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To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t Be Stopping Soon

I find you to be a very rational American. If all Americans are like you, there is no reason we can't be friend with each other. The like the concept of "power equilibrium" that makes both our great nation easy to predict and avoid clash. Xi proposed something similar to this.

I appreciate it, and feel the same. The China section is my favorite section on PDF, because I can have rational and informative discussions with level-headed individuals like you here. There are some bad apples that I've had to put on my ignore list, but on average, the quality of posters here is far higher than in the other sections of PDF, in my humble opinion.

It's a strange thing. I am a full-spectrum conservative as far as the US definition goes (economic, defense, social, cultural), but I see in China a society that reflects my values (on the whole) and one with which I can identify far more easily than the liberal-progressive axis of evil that is the US Democratic Party. I truly believe that when we finally have adults who occupy the White House and the Congress, we can get down to business, which is what most people really care about. We, as a country, care about jobs, the economy, and cost of living. We also like to defend our values. When none of those issues are involved (e.g. oil drilling in the SCS in areas disputed by countries that are not our allies), I see nothing standing between the US and China.

Many users on here talk about China vs. the US, or China and Russia vs. the US and everyone else, or containment, or the Thucydides Trap. But my long-term bet is on China and the US vs. everyone else, because it makes the most business sense for both of us. It would be great if we could depend on China to take care of its backyard, while we take care of ours, and then just concentrate on getting rich.

It's something of a motto for me at this point, but: what's not to like?
 
OK, I guess we've reached an impasse, since from the US perspective, it doesn't matter whether or not Hu was actually surprised, what matters is that he appeared to be surprised. Perhaps Hu had full control all along and was playing some kind of coy mind-game ("I'm surprised, but not really" and "I invited you here to build trust, now accept this spit in your face") to amuse himself, but the message that the US received was that Hu didn't have full control over his military.

In any case, I think we're beating a dead horse at this point.

Agreed, just let it go.
 
I appreciate it, and feel the same. The China section is my favorite section on PDF, because I can have rational and informative discussions with level-headed individuals like you here. There are some bad apples that I've had to put on my ignore list, but on average, the quality of posters here is far higher than in the other sections of PDF, in my humble opinion.

It's a strange thing. I am a full-spectrum conservative as far as the US definition goes (economic, defense, social, cultural), but I see in China a society that reflects my values (on the whole) and one with which I can identify far more easily than the liberal-progressive axis of evil that is the US Democratic Party. I truly believe that when we finally have adults who occupy the White House and the Congress, we can get down to business, which is what most people really care about. We, as a country, care about jobs, the economy, and cost of living. We also like to defend our values. When none of those issues are involved (e.g. oil drilling in the SCS in areas disputed by countries that are not our allies), I see nothing standing between the US and China.

Many users on here talk about China vs. the US, or China and Russia vs. the US and everyone else, or containment, or the Thucydides Trap. But my long-term bet is on China and the US vs. everyone else, because it makes the most business sense for both of us. It would be great if we could depend on China to take care of its backyard, while we take care of ours, and then just concentrate on getting rich.

It's something of a motto for me at this point, but: what's not to like?
Really appreciated your understanding of our country development, people, and interest. It is true that we have very few conflict of interest and many shared interest to safeguard. We both want freedom to do business. Competition is good for all. Many of our conflicts are small issue that easily can resolved through diplomatic channel and negotiation, which is the method we prefer btw. Any small issues are caused by non-relevant party trying to stir trouble for US-China relation so they gain leverage in dispute talk. In fact, we are like a couple that can't afford to divorce because we have responsibility in this world (children).

We hope a strong level-headed American leadership can guide China-US relation back.
 
Join the dark side... or challenge me.

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I appreciate it, and feel the same. The China section is my favorite section on PDF, because I can have rational and informative discussions with level-headed individuals like you here. There are some bad apples that I've had to put on my ignore list, but on average, the quality of posters here is far higher than in the other sections of PDF, in my humble opinion.

It's a strange thing. I am a full-spectrum conservative as far as the US definition goes (economic, defense, social, cultural), but I see in China a society that reflects my values (on the whole) and one with which I can identify far more easily than the liberal-progressive axis of evil that is the US Democratic Party. I truly believe that when we finally have adults who occupy the White House and the Congress, we can get down to business, which is what most people really care about. We, as a country, care about jobs, the economy, and cost of living. We also like to defend our values. When none of those issues are involved (e.g. oil drilling in the SCS in areas disputed by countries that are not our allies), I see nothing standing between the US and China.

Many users on here talk about China vs. the US, or China and Russia vs. the US and everyone else, or containment, or the Thucydides Trap. But my long-term bet is on China and the US vs. everyone else, because it makes the most business sense for both of us. It would be great if we could depend on China to take care of its backyard, while we take care of ours, and then just concentrate on getting rich.

It's something of a motto for me at this point, but: what's not to like?

Yes, I feel like the same. Whether people like it or not, China and the US are interdependent on each other many sectors, China is already integrated into this system.
 
Yes, I feel like the same. Whether people like it or not, China and the US are interdependent on each other many sectors, China is already integrated into this system.

Harper Lecture with John J. Mearsheimer: Can China Rise Peacefully?

It's the strategic intent of the US that puts it in conflict with China. Whether economic integration would be the deciding factor is really questionable.
 
Yes, the economic integration is not perfect, China is not well fitted into this system right now, to defend the current interest China got and to guarantee the persistence of long-term goal , China has to be the world policy maker, that's where the conflict comes from, just look at who made the current world rules.
 
Nothing we haven't already discussed, but as @cnleio 's friend Darth Vader might say: impressive, most impressive.

How the hammer falls as China nails corruption - MarketWatch

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Caixin Online

July 25, 2014, 1:22 a.m. EDT

How the hammer falls as China nails corruption
Millions flock to website for news on the next official to fall
By Gao Yu and Wang Heyan

BEIJING ( Caixin Online ) — Curiosity is one reason the website of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) attracts up to 2 million page views every day.


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Another reason is fear. Some website visitors, for example, want to know whether they or anyone they know has been targeted by a government campaign to root out corruption led by the CDIC Inspection Team.

Since the campaign began in December 2012, 33 high-level government and state company officials — all in positions at the deputy provincial level or higher — have come under investigation for violating laws or Communist Party rules. Each has been removed from office and detained. Some have been kicked out of the party.

Scores of executives, managers and bureaucrats on lower rungs of the ladder have been affected as well by the CDIC, which reports directly to party brass and functions outside the realm of the nation’s judicial system.

The campaign began shortly after the 18th National People’s Congress with the December 2, 2012, detention of Li Chuncheng. Li, who was then serving as a deputy party secretary for Sichuan Province, was taken into custody by CDIC officials less than a month after being named an alternate member to the party’s 205-member Central Committee.

In recent weeks, the campaign has intensified. Losing their jobs in June were Jiangxi Province party official Zhao Zhiyong; China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Vice Chairman Su Rong; Shanxi Province Deputy Governor Du Shanxue; Shanxi Province CPPCC Vice Chairman Ling Zhengce; and Guangzhou’s party secretary, Wan Qingliang.

Perhaps the most powerful party official to fall in recent weeks was Xu Caihou, who served on the 25-member Politburo and as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, the party’s highest authority on the military.

No one knows for sure who might fall next, which makes the website — 中央纪委监察部网站 — a must for anyone following the anti-corruption crackdown. These followers include members of the general public, ardent campaign supporters and a few cautious critics.

The critics include some party members who fear the CDIC may be going too far. Some of them argue that the crackdown could threaten everyday operations at targeted companies, the nation’s economy and even government stability in China.

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Anxiety is running high, for example, at the state-run oil company China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), where chief accountant Wen Qingshan was placed under investigation in December and deputy general manager Bo Qiliang was probed in May.

Previously removed were more than a dozen executives, including top officials such as the company’s petroleum planning department general manager Wu Mei, Indonesia operations general manager Wei Zhigang, and Iran operations general manager Zhang Benquan. Other CNPC executives axed since 2012 included Wang Yongchun, Li Hualin, Ran Xinquan and Wang Daofu.

CNPC sources said that high-level managers are so worried about these investigations that they have drawn up a contingency plan for filling any position left vacant after a CDIC inspection. As part of the plan, all mid- to upper-level company managers must contact department heads daily. Anyone who does not report is considered gone, and replaced the next day by a pre-approved successor.

Going too far?
Amid the anxiety at CNPC, other state companies and government agencies in the bull’s eye of CDIC inspectors, some officials have asked whether it might be time for the campaign to slow down, easing the pressure on the nation’s party members.

These go-slow voices include party supporters who worry that the campaign could tarnish the public’s view of the government and party. Others wonder whether the campaign is hurting economic growth and the productivity of officials, some of whom are laying low in hopes of avoiding the inspectors.

“The shock created by the anti-corruption campaign inside and outside the party is unprecedented,” said Professor Cai Xia of the Central Party School’s Party Construction Education and Research Department. “The shock and deterrence it has exerted on the thinking of cadres is also unprecedented. It’s evident that, at this point, very few cadres are risking any violations of party discipline rules.”

But supporters of the campaign point to its necessity at this stage of China’s modernization — and its long-term benefits.

One source close to the CDIC said most of the corrupt activity uncovered in government agencies was related to sales of government-owned land, mine development and transportation infrastructure projects. State-owned enterprises have been implicated in underhanded schemes involving project bidding, equipment procurement and overseas acquisitions.

“These areas just happened to be at the center of gravity during China’s high-speed urbanization and industrialization era,” the source said. “No nation has ever been able to avoid paying this kind of price during such a period. Not Britain, the United States, South Korea or Japan. This period is always rife with corruption.”

Corruption among China’s officials is hurting economic growth, said Andrew Wedeman, a political science professor at Georgia State University. Corrupt authorities use their power to deprive the marketplace of money, he said, so an economy subject to discretionary power opens doors to corruption.

Graft distorts pricing and resource allocation, impeding the quality of economic development. It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which it has harmed the soft environment of economic development, such as social psychology and governance systems.

“Bringing corruption under control requires rules and regulations,” Wedeman said. “But it also requires developing a culture in which officials do not think about using their power for private gain. And that is a very slow, frustrating process.”

Arduous struggle
CDIC General Secretary Wang Qishan, who began his term last year just as the campaign was getting under way, described the government’s anti-corruption strategy this way: “We must be deeply aware of the long-term nature, complexity and arduousness of the struggle to build a party-style, honest government and oppose corruption,” he said at a 2013 conference.

“We must persist in treating both the symptoms and the root causes” of corruption, Wang said. “The current crackdown is to win time for the therapy to solve fundamental problems.”

Some see the campaign and the government’s latest market reforms, such as the effort to find private investors for certain state-company assets, as two sides of the same coin. They point to the broad theme of reform pushed by President Xi Jinping since he took office in late 2012.

Ren Jianming, a public management professor at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, said the campaign “has been an important safeguard and has provided support for efforts to reform the political and economic systems.” He called it “a breakthrough for reforming the political and economic systems.”

Over the past year, Ren said, the crackdown has proven to be a useful deterrent against corruption. “If this continues,” he said, “we can expect corruption will be under control.”

A lot of challenges have yet to be overcome, Ren said. “A great deal of work is still needed to implement deep institutional and systemic reforms, to eradicate the causes of corruption and to get rid of the dirt in which corruption grows,” he said. “Macro reforms to the political system, state governance modernization, power structure reforms and democratic governance are all very difficult.

“At the micro level, there is major resistance to beginning substantive reforms in areas rife with corruption.”

The party’s Central Committee has entrusted the CDIC, whose inspection-team unit dates to 2003, to follow an anti-graft strategy spelled out in a December 2013 document.

Inspectors dig up evidence of wrongdoing and report to superiors at the CDIC. Suspicious activity involving high-level officials may be reported to the party’s central leaders or even President Xi, who is also the party’s general secretary.

The document called for stopping graft’s spread by “building a system for punishing and preventing corruption, and continuing to put pressure on efforts to punish” dirty officials. It also urged “preventing corruption by strengthening institutional innovations and guarantees; improving the party discipline system by improving the way incidents about leaders and cadres are reported; promoting programs through public institutions related to newly appointed leaders and cadres; establishing administrative procedures for officials whose spouses work abroad; and also reforming inspection agencies connected to local governments.”

On June 30, the Politburo took another step by approving reforms to the CDIC system and leadership. Cai said the move is designed to strengthen the anti-graft campaign. “A mere internal purge is not enough” to control corruption, he said. What is really needed is a system for strengthening the CDIC’s authority and functions.

The Politburo’s action “will strengthen the CDIC’s autonomy and reduce interference,” Cai said. “But we still must develop intra-party democracy” so that “intra-party authorities can operate publicly and transparently, [and] party members can supervise leaders and cadres.”

‘Everyone was stupefied’
In the run-up to the crackdown, authorities in early 2012 deposed former Politburo member and Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai, who was convicted of bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power and is now serving a life sentence. Party inspectors then looked closely at officials in Sichuan, such as Li Chuncheng, and executives at CNPC.

At a July 2012 meeting of CNPC executives in Chengdu, then-chairman Jiang Jiemin set ambitious goals for stepping up oil and gas field development in the region. Attending was the soon-to-be-sacked Li and other CDIC targets, including CNPC executives and provincial legislature Standing Committee Deputy Director Guo Yongxiang.

A few months later, Li, Jiang and Wang Yongchun were picked as alternate members of the party’s 18th Central Committee. A few weeks after that, Li was ousted. A source said that as investigators approached Li, he tried to get rid of his mobile-phone SIM card.

Reportedly, officials started probing Li for his ties to a real-estate project near Chengdu after getting a tip from someone with links to the city’s party organization and government.

Li was charged with helping a hometown acquaintance named Shi Zhenhua win a contract worth tens of millions of yuan to renovate the Chengdu government conference center and party building. Shi also got a good deal on a parcel of commercial land sold by the government.

The Li investigation led anti-graft officials to several other well-known business and government officials in the region.

For example, one of China’s richest men, Wang Junlin, then chairman of Sichuan liquor producer Langjiu Group Co., was taken into custody. Authorities also deposed Li Chongxi, the chairman of the province’s political advisory body.

Li Chongxi’s fall in December 2013 was especially shocking in Sichuan’s political circles. He had been a long-standing party member who ranked higher than Li Chuncheng and was considered untouchable.

“The realms of politics and business in Sichuan have undergone a great purge,” said a Sichuan official who asked not to be named.

The closer investigators looked at corruption in Sichuan, the more dirty business they found, until eventually party investigators working with the National Audit Office (NAO) turned their attention to CNPC, which is closely linked to the Sichuan government.

“Colluding politicians and businessmen are everywhere,” a CDIC official said. “But the situation in Sichuan, where with one tug a long thread can be pulled out, is unique.”

Wang Yongchun’s detention was announced through the official Xinhua News Agency in August 2013. Days later, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) disciplinary commission announced a probe of CNPC’s then-deputy general manager Li Hualin, and the company’s chief geologist and exploration institute director Wang Daofu.

Others in the state-run oil sector targeted in the corruption crackdown included Ran Xinquan, who was state-run PetroChina’s vice president and general manager of its Changqing oilfield subsidiary; China Huayou Group general manager Wang Wencang; and China National United Oil Corp. party secretary Shen Dingcheng.

“Everybody was stupefied” by the sweep of top oil executives and Sichuan party leaders, said a mid-level CNPC manager.

Executives across the industry, especially those who had dealings with people targeted, began looking over their shoulders as well. The CDIC made watching easier by launching the website in September 2013.

Investigators have since focused on CNPC operations in the Daqing and Changqing oilfields, as well as the company’s overseas branches. Hundreds of CNPC cadres have been questioned in the course of the probe.

Financial records experts from NAO have helped the CDIC’s “hunt tigers and swat flies” movement, as the anti-corruption campaign has been called. NAO inspectors helped bring down CNPC’s Jiang after he joined SASAC, as well as Guo Zhenxi, director of the finance and economics channel at state-run broadcaster CCTV who was detained in early June on suspicion of bribery.

Jiang was audited shortly after leaving CNPC for a new job as head of SASAC. Inspectors looked at his records from the previous decade at the oil company, extending the usual seven-year span for such probes, according to a CNPC source.

The audit’s findings were discussed at a June 2013 meeting between NAO and CNPC officials. Auditors had found numerous party rule infractions tied to Jiang, Wang Yongchun, Li Hualin, Ran Xinquan, Wang Daofu and others.

The NAO followed-up on the CNPC probe by dispatching hundreds of auditors to examine the books at government-owned energy concerns including State Grid Corp. and China Power Investment Corp.

The NAO released 17 documents in June 2013 describing problems at several state-owned companies and government agencies. In all, these findings led to various forms of discipline targeting 190 executives at 11 companies owned by the central government.

Three months later, state media said Jiang, 58, had been found guilty of violating party rules and the law. He thus became the first member of the party’s Central Committee to fall since the campaign began.

Afterward, the investigation pace accelerated. Party congress meetings encouraged the faster pace, and the website helped spread the message.

The CDIC used the website to announce that former China Resources Group Chairman Song Lin was under investigation, one day after he claimed he was not a target. Former Shanxi Province vice governor Du Shanxue and Shanxi CPPCC vice chairman Ling Zhengce attended a public event on June 17, two days before their names appeared as suspects on the CDIC website.

News about the arrests of the Sichuan officials Su Rong and Li Chongxi, as well as a former deputy minister of the national public security agency, Li Dongsheng, appeared on the website the day after they were taken away. The arrest of a former party secretary for the city of Guangzhou, Wan Qingliang, was announced online that same day.

Up-to-date, sometimes real-time news about the anti-corruption campaign’s activity has given the public a window to the fast-moving anti-corruption movement. The names of fallen officials can be checked and compared. And if you don’t know anyone whose name appears on the website today, check back tomorrow.
 
A Key Move to Protect Courts in China - China Real Time Report - WSJ

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  • July 30, 2014, 2:45 PM HKT
A Key Move to Protect Courts in China
OB-QZ652_wukan3_G_20111214072553.jpg

Villagers in Wukan rebelled against local Communist Party officials after numerous efforts to reclaim illegally sold land failed in the court system.
Malcolm Moore/Telegraph
By Stanley Lubman

China’s Communist Party made two major announcements on Tuesday night: The first revealed that former security czar Zhou Yongkang was being investigated for “discipline violations.” The second, related to the first, was that rule of law would be the focus of the party’s annual conclave in October. The reputation and legality of China’s police, courts and prosecutors suffered during Zhou’s tenure as head of the country’s security apparatus. Legal reform plans already put on the table could help China to move past the Zhou era.

Earlier this month, Beijing released a 45-item list of legal reform goals, a significant aim of which is to reduce the influence of local government on local courts. Such an aim may seem modest, but if successful, it would mark an important step in addressing the weakness of rule of law in the country.

Earlier this month, authorities released a 45-item list of judicial reform goals, a significant aim of which is to reduce the influence of local government on local courts. Such an aim may seem modest, but if successful, it would mark an important step in addressing the weakness of rule of law in the country.

In China’s rural counties and municipal districts, the so-called “basic-level” (local) courts are courts of first instance with jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. As the official Xinhua news agencyhas noted, the finances and staffing of such courts are typically managed directly by the local government, “thus local officials can often influence court decisions in their jurisdictions.”

In the current system, local authorities have the power to appoint judges, as well as finance and supervise the courts and law-enforcement agencies. This enables local Communist Party officials to influence the outcomes of court decisions and the enforcement of judgments to favor local disputants.

The influence of the local Party on local courts has long been criticized. The Vice-Secretary of the Shanghai Law Society, commenting to Xinhua on the launching of the judicial reform in Shanghai pilot, recently said : “When the coin bags are held at the hands of the local governments, their independence will be affected, as they are prone to the lobbying of the local officials.”

More In Legal Reform
Proposed reforms aim to reduce this local interference by giving provincial-level judicial bodies the power to nominate judges for the basic-level courts and by financing the lower courts out of provincial budgets.

The idea behind the reform is a good one that could go much to improve the Chinese legal system’s ability to deliver justice. Whether it will work very much remains to be seen.

Local protectionism is a systemic defect in China’s governance that has been difficult to control because it exists from the provincial level on down. It is so pervasive that it is not possible to know how provincial officials will respond to the reform or whether they will encourage or impede lower-level reforms.

Examples abound of provincial-level interference in legal disputes. They are particularly numerous in cases involving illegal land takings, with lower level courts often ruling in favor of the government even when evidence rests overwhelmingly on the side of the original occupants. Such dynamics appear to have played a key role in the famous uprising in the village of Wukan, in Guangdong Province, were locals literally chased Communist Party leaders out of town for illegally selling their land. According to one report, “Villagers started with the courts, moving from low-level county courts, up to provincial courts, and then petitioning government authorities. Some eleven court cases later, after failing to achieve any legal recourse, local citizens took the law into their own hands by taking to the streets.”

Another example of local protectionism, this one outside the courts, recently exposed the ability of provincial power to subvert national law and policy. After resisting repeated calls from Beijing to reduce steel processing capacity and shutdown polluting blast furnaces, officials from Hebei recently produced a video showing 15 blast furnaces in Hebei being blown up. The move was supposed to reduce the province’s annual production of pollutants by almost half. On further inspection, the furnaces that were destroyed turned out to be so obsolete that they were not even counted as contributing to excess capacity; in fact the province’s capacity was not reduced.

The resistance of local governments—both at the provincial level and below– to increased environmental regulation is so great that the last judicial reform plan includes a specific proposal for the establishment of special tribunals for environmental cases. Why? As He Jiaorong, the head of the legal reform office of the Supreme People’s Court, told state-run media, special interests have been “especially pronounced” when it comes to avoiding legal action on environmental grounds.

Because the provincial as well as local governments have been able to resist the impact of national laws and policies, it is reasonable to wonder whether provincial governments—once they receive control over the local courts— will seek to influence the outcomes of legal disputes in the same manner that local governments have done.

The pilot programs are too new to allow conjecture or predictions of how they will enable true law reform and if the judiciary’s adherence to promoting and fulfilling the rule of law might evolve. The principle of ruling China under law is stated in the country’s constitution and has been reaffirmed repeatedly, including by President Xi Jinping, but Party policy remains supreme in practice. The focus on local protectionism is significant because if successful, it could reduce a major obstacle to strengthening the rule of law without directly challenging Party supremacy. No one can expect quick progress on reducing local protectionism, but the fact that there is a stated desire to reduce the links between local governments and the operation of the courts is at least promising.

How China’s anti-corruption drive works — Caixin explains - MarketWatch
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Caixin Online

July 30, 2014, 12:22 a.m. EDT

How China’s anti-corruption drive works — Caixin explains
By Guo Kai and James Bradbury

BEIJING ( Caixin Online ) — One of the most important tools the Communist Party is employing in its fight against corruption are little-known “inspection teams” that have links to the 205-member Central Committee.

Very little has been reported on these teams in the past, especially in English. Caixin gathered enough information from the website of Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) and government documents to begin painting a picture of the history of these teams, who staffs them and how they operate.

One point of confusion is the name itself. The public is used to reading about investigations by the CDIC and may know that the party’s anti-corruption watchdog has been carrying out investigations that have hit a broad range of industries and fields over the past 20 months — from the oil and media sectors to the government and military — since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the party in late 2012.

The bodies under the CDIC that conduct those investigations are called “jijian jiancha shi,” which literally translates to “discipline inspection and supervision offices.”

But the inspection teams under the Central Committee are different. They are called “zhongyang xunshi zu,” or “central inspection tour groups.”

This system was officially established in 2003, and it has been central to Xi’s anti-graft campaign.

Recent years have seen two rounds of inspection by these teams. The first of this year’s two rounds of inspections ended in May. The two rounds last year and two this year will cover all of the Chinese mainland’s 31 provinces, regions and municipalities.

The number of inspection teams varies from year to year, and this year there are 12. That is cause for a little more confusion because the CDIC has 12 investigation offices.

The members of the inspection teams are selected from a set of names from different government departments put forward by the Central Committee. Each team is led by an active or retired ministry-level official.

The teams report to the Inspection Work Leading Group, which is chaired by Wang Qishan, the party’s top anti-corruption official. Wang, a member of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, also leads the CDIC.

Unlike the CDIC, the inspection teams do not have the authority to conduct official party investigations themselves.

Instead, they are sent to local governments and other institutions to conduct routine inspections. The teams then report any wrongdoing they uncover to the CDIC for investigation. If top leaders are implicated, they may report the cases to Xi.

The teams use a variety of methods to look for evidence of graft. They listen to reports from local discipline bodies, participate in meetings and talk with officials. The teams also receive petitions from the public and try to gauge the public’s opinions of local leaders. They also dig into the functions of local governments, making inquiries about particular areas of concern and checking documents for evidence of violations.


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Common problems
These complaints were frequently cited by the teams in their reports on local governments after the first round of inspection work this year from March to May. The teams visited Beijing, Tianjin, Fujian, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Gansu, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang.

  • Extravagance and waste: Includes violations like keeping multiple homes and breaking regulations on use of official vehicles. Major problem in Tianjin, Liaoning, Shandong, Gansu, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Collusion and illegal bidding: Often involves cadres or family members bidding on state-sponsored construction projects or collusion between cadres and bidders. Major problem in Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Personnel problems: Includes exceeding a department’s allocated numbers of cadres and “promotions in spite of wrongdoing,” where cadres with discipline issues are promoted with the expectation of future benefits for the officials who approved the promotion. Major problem in Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Buying and selling official posts: An especially blatant form of corruption in itself, this practice also depends on the ability of officials who have purchased their posts to make that money back through more corruption. Major problem in Shandong and Henan

  • “Formalism”: Refers to a work style problem where cadres merely go through the motions – such as for an investigation – but do not pay attention to content. Major problem in Beijing and Tianjin

  • Problems with land requisition and demolition: Land sales are an important source of income for local governments, and an area prone to graft. Major problem in Fujian and Henan

  • Falsification of official records: Includes falsifying economic data and cadre records. Major problem in Liaoning and Shandong

  • Bribery: Taking, demanding and coercing bribes is a major kind of corruption. Major problem in Liaoning and Henan

  • “Lazy politics”: Refers to cadres evading responsibility by pushing their work off to other departments. Major problem in Tianjin

  • “Naked officials”: Cadres whose family members are living abroad or have foreign passports. Major problem in Fujian
Several senior officials have been placed under investigation by CDIC and other organs as a result of this year’s first round of inspections. This graphic shows some of the most prominent cases, along with excerpts from the reports published by CDIC for each municipality, province and region.
 
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A Key Move to Protect Courts in China - China Real Time Report - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • July 30, 2014, 2:45 PM HKT
A Key Move to Protect Courts in China
OB-QZ652_wukan3_G_20111214072553.jpg

Villagers in Wukan rebelled against local Communist Party officials after numerous efforts to reclaim illegally sold land failed in the court system.
Malcolm Moore/Telegraph
By Stanley Lubman

China’s Communist Party made two major announcements on Tuesday night: The first revealed that former security czar Zhou Yongkang was being investigated for “discipline violations.” The second, related to the first, was that rule of law would be the focus of the party’s annual conclave in October. The reputation and legality of China’s police, courts and prosecutors suffered during Zhou’s tenure as head of the country’s security apparatus. Legal reform plans already put on the table could help China to move past the Zhou era.

Earlier this month, Beijing released a 45-item list of legal reform goals, a significant aim of which is to reduce the influence of local government on local courts. Such an aim may seem modest, but if successful, it would mark an important step in addressing the weakness of rule of law in the country.

Earlier this month, authorities released a 45-item list of judicial reform goals, a significant aim of which is to reduce the influence of local government on local courts. Such an aim may seem modest, but if successful, it would mark an important step in addressing the weakness of rule of law in the country.

In China’s rural counties and municipal districts, the so-called “basic-level” (local) courts are courts of first instance with jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. As the official Xinhua news agencyhas noted, the finances and staffing of such courts are typically managed directly by the local government, “thus local officials can often influence court decisions in their jurisdictions.”

In the current system, local authorities have the power to appoint judges, as well as finance and supervise the courts and law-enforcement agencies. This enables local Communist Party officials to influence the outcomes of court decisions and the enforcement of judgments to favor local disputants.

The influence of the local Party on local courts has long been criticized. The Vice-Secretary of the Shanghai Law Society, commenting to Xinhua on the launching of the judicial reform in Shanghai pilot, recently said : “When the coin bags are held at the hands of the local governments, their independence will be affected, as they are prone to the lobbying of the local officials.”

More In Legal Reform
Proposed reforms aim to reduce this local interference by giving provincial-level judicial bodies the power to nominate judges for the basic-level courts and by financing the lower courts out of provincial budgets.

The idea behind the reform is a good one that could go much to improve the Chinese legal system’s ability to deliver justice. Whether it will work very much remains to be seen.

Local protectionism is a systemic defect in China’s governance that has been difficult to control because it exists from the provincial level on down. It is so pervasive that it is not possible to know how provincial officials will respond to the reform or whether they will encourage or impede lower-level reforms.

Examples abound of provincial-level interference in legal disputes. They are particularly numerous in cases involving illegal land takings, with lower level courts often ruling in favor of the government even when evidence rests overwhelmingly on the side of the original occupants. Such dynamics appear to have played a key role in the famous uprising in the village of Wukan, in Guangdong Province, were locals literally chased Communist Party leaders out of town for illegally selling their land. According to one report, “Villagers started with the courts, moving from low-level county courts, up to provincial courts, and then petitioning government authorities. Some eleven court cases later, after failing to achieve any legal recourse, local citizens took the law into their own hands by taking to the streets.”

Another example of local protectionism, this one outside the courts, recently exposed the ability of provincial power to subvert national law and policy. After resisting repeated calls from Beijing to reduce steel processing capacity and shutdown polluting blast furnaces, officials from Hebei recently produced a video showing 15 blast furnaces in Hebei being blown up. The move was supposed to reduce the province’s annual production of pollutants by almost half. On further inspection, the furnaces that were destroyed turned out to be so obsolete that they were not even counted as contributing to excess capacity; in fact the province’s capacity was not reduced.

The resistance of local governments—both at the provincial level and below– to increased environmental regulation is so great that the last judicial reform plan includes a specific proposal for the establishment of special tribunals for environmental cases. Why? As He Jiaorong, the head of the legal reform office of the Supreme People’s Court, told state-run media, special interests have been “especially pronounced” when it comes to avoiding legal action on environmental grounds.

Because the provincial as well as local governments have been able to resist the impact of national laws and policies, it is reasonable to wonder whether provincial governments—once they receive control over the local courts— will seek to influence the outcomes of legal disputes in the same manner that local governments have done.

The pilot programs are too new to allow conjecture or predictions of how they will enable true law reform and if the judiciary’s adherence to promoting and fulfilling the rule of law might evolve. The principle of ruling China under law is stated in the country’s constitution and has been reaffirmed repeatedly, including by President Xi Jinping, but Party policy remains supreme in practice. The focus on local protectionism is significant because if successful, it could reduce a major obstacle to strengthening the rule of law without directly challenging Party supremacy. No one can expect quick progress on reducing local protectionism, but the fact that there is a stated desire to reduce the links between local governments and the operation of the courts is at least promising.

How China’s anti-corruption drive works — Caixin explains - MarketWatch
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Caixin Online

July 30, 2014, 12:22 a.m. EDT

How China’s anti-corruption drive works — Caixin explains
By Guo Kai and James Bradbury

BEIJING ( Caixin Online ) — One of the most important tools the Communist Party is employing in its fight against corruption are little-known “inspection teams” that have links to the 205-member Central Committee.

Very little has been reported on these teams in the past, especially in English. Caixin gathered enough information from the website of Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) and government documents to begin painting a picture of the history of these teams, who staffs them and how they operate.

One point of confusion is the name itself. The public is used to reading about investigations by the CDIC and may know that the party’s anti-corruption watchdog has been carrying out investigations that have hit a broad range of industries and fields over the past 20 months — from the oil and media sectors to the government and military — since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the party in late 2012.

The bodies under the CDIC that conduct those investigations are called “jijian jiancha shi,” which literally translates to “discipline inspection and supervision offices.”

But the inspection teams under the Central Committee are different. They are called “zhongyang xunshi zu,” or “central inspection tour groups.”

This system was officially established in 2003, and it has been central to Xi’s anti-graft campaign.

Recent years have seen two rounds of inspection by these teams. The first of this year’s two rounds of inspections ended in May. The two rounds last year and two this year will cover all of the Chinese mainland’s 31 provinces, regions and municipalities.

The number of inspection teams varies from year to year, and this year there are 12. That is cause for a little more confusion because the CDIC has 12 investigation offices.

The members of the inspection teams are selected from a set of names from different government departments put forward by the Central Committee. Each team is led by an active or retired ministry-level official.

The teams report to the Inspection Work Leading Group, which is chaired by Wang Qishan, the party’s top anti-corruption official. Wang, a member of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, also leads the CDIC.

Unlike the CDIC, the inspection teams do not have the authority to conduct official party investigations themselves.

Instead, they are sent to local governments and other institutions to conduct routine inspections. The teams then report any wrongdoing they uncover to the CDIC for investigation. If top leaders are implicated, they may report the cases to Xi.

The teams use a variety of methods to look for evidence of graft. They listen to reports from local discipline bodies, participate in meetings and talk with officials. The teams also receive petitions from the public and try to gauge the public’s opinions of local leaders. They also dig into the functions of local governments, making inquiries about particular areas of concern and checking documents for evidence of violations.


1406689679873320.jpg

Common problems
These complaints were frequently cited by the teams in their reports on local governments after the first round of inspection work this year from March to May. The teams visited Beijing, Tianjin, Fujian, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Gansu, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang.

  • Extravagance and waste: Includes violations like keeping multiple homes and breaking regulations on use of official vehicles. Major problem in Tianjin, Liaoning, Shandong, Gansu, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Collusion and illegal bidding: Often involves cadres or family members bidding on state-sponsored construction projects or collusion between cadres and bidders. Major problem in Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Personnel problems: Includes exceeding a department’s allocated numbers of cadres and “promotions in spite of wrongdoing,” where cadres with discipline issues are promoted with the expectation of future benefits for the officials who approved the promotion. Major problem in Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Hainan, Ningxia and Xinjiang

  • Buying and selling official posts: An especially blatant form of corruption in itself, this practice also depends on the ability of officials who have purchased their posts to make that money back through more corruption. Major problem in Shandong and Henan

  • “Formalism”: Refers to a work style problem where cadres merely go through the motions – such as for an investigation – but do not pay attention to content. Major problem in Beijing and Tianjin

  • Problems with land requisition and demolition: Land sales are an important source of income for local governments, and an area prone to graft. Major problem in Fujian and Henan

  • Falsification of official records: Includes falsifying economic data and cadre records. Major problem in Liaoning and Shandong

  • Bribery: Taking, demanding and coercing bribes is a major kind of corruption. Major problem in Liaoning and Henan

  • “Lazy politics”: Refers to cadres evading responsibility by pushing their work off to other departments. Major problem in Tianjin

  • “Naked officials”: Cadres whose family members are living abroad or have foreign passports. Major problem in Fujian
Several senior officials have been placed under investigation by CDIC and other organs as a result of this year’s first round of inspections. This graphic shows some of the most prominent cases, along with excerpts from the reports published by CDIC for each municipality, province and region.

Yankee propaganda of the day!
 
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen Have you read the Shandong Study (linked below in the article)? Can you please summarize the findings? It sounds fascinating. The article alludes to a system that encourages self-promotion over good policy decision-making, but doesn't the CCP's human resources branch (sorry, can't remember the name) serve as an effective check on this sort of behavior?

---

Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push - China Real Time Report - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • September 5, 2014, 7:00 PM HKT
Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push
By Russell Leigh Moses

BN-EK396_Xi_G_20140905051559.jpg

China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Reuters
The recent study examining the lives and labors of Communist party cadres in Shandong province is noteworthy not only because it shows that many Chinese officials have a tough time staying clean.

It’s also a telling example of the tension within China’s political circles about the best way to wage war against corruption.

The Xi leadership’s preferred approach thus far has followed two complementary tracks.

The first track has featured well-publicized takedowns of “tigers”–high-ranking party officials and even military commanders who have felt the wrath of the anticorruption crusade and will likely face trial. Making examples out of once-powerful figures like former security czar Zhou Yongkang shows both the public and party ranks that Beijing is dead serious about stopping graft.

The second part of Xi’s strategy is shaking up the way party cadres work. By pushing officials to focus on making policies that actually matter to people, Xi is also striving to “make cadres more honest and pragmatic simply by carrying out activities that will reflect better on them.” Those who don’t change their work style are subject to rectification campaigns and risk becoming political road kill.

That’s hardline stuff. It shows officials who behave badly that they can’t hide or run away.

But there are others who aren’t so sure that the current emphasis on cracking down by punishing officials will bring good results. Those skeptics say that there may be more effective ways of fighting graft in the system. One way is to look more critically at some of the ways China’s political system operates.

That’s a major reason why the Shandong study was so prominently featured across state media in the past few days. It supports a more complex view of China’s corruption problem. Specifically, it suggests that cadres might not immediately begin behaving badly. Instead, they become susceptible to a political system built more for self-promotion than sound policy-making.

According to the Shandong findings, the way forward isn’t so much reconnecting cadres to citizens. Rather, it suggests that officials should be able to rejoin their families and build a better social life. The “new normal” that Xi and his allies like to refer to isn’t normal at all, the study suggests. In fact, it’s putting pressure on officials to work even harder—leaving the root causes of corruption in the system long after the current crusade has expired.

Others voices in China are calling for different approaches.

One group favors a simple zero-tolerance policy where gifts of any sort are concerned, blaming officials for simply not being moral enough to resist enticement.

Some others want the party to stop being so concerned about what cadres do in the darkness and to start looking at what government isn’t doing well in the daytime.



More In Anticorruption


For example, as one essay has it, Beijing should worry less about monitoring public opinion for dissent and focus more on acting on the reasons for discontent. Expressions of disgust from netizens aren’t signs of instability, this argument goes, but echoes of important work left undone. Castigating cadres for being corrupt has merit, this argument goes, but what’s really ailing the Chinese body politic isn’t graft but bad governance. Slapping down cadres and citizens might solve one challenge, but it leaves other social problems to smolder.

Another alternative approach calls for the party to move away from relying on abrupt inspections designed to catch cadres committing crimes. Instead it appeals for building better institutions and procedures, such as more regular audits and oversight. Combating corruption is fine, this argument goes, but clean government should be aiming to create better governance, not just cowed cadres.

After all, Beijing has historically been woefully reactive when it comes to enforcing its authority, believing that punishment after the fact solves problems. According to this point of view, fear is the best force for forward progress in the long run.

These dissents from the party line aren’t dangerous departures, but part of a larger debate about reforms in China. That’s the good news, because Xi’s leadership represents a general recognition in the Communist party that China needs new thinking to face new challenges.

The bad news is that the debate still has sharp boundaries, at least where activists are concerned. Restricting public input of any sort hampers Beijing’s ability to brainstorm other ways of tackling China’s corruption problem.

That even semi-official alternative analyses such as the Shandong study are appearing at all in the state media is a further sign that Xi’s rule isn’t dictatorial.

But it’s also a caution. It suggests that there are some who still believe Xi’s anticorruption crusade won’t ultimately do enough to stamp out the problem, and who want other options for political change placed on the table for discussion. That’s a debate that Xi surely doesn’t want.
 
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen Have you read the Shandong Study (linked below in the article)? Can you please summarize the findings? It sounds fascinating. The article alludes to a system that encourages self-promotion over good policy decision-making, but doesn't the CCP's human resources branch (sorry, can't remember the name) serve as an effective check on this sort of behavior?

---

Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push - China Real Time Report - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • September 5, 2014, 7:00 PM HKT
Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push
By Russell Leigh Moses

BN-EK396_Xi_G_20140905051559.jpg

China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Reuters
The recent study examining the lives and labors of Communist party cadres in Shandong province is noteworthy not only because it shows that many Chinese officials have a tough time staying clean.

It’s also a telling example of the tension within China’s political circles about the best way to wage war against corruption.

The Xi leadership’s preferred approach thus far has followed two complementary tracks.

The first track has featured well-publicized takedowns of “tigers”–high-ranking party officials and even military commanders who have felt the wrath of the anticorruption crusade and will likely face trial. Making examples out of once-powerful figures like former security czar Zhou Yongkang shows both the public and party ranks that Beijing is dead serious about stopping graft.

The second part of Xi’s strategy is shaking up the way party cadres work. By pushing officials to focus on making policies that actually matter to people, Xi is also striving to “make cadres more honest and pragmatic simply by carrying out activities that will reflect better on them.” Those who don’t change their work style are subject to rectification campaigns and risk becoming political road kill.

That’s hardline stuff. It shows officials who behave badly that they can’t hide or run away.

But there are others who aren’t so sure that the current emphasis on cracking down by punishing officials will bring good results. Those skeptics say that there may be more effective ways of fighting graft in the system. One way is to look more critically at some of the ways China’s political system operates.

That’s a major reason why the Shandong study was so prominently featured across state media in the past few days. It supports a more complex view of China’s corruption problem. Specifically, it suggests that cadres might not immediately begin behaving badly. Instead, they become susceptible to a political system built more for self-promotion than sound policy-making.

According to the Shandong findings, the way forward isn’t so much reconnecting cadres to citizens. Rather, it suggests that officials should be able to rejoin their families and build a better social life. The “new normal” that Xi and his allies like to refer to isn’t normal at all, the study suggests. In fact, it’s putting pressure on officials to work even harder—leaving the root causes of corruption in the system long after the current crusade has expired.

Others voices in China are calling for different approaches.

One group favors a simple zero-tolerance policy where gifts of any sort are concerned, blaming officials for simply not being moral enough to resist enticement.

Some others want the party to stop being so concerned about what cadres do in the darkness and to start looking at what government isn’t doing well in the daytime.



More In Anticorruption


For example, as one essay has it, Beijing should worry less about monitoring public opinion for dissent and focus more on acting on the reasons for discontent. Expressions of disgust from netizens aren’t signs of instability, this argument goes, but echoes of important work left undone. Castigating cadres for being corrupt has merit, this argument goes, but what’s really ailing the Chinese body politic isn’t graft but bad governance. Slapping down cadres and citizens might solve one challenge, but it leaves other social problems to smolder.

Another alternative approach calls for the party to move away from relying on abrupt inspections designed to catch cadres committing crimes. Instead it appeals for building better institutions and procedures, such as more regular audits and oversight. Combating corruption is fine, this argument goes, but clean government should be aiming to create better governance, not just cowed cadres.

After all, Beijing has historically been woefully reactive when it comes to enforcing its authority, believing that punishment after the fact solves problems. According to this point of view, fear is the best force for forward progress in the long run.

These dissents from the party line aren’t dangerous departures, but part of a larger debate about reforms in China. That’s the good news, because Xi’s leadership represents a general recognition in the Communist party that China needs new thinking to face new challenges.

The bad news is that the debate still has sharp boundaries, at least where activists are concerned. Restricting public input of any sort hampers Beijing’s ability to brainstorm other ways of tackling China’s corruption problem.

That even semi-official alternative analyses such as the Shandong study are appearing at all in the state media is a further sign that Xi’s rule isn’t dictatorial.

But it’s also a caution. It suggests that there are some who still believe Xi’s anticorruption crusade won’t ultimately do enough to stamp out the problem, and who want other options for political change placed on the table for discussion. That’s a debate that Xi surely doesn’t want.

Interesting, but this isn't a very well written article, but then again, it's very short, and what can you say really in a few sentences.

Let me make a few points.

Corruption happens, not because of how bad or greedy a person happens to be, not always. The system itself has flaws, would American system be better? You tell me.

Accepting bribes, is not simply due to greed, sometimes, if you don't accept, people think it's not enough, and they try again, if you still don't, they will think are you working against me? This money then goes to plot against you.

Then there is the fact, your boss if corrupt, and most likely is due to the circumstances, would want you to be corrupt as well, or at least have no way of shielding you, and thus makes you more vulnerable to corruption.

Let's not forget, schools, living conditions, children's fees, and every thing cost money, but the Chinese wage hasn't caught up, at least not as fast.




But of course this talks dissent, let me say something that needs to be said, Weibo is a breeding ground for hate against EVERYONE, including the party, everybody talks about the party, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, when I first went back home some years ago, my cousins were talking about corruption for like hours.

There is dissent, but here's the thing, we love our country, China is improving, as much as people like to say what we could have been, we could have been much worse, the propaganda is effective, especially if it's not entirely false, but most of all there is hope.

Chinese can always dream, because there is no established class, the supposed privileged class of children usually don't last more than their own generation in terms of power and influence.



As to self serving and self publicizing, which Communist party leader has less accomplishment or experience than the man sitting in the white house?
 
Interesting, but this isn't a very well written article, but then again, it's very short, and what can you say really in a few sentences.

Let me make a few points.

Corruption happens, not because of how bad or greedy a person happens to be, not always. The system itself has flaws, would American system be better? You tell me.

Accepting bribes, is not simply due to greed, sometimes, if you don't accept, people think it's not enough, and they try again, if you still don't, they will think are you working against me? This money then goes to plot against you.

Then there is the fact, your boss if corrupt, and most likely is due to the circumstances, would want you to be corrupt as well, or at least have no way of shielding you, and thus makes you more vulnerable to corruption.

Let's not forget, schools, living conditions, children's fees, and every thing cost money, but the Chinese wage hasn't caught up, at least not as fast.




But of course this talks dissent, let me say something that needs to be said, Weibo is a breeding ground for hate against EVERYONE, including the party, everybody talks about the party, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, when I first went back home some years ago, my cousins were talking about corruption for like hours.

There is dissent, but here's the thing, we love our country, China is improving, as much as people like to say what we could have been, we could have been much worse, the propaganda is effective, especially if it's not entirely false, but most of all there is hope.

Chinese can always dream, because there is no established class, the supposed privileged class of children usually don't last more than their own generation in terms of power and influence.



As to self serving and self publicizing, which Communist party leader has less accomplishment or experience than the man sitting in the white house?

It's not clear why you found the article to be not well-written, as I thought it explained the two schools of thought quite well. Please elaborate.

Regarding bribery and corruption, what you describe is a vicious circle: even if you keep your hands clean, the corrupt officials around you will plot against you. That kind of reminds me of the movie Serpico. The only solution in that case is to clean the entire organization out, because if it's rotten to the core, it should be destroyed and restarted. Corruption is like cancer: if it is not eradicated, it just re-grows. That shouldn't be an excuse to do nothing, but rather, to try harder. If Singapore can do it, so can China.

I don't deny that there is corruption in the US, but it tends to be on a much smaller scale than in China. Part of the reason for this is the structure of the bureaucracy, where internal controls and auditing are strong. Corruption may exist, but those who engage in it will eventually be caught and prosecuted. Those public sector employees who keep their noses clean can look forward to a generous pension and good health-care benefits, as well as virtual lifetime employment. That serves as an effective deterrent to corruption (little upside), so the bad apples are few and far between.

I'm not sure what this has to do with Weibo, but dissent is good, as it serves as a check on groupthink and ossification. It provides dynamism, and can be an agent for reform. That's one of the fundamental reasons why I prefer democracy, despite its problems--the opposition built into the system serves as a self-correcting mechanism. As the article stated, it's important to combat the causes of dissent (corruption, pollution, etc.) instead of dissent itself.

Finally, I completely agree with you about Obama and his incompetence and his failures. But what does that have to do with the article?
 
American system is more corrupt. Governments working for the betterment of corporations and not the common folks. China have some issues but i think it's overblown. I don't even know why the American political system allow lobbyists.
 
Anti-graft campaign to last 'at least 5 years'

China's anti-corruption chief said the central government's ongoing campaign against extravagance and corruption will continue for at least five years.

In a speech delivered at the seventh meeting of the 12th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Standing Committee, held in Beijing on Aug 25, Wang Qishan, secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said the fight against corruption is a war that "the nation cannot afford to lose".

The central government's fight against lavishness and graft began in November 2012, when President Xi Jinping took office.

The August meeting was held to discuss the implementation of Xi's eight rules to promote austerity and fight bureaucracy and extravagance. Wang said the rules will change official work styles and win over the public, Phoenix Satellite Television reported on Thursday.

He emphasized that the next phase of the campaign will strengthen officials' attitudes against corruption.

Zhu Lijia, a professor of public administration at the Chinese Academy of Governance, said Wang's speech laid out the country's anti-corruption road map.

"Within five years, officials stance on corruption will change dramatically, and after five years, a comprehensive corruption prevention system will be established," Zhu said.

At the meeting, Wang also criticized the Chinese tradition of giving mooncakes, which he said creates opportunities for corruption to occur. He noted that cellphones, jewelry and money are often hidden inside mooncake boxes or baskets.

Mid-Autumn Festival, which falls on Monday, is an occasion for families to reunite and eat mooncakes.

The CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection opened a "special tipoff section" on its website in early August inviting people to report officials who are spending lavishly or using public funds to buy gifts during the festival. Officials found in violation of the rules will be named in a weekly report on the commission's website.
 

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