sonicboom
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Time to stem the rot
With Pakistan facing an existential threat it is time to look for the rot in our own ranks. The protégés we groomed for others have returned as mentors of our youth and as killing machines striking terror in the countrys towns and cities. Indoctrinated to trap the bear in Afghanistan, they have, in fact, trapped Pakistan in a deadly bear hug.
Since the end of the Afghan war in 1989 when the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, Pakistan had been looking for strategic depth in the war-torn country. First a government of so-called Mujahideen was cobbled together in Peshawar. Although it held the reins of power in Kabul, it turned out to be more of a disaster than a unifying force for Afghanistans different ethnic groups. Divided on ethnic grounds, it was no wonder that Afghanistan once again became a turf for proxy wars. Iran, wary of the growing Wahabi influence in its neighbourhood, rallied behind the non-Pakhtuns since the Saudi lobby had more influence with the dominant Pakhtuns comprising more than 40 per cent of the Afghan population.
India had been enjoying cordial relations with Afghanistan since 1947, but lost touch with Kabul when the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan) government was toppled to be replaced by a motley set of warlords. The daily barrage of rockets by the Hekmatyar group reduced Kabul to rubble and caused ethnic divisions to be entrenched in Afghanistan which hitherto had been immune to such fissures. This strife caused more damage than the intrusion of the Soviets. Every neighbouring country bet on a separate faction to get a foothold in Afghanistan in order to compensate themselves for their sacrifices since 1979. Pakistan was a major contender because it had hosted and still hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees. Pakistan was not only the staging post for the Afghan jihad; it was also the biggest centre of guerilla training.
And then came the Taliban, the root of all our militancy-related troubles today. Emerging in Kandahar they started their march on Kabul in the mid-1990s. One after the other province fell to the rag-tag forces of Mullah Omar bringing Iran and Pakistan face to face in Afghanistan: Pakistan supporting the Taliban, ethnic Pakhtuns with a hardline Sunni creed and Iran the Northern Alliance. But Irans involvement in Afghanistan was logistic, while Pakistan invested more in ideological and military aims than diplomatic or political.
This is the reason that today there is almost no fallout of the Afghan war in Iran whereas Pakistan continues to pay a heavy price for its strategic follies in the shape of Talibanisation. To deny a space to India in Afghanistan a genuine worry Pakistan aimed for a government in Kabul whose strings it could pull easily. Its forced U-turn since 9/11 and at least official abandonment of the obscurantist forces it helped nurture has not resolved the problem. After all, it is not easy to completely disown a force in which the country had invested heavily.
The general view today is this: while Pakistan now has to deal with its own version of the Taliban who declared a war on their own country to settle scores for their betrayal, Iran is facing no such problem. India, which had been all these years sitting on the fence, too, appears non-partisan. The Northern Alliance in its animosity with Pakistan came close to India which was looking for this opportunity. India reportedly opened a string of consulates in areas close to the Durand Line, thus encircling Pakistan effectively.
The chickens have come home to roost. Right now Pakistan is facing a double jeopardy. It must tackle Indias growing influence in Afghanistan on the one hand which it can do only through the Taliban and counter spreading Talibanisation in its own territory, on the other. That is the reason why Pakistan is believed to have a soft corner for the Afghan Taliban and almost zero tolerance for the Taliban within. This has landed Pakistan in a catch-22 situation it cannot eliminate the Taliban within without snapping their links with the Taliban across the border; while snapping ties with the Afghan Taliban will deprive Pakistan of a vital card for future use.
Growing Talibanisation inside the country is the blowback of using jihadi indoctrination for strategic goals. With strategic depth no longer anywhere in sight, Pakistans own social fabric is in tatters with extremists posing an existential threat to the country. Little did our policymakers know that their policies formulated so many years ago for a strategic objective could boomerang with such force.
Pakistan should reassess its Afghan policy and befriend the Afghan nation by joining hands with the Karzai government in fighting the scourge of extremism. Now that the Karzai government has offered talks, and even power-sharing, to those among Taliban ranks who renounce violence, Pakistan can extend a helping hand by facilitating this exercise. In fact, why should Pakistan not facilitate an intra-Afghan dialogue which will work in two ways: Pakistan will be seen in Afghanistan as a peace broker and at home it can easily drive a wedge between local and Afghan Taliban.
The time for jihad is over in the unipolar world because jihadists have an unending agenda that does not confine itself to a single nation state. With one country under its sway it tries to spill over its boundaries in all directions, with the same country their first target. This is what has happened to us in Pakistan.
Its All About Pakistan
With Pakistan facing an existential threat it is time to look for the rot in our own ranks. The protégés we groomed for others have returned as mentors of our youth and as killing machines striking terror in the countrys towns and cities. Indoctrinated to trap the bear in Afghanistan, they have, in fact, trapped Pakistan in a deadly bear hug.
Since the end of the Afghan war in 1989 when the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, Pakistan had been looking for strategic depth in the war-torn country. First a government of so-called Mujahideen was cobbled together in Peshawar. Although it held the reins of power in Kabul, it turned out to be more of a disaster than a unifying force for Afghanistans different ethnic groups. Divided on ethnic grounds, it was no wonder that Afghanistan once again became a turf for proxy wars. Iran, wary of the growing Wahabi influence in its neighbourhood, rallied behind the non-Pakhtuns since the Saudi lobby had more influence with the dominant Pakhtuns comprising more than 40 per cent of the Afghan population.
India had been enjoying cordial relations with Afghanistan since 1947, but lost touch with Kabul when the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan) government was toppled to be replaced by a motley set of warlords. The daily barrage of rockets by the Hekmatyar group reduced Kabul to rubble and caused ethnic divisions to be entrenched in Afghanistan which hitherto had been immune to such fissures. This strife caused more damage than the intrusion of the Soviets. Every neighbouring country bet on a separate faction to get a foothold in Afghanistan in order to compensate themselves for their sacrifices since 1979. Pakistan was a major contender because it had hosted and still hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees. Pakistan was not only the staging post for the Afghan jihad; it was also the biggest centre of guerilla training.
And then came the Taliban, the root of all our militancy-related troubles today. Emerging in Kandahar they started their march on Kabul in the mid-1990s. One after the other province fell to the rag-tag forces of Mullah Omar bringing Iran and Pakistan face to face in Afghanistan: Pakistan supporting the Taliban, ethnic Pakhtuns with a hardline Sunni creed and Iran the Northern Alliance. But Irans involvement in Afghanistan was logistic, while Pakistan invested more in ideological and military aims than diplomatic or political.
This is the reason that today there is almost no fallout of the Afghan war in Iran whereas Pakistan continues to pay a heavy price for its strategic follies in the shape of Talibanisation. To deny a space to India in Afghanistan a genuine worry Pakistan aimed for a government in Kabul whose strings it could pull easily. Its forced U-turn since 9/11 and at least official abandonment of the obscurantist forces it helped nurture has not resolved the problem. After all, it is not easy to completely disown a force in which the country had invested heavily.
The general view today is this: while Pakistan now has to deal with its own version of the Taliban who declared a war on their own country to settle scores for their betrayal, Iran is facing no such problem. India, which had been all these years sitting on the fence, too, appears non-partisan. The Northern Alliance in its animosity with Pakistan came close to India which was looking for this opportunity. India reportedly opened a string of consulates in areas close to the Durand Line, thus encircling Pakistan effectively.
The chickens have come home to roost. Right now Pakistan is facing a double jeopardy. It must tackle Indias growing influence in Afghanistan on the one hand which it can do only through the Taliban and counter spreading Talibanisation in its own territory, on the other. That is the reason why Pakistan is believed to have a soft corner for the Afghan Taliban and almost zero tolerance for the Taliban within. This has landed Pakistan in a catch-22 situation it cannot eliminate the Taliban within without snapping their links with the Taliban across the border; while snapping ties with the Afghan Taliban will deprive Pakistan of a vital card for future use.
Growing Talibanisation inside the country is the blowback of using jihadi indoctrination for strategic goals. With strategic depth no longer anywhere in sight, Pakistans own social fabric is in tatters with extremists posing an existential threat to the country. Little did our policymakers know that their policies formulated so many years ago for a strategic objective could boomerang with such force.
Pakistan should reassess its Afghan policy and befriend the Afghan nation by joining hands with the Karzai government in fighting the scourge of extremism. Now that the Karzai government has offered talks, and even power-sharing, to those among Taliban ranks who renounce violence, Pakistan can extend a helping hand by facilitating this exercise. In fact, why should Pakistan not facilitate an intra-Afghan dialogue which will work in two ways: Pakistan will be seen in Afghanistan as a peace broker and at home it can easily drive a wedge between local and Afghan Taliban.
The time for jihad is over in the unipolar world because jihadists have an unending agenda that does not confine itself to a single nation state. With one country under its sway it tries to spill over its boundaries in all directions, with the same country their first target. This is what has happened to us in Pakistan.
Its All About Pakistan
