in Hong Kong. We note that reported corruption cases have occurred in some well-oiled sectors, including the military, coal, energy and utilities. With Beijing expanding investigations into local governments’ past land sales and the financial space, on top of the SOEs, total seized assets will likely rise. Hypothetically, if 3% of China’s GDP since 1995 went to corruption, this would total CNY4tn, assuming the amount was compounded at the modest PBOC 1-year benchmark savings rate and a 25% recovery rate. We note the actual amount could be even higher considering the decade-long bull market in various assets.
So, perhaps the LGFV risk is not so unmanageable after all?
While the distribution of seized illegal gains among central and local governments would be subject to technicalities, we are talking about a lot of money that could help to fix quite a few problems. China’s fiscal income was CNY12.9tn and fiscal deficit was CNY1.1tn in 2013. As of end-June 2013, the balances of China’s local government funding vehicle (LGFV) and local government debt were estimated at CNY7tn and CNY10.9tn, according to the National Audit Office. While family members have been allowed to retain illegal proceeds in cases where the official(s) involved are deceased or out of jurisdication, we expect tougher efforts by Beijing to seize all illegal gains under the new Code of Criminal Procedure effective in 2013, the Ministry of Public Security’s “Fox Hunting 2014” project and the APEC anti-corruption network established in August 2014.
We have no idea if this will come to pass — or, if it does, how big a risk there is that local governments will respond to this incentive in dangerous ways.
But it does paint a very direct picture of the reform battle (maybe) being waged at the top levels in China. As Michael Pettis has said many times before, “what will largely determine the path China follows is the political struggle the Xi administration will have in imposing the needed reforms on an elite that will strongly resist these reforms – mainly of course because these reforms must necessarily come at their expense.”
The above (and yes the obvious caveats about the drivers behind this anti-corruption drive apply — there remains no guarantee this isn’t an exercise in control, in the absence of real reform) would be a pleasingly streamlined example. Just need to find one for those who gained via the system rather than through corruption directly next.