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The Karzai Conundrum
By Wasif Khan
Wednesday, 14 Apr, 2010
Hamid Karzais behavior during the past week has been erratic and alarming to say the least, particularly for the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. According to media reports, the Afghan President made a number of disturbing statements, which set off alarm bells in Washington and allied capitals. Karzais dramatic outbursts came after President Obamas recent visit to Afghanistan, during which Obama reportedly pressed him to get his act together.
First, Karzai conceded that last years Afghan elections were plagued by fraud, but in a bizarre twist he publicly accused western governments and the United Nations for perpetrating the fraud (a charge that his own administration has been accused of). Next, he reportedly threatened to join the Taliban if the west continued to pressure him on issues such as corruption, transparent elections, and accountability. Sparring with Afghan parliamentarians over control of the election commission, Karzai reportedly said, If you and the international community pressure me more, I swear that I am going to join the Taliban. According to the New York Times, Karzai has also warned that the US-led coalition in Afghanistan was increasingly being seen as a foreign occupation force. Finally, to add insult to injury, he invited Irans Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a staunch opponent of the West, to Kabul for an official visit.
Supporters of the Afghan President claim that the Obama administration and US media have launched a smear campaign against Karzai, as part of their exit strategy from Afghanistan. Essentially, they argue that the Americans are planning to use Karzai as a fall guy to justify their withdrawal from the war-torn country.
Indeed, the Western media has been awash with negative reports about the Afghan leader, but it can be argued that his questionable actions and dismal record have invited the unwanted attention. Karzai has been described as incompetent and paranoid in recent reports, and Peter Galbraith, a former high-ranking UN official in Afghanistan even suggested that he might be using drugs. To further complicate matters, the New York Times published a front page story alleging that Karzais brother, Ahmed Wali (who is also governor of Kandahar), has been on the CIAs payroll, in addition to being a major drug baron. Needless to say, the mutual exchange of accusations and the subsequent media hype have strained relations between Karzai and his western benefactors.
The tactical strategy adopted by the US in Afghanistan requires a credible and competent local partner to succeed. However, the scenario in Afghanistan clearly illustrates that Hamid Karzai is not the man for this job. The Afghan leader has proved to be volatile, corrupt, and unreliable. In doing so, he has also alienated the western coalition, on which his political survival depends.
From the American perspective, the problem is much more complex than simply replacing Karzai. Under the current system in Afghanistan, the president holds the power to appoint almost every senior government official. As a result, key positions at the federal and provincial levels are held by Karzai-loyalists who suffer from a lack of credibility and local support. This puts Karzai at the helm of a tightly centralized government structure that is detached from the diverse Afghan population. Thus, due to the absence of credible leaders at the provincial and district levels, the west has little choice but to rely on Karzai.
It can be argued that Karzais irrational behavior is a result of the fast-approaching U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011. Clearly, the Afghan Army and National Police are not ready to independently maintain order in the restive country, nor will they be any time soon. Therefore, the departure of western forces may very well signal the end of Karzais struggling regime. This would also explain the Afghan leaders desperate attempts to forge close ties with neighboring powers such as China, Iran, and India. However, it would be naïve to believe that any of these nations could effectively ensure the survival of his government once American forces disengage.
There have also been numerous reports that Karzai has been trying to reach a deal with the Taliban while Nato forces are still present in Afghanistan. The Americans however are clearly determined to hammer the Taliban (and Al Qaeda elements) as much as possible, before they consider negotiations. Unfortunately, these divergent policies have proved to be thoroughly incompatible and have resulted in a growing divide between Karzai and the Obama administration.
While both sides have softened their stance and made attempts at reconciliation following the week-long spat, it is clear that the long term prospects for the US-Karzai alliance are bleak. For the moment though, necessity and pragmatism have compelled the Americans to mend fences with Hamid Karzai. The absence of (viable) alternative leadership and an expanding military offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar have left the west with limited options for the time being.
The rocky American-Karzai relationship has serious implications for neighboring Pakistan as well. On one hand, the Karzai regime has hardly masked its mistrust and hostility toward Pakistan. The Afghan President has publicly accused Pakistan of meddling in domestic affairs and even supporting the Taliban on numerous occasions during his stint in power. Karzai has also actively encouraged Indian support and involvement in Afghanistan, which has been of great concern for the Pakistani establishment. Yet, if Karzais government were to crumble following a US withdrawal, the consequences for Pakistan could be disastrous. A Taliban resurgence in Kabul would undoubtedly bolster the insurgency in Pakistan, where the military and security forces are already spread thin battling homegrown militants, and the population is reeling from frequent suicide attacks. Like all other stakeholders, for Pakistan, there are no easy solutions in Afghanistan. Perhaps one reason for optimism is that in contrast to the 1980s, the US has indicated a firm and balanced resolve to support and engage Pakistan in the long run, at least under the Obama administration.
wasif.kh@gmail.com
DAWN.COM | World | The Karzai Conundrum
By Wasif Khan
Wednesday, 14 Apr, 2010
Hamid Karzais behavior during the past week has been erratic and alarming to say the least, particularly for the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. According to media reports, the Afghan President made a number of disturbing statements, which set off alarm bells in Washington and allied capitals. Karzais dramatic outbursts came after President Obamas recent visit to Afghanistan, during which Obama reportedly pressed him to get his act together.
First, Karzai conceded that last years Afghan elections were plagued by fraud, but in a bizarre twist he publicly accused western governments and the United Nations for perpetrating the fraud (a charge that his own administration has been accused of). Next, he reportedly threatened to join the Taliban if the west continued to pressure him on issues such as corruption, transparent elections, and accountability. Sparring with Afghan parliamentarians over control of the election commission, Karzai reportedly said, If you and the international community pressure me more, I swear that I am going to join the Taliban. According to the New York Times, Karzai has also warned that the US-led coalition in Afghanistan was increasingly being seen as a foreign occupation force. Finally, to add insult to injury, he invited Irans Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a staunch opponent of the West, to Kabul for an official visit.
Supporters of the Afghan President claim that the Obama administration and US media have launched a smear campaign against Karzai, as part of their exit strategy from Afghanistan. Essentially, they argue that the Americans are planning to use Karzai as a fall guy to justify their withdrawal from the war-torn country.
Indeed, the Western media has been awash with negative reports about the Afghan leader, but it can be argued that his questionable actions and dismal record have invited the unwanted attention. Karzai has been described as incompetent and paranoid in recent reports, and Peter Galbraith, a former high-ranking UN official in Afghanistan even suggested that he might be using drugs. To further complicate matters, the New York Times published a front page story alleging that Karzais brother, Ahmed Wali (who is also governor of Kandahar), has been on the CIAs payroll, in addition to being a major drug baron. Needless to say, the mutual exchange of accusations and the subsequent media hype have strained relations between Karzai and his western benefactors.
The tactical strategy adopted by the US in Afghanistan requires a credible and competent local partner to succeed. However, the scenario in Afghanistan clearly illustrates that Hamid Karzai is not the man for this job. The Afghan leader has proved to be volatile, corrupt, and unreliable. In doing so, he has also alienated the western coalition, on which his political survival depends.
From the American perspective, the problem is much more complex than simply replacing Karzai. Under the current system in Afghanistan, the president holds the power to appoint almost every senior government official. As a result, key positions at the federal and provincial levels are held by Karzai-loyalists who suffer from a lack of credibility and local support. This puts Karzai at the helm of a tightly centralized government structure that is detached from the diverse Afghan population. Thus, due to the absence of credible leaders at the provincial and district levels, the west has little choice but to rely on Karzai.
It can be argued that Karzais irrational behavior is a result of the fast-approaching U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011. Clearly, the Afghan Army and National Police are not ready to independently maintain order in the restive country, nor will they be any time soon. Therefore, the departure of western forces may very well signal the end of Karzais struggling regime. This would also explain the Afghan leaders desperate attempts to forge close ties with neighboring powers such as China, Iran, and India. However, it would be naïve to believe that any of these nations could effectively ensure the survival of his government once American forces disengage.
There have also been numerous reports that Karzai has been trying to reach a deal with the Taliban while Nato forces are still present in Afghanistan. The Americans however are clearly determined to hammer the Taliban (and Al Qaeda elements) as much as possible, before they consider negotiations. Unfortunately, these divergent policies have proved to be thoroughly incompatible and have resulted in a growing divide between Karzai and the Obama administration.
While both sides have softened their stance and made attempts at reconciliation following the week-long spat, it is clear that the long term prospects for the US-Karzai alliance are bleak. For the moment though, necessity and pragmatism have compelled the Americans to mend fences with Hamid Karzai. The absence of (viable) alternative leadership and an expanding military offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar have left the west with limited options for the time being.
The rocky American-Karzai relationship has serious implications for neighboring Pakistan as well. On one hand, the Karzai regime has hardly masked its mistrust and hostility toward Pakistan. The Afghan President has publicly accused Pakistan of meddling in domestic affairs and even supporting the Taliban on numerous occasions during his stint in power. Karzai has also actively encouraged Indian support and involvement in Afghanistan, which has been of great concern for the Pakistani establishment. Yet, if Karzais government were to crumble following a US withdrawal, the consequences for Pakistan could be disastrous. A Taliban resurgence in Kabul would undoubtedly bolster the insurgency in Pakistan, where the military and security forces are already spread thin battling homegrown militants, and the population is reeling from frequent suicide attacks. Like all other stakeholders, for Pakistan, there are no easy solutions in Afghanistan. Perhaps one reason for optimism is that in contrast to the 1980s, the US has indicated a firm and balanced resolve to support and engage Pakistan in the long run, at least under the Obama administration.
wasif.kh@gmail.com
DAWN.COM | World | The Karzai Conundrum
