Asia’s geopolitical shift is now entering its third decade. The steady emergence of China as a major political and security player in the Indo-Pacific region has been accompanied by a reordering of economic relations in which China is central. The combination of security challenge and economic interdependence continues to pose a foreign policy conundrum for Asian states, which fear Beijing’s growing power and yet must maintain smooth trading relations.
Over the past several years, the epicenter of this geopolitical shift has been in the South China Sea, and particularly the Spratly Islands. The disputes there over atolls, shoals and islands have flared up among China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. Much to its discomfort, the U.S. has also become involved in response to calls from its Philippine ally as well as by more abstract concepts of regional order and freedom of navigation.
While many of the claimants to the Spratlys have built up and fortified their possessions, none has been as active in doing so as China. The region has been increasingly on edge since it was first revealed earlier this year that Beijing was engaging in a massive island-building project, adding at least 1,100 hectares of land dredged from the sea bottom to construct islands on what were formerly specks of land that emerged only at low tide. The fortification of China’s islands, including the building of at least three 3,000-meter runways and placement of radars and reports of anti-aircraft weaponry, has the potential to change the regional power balance. Its activities have been highlighted by Beijing’s recent claims that the entire South China Sea is Chinese territory.
After months of hesitation, Washington moved gingerly to challenge China’s claims — sending naval vessels into the area in October. Yet questions over whether the U.S. Navy sailed within 12 nautical miles of one of China’s artificial islands in a deliberate “freedom of navigation operation,” or simply under “innocent passage,” thereby not challenging China’s territorial claims, have left many in the region uncertain about the strength of the U.S. commitment to maintaining stability.
Perhaps due to perceived U.S. reluctance to risk increasing tensions with China, other regional states are beginning to speak up more forcefully and even act. Although not a party to the territorial dispute, Indonesia recently publicly announced its opposition to China’s claim over the South China Sea, which is based on Beijing’s infamous “nine -dash line” that demarcates the claimed waters. India also has weighed in on the disputes, urging a peaceful resolution, even while increasing its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations under Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s “Act East”policy.
But the Asian country with perhaps the greatest potential for playing a role in the South China Sea has just begun to make its interest known.
New assertiveness
Japan remains Asia’s most important maritime nation, entirely dependent on freedom of the seas. It also faces a continuing Chinese challenge to its administrative control over the East China Sea’s Senkaku Islands. Yet so far, Tokyo has been wary of being drawn into the Spratly dispute.
That reluctance slowly seems to be changing. Encouraged perhaps by U.S. comments earlier this year that appeared to welcome a greater Japanese presence in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated that he might consider dispatching Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the region. This follows Abe’s unusually strong expression of concern at the recent annual ASEAN summit over China’s maritime activities in the region. The fact that Abe made his comment about dispatching Japanese naval vessels to U.S. President Barack Obama indicates the level of importance Tokyo attaches to the issue.
There is a long way to go before JMSDF ships undertake joint patrols in the South China Sea with their U.S. allies or other Asian partners. Indeed, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga was quick to play down Abe’s comments, indicating that there would be no immediate change in Japanese policy.
Yet, in recent conversations in Tokyo, officials signaled that Japan is moving steadily toward expanding its presence in Southeast Asia, in part by deepening its security relationships in the region. The Japanese government recently announced it would provide old patrol aircraft to the Philippines, following the sale of patrol ships to both Manila and Hanoi. After an eight-year absence, as well, Tokyo will rejoin the Malabar naval exercises between India and the U.S., adding to its regular presence at other exercises like the U.S.-run RIMPAC.
More significant is Abe’s statement to Obama at the APEC summit in November ago that Japan would consider sending JMSDF vessels to the South China Sea. As with other controversial issues, Abe is not rushing to make major changes. Rather, he is slowly preparing the ground, first through public statements, followed by plans to explore more concrete policy changes. Placing Japan’s possible action within the context of a communal regional response, including the U.S., is another way of blunting the almost certain public opposition to such a move.
Abe knows that any dispatch of Japanese forces to the South China Sea, even for exercises or maritime cooperation activities, may result in a political and public backlash. Yet he has also spent much time talking about Japan’s role in upholding Asia’s rules-based order. Even to broach the possibility of sending Japan’s navy to the contested Spratlys, however, is to put China on notice that Asia’s leading democratic power is not content to watch Beijing change the status quo. Along with voices from Jakarta, Hanoi, Manila and Washington, Tokyo is helping shape a new community of interests through joint diplomatic initiatives and concrete steps such as arms sales. While not directly challenging China’s activities, Tokyo hopes that its responses will send a signal of resolve to Beijing and help maintain stability even in the face of the creeping militarization of the South China Sea.
The time is right for Japan to expand its security role - AEI
Over the past several years, the epicenter of this geopolitical shift has been in the South China Sea, and particularly the Spratly Islands. The disputes there over atolls, shoals and islands have flared up among China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. Much to its discomfort, the U.S. has also become involved in response to calls from its Philippine ally as well as by more abstract concepts of regional order and freedom of navigation.
While many of the claimants to the Spratlys have built up and fortified their possessions, none has been as active in doing so as China. The region has been increasingly on edge since it was first revealed earlier this year that Beijing was engaging in a massive island-building project, adding at least 1,100 hectares of land dredged from the sea bottom to construct islands on what were formerly specks of land that emerged only at low tide. The fortification of China’s islands, including the building of at least three 3,000-meter runways and placement of radars and reports of anti-aircraft weaponry, has the potential to change the regional power balance. Its activities have been highlighted by Beijing’s recent claims that the entire South China Sea is Chinese territory.
After months of hesitation, Washington moved gingerly to challenge China’s claims — sending naval vessels into the area in October. Yet questions over whether the U.S. Navy sailed within 12 nautical miles of one of China’s artificial islands in a deliberate “freedom of navigation operation,” or simply under “innocent passage,” thereby not challenging China’s territorial claims, have left many in the region uncertain about the strength of the U.S. commitment to maintaining stability.
Perhaps due to perceived U.S. reluctance to risk increasing tensions with China, other regional states are beginning to speak up more forcefully and even act. Although not a party to the territorial dispute, Indonesia recently publicly announced its opposition to China’s claim over the South China Sea, which is based on Beijing’s infamous “nine -dash line” that demarcates the claimed waters. India also has weighed in on the disputes, urging a peaceful resolution, even while increasing its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations under Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s “Act East”policy.
But the Asian country with perhaps the greatest potential for playing a role in the South China Sea has just begun to make its interest known.
New assertiveness
Japan remains Asia’s most important maritime nation, entirely dependent on freedom of the seas. It also faces a continuing Chinese challenge to its administrative control over the East China Sea’s Senkaku Islands. Yet so far, Tokyo has been wary of being drawn into the Spratly dispute.
That reluctance slowly seems to be changing. Encouraged perhaps by U.S. comments earlier this year that appeared to welcome a greater Japanese presence in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated that he might consider dispatching Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the region. This follows Abe’s unusually strong expression of concern at the recent annual ASEAN summit over China’s maritime activities in the region. The fact that Abe made his comment about dispatching Japanese naval vessels to U.S. President Barack Obama indicates the level of importance Tokyo attaches to the issue.
There is a long way to go before JMSDF ships undertake joint patrols in the South China Sea with their U.S. allies or other Asian partners. Indeed, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga was quick to play down Abe’s comments, indicating that there would be no immediate change in Japanese policy.
Yet, in recent conversations in Tokyo, officials signaled that Japan is moving steadily toward expanding its presence in Southeast Asia, in part by deepening its security relationships in the region. The Japanese government recently announced it would provide old patrol aircraft to the Philippines, following the sale of patrol ships to both Manila and Hanoi. After an eight-year absence, as well, Tokyo will rejoin the Malabar naval exercises between India and the U.S., adding to its regular presence at other exercises like the U.S.-run RIMPAC.
More significant is Abe’s statement to Obama at the APEC summit in November ago that Japan would consider sending JMSDF vessels to the South China Sea. As with other controversial issues, Abe is not rushing to make major changes. Rather, he is slowly preparing the ground, first through public statements, followed by plans to explore more concrete policy changes. Placing Japan’s possible action within the context of a communal regional response, including the U.S., is another way of blunting the almost certain public opposition to such a move.
Abe knows that any dispatch of Japanese forces to the South China Sea, even for exercises or maritime cooperation activities, may result in a political and public backlash. Yet he has also spent much time talking about Japan’s role in upholding Asia’s rules-based order. Even to broach the possibility of sending Japan’s navy to the contested Spratlys, however, is to put China on notice that Asia’s leading democratic power is not content to watch Beijing change the status quo. Along with voices from Jakarta, Hanoi, Manila and Washington, Tokyo is helping shape a new community of interests through joint diplomatic initiatives and concrete steps such as arms sales. While not directly challenging China’s activities, Tokyo hopes that its responses will send a signal of resolve to Beijing and help maintain stability even in the face of the creeping militarization of the South China Sea.
The time is right for Japan to expand its security role - AEI
