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The nuclear pecking order
Shahzad Chaudhry
Perhaps, the sense of suggesting a nuclear pecking order and its placement along an ascending incline is best reflected in a recent study, Americas Strategic Posture, by William Perry and James Schlesinger, who propose that disarmament, looked at today, seems like a mountain peak from the bottom, which is just not visible.
Instead, they propose a base-camp approach, where America is seen to lead the world up the incline of disarmament, through a series of base-camp stops, which ultimately nears them to their objective. The base-camps are, of course, measures of incremental reduction towards elimination of nuclear weapons.
Using the same analogy, of a peak and camps, but modifying it to reflect the surety of what exists and has an influence, as against enabling a mix of lead and hedge the US nuclear strategy of recent times which is both contradictory in intent and shorn of credibility from a disarmament perspective it is possible to place the current nuclear powers of the world in a hierarchical classification.
On the top of the peak sit the United States, China and Russia the Exclusive Three (E-3). This in itself may be provocative to some since it divorces itself from the usual P-5, but is easily reflective of the influence that the three are likely to continue to exercise on the global political order. It also points to a need to shed the anachronistic epitaph of P-5. With strong elements of national power that each possesses, robust political systems suitable to their own socio-political environment and evolved over years to pursue respective national objectives, very strong economic bases and great potential to dominate the world scene, the E-3 stand alone in terms of the pecking order.
There can be identified minor variations and glitches impacting their inter-state relations, but through the détente that has evolved because of the great interplay of politico-economic forces in the last two decades, they have not only retained a sense of strategic stability within themselves, but have also helped sustain a stable global order. Forays into Iraq, Afghanistan and Georgia have essentially been well contained without destabilising the regions around, and Hong Kong and Macau have been absorbed into China without geo-political upheavals.
Their combined military and nuclear arsenals provide them essential deterrence, forcing them to respect each other, avoiding blatant challenge; one does not see the three going into an armed confrontation in the foreseeable future. The accrued détente has been a major contribution to sustaining the existing order, and is likely to continue to offer that necessary stability overhang under which nations of the globe can continue to seek avenues of improvement in areas of development and progress. We must not mistake such an umbrella ensuring elimination of conflict which will continue to subsist in various forms just that global stability through the beneficial détente of the E-3 will mitigate huge global disorder.
The remaining two of the original P-5 are proposed to be called the Superfluous Two (S-2) Britain and France. No, not for any lack of importance in their very worthwhile role in the global political economy, but simply through redefinition of their respective roles in a more Europeanised environment ably subsisted through the pervasive presence of NATO as an integrated and cooperative security cover. Their respective positions at the end of WWII as allied victors granted them the right to a prime place among the P-5 and hence the accrued access to the most powerful weapon of effect in the immediate aftermath, although both had to be augmented from outside to recover from precarious individual positions in the war.
Frances nationalistic posture and an impressive individualistic stance over the years has evolved into a more committed European outlook, while Britain, despite some crucial political role-playing in global matters, has pragmatically understood the limitations of a waning military capacity; both therefore stand aside respectfully to the dominating presence of the E-3.
More to the point, both have gradually reduced their nuclear weapons holding. Frances reliance is now more on naval platforms, while Britain, as a unilateral measure, eliminated tactical nuclear weapons with the end of the Cold War. The United States nuclear deployments in Europe provide its European allies the safety of a nuclear umbrella. The absence of any direct militarised threat to Europe and its consequential pacification as a society has diminished the need and the role of nuclear weapons in their security calculus. The two hold onto some strategic nuclear prowess only as a matter of prestige, and less as a need.
In the lead and hedge strategy of the United States, it would be crucial to not only retain the START format with Russia, and reduce their stock holdings in an equitable fashion, but also to integrate China into a similar arrangement. A good measure to determine the requisite numbers for sustainable credibility of deterrence should be the number of warheads presently held by China.
An E-3 initiative in this direction will leave a greater sense of credibility with the rest to follow suit. An even more poignant indicator of the western resolve towards disarmament and non-proliferation would be for both Britain and France to give up their nuclear arsenals completely since there is no plausible politico-military logic for each to hedge with their existing holdings.
This is the first article in a two-part series. The concluding piece will appear next Monday, September 14. The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former envoy. Contact shahzad.a.chaudhry***********
Shahzad Chaudhry
Perhaps, the sense of suggesting a nuclear pecking order and its placement along an ascending incline is best reflected in a recent study, Americas Strategic Posture, by William Perry and James Schlesinger, who propose that disarmament, looked at today, seems like a mountain peak from the bottom, which is just not visible.
Instead, they propose a base-camp approach, where America is seen to lead the world up the incline of disarmament, through a series of base-camp stops, which ultimately nears them to their objective. The base-camps are, of course, measures of incremental reduction towards elimination of nuclear weapons.
Using the same analogy, of a peak and camps, but modifying it to reflect the surety of what exists and has an influence, as against enabling a mix of lead and hedge the US nuclear strategy of recent times which is both contradictory in intent and shorn of credibility from a disarmament perspective it is possible to place the current nuclear powers of the world in a hierarchical classification.
On the top of the peak sit the United States, China and Russia the Exclusive Three (E-3). This in itself may be provocative to some since it divorces itself from the usual P-5, but is easily reflective of the influence that the three are likely to continue to exercise on the global political order. It also points to a need to shed the anachronistic epitaph of P-5. With strong elements of national power that each possesses, robust political systems suitable to their own socio-political environment and evolved over years to pursue respective national objectives, very strong economic bases and great potential to dominate the world scene, the E-3 stand alone in terms of the pecking order.
There can be identified minor variations and glitches impacting their inter-state relations, but through the détente that has evolved because of the great interplay of politico-economic forces in the last two decades, they have not only retained a sense of strategic stability within themselves, but have also helped sustain a stable global order. Forays into Iraq, Afghanistan and Georgia have essentially been well contained without destabilising the regions around, and Hong Kong and Macau have been absorbed into China without geo-political upheavals.
Their combined military and nuclear arsenals provide them essential deterrence, forcing them to respect each other, avoiding blatant challenge; one does not see the three going into an armed confrontation in the foreseeable future. The accrued détente has been a major contribution to sustaining the existing order, and is likely to continue to offer that necessary stability overhang under which nations of the globe can continue to seek avenues of improvement in areas of development and progress. We must not mistake such an umbrella ensuring elimination of conflict which will continue to subsist in various forms just that global stability through the beneficial détente of the E-3 will mitigate huge global disorder.
The remaining two of the original P-5 are proposed to be called the Superfluous Two (S-2) Britain and France. No, not for any lack of importance in their very worthwhile role in the global political economy, but simply through redefinition of their respective roles in a more Europeanised environment ably subsisted through the pervasive presence of NATO as an integrated and cooperative security cover. Their respective positions at the end of WWII as allied victors granted them the right to a prime place among the P-5 and hence the accrued access to the most powerful weapon of effect in the immediate aftermath, although both had to be augmented from outside to recover from precarious individual positions in the war.
Frances nationalistic posture and an impressive individualistic stance over the years has evolved into a more committed European outlook, while Britain, despite some crucial political role-playing in global matters, has pragmatically understood the limitations of a waning military capacity; both therefore stand aside respectfully to the dominating presence of the E-3.
More to the point, both have gradually reduced their nuclear weapons holding. Frances reliance is now more on naval platforms, while Britain, as a unilateral measure, eliminated tactical nuclear weapons with the end of the Cold War. The United States nuclear deployments in Europe provide its European allies the safety of a nuclear umbrella. The absence of any direct militarised threat to Europe and its consequential pacification as a society has diminished the need and the role of nuclear weapons in their security calculus. The two hold onto some strategic nuclear prowess only as a matter of prestige, and less as a need.
In the lead and hedge strategy of the United States, it would be crucial to not only retain the START format with Russia, and reduce their stock holdings in an equitable fashion, but also to integrate China into a similar arrangement. A good measure to determine the requisite numbers for sustainable credibility of deterrence should be the number of warheads presently held by China.
An E-3 initiative in this direction will leave a greater sense of credibility with the rest to follow suit. An even more poignant indicator of the western resolve towards disarmament and non-proliferation would be for both Britain and France to give up their nuclear arsenals completely since there is no plausible politico-military logic for each to hedge with their existing holdings.
This is the first article in a two-part series. The concluding piece will appear next Monday, September 14. The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former envoy. Contact shahzad.a.chaudhry***********